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Abstract 
 
The dissertation aims to explore the supply and demand side determinant of child labour at 
macro, meso and micro level. At macro level it explores the effect of globalization (defined 
as openness to trade and inflow of foreign direct investment) and credit market 
imperfections on child labour. At meso level it explores the effect of labour market 
conditions on child labour. As the above two levels of analysis are mainly concerned with 
the demand for child labour, the micro level analysis explores the supply side determinant 
of child labour. At micro level this dissertation explores the effect of intrahousehold 
distribution of power on child related outcome. Specifically it explores the effect of 
PRWKHU¶V GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ SRZHU RQ KHU FKLOG¶V ODERXU DQG VFKRROLQJ 7KH PDFUR OHYHO
analysis is based on cross country regression framework while meso and micro level 
analysis is based on the data from Pakistan. 
 
At macro level, this dissertation points out that trade openness and FDI inflow raise the 
standard of living in an economy thereby reducing child labour incidence. As the channel 
through which trade could affect child labour is by increasing income of the poor, credit 
market imperfection shows insignificant effect. At meso level, this dissertation points out 
that high adult wages in an area increase demand for child labour while presence of adult 
unemployed proportion in an area reduces demand for child labour. However, presence of 
unemployed adult in a house increases supply of child labour. Exports, on one hand, reduce 
supply of child labour by affecting the income of poor at macro level while on the other 
hand at meso level, subcontracting of production process to small informal sector increases 
demand for child labour. The informal sector being unprotected by law employs a high 
SURSRUWLRQ RI FKLOG ODERXU $W PLFUR OHYHO PRWKHU¶V GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ SRZHU VLJQLILcantly 
decreases child labour supply and increases child schooling. The effect is significant in 
case of girls but not in case of boys. This study also shows that whether children work for 
generating income or as family helpers, mothers are equally concerned for their welfare. 
Their decision making power significantly reduces labour among children.   
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"Safety and security don't just happen; they are the result of collective consensus and 
public investment. We owe our children, the most vulnerable citizens in our society, a life 
free of violence and fear." (Nelson Mandela, former president of South Africa) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This dissertation aims to explore the supply and demand side determinants of child labour 
at macro, meso and micro level. This study acknowledges that the issue of child labour is 
not new. It has always remained in debate both in developed countries and in developing 
countries, as every country has passed through a stage of development where child labour 
has persisted. However, the last decade has seen an enormous growth in the literature on 
economics of child labour. This growth in the literature is attributed to globalization and 
international economy. Interest of the economists on the effect of globalization is often 
attributed to the US Child Deterrence Act of 1997, which seeks to ban the import of those 
goods that use child labour as input. The aim of trade sanction is to force the countries to 
LPSOHPHQWµLQWHUQDWLRQDOODERXUVWDQGDUGV¶DQGµVRFLDOFODXVHV¶ZKLFKDUHSUHUHTXLVLWHs for 
trade. But the implementation of the ban has opened a new debate among the economists. 
There exist arguments against and in favour of the trade ban. Those in favour of trade ban 
argue that developing countries have a trade advantage in labour-intensive goods as they 
rely on child labour although child labour is illegal. Opponents of the trade ban on the other 
hand argue that trade sanctions encourage protectionism, which will hurt not only the 
workers in developing countries but also consumers in the developed countries1. No matter 
what the reasons are, these arguments have opened a debate among the economists 
especially among those related to trade and development; and as said above, the growth in 
the literature is extensive and provides mixed evidence.   
Motivation of the first part of the dissertation therefore is based on the current on-going 
debate. First part of the dissertation is mainly concerned with evaluating the impact of trade 
on child labour across developing countries. Specifically, the purpose of the first part is to 
                                                 
1
 See Gupta (2002) for detail 
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investigate the link between globalization, defined as an increase in trade openness and 
penetration of FDI, and the incidence of child labour while taking into account the role of 
credit market imperfections. The empirical assessment of the first part is based on the panel 
data comprising of 129 developing countries for four decades beginning from 1970 to 
2010. The basic hypothesis tested is that trade sanctions may reduce the demand for 
unskilled worker and lower their wages. Poor families in such conditions when unable to 
borrow may have no alternative but to send their children to work. In addition to this, the 
first part has also tested the hypothesis that trade sanctions only affect exporting sector 
therefore the effect of trade openness may differ from the effect of export. The first part has 
also explored the effect of income on child labour using three alternative measures.  
The second part explores the effect of labour market conditions on child labour by arguing 
that the economic value of children may not be assessed properly without reference to the 
structure of labour market2. The second part is based on the Labour Force Survey data of 
Pakistan. A high proportion of literature on child labour in Pakistan only focuses on 
poverty, schooling, KRXVHKROG DQG FKLOG¶V RZQ FKDUDFWHULVWLFV DV PDMRU GHWHUPLQDQWs ± 
mainly emphasizing on the supply side while ignoring the demand side. The demand for 
child labour usually arises due to labour market conditions. Specifically the second chapter 
explores the effects of segmentation of economy between formal and informal sector, 
degree of substitution between adult and child labour (generating adult unemployment) and 
the wage structure on the incidence of child labour. 
As mentioned earlier, the above two parts are mainly concerned with the demand side of 
child labour. These issues do not address the phenomenon why households supply child 
labour. Literature on the supply side determinant is extensive in Pakistan. But these studies 
only focused on poverty, household and child characteristics as major determinants. 
Recently there is a growing debate on the intrahousehold distribution of power and its 
effect on household expenditure including expenditure on education. The on-going debate 
on intrahousehold balance of power has raised an argument i.e. is the identification of the 
person who holds the money important for the welfare of the household, especially for the 
child related outcome (health and education)? In keeping with the argument raised in the 
                                                 
2
 See Cain and Mozumder (1980) in Grootaert and Kanbur (1995) for more detail. 
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literature, the third part of the dissertation IRFXVHVRQWKHHIIHFWRIWKHPRWKHU¶VEDUJDLQLQJ
SRZHU DQG LWV HIIHFW RQ KHU FKLOG¶V VFKRROLQJ DQG ODEour decision. The issue is probed 
further by using the Pakistan Standard of Living Measurement Survey of Pakistan.   
The final part of the dissertation summarizes the overall findings and recommends some 
policy implications. The final part also addresses the shortcoming of this dissertation and 
provides some future research agenda. As far as the organization of this chapter is 
concerned, the next section will provide a complete conceptual framework for analysing 
the supply and demand side determinant at macro, meso and micro level, and then proceed 
to outline the basic objectives explored in each part and finally discuss how the dissertation 
contributes to the existing literature on economics of child labour. 
1.1 Conceptual Framework 
 
A conceptual framework for the study on child labour is provided by Lim (2002). The 
framework defines three levels, as summarized in Figure 1.1. First and the most basic is the 
micro or household/firm level, wherein decisions that affect whether a child goes to school, 
participates in economic or market activities or in housework, are made. This level 
identifies that children participate in labour market mainly due to the economic condition 
of the household. Poverty, unemployment among adults, lower returns to education, high 
dependency ratio and lack of credit in case of sudden income shocks force households to 
send their children to the labour market. Here at this level on one hand if households 
supply child labour then on the other hand employers demand child labour. Their demand 
is based on the unavailability of skilled labour in abundance, use of under-developed 
technology, dependence on family and low cost unskilled labour and short supply of 
capital.  Under the short term horizon these small firms cannot invest in skill and capital 
development. In under-developed economies, unstable macroeconomic conditions do not 
encourage employers to invest in skill and capital equipment. These conditions result in 
low productivity leading to child labour.    
 
The second level is the meso level, wherein the direct economic, social and institutional 
environment that affects the child and her/his family, as well as the employers of child 
labour, is situated. This is an important setting where on one hand relevant actors and 
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institutions interact on the promotion and practice of child labour, and on the other hand 
national and local governments and civil society organizations undertake prevention, 
identification, detection, rescue and rehabilitation of child labour. Here at this level weak 
labour market conditions, human capital development, extent of informal and self-
employment sector determines the demand for child labour. Demand for child labour 
usually arises due to family-based activities. Households themselves are the biggest 
employers of children. These households sell their products and services through sub-
contracting mechanism. These activities (especially in agriculture) are often informal in 
nature. A large number of children are engaged in these informal activities. The sub-
contracting of labour may also arise as part of the cost coping mechanism of uncompetitive 
firms. These uncompetitive firms try to lower their costs or try to avoid labour standards by 
sub-contracting to the informal sector, all having a significant influence on child labour 
demand. 
 
The last level is the macro level wherein national and international conditions determine 
both the constraints and the possibilities of economic and social advancement of the poor 
and the disadvantaged people. It is at this level where the socio-economic, legal and 
political conditions determine whether employers will have incentives to use child labour 
or not. It is also at this level where we find economic and social programs (such as 
development plans, poverty alleviation programs, and social welfare programs, formal and 
non-formal educational and vocational programs) that have direct impact on child labour. 
At this level governance structures and the political will of the state and civil society 
XOWLPDWHO\VKDSHDQGIRUPDQHQWLUHVRFLHW\¶VUHVSRQVHWR WKHFKLOGODERXUSUREOHPMore 
specifically, here at this level the socio-economic policies, infrastructure development, 
governance situation and global and macro volatilities determine child labour demand and 
supply in an economy. 
Lim (2002) emphasizing on linkages argues that, economically depressed and volatile 
conditions i.e. weak and unstable economy, high unemployment rates and inflation results 
in families entering poverty which eventually leads to child labour. Furthermore poverty 
with weak labour markets also brings with it unemployment and migration. This situation 
is further aggravated by the lack of social insurance leading more people and families 
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ending into poverty. The lack of social assistance and welfare services provided by the 
government results in extreme anxiety for the families ±i.e. health, education and social 
services are either deficient or of very low quality. All these, coupled with inadequate 
population policies and lack of economic development, disseminate high dependency 
burdens and add more to child labour. Moreover, poor, inadequate and unsubsidized 
education systems (especially lack of non-formal and vocational training programme at 
schools) with undeveloped transportation system reduce the incentive for the children to be 
in school.  
Following figure 1.1, the study determines to explore the effect of globalization while 
taking into account credit market imperfections at macro level, the effect of labour market 
conditions at meso level and the effect of household decision making process at micro level 
(as discussed earlier). The basic framework therefore covers the issues related to all three 
levels: macro, meso and micro. For example, figure 1.1 points out that primary decision 
makers deciding about the supply of child labour is household. Third part of the 
dissertation exploring the household decision making process will show how, at micro 
OHYHOPRWKHUVGHFLVLRQPDNLQJSRZHU LQIOXHQFHKHUFKLOG¶V ODERXU VXSSO\ DQGVFKRROLQJ
The main hypothesis is that household will supply less child labour if the prevailing 
cultural, social and family values give autonomy to mothers as mothers are more concerned 
about child welfare. As shown in figure 1.1, social policies at macro level effect cast, 
ethnicity and socio-cultural practice at meso level which in turn determine household value 
and affect autonomy of women. The issue is based on the literature on intrahousehold 
distribution of power and its effect on child welfare.  
 
The second part of the study, at the meso level, explores how labour market conditions 
LQIOXHQFH WKH HPSOR\HU¶V GHFLVLRQ WR GHPDQG FKLOG ODERXU $V discussed earlier here, at 
meso level weak labour market and extent of informal sector determines the child labour 
demand. In addition to the size of informal sector, adult unemployment rate and wages are 
used to explore the labour market conditions. Labour market indicators at meso level 
assume to have demand side effect on child labour. For example increase in the adult 
unemployed proportion in a district will reduce the demand for child labour as adults are 
actively searching for jobs and will be willing to work at low wages. Low adult wages at 
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district level therefore reduces the demand for child labour. As far as the size of the 
informal sector is concerned, as said earlier, this sector is the biggest employer of child 
labour generating the demand for child labour in an economy. Furthermore, study has also 
explored the effect of size of export related industries as well. This is to evaluate the 
condition that uncompetitive firms in order to remain cost competitive at the world market, 
use sub-contracting mechanism for production process. Children work for the large scale 
manufacturing sector by producing input in the informal sector. These informal activities 
further create demand for child labour. 
 
The first part of the study concerned with the macro level analysis explores how 
globalization and macro-economic conditions influence child labour incidence. 
Globalization is defined as expansion in trade and inflow of foreign direct investment. 
Expansion in trade and inflow of foreign direct investment generates employment and 
earning opportunities (leads to increase in labour demand and high wages in the labour 
market) for the poor household, thereby increasing their income. Increase in income will 
reduce supply of child labour if one assumes that child labour arises due to poverty. 
Globalization therefore reduces child labour incidence by increasing the income of the 
poor. But income is one channel through which globalisation can affect child labour, the 
other channel stresses that expansion in the earning opportunities may create the demand 
for child labour as well. Increase in the demand for exports may either increase the demand 
for child labour directly if children can be used as input in the sector, or it may increase the 
demand for child labour as a result of the switching of the job by adults while children take 
their place. For example, increased earning opportunities available to adults change the 
types of work performed by them and children may be forced to take over the activities 
performed by adults. However, there is no concrete evidence that shows globalisation 
increases child labour demand at macro level. 
 
Note that all the three levels are interlinked. Macro level factors such as expansion in trade, 
FDI and growth, influence both labour market conditions and household decision regarding 
child labour supply while household labour supply decision affect labour market conditions 
which in turn has an effect on macroeconomic environment. The labour market conditions 
may also influence household decision as well. For example, high adult unemployed 
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proportion in a household lower the household income which may influence the decision of 
household to supply more child labour. In sum the three levels are inter-linked and the 
dissertation tries to explore some of the issues that have been over-looked in the present 
literature at micro, meso or macro level.  
 
Figure 1.1: Factors Contributing to Child Labour 
 
Source: Lim (2002). 
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1.2 Objectives and Organization of the study 
 
There is an extensive literature available on the subject and the growth in the literature in 
the last decade is enormous. The large part of the literature is only theoretical, focusing on 
modelling the demand and supply of child labour and determining its welfare implications. 
The part that is empirical mainly consists of country specific empirical studies that estimate 
household choice models using household data. Their findings indicate that child labour is 
associated with large family size, low levels of parental education, low income levels, 
higher costs of sFKRROLQJ JHRJUDSKLF GLVWDQFH IURP VFKRRO SDUHQW¶V HPSOR\PHQW VWDWXV
the child's gender (boys are more likely to work, while girls usually stay at home to care for 
younger siblings and conduct household chores), child birth order (younger children are 
less likely to work if their older siblings are currently working), country's industrial 
distribution, with greater demand in the agriculture sector, and with the country's income 
distribution. 
Although the literature provides many insights on the determinants of child labour, but still 
there are some major issues that need to be addressed. For example, the recent literature on 
globalization and child labour incidence has ignored the effects of exports on child labour 
incidence. If the trade sanction theories have to be linked with child labour incidence then 
it is necessary to look for the effect through export rather than simply trade openness. 
While, at meso or micro level, in case of Pakistan, studies have ignored the effect of labour 
market conditions and mothers bargaining power on child labour. For example, to explore 
how the demand for child labour arises in an economy; the role of segmentation of the 
economy into formal and informal sectors, the degree of substitution between adult and 
child labour and wage structure prevailing in the economy, are in need of examination with 
respect to regions and time. Furthermore, literature in Pakistan exploring the supply side 
determinant of child labour does not address the intra-household decision-making process 
affecting child labour supply decision. Based on the conceptual framework, theories of 
demand and supply (see section 2.1 for a detailed review) and the gap present at macro, 
meso and micro level, this study tries to fill the gaps that are evident in the literature. At the 
macro level, this study has conducted a cross country analysis comprising of four decades, 
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from 1970 to 2010, and at the meso and micro level the estimation is based on Labour 
Force Survey and Social and Living Standard Measurement Survey (PSLM) of Pakistan.  
Firstly, chapter 3, at the macro level, explores the effects of income, trade openness and 
credit market imperfections on the incidence of child labour in a cross country setting. The 
following questions are specifically addressed; 
1. Does income remain a significant determinant of the child labour participation rate± 
Is the effect sensitive to different measures of the income?  
 
2. Do credit markets or financial development matter for the child labour incidence 
rate with particular reference to trade sanctions?  
 
3. What role does globalization (captured via trade volume and penetration of FDI in 
the economy) play? Does it lead to more child employment? ± Is the effect 
channelled through income? Does the effect of trade differ from the effect of 
exports? 
 
Secondly, chapter 4, at the meso level, explores the effect of labour market conditions on 
the incidence of child labour by evaluating the following key points;   
1. Higher adult wage rate will either reduce child labour incidence by increasing 
income of the household or it would attract more children to work if employers 
substitute adult labour with cheap child labour.  
 
2. Adult unemployment rate may have two types of effects; the higher the adult 
unemployed proportion in a division/district/city, the lower will be the probability 
for a child to find employment. While the higher the adult unemployed proportion 
in a house the lower will be the income of the household and the higher will be 
supply of child labour.  
 
3. Informal sector being disorganized in nature with low skilled requirement 
accommodates most of the child labour in an economy. Therefore, the higher the 
degree of in-formalization the higher will be the demand for child labour.   
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4. In relation to above, in Pakistan, like in other developing countries, to remain cost 
competitive, employers in exporting industries often rely on child labour. Although 
due to world pressure on the exports, employers have started substituting children 
with adult unskilled labour but still, in order to remain competitive, employers are 
now using a contract system approach. Children work for the exporting sector 
through contract system by engaging themselves in the informal sector or in the 
subsidiary sectors which provides raw material to the exporting sectors. This 
increases the demand for child labour in the informal sector.  
 
Finally, to analyse the effect of LQWUDKRXVHKROGGLVWULEXWLRQRISRZHURQFKLOG¶VODERXUDQG
schRROLQJ FKDSWHU  H[SORUHV WKH UROH RI WKH PRWKHU¶V GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ SRZHU 0RUH
specifically, the following questions are analysed; 
1. What is an appropriate way to measure decision making power?  
 
2. How does this decision making power of mothers in the household affects child 
welfare?  
 
3. Is the effect RIWKHPRWKHU¶VSRZHURQKHUFKLOG¶VODERXUDQGVFKRROLQJnon-linear 
and non-monotonic as predicted by all the recent literature? 
 
To summarize the organization of the study: chapter 2 provides the review of theoretical 
models, empirical literature worldwide and a separate section for literature on Pakistan; 
chapter 3 assesses the effects  of Globalization and Credit Market Imperfections on the 
incidence of child labour; chapter 4 assesses the effect of labour market conditions on the 
incidence of child labour in case of Pakistan, chapter 5 assesses the effect of Mother¶s 
Bargaining Power on KHUFKLOG¶V ODERXUDQGVFKRROLQJ; chapter 6 concludes and provides 
policy implications. It also identifies some limitations and future scope of the study as well. 
Lastly, the three issues addressed in the dissertation (globalization under imperfect credit 
market, labour market conditions and intrahousehold decision making process) are 
interlinked. However, the individual empirical chapters may stand unrelated. The reason 
behind this is the non-availability of comprehensive data set at cross country level. Each 
11 
 
issue is therefore addressed by employing separate datasets and thus provide 
comprehensive assessment of that issue only. Nevertheless the individual chapters are 
helpful in understanding the issues that are not yet addressed, especially in case of 
Pakistan. 
 
1.3 Data and Methodology 
 
Each empirical chapter, as said earlier, differs from others in terms of data sets employed 
and the methodology followed. Chapter 3 is based on cross country data of 129 developing 
countries for five periods, chapter 4 focuses on Labour Force Survey (LFS) data of 
Pakistan form 1990-91 onwards, while chapter 5 takes into consideration the Pakistan 
Living Standard Measurement (PSLM) Survey data for the period 2007-8. Compilation of 
the data for cross-country analysis and formation of pseudo panel to analyse the labour 
market conditions of Pakistan is the most difficult task of the study. 
 
As chapter 3 is based on the secondary data, the data set is compiled across 129 developing 
countries using different sources. Most of the data is from World Bank Development 
Indicator (WDI) and Penn World Table (PWT) version 6.3. Compiling data using WDI and 
PWT is relatively easy, but these datasets do not contain information on the economically 
active children aged 10-14. Although earlier versions of WDI does contain some 
information on child labour but it has missing values. The main source as indicated by 
WDI is International Labour Organization (ILO) for child labour data. However, data set 
compiled by ILO reports percentage of economically active children aged 10-14 with 10-
year gaps. The data is downloaded by using UN common database. The two data sets (one 
from the World Bank and the other from the ILO) are merged by using the 3 digit country 
code (known as ISO code). Furthermore in chapter 3, in order to come up with the 
instrument for trade openness, gravity model approach is used. For this purpose bilateral 
trade data and gravity model indicators such as distance between the two countries, 
common languages, population between the two, common borders between the two etc. are 
compiled from different sources. The main data source to estimate the gravity model is 
from Direction of Trade Statistics UN Comtrade, CPII and Rose 2004. The data set is once 
again merged using the 3-digit country code. Getting the information on Gini coefficient 
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and income share held by bottom quintile population (Q1) to compute the income of the 
bottom quintile population is another major difficulty that this study has faced. Information 
on Gini coefficient and Q1 is compiled by using UN-Wider database. Although this is the 
major database that has cross country information on Gini coefficients and Q1, but it still 
has missing information. Some of the missing information is then taken from EHII 
(Estimated Household Income Inequality Dataset). Overall for chapter 3 we acknowledge 
that the major task is compilation of the dataset. Once the dataset is compiled the 
methodology followed is straightforward; instrumental variable regression based on time 
and country fixed effect.  
 
As far as chapter 4 is concerned, the major difficulty this study faced is that Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) data is only cross-sectional. These datasets do not follow the same 
individuals every year. Hence, true panel does not exist. In the absence of the true panel, a 
pseudo panel is formed. The main objective of making the pseudo panel is to evaluate the 
effects of labour market conditions from 1990-91 to 2007-08 (last available LFS with the 
author). However, due to the unavailability of the division/district/city codes (used as 
cohorts to merge the datasets) and changes in the sampling methodology after 1995-96, all 
the available datasets cannot be merged together. Therefore, two different pseudo panels 
are formed; one for the period before 1995-96, and the other for the period after 1995-96. 
The comparison of the two pseudo panels also gives us an opportunity to track changes in 
the labour market indicator after the US Child Deterrence Act of 1997 as well. Fixed effect 
within estimator is used to analyse the effect of labour market indicators on child labour 
across divisions/districts/cities and time. 
 
Finally, estimation of chapter 5 is based on Pakistan Standard of Living Measurement 
Survey data of 2007-08. Although some recent datasets are also available but as these 
datasets do not contain information on decision- making power of mothers (the variable of 
interest), the survey data of 2007-08 is used for estimating the effect of mother's power on 
KHU FKLOG
V ODERXU DQG VFKRROLQJ 36/0 GDWDVHWV FRQWDLQ LQIRUPDWLRQ DERXW LQGLYLGXDO¶V
education, employment, health, housing conditions, household income and expenditure in 
different files. These files are then merged together using the individual and household 
identity. First, females who are currently married and having children aged 10-14 are 
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selected. Second, information on their decision- making power and household 
characteristics are merged to the main file. Finally, after computing the decision- making 
index, all the relevant information is then merged with the children¶V file using PRWKHU¶V
code as an identity. As our dependent variable is binary in nature, one if child is 
economically active, zero otherwise, therefore, the estimation technique followed is probit 
model. 
 
1.4 Contribution of the study  
 
The dissertation contributes in the empirical literature by filling gaps in the existing 
empirical literature at the macro level by using cross country data at meso and micro levels 
by using data on Pakistan. First at the macro level it incorporates the credit market 
imperfections in a trade model after correcting for endogeneity. Credit market imperfection 
is taken into account because if poor household are credit constrained then any income 
shock may lead to increase in child labour supply. For example if a trade sanction reduces 
wages and income of the poor household by lowering the production of unskilled goods. 
This income shock may increase child labour supply.  However, our result shows that 
effect of credit on child labour incidence is insignificant 
 
Second, at the macro level, the study compares the effect of trade openness and export by 
arguing that trade sanctions only effects child labour through its effect on exports. 
Therefore the effect of exports could be different from the effect of trade openness. 
Literature on globalization and child labour often ignores the effect of exports by stressing 
that it is hard to find children in exporting sector. Hence, the channel through which trade 
can affect child labour is by increasing the employment opportunities thereby income in an 
economy. Considering the two arguments, this study is the first that tries to explore the 
effects of the two separately. Result indicates that trade increases the employment 
opportunity therefore raises income and living standard in an economy which in turn 
reduces the child labour supply. Therefore, income could be considered as the channel 
through which trade effect child labour.   
 
Furthermore, at the macro level this study has also explored the effect of income on child 
labour by considering three different measures of income: Real GDP per capita, income of 
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the bottom quintile of the population and adult wages. Result shows significant effect of 
the first two measures of income on child labour while adult wages remain insignificant in 
explaining the child labour incidence. Studies exploring the effect of income on child 
labour at macro level usually use GDP per-capita to represent income. This study argues 
that GDP per-capita may not be a good measure of income as in developing countries only 
a small percentage of the population hold most of the wealth. Hence, GDP per-capita may 
not exactly represent income of the poor. In order to determine more accurate effect, this 
study develops a new measure estimated through Gini co-efficient and income share of the 
bottom quintile of the population.  On the basis of the results, the study concludes that 
income of the bottom quintile of the population rather than GDP per capita is a better proxy 
of income to use when analysing child labour.  
 
Next at the meso level, it is the first study in Pakistan that has investigated the effect of 
labour market conditions at division/district/city level and across time, from 1990-91 to 
2007-08. Literature in Pakistan either explores the supply side determinant or uses simple 
descriptive analysis to explore the effect of labour market indicators on child labour. 
Furthermore, literature incorporating labour market indicators has mainly explored wages, 
adult unemployment and working hours, and are also based on case studies having small 
sample size. This is the first study that has used the national level survey to explore labour 
market conditions in depth. It has not only explored the effect of wages and adult 
unemployment but has also explored the effect of size of informal, agriculture and 
exporting sector as well. Our result shows significant effect of all the labour market 
indicators on child labour incidence. 
 
At the meso level the most important contribution of the study is the construction of pseudo 
panel using divisions/districts/cities as cohorts. Analysis is done across 114 cohorts, first 
across six periods and then across four periods, before and after 1995-96. Although the 
construction of the two pseudo-panels is due to the changes in the sampling methodology 
but this has also helped in exploring the situation before and after Child Deterrence Act of 
1997. Moreover, meso level analysis has also explored the variations of labour market 
indicators across provinces, regions and time periods affecting child labour. 
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Furthermore, at meso level, the study will also contribute to the existing literature by 
exploring the effect of the size of export related industries in a division/district/city. The 
motivation behind including the size of the export related sector in the model is that in 
Pakistan, to remain cost competitive in the international market, exporting firms usually 
use sub-contracting mechanism for production process. Children remain employees of the 
large-scale manufacturing sector by producing raw material in the informal sector. Hence 
trade sanctions only shift children to informal sectors. The dissertation therefore not only 
explores the effect of exports at macro level but also at meso level as well. The analysis at 
the meso level will be beneficial for designing the policy to combat child labour in Pakistan 
through labour market indicators.  
 
Finally, at the micro level, the study will contribute to the existing literature by exploring 
WKH HIIHFW RI PRWKHU¶V GHFLVLRQ-PDNLQJ SRZHU RQ KHU FKLOG¶V ODERXU DQG VFKRROLQJ 7KH
effect is explored by considering the on-going work on intra-household distribution of 
power and its effect on household welfare around the world. Recently, in case of Pakistan, 
OLWHUDWXUHRQLQWUDKRXVHKROGGLVWULEXWLRQRISRZHUKDVRIWHQOLQNHGWKHZRPHQ¶VGHFLsion-
making power to changes in the calorie intake and schooling expenditure only. Exploring 
its effect on child labour supply decision will be fruitful in designing the income support 
programme that specifically target women for cash transfer. Micro level analysis also 
outlines the appropriate strategy to measure decision-making power of mothers as well. It 
also highlights some of the factors influencing intrahousehold distribution of power in 
Pakistan. This study not only contributes to the literature by exploring the effect of mothers 
decision-PDNLQJSRZHU RQKHU FKLOG¶V ODERXU DQG VFKRROLQJEXW LW DOVR FRQWULEXWHV WR WKH
OLWHUDWXUH E\ H[SORULQJ LWV HIIHFW RQ FKLOGUHQ¶V SDLG DQG XQSDLG HPSOR\PHQW VHSDUDWHO\
Lastly, this study also provides gender sensitive analysis and it also explores the non-
linearity and non-PRQRWRQLFHIIHFWRIPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQ-making power as well.  
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2. Literature Review 
 
As mentioned earlier the literature available on the topic and its growth in recent years is 
enormous. Researchers have put forward both theoretical arguments and empirical 
evidences from across the world on why children work. Literature therefore can be grouped 
into either having theoretical arguments or providing empirical findings. This chapter first 
discusses some arguments raised in literature that may or may not be explicitly addressed 
in this dissertation but nevertheless help in understanding the economics of child labour 
(demand and supply of child labour) while the second part provides the review of 
theoretical models that will be followed in the subsequent chapters (chapter 3 to 5). 
 
2.1 Economics of Child Labour 
 
This section will highlight some interesting facts that have remained under discussion in 
the literature. The review consists of findings both at macro level and micro level. It will 
also try to give an in-depth review of literature on Pakistan as well. This is because chapter 
4 and 5 explore the child labour issues in Pakistan. But before all these; why economists 
are interested in child labour? The interest of economists starts with the fertility and human 
capital theories. It dates back to 17th century. With the passage of time the interest turns to 
globalization and intrahousehold bargaining model. More specifically, economists basically 
consider the issue of child labour as a complex phenomenon whose supply and demand are 
affected by conditions in the labour market, education market, financial market (credit 
constraint) and to some extent by globalization. Recently some empirical works also 
provide support for the effect of intra-household decision making patterns on child related 
outcome as well. The purpose of this section therefore is to provide a brief review of the 
existing literature to predict why children work. The first part will discuss the supply side 
economics of child labour while the second part discuss the demand driven factors 
influencing child labour incidence. The sub section is mainly based on the review provided 
by Brown et.al, (2002) and on the report of ILO/IPEC-SIMPOC (2007). 
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a) Economics of Supply of child labour 
 
The economic theories related to the supply of child labour have long recognized poverty 
as the major determinant of child labour. Literature has developed a theoretical model to 
examine the household behaviour to examine the child labour supply decision. Empirical 
literature, both at macro level and micro level, has also emphasized on poverty as major 
determinant of child labour supply. At macro level studies have analysed the effect of GDP 
per capita on the child labour incidence while at the micro level household income or low 
parental wages are considered as the major determinant of child labour. The sub- section 
therefore begins by reviewing what the basic household model is predicting. 
 
(i) Household Decision Making Model 
 
In general, a unitary model (or common preference model) is used to predict the child 
labour supply decision. In such model the household maximizes utility, which is considered 
as a function of children in the house, the schooling per child, the leisure time available to 
children and parents, and a composite consumption good. Household earned income by 
selling goods produced in a household enterprise or by working as wage labourer. Father 
allocates time between market work and leisure; the mother allocates time among market 
work and child rearing; and children allocate time among market work, education and 
leisure [Brown et.al, (2002)].  
 
7KHHPSLULFDO ILQGLQJVRIVXFKPRGHOVKRZWKDW LDQ LQFUHDVH LQ WKHIDWKHU¶VZDJHZLOO
raise household income aQG LI D FKLOG¶V HGXFDWLRQ LV D QRUPDO JRRG WKHQ HGXFDWLRQ ZLOO
also rise, (ii) if the mother work is substitute for the child work then the higher the mother 
ZDJHWKHORZHUZLOOEHFKLOGOHLVXUHDQGHGXFDWLRQLLLWKHULVHLQWKHPRWKHU¶VZDJHZLOO
also raise the child education as well, considering education as a normal good, (iv) an 
increase in child wage would reduce the child schooling by affecting its opportunity cost, 
(v) increase in child wage may raise the demand for children as well therefore, increases 
WKH IDPLO\ VL]H 7KLV ZLOO DJDLQ UHGXFH WKH FKLOG¶V VFKRROLQJ DV IHZHU UHVRXUFHV ZLOO EH
available per child ± leading to a trade-off between quality and quantity.  
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(ii) Trade-off between Quality and Quantity 
 
In general, utility function of the unitary household model often points out towards the 
trade-off between Quantity and quality of children. As number of children, schooling per 
child, consumption of goods and leisure all enters into the utility function of the household 
together. Thus any changes in the child wages will lead to trade-off between education and 
labour. The trade-off depends on the household budget constraint, personal ability of the 
child and on the returns to home production. Poor parents cannot invest equally to all 
children because of the limited household income. There are empirical evidences that 
suggest that parents invest differently on the human capital formation of the first and the 
last born. One theory indicates that as the eldest child enters in the labour force, the 
household income becomes stabilized and they invest more on the human capital formation 
of the youngest child. The second theory indicates that the investment in a child depends on 
the innate ability of the child. Therefore children can be assigned different tasks depending 
upon their abilities. They could acquire education or acquire skill by doing on- job training.   
 
(iii) Human Capital theories 
 
The Human Capital Theory is based the on neo-classical theory of endogenous growth. It 
assumes that people are productive resource. Hence higher education will lead to higher 
productivity. Basic proposition behind this theory is that parents make trade-off when 
allocating their children¶V time, especially for education and labour. Their decision is based 
on family economic and social conditions. Time spent on accumulating human capital 
affects child labour. $SDUHQW¶Vdecision regarding the investment in their child¶V human 
capital depends on return to schooling. If the return from schooling is high the number of 
working children would reduce. According to Schultz, (1961) education increase 
productivity, labour quality and income at both individual and national level. 
(iv) Parental Education and Schooling Quality 
 
Bonnet (1993) argues that failure of the education system is an important explanation for 
the prevalence of child labour. When parents do not expect children to learn much in 
school, they decide to give them informal education in terms of work. Cigno and Rosati 
(2000) provide an analytical model of non-altruistic parents while Lopez-Calva et.al, 
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(1999) consider an infinite-horizon overlapping generations model. Each generation has to 
choose how much to educate their children, how much to save, and how much to transfer to 
their parents when they retire. If one generation chooses to educate its children, the 
children become more productive in the future. However, the parent will only get a pay-off 
from the investment in their children if the children decide to make a transfer back to the 
parents at retirement.  
 
Strauss and Thomas (1995) stressing on the parental education argue that parental years of 
schooling plays a significant role in reducing the child labour incidence. Brown et.al, argue 
that there is an HPSLULFDO HYLGHQFH WKDW VXJJHVWV WKDW D SDUHQW¶V HGXFDtion affects their 
future generation. Educated parents value education, and hence invest in the human capital 
formation of their children while parents who are illiterate themselves do not value 
education for their children as well. Education affects the future income streams of the 
household as well. This also motivates parents to invest in the human capital formation. 
This implies that human capital formation is dependent on the return to schooling which in 
turn depends on the quality of schooling.  
 
(v) Risk Theory 
 
Poor household faces shocks and risks such as unemployment, natural disasters effecting 
income like draught and flood, war etc. The income shocks could be severe among the 
household who do not have enough reserve resources to meet such shocks. These 
household are more likely to supply child labour if they remain unable to borrow to smooth 
their present consumption need. Literature often points out that in extreme cases household 
could sell the future hours of their child work to overcome the present income shocks. At 
the macro level, Behrman et.al, (1999) found out that macroeconomic instability has played 
a major role in the low education attainment level in the early 1980s for the Latin American 
and Caribbean countries. Duryea (1998) concluded thaWWKHSDUHQW¶VXQHPSOR\PHQWUHGXFHV
the probability of grade advancement among the children. Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) 
working on the data of rural India provide evidence that parents withdraw children from 
school during unexpected decline in crop income. 
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(vi) Credit Market Failure 
 
Ranjan P. (2001) claims that child labour arises due to imperfections in the credit market. 
Intuition behind the claim is the belief that if poor household have access to well-
functioning credit markets, they would borrow money to smooth their present consumption 
hence invest in their child human capital by sending them to school. Basu and Chau (2003) 
identify poverty and the absence of reliable legal and financial systems through which the 
poor can secure loans to safeguard against hunger or unexpected consumption needs. 
Consequently, child labour grows out of an institutional arrangement in which labour and 
credit contracts are inter-linked. Outstanding household debts are sometime paid through 
the labour services of children [Basu and Chau (2003) as cited in ILO/IPEC-SIMPOC 
(2007)]. Baland and Robinson (2000) argue that if parents expect that the household 
income will increase in future they would borrow against that future income. But if the 
credit market is not well functioning, poor household has to rely on child labour ± the 
internal resource available to them.   
 
(vii) 3DUHQWVDOWUXLVPDQG0RWKHU·V%DUJDLQLQJ3RZHU 
 
/LWHUDWXUHRQFKLOGODERXURIWHQDVVXPHVWKDWSDUHQWVDUHDOWUXLVWLFLHSDUHQW¶V act is always 
in the best interest of their children. This means that children would be in school rather 
than at work under favourable circumstances [ILO/IPEC-SIMPOC (2007)]. But 
Humphries, (2003) illustrates that even when parents are altruistic, child labour could arise 
as a result of extreme poverty. $FFRUGLQJWR%KDORWUD3DUHQW¶VDOWUXLVPLVDFULWLFDO
assumption in many economic models, ranging from models of education and child labour 
to models of macroeconomic policy. Incrementing the resources available to parents may 
not improve child welfare if parents are incompetent, myopic or selfish (Mayer, 1997 as 
explained in Bhalotra, 2004). Basu and Van (1998) argue that the role of parents is to some 
extent mis-characterized in the literature. They elaborate that when children are working in 
a society as a mass phenomenon, as in many less developed countries, it is much more 
likely that this reflects not a difference in the attitude of the parents but the problem of 
stark poverty. Bhalotra, (2004) in her in-GHSWK DQDO\VLV RQ SDUHQW¶V altruism argues that 
altruism remains a relatively neglected issue in the literature on household decision-
making.  
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Furthermore, according to Patel et.al, (2007) empirical work has refuted with the idea that 
parents know how to allocate labour and other resources to improve household well-being. 
Preferences have a large impact on the well-being of children. Resources invested in a 
child are determined not only by the level of resources available, but also by the SDUHQW¶V
preferences. Chiappori (1988) and Manser & Brown (1980) suggest that preferences 
between parents need not be the same. The outcome of mother and father¶V actions can 
differ. Agarwal (1997); Chiappori (1988) and Manser & Brown (1980) suggest that 
bargaining power over household economic decisions, when held by women, is associated 
with improved well-being for herself and her children than when the same resources are in 
the hands of men [see also Haddad & Hoddinott (1994); Rubalcava, Teruel & Thomas 
(2004); Thomas (1994)]. The existing economic literature provides evidence that women 
invest more than men in children because they are more altruistic. For example Kanbur and 
Haddad (1994) show that, men usually spend most of the money on personal consumption 
while women channelize a large share to their children's education and health. Bargaining 
power affects the allocation of household resources as well as schooling [Quisumbing and 
Maluccio, (2000)].  
 
(viii) Poverty and Income Distribution 
 
As discussed earlier that the literature on supply of child labour has long recognized the 
poverty as the major factor influencing the household decision to supply child labour. 
There are number of studies available showing the negative effect of GDP per-capita on 
child labour incidence at cross country level. At the micro level studies have also shown 
the negative association of child labour with income. However considering the connection 
among income, child labour and credit market imperfection, Baland and Robinson (2000) 
has considered child labour as a device which transfers resources from future to present. 
Thus child labour not necessarily responds to the income today but to the level of income 
today relative to future income [Brown et.al, (2002)]. Moreover, Blunch et.al, (2002) 
observing the linkages between child labour and poverty concluded that child labour 
responds to poverty in the short run, but not in the long run. In the recent literature the 
much cited work is of Basu and Van (1998). Basu and Van base their model on the basic 
assumption that parents are altruistic. The other two crucial assumptions of their model are 
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L WKH µOX[XU\¶DQG LL WKH µVXEVWLWXWLRQ¶D[LRPV$FFRUGLQJ WR WKH OX[XU\D[LRPSDUHQWV
will only send their children to work when their income drop from a level to provide the 
subsistence level of living. While the substitution axiom argues that adult and child labour 
are substitutes in the labour market, subject to an adult equivalency correction. They drive 
the supply curve and provide the evidence of the existence of multiple equilibria in the 
labour market. First where the adult wage rate is low and children work, second in which 
the adult wage rate is high and children do not work. The multiple equilibrium results in 
general equilibrium. Their general equilibrium analysis shows that in an economy where 
child labour is prevalent, there is a need to think of social welfare functions, which attach a 
SRVLWLYHZHLJKWWRZRUNHU¶VZHOIDUHRUDQHJDWLYHZHLJKWWRFKLOGZRUN+RZHYHU%DVXDQG
Van model is silent on the questions of income distribution and unemployment [ILO/IPEC-
SIMPOC (2007)]. 
 
As far income inequality or income redistribution is concerned, Swinnerton and Rogers 
(1999) argued that the Basu and Van (998) model will only hold if the distribution axiom 
holds. They argue that income from the non labour sources should be concentrated in the 
hands of few agents. Ranjan R. (1999) provides evidence of the positive relationship 
between child labour incidence and income distribution. He developed an over-lapping 
generation general equilibrium model in which child labour arises because parents are 
unable to borrow to overcome their present needs. His model points out that if parents are 
unable to borrow against the future earnings of their children then the prevalence of 
inequality will be associated with the greater incidence of child labour. Grootaert and 
Kanbur (1995) concluded that equitable income distribution is the most suitable way of 
reducing child labour incidence. Rogers and Swinnerton (2001) further points out that child 
labour, in countries having high productivity, can be reduced or eliminated through a more 
equal income distribution whereas  in countries having low productivity a more equal 
distribution of income will further aggravate the child labour problem. 
 
b) Economics of Demand for Child Labour 
 
Anker et.al, (1998), based on the review of research studies analyses the factors that may 
affect demand for child labour. According to him demand for child labour arises because 
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(i) children are submissive and innocent they create less trouble (ii) perform repetitive task 
more easily, (iii) do not join trade unions (iv) their physical structure makes them 
appropriate for certain tasks (v) employer hire children in order to ensure the supply of 
skilled workers in future and (vi) traditional occupations encourage the children to work 
with parents.  
 
(i) Nimble Finger Hypothesis 
 
The most common and traditional view about why demand for child labour arises is based 
on the opinion that children have specific features that make them effective in performing 
certain tasks such as making rugs, sports goods, mining etc. This theory remains in 
circulation for a long time, especially during the British industrial revolution. At that time 
textile mills were powered by water and machinery was wooden hence children were very 
effective because of their size to operate such machines. Children were also employed in 
mines because of their small size as well. But the technological advancement of the 19th 
century substantially reduced the demand for child labour. Edmond (2003) rejected the 
nimble finger argument by pointing out that children mostly work in the agriculture sector 
while research on nimble finger argument is based on the children employment in the 
industrial sector. 
 
(ii) Technological Progress 
 
If the argument considered above is true then technological advancement should reduce the 
demand for child labour. There is impulsive evidence available for the technological 
advancement of 19th century that has reduced the demand for child labour.  As the demand 
for child labour was concentrated in the unskilled sector therefore it could be easily 
controlled by adopting skilled based technological advancement. For example the 
mechanization of Egyptian farms during 1970 lowered the demand for child labour 
considerably. Hence skilled based advancement is always documented in the literature as 
reducing the child labour demand. 
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(iii) Structure of the Labour Market 
 
Among the demand-side determinant of child labour an important factor is structure of the 
labour market especially level of market wages - both the wages of children and those of 
adults. Cain and Mozumder (1980) have argued that the economic value of children may 
not properly be assessed without reference to structure of the labour market. Structure of 
the labour market determines the level of wages, which in turn determines the contribution 
of child labour to household income. Moreover the relative importance of the formal sector 
in the economy and the degree of segmentation between formal and the informal sector and 
its effect on child labour cannot be ignored as well. In general, the evidence suggests that 
the extent of child labour in the formal economy is small. In many countries there is a 
tendency towards in-formalization of production methods, with formal enterprises either 
breaking up into smaller units or subcontracting to households or informal enterprises 
(mainly to try to escape social legislation and charges which add to the cost of labour). In 
such conditions the demand for child labour may increase. Another important factor 
pushing children to participate in the labour market is the economic condition of the 
household due to prevailing unemployment among the adults. Child labour is often viewed 
as a cause and a contributor to adult unemployment rate and low wages.  
 
(iv) Trade and Comparative Advantage 
 
According to Basu and Van (1998), whenever people are informed about the child labour 
their first reaction is to ban it. But banning may worsen the situation rather than solving the 
SUREOHP 7KH DUJXPHQW KDV VWDUWHG D QHZ GHEDWH DPRQJ WKH VFKRODUV LV µEDQ¶ WKH RQO\
solution? Will it work? As indicated in section 1.1 the growing literature on the topic is 
after the United States; Harkin's bill (Child Labour Deterrence Act of 1997). The model 
presented by Basu and Van clearly indicates that ban will not work. In the developing 
countries children mostly work in the unskilled sectors. Any trade sanction will lower the 
price of the unskilled products thereby lowering the unskilled labour wages. This if on one 
hand increases the returns to schooling, on the other hand low unskilled wages would 
decrease the household income. The overall effect of trade sanction therefore may not be in 
favour of the children.  
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Ensing (2010) has evaluated the working condition of boys in the leather sector and the 
condition of working girls in garment industry of Bangladesh. Her study revealed that the 
presence of children in the export-oriented factories of Bangladesh has been seriously 
reduced, but it is extremely impossible to differentiate between the products from these 
factories and those from the informal workshops and home-based production, where child 
labour remains in abundant. Girls are still working in informal industries at home, on the 
streets and in informal industries related to garments. Ensing (2010) argues that, after the 
outcry about child labour in the garments industry, and the resulting trade boycott, girls 
below the age of 14 are no longer found in the export-oriented factories, but the adolescent 
girls still working there, under harsh circumstances, which nevertheless classify them as 
child labourers under ILO norms [Ensing (2010)] 
 
2.2 Review of Selected Theoretical Model 
 
In the recent literature the most cited work is the theoretical model put forward by Basu 
and Van (1998). Many researchers have based their empirical findings on the theoretical 
arguments placed by Basu and Van. Basu and Van model has criticized trade sanctions. 
They argue that these trade sanctions will only create poverty and will worsen the situation 
of child labour instead of reducing it.  As in past literature much discussion has already 
been done on the model therefore here it is not discussed at length. This section will first 
provide the review of Jafarey and Lahiri (2002) theoretical model on which chapter 3 is 
based. It then proceeds to Dwibedi and Chaudhuri (2010) and Chaudhuri (2009) models on 
which chapter 4 is based. Finally, the theoretical model of Basu (2006) will be discussed on 
which chapter 5 is based. 
 
a) Trade sanctions, Child Labour and Role of Credit by Jafarey and Lahiri (2002) 
 
Jafarey and Lahiri (2002) consider a small open economy case of two period ሺݐ ൌ  ?ǡ  ?ሻ 
producing two goods per period (good labelled ݅ ൌ  ?ǡ  ?ǥ  ?ሻǤThey assume that the 
economy is a net exporter of unskilled goods. Goods 1 and 2 are produced during period 1 
while 3 and 4 are produced during period 2.ܲ݅ presents the world price of good ݅.  Labour 
is considered as the only input and could be skilled or unskilled. Jafarey and Lahiri 
consider that labour cannot be substituted and one unit of each good is produced by using 
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one unit of labour. Assuming that good 1 and 3 are produced by skilled labour and 2 and 4 
are produced by unskilled labour; the wage rate paid to skill worker is thus defined as equal 
to P1 in period 1 and P3 in period 2. While for unskilled labour the wage is defined as ଶܲ in 
period 1 and ସܲ  in period 2 such that ଵܲ ൐ ଶܲܽ݊݀ ଷܲ ൐ ସܲǤ Households in Jafarey and 
Lahiri model are headed by the single parents either skilled or unskilled (exogenous in the 
model).  
 
Households headed by skilled parents are considered rich Ǯݏǯ while households headed by 
unskilled parents are assumed to be poor Ǯݑǯ. It is also assumed that there are Ǯܰǯ identical 
numbers of children in each household. Each child is born without skill but can acquire 
skill by taking training in period 1 thus he could earn skilled wages P3 in period 2. If they 
don't receive training then they would earn unskilled 
wages ଶ ?ସ ?. The training decision is characterized by a 
function (e) and is assumed to be solely taken by the parents with Ne children receiving 
training while ܰሺ ? െ ݁ሻ ending up as child labour. Jafarey and Lahiri household utility 
function Ǯݒǯ is based on the consumption ሺܿሻ of 4 goods and a measure of educational level: 
 ݒ ൌ ݓሺܿଵǡ ܿଶǡ ܿଷǡ ܿସሻ ൅ ݃ሺܰ݁ሻሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
 
While the budget constraint is: 
 ܻ ൅ ܰሺ ? െ ሻ݁ ଶܲ ൅ ܼ ݎ ? ൅ ܰ݁ ଷܲ ݎ ? ൅ ܰሺ ? െ ሻ݁ ସܲ ݎ ?ൌ ܧሺ ଵܲǡ ଶܲǡ ଷܲ ݎ ? ǡ ସܲ ݎ ? ǡ ݒ െ ݃ሺܰ݁ሻሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
 
Further, assuming the non-increasing marginal utility of income and normality in all the 
goods Jafarey and Lahiri evaluated the household education decision as a function of price 
and a given interest rate Ǯݎǯ.  
 ܧ݃ᇱሺܰ݁ሻ ൅ ሺ ଷܲ െ ସܲሻ ݎ ? ൒ ଶܲሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
 
According to Jafarey and Lahiri an increase in training decision Ǯ݁ǯmeans gaining income 
and it also increases the income of the second period by skill premium ሺ ଷܲ െ ସܲሻ which 
will be discounted back in period  ?. This will also result in the loss of first period income.  
Such a result is interpreted by Jafarey and Lahiri as the interior solution and is basically 
because of the negative discounted economic returns to education. As training decision and 
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utility function are jointly determined in their model, they study the dependence of training 
decision and interest rate. They show that with the increase in interest rate, welfare of the 
lender rises while welfare of the borrowers falls. According to them an increase in interest 
rate reduces the economic returns to education. It reduces the marginal benefits of 
education and induces a lower choice of training decision. But for lenders, the welfare 
effect is positive and works against the effect of a decline in returns to education. This 
makes training decision to increase with interest rate for household that lends.  
 
Furthermore in order to evaluate the dependence of borrowing Ǯܾǯon interest rate Jafarey 
and Lahiri conclude that an increase in interest rate reduces the training decision and 
demand for loans by borrowers as training decision has decreased. After establishing the 
relationship among borrowing, interest rate and training decision Jafarey and Lahiri 
precede the analysis by considering three scenarios in credit market: 
 
In scenario 1 it was assumed that all the households can borrow and lend freely in the 
perfectly competitive credit market that link to international market. In this case interest 
rate is exogenously given and equal to world interest rate while the decision of rich and 
poor are entirely independent.  
 
Under Scenario 2 Jafarey and Lahiri assume that borrowing is subject to a quantitative 
constraint, i.e. interest rate faced by the poor household is influenced by some subjective 
factors and quantitative constraint (b=ത). It is again independent of rich household. 
 
In scenario 3 households borrow from the domestic credit market. According to Jafarey and 
Lahiri in this case rich and poor household exchange loan and each household discount rate 
is equal to the equilibrium interest rate. Jafarey and Lahiri have used a combination of 
different equations to determine training decision, utility function and borrowing decision 
of poor household and utility function and supply of loan for rich household along with the 
condition that training decision for rich household is equal to 1. The equilibrium interest 
rate is therefore determined by the interaction of demand and supply of borrowing. This 
case is viewed by Jafarey and Lahiri as having an interesting policy implication. According 
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to them rich households increase their savings entirely through lending in the credit market, 
VLQFHWKHFKLOGUHQ¶VHGXFDWLRQLVHTXDOWRWKDWLVFDQQRWEHLQFUHDVHGIXUWKHU 
 
Considering scenario 2, Jafarey and Lahiri stress that borrowing constraint is small relative 
to the unconstrained or equilibrium level borrowing. Hence given that the constraint binds, 
interest rate will be higher than the equilibrium interest rate. Opening a domestic credit 
market according to them will result in a fall in the discount rate for poor households which 
leads to higher educational choice and if there is an international credit market in which all 
households could participate, it is reasonable to assume that for a developing country 
equilibrium interest rate will be higher or equal to world interest rate and one shall have 
world education outcome higher or equal to equilibrium level education outcome. After 
analysing the equilibrium in the credit market, Jafarey and Lahiri introduce the effect of 
trade sanction on the incidence of child labour. Keeping in mind the assumption that the 
country is a net exporter of unskilled goods now trade sanctions will result in a fall in price 
of unskilled good in period 1 (i.e. P2).  
 ܧହ݀ݒ ൌ ሾሼ ? ൅ ሺܰ ? െ ሻ݁ሽ െ ܧଶሿ݀ ଶܲ െ ሺܾ ݎ ? ሻ݀ ݎሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
 
Because of the assumption that the economy is a net exporter of unskilled good, a reduction 
in price of unskilled good will reduce the welfare of the unskilled families. Turning to the 
effect on training decision and borrowing, Jafarey and Lahiri have shown that a decrease in 
the price of the exportable, for a given level of real income, would reduce the opportunity 
cost of education (a substitution effect) and therefore might increase training decision. The 
same will be true for the increase in real income. On the other hand a decrease in price of 
unskilled good would also decrease real income and thus encourage a decrease in training 
(the income effect). Hence the two effects are opposite while changes in training decision 
via interest rate  means an increase in interest rate  reduces training decision. 
 
Overall Jafarey and Lahiri suggest that a decrease in price of unskilled good has the 
potential to decrease training decision (increase child labour) if the income effect 
dominates the substitution effect. Their results hold even for the internationally perfect 
credit markets as well. On the other hand, a decrease in price increases the demand for 
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consumption in period 1 relative to period 2. But it also reduces the income of unskilled 
families in period 1. Similarly, any increase in the level of schooling will also increases 
future income and therefore the demand for loans. This indirectly raises the interest rate. 
What happens to the supply of loans? Supply comes from the rich households and Jafarey 
and Lahiri show that a decrease in price of unskilled good increases the supply of loans.  
 
According to them, a decrease in price of unskilled good will increase the income of the 
rich household as they do not participate  in the production of unskilled good. This will 
increase the supply of loan because education cannot be further increased. Jafarey and 
Lahiri compare the effects of a trade sanction under two scenarios: in the first case the 
borrowing constraint is assumed to be preventing loans from adjustment in response of 
changes in demand or supply of funds; in the second case Jafarey and Lahiri assume that 
market freely adjusts to a new equilibrium. According to Jafarey and Lahiri in the first 
case, when a decrease in P2 raises the demand for loans, for a given interest rate, training 
decision increases. Jafarey and Lahiri have proved that a low value of training decision is 
associated with a high marginal utility of both income and education. As low initial value 
of training decision is associated with low parental income in their model therefore a trade 
VDQFWLRQFRXOGFDXVHDGHFOLQHLQFKLOGUHQ¶VHGXFDWLRQDWOHDVWIRUKRXVHKROGVWKDWDUHSRRU
Jafarey and Lahiri stress that only those families that suffer large income effects as a result 
of trade sanctions send a large proportion of children to work. Summarizing the result for 
FDVH-DIDUH\DQG/DKLULFRQFOXGHWKDW³,QWKHSUHVHQFHRIDERUURZLQJFRQVWUDLQWDWUDGH
VDQFWLRQLQFUHDVHVDSRRUKRXVHKROG¶VGLVFRXQWUDWHZKLFKQHJDWLYHO\DIIHFWVLWVFKLOGUHQ¶V
HGXFDWLRQ´ 
 
Turning to the second case where supply of funds adjust in response to changes in demand, 
new equilibrium will arise where interest rate increases, still having negative effect on child 
labour. However, a comparison of both cases shows that the trade sanction is less likely to 
lead to perverse effects on child labour if the supply of loans can adjust in a competitive 
domestic credit market than if it cannot. To summarize, the analysis of Jafarey and Lahiri 
VXJJHVWHGWKDW³7KHGLVFount rate of poor households rises more strongly under borrowing 
constraints and rises less strongly or even falls under a domestic credit market. This implies 
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that a perverse effect from trade sanctions to child labour in poor households is less likely 
if FUHGLWLVDYDLODEOHDWWKHPDUJLQ´ 
 
b) Foreign capital, Returns to education & child labour by Dwibedi and Chaudhuri (2010) 
 
Recently Dwibedi and Chaudhuri (2010) using a three sector general equilibrium 
framework has shown that reduction in poverty does not necessarily transfer in the 
reduction of child labour. They argue that economic reforms like inflow of capital can affect 
the incidence of child labour by lowering the opportunities of child work. Although main 
analysis of their study revolves around the effect of foreign capital inflow on child labour 
but nevertheless they provide extensive detail on the relationship between child labour, 
wages and skilled composition. Dwibedi and Chaudhuri (2010) are the first to derive the 
supply function of child labour using inter temporal utility maximization behaviour. They 
consider a two period optimizing problem. Working family in their model consists of one 
adult and a child. They assume two different types of families; one with skill (S) and other 
without skill (L). In the first period adult wage is ଴ܹ, which is the sum of unskilled wage 
(W) and skilled wage ( ௦ܹሻ. Child schooling decision is assumed to be taken by adult in 
period 1 and the total time available to child is assumed to be 1. Out of the total time 
available, child used  ݈௖ time in work and receive wage ௖ܹ. Thus time spent in schooling is 
equal to  ? െ ௖݈ and if child is in sFKRROLQWKHILUVWSHULRGKHVKHZRQ¶WUHFHLYHZDJH ௖ܹ but 
earn skilled wage, ௦ܹ in period 2. Such that skilled wages is greater than unskilled wages, ௦ܹ ൐ ܹ due to positive returns to schooling. In period 2, adults do not work and lives on 
child income. 
 
Assuming that the parents only care about life time consumption and do not care for the 
child leisure, they derive the utility function based on two period (1, 2) consumption levels. 
They assumed logarithmic utility function with unitary inter temporal elasticity of 
substitution:  
 ܷ ൌ ݈݋݃ܥଵ ൅ ߚ݈݋݃ܥଶሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ  
 
Where ߚ is the time discounted factor. The first period consumption ܥଵ  depends on the 
adult income and child wage: 
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 ܥଵ ൌ ሺ ଴ܹ ൅ ݈௖ ௖ܹሻሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
 
Consumption in period 2 ሺܥଶሻ is the sum of the skilled wage of educated (skilled) adult 
labour (that went to school in the first period) and unskilled wage of uneducated (unskilled) 
adult labour (that went to work in period 1). 
 ܥଶ ൌ ሺ݈௖ܹ ൅ ሺ ? െ ௖݈ሻ ௌܹሻሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
 
It was assumed that cost of education is the only opportunity cost in terms of forgone 
earning of the children. Adult maximize the life time utility with respect to children time in 
labour, ݈௖ and subject to equation 2.6 and 2.7. First order condition thus can be written as: 
 ሺ௟೎ௐାሺଵି௟೎ሻௐೞሻௐబା௟೎ௐ೎ ൌ ఉሺௐೞିௐሻௐ೎              (2.8) 
 
By solving the above equation, child labour function for each working family is obtained 
as: 
 ݈௖ ൌ ௐೞሺଵାఉሻሺௐೞିௐሻ െ ఉሺௐబሻሺଵାఉሻௐ೎ ሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ  
 
and for the two families (skilled and unskilled) the supply functions can be written as: 
 ݈௖௦ ൌ ௦ܹሺ ? ൅ ߚሻሺ ௦ܹ െ ܹሻ െ ߚሺ ௦ܹሻሺ ? ൅ ߚሻ ௖ܹ ሺ ?Ǥ ? ?ሻ 
 ݈௖௨ ൌ ௦ܹሺ ? ൅ ߚሻሺ ௦ܹ െ ܹሻ െ ߚሺܹሻሺ ? ൅ ߚሻ ௖ܹ ሺ ?Ǥ ? ?ሻ 
 
As both skilled and unskilled families supply child labour the following can be concluded: 
 ݈௖௦ ൐  ?݂݅ܽ݊݀݋݈݊ݕ݂݅ ௖ܹ ൐ ߚሺ ௦ܹ െ ܹሻǢ ܽ݊݀ 
 ݈௖௨ ൐  ?݂݅ ௖ܹ ൒ ߚሺ ௦ܹ െ ܹሻ 
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Child labour supply function shows that any increase in the current income, will raise 
current consumption, and hence lower child time at work. It will also have positive income 
effect and consumption in period 2, will increase. However, any increase in the child wage 
rate will increase the opportunity cost of schooling and hence will lead to more child labour 
supply. Moreover, any changes in the skilled and unskilled wages will influence the returns 
to education and hence influence the decision made by adult in the period 1 about the 
FKLOG¶V VFKRROLQJ ,I VNLOOHG ZDJHV LQFUHDVH RU XQVNLOOHG ZDJHV GHFUHDVH LW ZLOO PDNH
education more attractive and hence child schooling will increase.. This will lower child 
labour supply.   
 
As explained earlier, Dwibedi and Chaudhuri (2010) consider a small open economy case 
with three sectors. The first sector is assumed to be employing adult unskilled labour (L), 
child labour (ܮ஼) and capital (K). This sector produces ܺଵ commodity. Second sector is 
assumed to use adult unskilled labour and capital only to produce low skilled commodity ܺଶ . Although this sector can also employ children but Dwibedi and Chaudhuri (2010) 
justify their assumption on the ground that 70% of the economically active children in the 
developing countries are engaged in the agriculture sector and only less than 9% is 
employed in the manufacturing sector (low skilled sector). Finally sector 3 is assumed to 
produce high skilled commodity ܺଷ using skilled labour (S) and capital only. Products are 
assumed to be final commodities and their prices ௜ܲԢݏ, are given by small open economy 
assumption. They also assumed competitive markets, CRS technologies with diminishing 
marginal productivities and full-employment of all resources. Price unit costs for the three 
sectors are given by: 
 ܹܽ௅ଵ ൅ ௖ܹܽ஼ଵ ൅ ܴܽ௄ଵ ൌ ଵܲሺ ?Ǥ ? ?ሻ 
 ܹܽ௅ଶ ൅ ܴܽ௄ଶ ൌ ଶܲሺ ?Ǥ ? ?ሻ 
 ௦ܹܽௌଷ ൅ ܴܽ௄ଷ ൌ ଷܲሺ ?Ǥ ? ?ሻ 
 
Where, ௝ܽ௜ ƍs are input output ratios and ܴ is the return to capital. 
 
Full employment conditions are given by: 
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ܽ௅ଵܺଵ ൅ ܽ௅ଶܺଶ ൌ ܮሺ ?Ǥ ? ?ሻ 
 ܽ஼ଵܺଵ ൌ ܮ௖ሺ ?Ǥ ? ?ሻ 
 ܽ௄ଵܺଵ ൅ ܽ௄ଶܺଶ ൅ ܽ௄ଷܺଷ ൌ ܭሺ ?Ǥ ? ?ሻ 
 ܽௌଷܺଷ ൌ ܵሺ ?Ǥ ? ?ሻ 
 
As there are ܮ and ܵ numbers of unskilled and skilled families supplying child labour in the 
economy the aggregate child labour supply function is written as: 
 ܮ௖ ൌ ቀ ଵଵାఉቁ ቂܮ ቄௐೄାோಹሺௐೄିௐሻ െ ఉǤሺௐାோಹௐ಴ ቅ ൅ ܵ ቄௐೄାோಹௐೄିௐ െ ఉǤሺௐೄାோಹሻௐ಴ ቅቃ ሺ ?Ǥ ? ?ሻ  
 
The above general equilibrium system consists of 8 equations and the same number of 
variables. This system shows that factor prices depend on both commodity prices and 
factor endowment. By totally differentiating the above system of equation they obtained 
the distributive share of ݆ݐ݄ input in the ݅ݐ݄ sector and the degree of substitution between 
factor ݆ and ݅ in the ܭݐ݄ sector.  
 
On the basis of the theoretical findings they made some final conclusion. According to 
their proposition any increase in the inflow of capital lowers the returns to capital leading 
to expansion in sector 2 and 3, and contraction in sector 1, as sector 1 is more labour 
intensive then sector 2 and 3. Under this condition demand for child labour falls in sector 1 
and demand for skilled labour increases in sector 3. This will result in a decrease in the 
child wage and a rise in the skilled wage.  A decrease in child wage rate means a decrease 
in the opportunity cost of schooling. In sector 2, demand for unskilled labour also increases 
leading to an increase in unskilled wages. As sector 3 is more capital intensive then sector 
2, saving on capital input is more in sector 3 then in sector 2. This in turn increases the 
relative wage inequalities. On the other hand, returns to education rise as wage inequality 
rises, thereby reducing the incidence of child labour.    
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c) Labour Market Reform and Incidence of Child Labour in a Developing Economy by 
Chaudhuri (2009) 
 
Similar to the above, in an earlier study, Chaudhuri (2009) considers a small open 
economy case to generalize the effect of changes in wage policy on child labour. The 
main difference between Dwibedi and Chaudhuri (2010) and Chaudhuri (2009) is 
that Chaudhuri (2009) emphasize on formal and informal sector while Dwibedi and 
Chaudhuri (2010) put emphasis on skilled and unskilled composition. Chaudhuri 
(2009) considers a case of two sectors, formal and informal (sector 1 is informal and 
sector 2 is formal) and three factors of production, adult labour (L), child labour (LC) 
and capital (K). The informal sector employs both adult labour and child labour apart 
from capital and produces commodity, X1. The formal sector produces commodity, X2 
by means of capital and adult labour only. Adult labour in his model is imperfectly mobile 
while capital is completely mobile and market for adult labour has imperfection. In the formal 
sector workers receive high wages, W*, while workers in informal sector earn only a 
competitive wage, W, such that wages in the formal sector is greater than the wages in the 
informal sector, W* >W.  
 
Following Basu and Van¶V (1998) µLuxury Axiom¶, he assumed that there exists a critical 
level of family incomeതܹതത, such that the families will send their children to work if and 
only if adult wage rate is less than critical level. It was further assumed that adult worker 
in the formal sector earns wage income greater than this critical level. Hence, workers 
working in the formal sector will not send their children to work. On the other hand, adult 
workers employed in the informal sector earn less than critical level of wage income 
and are therefore compelled to send their children to work in order to supplement family 
income. The supply function of child labour determined by Chaudhuri (2009) again 
shows the same properties as given in Dwibedi and Chaudhuri (2010). They assume that 
wages in the formal sector are higher than the informal sector because of the existence of 
well-organized trade unions to bargain with employers in respect of working conditions, 
benefits and wages. 
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Like Dwibedi and Chaudhuri (2010) using a general equilibrium system, comes up with 
the following proposition; whenever wages in the formal sector fall3, return to capital 
must rise in order to satisfy the zero profit condition. This will result in the less use of 
capital by the producers and the capital output ratio in the two sectors decreases. There 
would be an excess supply of capital which according to Chaudhuri (2009) will create a 
Rybczynski-type effect and as a result formal sector will expand while informal sector 
will contract. This will result in the fall in the production in informal sector. The fall in 
the production and rise in the return to capital would have two opposite effects on the 
informal sector. First, demand for adult labour and child labour falls, which exerts a 
downward pressure on wages, and second as return to capital rises producers substitute 
capital by labour. This will raise the labour output ratio which increases the demand for 
labour; both adult and child labour. The net effect on adult wages and child wages in 
the informal sector is ambiguous. According to Chaudhuri (2009) the child wages 
decline only if elasticity of substitution between adult labours to capital is greater than 
the elasticity of substitution between child labours to capital. While adult wages fall only 
if elasticity of substitution between adult labours to capital is less than the elasticity of 
substitution between child labours to capital. However, if the two elasticities of 
substitution are equal the proportionate fall in adult wages will be less than that in child 
wages. Hence, ratio of adult wages over child wages rises and the supply of child labour 
falls.  
 
d) Gender and Say: A Model of Household Behaviour with Endogenously Determined 
Balance of Power by Basu (2006) 
 
Basu (2006) presented a model for intra-household bargaining power. He suggests that the 
understanding of the relationship between household balance of power and household 
decision making is necessary to develop a policy design affecting household welfare. 
According to him all the recent literature modelling the impact of household bargaining 
power on household decision-making ignores the opposite relationship between the two i.e. 
                                                 
3
 Adult wages can change directly because of some policy measures such as minimum wage law or because 
of the economic development or may be because of the changes in the trade policy. Here Chaudhuri (2009) 
assumes that wages falls because of the policy reform. 
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the effect of decisions on bargaining power. His study provides some theoretical initiative 
to model both of these relations simultaneously. 
 
Basu (2006) assumed a household with two adults, male (1) and female (2) having distinct 
utility function. Household may be with and without children. Household maximizes the 
weighted average of these two distinct utility functions. The weight captures the bargaining 
power between the two. Let: 
    ߤ௜ǣԸା௡ ՜ Ըሺ ?Ǥ ? ?ሻ 
 
Where, Ը  is a real number, ݊  is the number of goods consumed by household ݅  is 
individual. A good could be anything consumed by the individual for example it may 
represent the leisure of the two. The argument ݔ א Ըା௡  of the utility function is a vector of 
goods consumed by the households. The household maximand function is given by: 
 ߗ ؠ ߠߤଵሺݔሻ ൅ሺ ? െ ߠሻߤଶሺݔሻሺ ?Ǥ ? ?ሻ 
 
Where, ߠ א ሾ ? ?ሿ that captures the balance of power in the house. According to Basu, ߠ 
depends on other variables like wages, inherited wealth and cultural factors. Assuming that 
there are ݖ numbers of variables that determine balance of power ԢߠԢ the bargaining power 
function can be written as a function ofԢݖԢ number of variables ԢߠሺݖሻԢ. Where ݖ is assumed 
to be exogenous under the collective household model. The household maximization 
function can be written as follow: 
 ܯܽݔߠሺݖሻߤଵሺݔሻ ൅ሺ ? െ ߠሺݖሻሻߤଶሺݔሻሺ ?Ǥ ? ?ሻ 
 
Subject to: ݔ א Ըା௡  and ݌ݔ ൑ ܻ 
 
Where ݌ is the vector of prices and ܻ the total income of the household. The budget set ܶ 
hence given as: 
 ܶ ൌ ሼݔ א Ըା௡ ȁ݌ݔ ൑ ܻሽሺ ?Ǥ ? ?ሻ 
 
Here if income and prices remain constant than household expenditure pattern can change 
with the changes in the exogenous variables ԢݖԢ. This will shift the balance of power. 
Although the model is very simple but one short coming of this model according to Basu is 
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that here variables that determine balance of power are considered as exogenous. This may 
not be necessary in every situation. It is reasonable to believe that balance of power 
changes with the choice of ݔ)RUH[DPSOHEDODQFHRISRZHULQFUHDVHVZKHQWKHZRPDQ¶V
earning power increases. Her earning power not only depends on the prevailing market 
wages but also on the hours of work. The hours of work in turn are determined by the 
household. Hence, balance of power can be influenced by the household decision, a point 
which was usually ignored by other studies. The problem therefore needs to be addressed. 
In order to keep the model simple Basu assumes that balance of power depends not only on 
exogenous factors but also on ݔ i.e ߠ ൌ ߠሺݖǡ ݔሻ. Now for a given balance of power the 
household maximize utility by choosing ݔ which in-turn effect balance of power. Therefore 
household further adjust ݔ . To come up with the solution Basu first describes the 
maximization problem as: 
 ݔ ൌ ߟሺ݌ǡ ܻǡ ߠሻሺ ?Ǥ ? ?ሻ 
 
Given prices, income and balance of power ሺ݌ǡ ܻǡ ߠሻ, a household equilibrium is therefore 
an index of bargaining power ߠכ  and a vector of goods ݔכ , such that ߠכ ൌ ߠሺݖǡ ݔכሻǡܽ݊݀ݔכ ൌ ߟሺ݌ǡ ܻǡ ߠכሻ. According to Basu, there may exist more than one equilibrium.  
 
Basu argues that equilibrium must exist. He proves that household maximand function ߗis 
concave and continuous. Therefore, ߗmust reach to a maximum point to some unique 
value of ݔ  in the domain ܶ . This shows that ߟሺ݌ǡ ܻǡ ߠሻ  is a function and as prices and 
income are fixed it becomes the function on the domain [1, 0]. After fixing the value of 
exogenous variables, income and prices ሺݖ, ܻ and ݌) he define: ߮ǣ ܶܺሾ ?ǡ  ?ሿ ՜ ܶܺሾ ?ǡ  ?ሿis 
a response function if for all ሺݔǡ ߠሻ߳ܶܺሾ ?ǡ  ?ሿǡ ߮ሺݔǡ ߠሻ ؠ  ሺݔᇱǡ ߠᇱሻݏݑ݄ܿݐ݄ܽݐݔᇱ ൌߟሺ݌ǡ ܻǡ ߠሻ and ߠᇱ ൌ ߠሺݖǡ ݔሻ. Given condition ܶ is non empty hence ܶܺሾ ?ǡ  ?ሿ is also non 
empty and because of condition ߠ is continuous hence ߮ is a continuous function. Using 
%URXZHU¶VIL[HGSRLQWWKHRUHPKHFRQFOXGHGWKDWWKHUHH[LVWሺݔכǡ ߠכሻ such that ߮ሺݔכǡ ߠכሻ ൌሺݔכǡ ߠכሻǤ 
 
The above household bargaining power was then applied to explain the child work status. 
But before explaining the effect he made further assumptions. First he assumed that both 
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mother and father feel bad about child labour. Secondly, although they feel bad about child 
labour but they have their differences about how and on what to spend the additional 
income that the child brings. The cost of child labour thus: 
 ܿ௜ ൌ ܿሺ݄ሻǡܿᇱ ൐  ?ܽ݊݀ ᇱܿᇱ ൐  ?ሺ ?Ǥ ? ?ሻ 
Where, ݄  is the work done by child. Assume that women like to spend the additional 
income on good 1 while husband want to spend the additional income on good 2 ± good ݔ௜. 
The utility function would now be:  
 ߤ௜ ൌ ߮ݔ௜ െ ܿሺ݄ሻ, where, ߮ᇱ ൐  ?ǡ ᇱ߮ ൑  ?ሺ ?Ǥ ? ?ሻ 
 
Assuming the amount of work done by adult is fixed the household maximand can be written 
as:  ߗ ؠ ߠߤଵሺݔሻ ൅ሺ ? െ ߠሻߤଶሺݔሻ െ ܿሺ݄ሻሺ ?Ǥ ? ?ሻ 
 
Taking the price of a good as 1 and wage of child as ݓ the budget constraint can be written 
as: ݔଵ ൅ݔଶ ൌ ݄ݓ ൅ ݓଵ ൅ ݓଶሺ ?Ǥ ? ?ሻ 
 
Solving the maximization problem subject to budget constraint shows a special case where: 
 ߮ሺݔ௜ሻ ൌ ݔ௜ఈ ǡݓ݄݁ݎ݁ ?ߙ ൑  ?ሺ ?Ǥ ? ?ሻ 
 
This is a concave function having a linear special case when ߙ ൌ  ?. This shows that as the 
bargaining power, ߠ  increases (starting from 0), child labour first declines; but as ߠ 
continues to rise (beyond 1/2), child labour again rises [see Basu (2006) for prove]. 
 
7KHWKHRUHPLPSOLHV WKDW WKHUHODWLRQEHWZHHQDZRPDQ¶VSRZHUDQGWKHDPRXQWRIFKLOG
labour is U-shaped. The intuition given by Basu is straight forward. According to him child 
labour is painful for both parents. The difference between the two is only on the spending 
of the additional income. When the bargaining power of the two fairly matched, that is 
balance of power is 1/2, ሺߠ ൌ ଵଶሻ changes in balance of power will have little effect on the 
cost of child labour. The benefits of the additional income generated by sending the child to 
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work will not be fully reaped by any of the two, as ߠis close to half, creating a tussle 
between good 1 and 2. But neither of the two gets the full benefit of the additional income. 
The net result is that the child will be less likely to work. On the other hand, if balance of 
power goes to 1 or to 0, only one parent becomes powerful and so he/she will gain the full 
benefits of child labour therefore child work will increase. 
 
According to Basu the above result (U-shape) would only be violated if one assumed that 
women are more inclined towards the welfare of her child, then the amount of child labour 
will be less when balance of power is equal to 1 ሺߠ ൌ  ?ሻ  than when balance of power is 
equal to 0 ሺߠ ൌ  ?ሻ.  In that case the child labour curve, instead of being U-shaped, would 
be tau-shaped.  
 
2.3 Literature on Pakistan 
 
As far as the literature on Pakistan is concerned table 2.1 summarises the findings of few of 
the recent studies on Pakistan in detail. Findings indicate that the literature on child labour 
is usually approached by economists in Pakistan from supply side. There is small literature 
available that explores the demand side of child labour. In Pakistan poverty, low literacy 
level and household composition/demography are often considered as the most important 
determinants of child labour, when the problem is addressed at micro level. At micro level 
as said above poverty is considered as the main cause of child labour. Altruistic parents 
take the decision to send their children to labour because of poverty. A look on the table 
2.1 suggests that literature exploring the determinants of child labour has explored either 
poverty and child labour nexus or human capital and child labour nexus. The Cultural 
norms are also considered as an important factor affecting incidence of child labour 
significantly. Recently household decision making models, bargaining models, have also 
been used to explain the decisions about household consumption expenditure and 
expenditure on child schooling. 
 
As far as demand side studies are concerned these are either case studies or based on cross 
tabulation of Labour Force Survey of Pakistan. The demand side literature based on simple 
crosstabs has highlighted some of the features of labour market like employment status, 
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working hour, child wages, sectoral compositions, unemployment and wage rate. However, 
the literature fails to provide an in-depth analysis of effect of labour market conditions on 
child labour incidence. Furthermore, at macro level the effect of growth, trade openness 
and FDI has also been explored. But overall literature in Pakistan emphasizes more on 
supply side determinant rather than demand side. The supply side determinant is usually 
explored using micro data. A very less emphasis is place on the macro data as well. 
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Table2.1: Literature on Pakistan 
Authors Variables Used 
Estimation 
Techniques & Data 
Objectives Major Findings 
Shahnaz Hamid 
(1994) 
child labour (5-14), 
in school or out of school, 
child characteristic, 
household characteristics, 
Household head 
employment status. 
None 
Cross tabs Using 
IFPRI (1986) 
1. Estimate urban child 
Labour supply  
2. Evaluate working 
condition. 
1.  Out of the total working children 5% are private regular employee, 1% 
are self-employee, 2% involved in joint work. 
2.  Dropout rates are not important as 91% children never went to school. 
3.  Out of the total working children 37% earn Rs. 200 per month. 
4.  Other important factors that influence child labour includes household 
income, gender, educational level and occupational status of the 
household head. 
Mahmood 
Moazam, Tariq 
Javed and 
Ajmal Baig 
(1994) 
Children not in school 
Theoretical framework 
 
1. Study explores the effect 
of poverty  
2. Demographic implication 
of child labour and 
3. implication for labour 
market 
1. Child labour can proliferate by the dominion across sectors. This 
dominion is composed of both supplementary and substitution 
effect.  
2. Child labour will have a higher incidence in the labour intensive 
exporting sector. 
3. Child labour has significant effect on fertility rate.  
4. Child labour can enforce constraint on adult female labour force 
participation rate. 
Younous Jafri 
and Raishad 
(1997) 
Participation rate of (10-14), 
Child characteristics across 
industries, employment 
status, household income 
and periodicity of earning 
None 
Cross tabs Using 
LFS- (1990-1) 
(1991-2) 
(1992-3) 
Analysing child labour 
phenomenon across 
different time period 
1. Child labour grew up from 1.8 million in 1990-91 to 2.0 million in 
1992-93 
2. The growth of girl workers is higher as compared to boys. 
3. Gender differential in participation is more pronounced in urban areas 
than in rural areas 
4. In rural areas agriculture has engaged the maximum number of 
children 
5. In urban areas, the services sector has played the dominant role 
because service sector in urban areas is still largely dominated by the 
informal sector 
6. Employment status indicates that children mostly work as unpaid 
family helpers, 70% worked 35 hours per week. 
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Authors Variables Used 
Estimation 
Techniques & Data 
Objectives Major Findings 
Sabur Ghayur 
(1996) 
Child labour, 
Labour Market conditions 
such as unemployment, 
sectoral composition, 
informal sector, poverty, 
working conditions, hours of 
work, wages and income 
None cross tabs Using 
Secondary data and 
personal observation 
To explore the labour 
market conditions, in the 
context of prevailing child 
labour. 
 
 
1. Labour market is mainly informal in nature 
2. Self-employed and unpaid family helpers account for about two-thirds 
of the total employed. 
3. Highly skewed land ownership pattern generate extremely low income 
for the large proportion of the workers engaged in agriculture 
4. Labour force survey of 1993-94 indicate that 42.13% employed labour 
force were drawing a monthly income less than Rs 1500 
5. One-third of the employed in Pakistan found to be working 56 hours a 
week 
6. The industrial classification of child labour is such that two-thirds of 
them work in the agricultural sector. Further three fourths of them 
were in rural areas and are unpaid family helpers, while a three-fifths 
of those working in urban areas are employees, mainly engaged in 
the informal sector 
Akmal Hussain  
(1998) 
Working children, 
Work environment and 
Index of work hazards 
 
Cross tabs Using 
400 worker in 200 
small scale 
establishment of 7 
industries in Lahore 
(1990) 
To explore the nature and 
extent of hazards faced by 
child workers in the 
construction related 
industries, keeping in mind 
that the number of children 
in the large-scale formal 
sector may have declined 
but child work persists to a 
significant extent by means 
of the "Contract System".  
1. In Urban and semi-urban areas, most of the working children are 
employed in small scale unregistered establishments, in the informal 
sector. 
2.  Children remain employee of a contractor in the informal sector while 
actually working for the larger industries 
3. Children earn an average monthly income of Rs. 200. 
4. child workers in the construction related industries are facing at least 
16 different hazards 
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Authors Variables Used 
Estimation 
Techniques & Data 
Objectives Major Findings 
Rana Ejaz Ali 
Khan 
(2001) 
Working children, 
child characteristic, 
parent characteristics, 
Employment situation. 
None 
Cross tabs Using 
Sample survey of 
children working in 
Auto workshop 
a) explore socio-economic 
background 
b)  reasons for leaving 
schools 
c)  extent of exploitation 
1. Child labour in auto workshops is 30%. 
2. Child labour exists equally in heavy as well as light vehicle 
workshops. 
3. There is no bonded child labour in auto workshops. 
4. The daily working hours are 11.45 on average. 
5. Majority of the children have not completed the primary level  
6. 31% of children, belongs to households where heads are in private 
employment 
Ranjan Ray 
(2001) 
Age specific participation 
rate below 17, 
Child Characteristics, 
Household Characteristics, 
Cluster/community 
characteristics 
two-step procedure 
after correcting for 
sample selectivity 
Using 
PIHS, Pakistan (1991) 
PLSS, Peru (1995) 
To explore the Key 
determinants of Child 
Labour hours in Pakistan 
and Peru 
1. There is a negative association between years of schooling and 
household poverty. 
2. income from child labour pulls more households out of poverty in 
Pakistan than in Peru 
3. When a Pakistani household falls into poverty, it increases child's 
involvement outside. 
4. In contrast, the Peruvian data fail to detect any significant association 
between household poverty and child labour or between household 
poverty & schooling. 
M. Aslam 
Choudhary and 
Farzana 
Naheed Khan 
(2002) 
age (5-14), 
child characteristic 
Household characteristics 
employment condition 
None 
Cross tabs Using 
125 working children 
In Dera ismail Khan 
City of Pakistan 
To identify relationship 
between child labour and 
variables such as poverty, 
fertility and adult literacy 
rate etc. Consequences of 
child labour on working 
children, considering 
working hours, behaviour of 
bosses and health status of 
children 
1. Poverty is the main cause of child labour in the city. 
2. Fertility, family size, adult illiteracy and schooling system also 
contribute to the supply of child labour. 
3. Situation is comparatively less serious for female child labour. 
4. Parents think that poor quality of education does not add to the 
FKLOGUHQ¶VDELOLW\WRLPSURYHSURGXFWLYLW\ 
5. Working conditions were poor and dangerous and harmed children by 
ruining their eyesight, bone deformations, chronic lung diseases, and 
sometimes resulted in the death of children. 
Gautandr 
Hazarika and 
Arjun S. Bedi 
(2003) 
weekly work hours, 
Child characteristics, 
Educational profile, 
Community and regional 
controls 
Tobit, 
Heckman Two steps, 
Probit model Using 
Pakistan Integrated 
Household Survey 
(1991) 
Explore Schooling as policy 
variable  using the concept 
of intra household (with in) 
child labour supply and 
extra household (outside) 
child labour supply 
1. Schooling cost is positively related to extra household child labour 
supply. 
2. Intra household child labour supply is unresponsive to schooling cost. 
3. Parents consider extra household labour and schooling as substitute. 
Rana Ijaz Ali 
Khan 
(2003) 
Child in school, 
Child school + work, 
Child Work only, 
Neither in school nor work, 
Sequential probit 
model Using 
Sample survey of two 
districts 
whether and to what 
extent changes in the 
education, household 
income, education level of 
1. Birth order has negative effect on schooling only decision. 
2. The male children are more likely to go to school as compared to 
female children. 
3. 7KHKHDGRIWKHKRXVHKROGVDUHFULWLFDOLQGHWHUPLQLQJWKHFKLOG¶V
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Authors Variables Used 
Estimation 
Techniques & Data 
Objectives Major Findings 
child characteristic 
Household characteristics 
 
parents, unemployment 
level of parents and the 
demographic factor 
could effectively reduce 
child labour 
schooling and labour decision. 
4. Younger children are less likely to combine schooling with work. 
5. 0RWKHU¶VHGXFDWLRQLVQHJDWLYHO\related to the decision of combining 
school and work. 
6. 0RWKHU¶VLQFRPHKDVDSRVLWLYHUHODWLRQZLWKWKHSUREDELOLW\RIWKH
child combining school and work and has negative relation to no-
school, no work decision. 
7. The birth order of the child is negatively related to work only. 
8. Education of the head of the household has significant and negative 
LPSDFWRQFKLOG¶VZRUN 
9. The higher the birth orders the more likely him /her to be in the state 
of no school no work. 
10. 0RWKHU¶VLQFRPHDQGHPSOR\PHQWERWKKDYHDnegative impact on no-
school no-work activity 
Umer Khalid 
and Lubna 
Shahnaz 
(2004) 
Participation rate 10-14, 
child characteristic, 
Household characteristics 
None 
Cross tabs Using 
LFS-(1996-7) 
Explore Socio-economic 
background 
1. A higher proportion of children between the age cohorts of 12-14 
years are involved in work and the majority of them are male. 
2. Working children are found uneducated and working without any 
technical training. 
3. Majority work in the elementary (unskilled) occupations. 
4. 58 per cent of working children earn monthly wages up to 1000 
rupees. 
5. Majority work nearly 40-50 hours per week. 
6. Parent's occupational status and educational level are together linked 
to child labour. 
Imran Ashraf 
Toor 
(2005) 
Child Labour rate (10-14), 
Per capita income, literacy 
rate, deprivation index, 
household size 
Multiple Linear 
Regression Using 
Pakistan Population 
Census (1998) 
Exploring hypothesis that 
child labour incidence is 
high among less deprived 
district 
1. Multiple Deprivation index composed of a) Out of school children (b) 
Inadequate Housing structure (c) Residential housing services and 
(d) Unemployment rate, shows negative association with child labour 
incidence. 
2. Result shows that child labour has a negative relationship with the 
literacy rate and per capita income as well 
Rafia Kulsoom  
(2009) 
Working Children age 
(11-17),Child income, 
Work experience, age, 
working hours, household 
per capita income, age of 
parents& # earners  
Maximum Likelihood 
Estimates Using 
Sample Survey of 150 
male Children from 
Rawalpindi 
study assessed several 
demographic characteristics 
as basic determinant of the 
incidence of child labour in 
Rawalpindi city 
1. The major determinant of child labour is poverty. 
2. Age of the child has a positive impact on participation decisions. 
3. The ownership of asset has shown a negative impact on participation 
decisions. 
4. weekly working hours is also statistically significant 
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Authors Variables Used 
Estimation 
Techniques & Data 
Objectives Major Findings 
Xiaohui Hou 
(World Bank 
Economic Policy 
and Poverty 
Unit) 
(2009) 
Children going to school 
only, 
Children working only 
And neither in school nor 
working, 
Household Demographic 
Variables, 
Household 
Expenditure/Income, 
Productive assets held, 
Community Characteristics 
Multinomial Logit 
model, 
Fixed Effect Test 
Using 
Data from 1998-2006, 
time series and cross 
Sectional data. 
Pakistan Integrated 
Household Survey 
(1998-9); (2001-2) and 
(2005-6) 
Explore the relationship for 
wealth, child labour and 
Schooling 
1. When per capita log expenditures increases, rural boys are less likely 
to work. 
2. Wealth plays an insignificant role in deterPLQLQJUXUDOJLUOV¶DFWLYLW\
decisions.  
3. Study does not find the inverted U-relationship between agricultural 
land and propensity of child work. 
4. Children in households with agricultural land are less likely to be 
Inactive. 
5. Children in households with land are more likely to go to school. 
6. Children in households with any farm animals are more likely to work. 
7. Rural boys are more likely to work and less likely to be inactive when 
they get older 
Akhtar A. Hai, 
Ambreen 
Fatima and 
Mahpara 
sadaqat 
(2010) 
Child labour percentage, 
Child characteristic, 
Household and household 
head characteristics 
Cross tabs and 
correlations and 
Simple OLS Using 
217 household with 
1,639 individuals 
Paper explore the extent 
and the effect of socio-
economic and demographic 
factors that lead to the 
phenomenon of child labour 
in the fishing sector of 
Balochistan 
(province of Pakistan) 
The findings of the paper show that in the coastal areas about 30 
percent of the children are involved in fishing. It is observed that the 
main cause of child labour is not poverty it comes out to be low quality of 
education, lack of job opportunity, and lack of development. 
Uzma Iram and 
Ambreen 
Ftaima 
(2008) 
Percentage of child labour 
(10-14), 
FDI, trade openness, GDP 
per capita, value added of 
agriculture sector in GDP 
and urban population  
Multivariate vector 
autoregressive (VAR) 
model Using 
Annual data 
1970-2003 
Paper investigates the 
causal links between FDI, 
openness and child labour. 
1. Study rejects the null hypothesis of no-co integration at 1 percent 
significant level. 
2. Cointegration coefficients normalized on child labour shows that 
openness and the percent of urban population have a positive and 
significant impact on child labour, while the agriculture share in GDP 
and FDI have significant negative effect on child labour. 
46 
 
Authors Variables Used 
Estimation 
Techniques & Data 
Objectives Major Findings 
Sonia Bhalotra 
(2004) 
Expenditure on child 
clothing, expenditure on 
adult clothing tea, coffee 
and tobacco, 
Wages, 
Proportion of children (10-
14), proportion of adult male 
and female, 
Land size, tenancy, 
occupational status and 
schooling variables. 
Two-step generalized 
PHWKRGRIPRPHQW¶V
estimator (GMM) 
Using 
Pakistan Integrated 
Household Survey 
(1991); Using 2,400 
rural households 
containing 18,382 
individuals 
Investigate the relative 
weight on child consumption 
LQWKHSDUHQWV¶XWLOLW\
function; i.e. whether child 
consumption exhibits a 
positive co-variation with 
adult consumption. 
1. The null of egoistic parents is rejected. For every additional rupee 
spent on adult clothing, expenditure on child clothing increases by 
0.52 of a rupee. 
2. The weight that parents attach to child consumption is positive but 
smaller than the weight they attach to their own consumption. 
3. The results are robust for alternative specification used with one 
exception when tobacco expenditure increases, there is no increase 
in expenditure on child clothing. A possible interpretation is 
therefore that there are deviations from altruism amongst those 
households that contain a smoker. 
4. The main result is robust to a number of alternative specifications 
such as allowing for non-separability of child consumption and adult 
leisure, and allowing for the presence of child labour. 
 
Sonia Bhalotra 
(2007) 
Hours of wage work, 
Non labour income, age, 
household size, proportion 
of male/female in different 
age group, Parents age and 
Education, household Head 
age and gender, land size, 
religion and Province 
OLS, 2SLS, GMM and 
Probit model Using 
Pakistan Integrated 
Household Survey 
(1991) 
Test the hypothesis that 
child labour is compelled by 
poverty 
1. The wage elasticity is significantly negative for boys. The hypothesis 
that boys work on account of poverty compulsions cannot be 
rejected. The estimates suggest that if wage rate of boys drops, he 
works longer hours to make up the loss in earnings.  
2. +RXVHKROGLQFRPHKDVDQHJDWLYHLPSDFWRQER\V¶ZRUNHODVWLFLW\
(0.63). 
3. Substitution effects associated with land ownership dominate wealth 
effects for girls, but not for boys. Girls in households that own 
relatively large plots of land are more likely to work.  
4. *LUOV¶ZRUNLVQRWFRPSHOOHGE\SRYHUW\ 
5. Household income had a large and negative effect on boy labour, 
but no significant effect on girl labour. 
6.  parents in this sample being more altruistic towards boys than girls 
7. Land ownership reduces the hours of work for boys but not girls. 
Sonia Bhalotra 
and Christopher 
Heady 
(2003) 
Hours of child work, school 
attendance, land ownership, 
land size, food per capita 
expenditure, agriculture 
wage rate in a community, 
education attainment of 
adults, unemployment rate 
at community level, level of 
infrastructure in the 
Tobit and probit model 
using Ghana Living 
Standard Survey 
1991/2 and Pakistan 
Integrated Household 
Survey (1991) 
Explains the phenomenon 
of wealth paradox by 
testing: (1) A zero 
coefficient on land size 
means either all markets 
are perfect or the credit 
market is perfect and either 
of the other two is perfect. 
(2) Positive coefficient on 
1. The wealth paradox can be explained in terms of imperfections in 
land and labour markets. This effect appears to dominate on  effect 
of credit market imperfections 
2. Farm size has highly significant positive effect on both boys & girls. 
3. Household per capita consumption has negative effect on child 
work, even after correcting for its endogeneity. An increase in the 
consumption of 10% is associated with a reduction in the probability 
RIER\V¶ZRUNabout 5 percentage points. 
4. *LUO¶VKRXUVRIZRUNLQFUHDVHZLWKWKHIDUPVL]H7KLVSRLQWRXW
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Authors Variables Used 
Estimation 
Techniques & Data 
Objectives Major Findings 
community, schooling cost 
at community level, 
household size, female 
head, child age, relationship 
with head and birth order of 
the child. 
land means either all three 
markets are imperfect or the 
credit market is perfect but 
other two are imperfect. (3) 
Negative coefficient on land 
means either all three 
markets are imperfect, or 
credit markets are imperfect 
and one of the land or the 
labour market is perfect. 
towards the imperfections in the land and labour markets. This 
effect is consistent with the imperfect credit market.   
5. Children from larger households are not more likely to work. 
6. Land tenancy significantly affects child labour. 
7. The re-estimation of model using school attendance shows that In 
Ghana, there is no wealth paradox exist as acreage of farm land is 
insignificant in the equations for both boys and girls. In Pakistan, the 
wealth paradox is evident in farm labour case, for the girls and not 
for the boys 
 
 
48 
 
3. The Effect of Globalization and credit Market Imperfections on the Incidence of 
Child Labour 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the link between globalization, defined as 
an increase in trade openness and penetration of FDI, and the incidence of child labour 
while taking into account the role of credit market imperfections. The empirical 
assessment is based on the panel data comprising of 129 developing countries for four 
decades from 1970 to 2010. The basic proposition is that trade sanctions may reduce the 
demand for unskilled workers and minimize their wages; poor families when unable to 
borrow may have no alternative but to send their children to work. The chapter 
contributes to the existing literature of globalization and child labour not only by 
exploring the role of credit market imperfections but also by highlighting the changes in 
exports, incorporating the Jafarey and Lahiri (2002) model of trade sanction and credit 
market imperfectionV,WIXUWKHUFULWLFDOO\H[DPLQHV(GPRQG¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWWKH
channel through which trade could affect child labour is income because the proportion 
of child labour in the exporting sector is negligible. Another major contribution of the 
article is related to analysing the gender differences which previous cross country 
studies have mainly overlooked.   
 
There already exists an extensive amount of literature on the factors explaining 
incidence of child labour but it primarily  focuses on modelling the demand and supply 
of child labour and determining its welfare implications (as evident from chapter 2). 
Very few studies have empirically tested the effect of globalization and credit market 
imperfection on the incidence of child labour. According to Edmonds and Pavcnik 
(2006) the interaction of trade and child labour has received considerable theoretical 
attention but empirical evidence on the topic is very scarce.  
 
On the theoretical sides Maskus (1997) developed a two-sector model, wherein child 
labour is viewed as a specific factor employed in the exportable sector and adult labour 
is viewed as a mobile factor.  Maskus (1997) showed that opening up to trade raises the 
output of the exportable sector and thus increases the demand for child labour and child 
wages both. Working on a two sector general equilibrium model Chaudhuri and Gupta 
(2004) pointed out that the effect of trade on incidence of child labour crucially depends 
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on the relative factor intensities within the sectors. According to them if the import 
competing sector is capital intensive and receives tariff protection, then a reduction in 
import tariffs may lower the supply of child labour. On the other hand, if the import-
competing sector is more labour-intensive it may increase the incidence of child labour.  
 
Jafarey and Lahiri (2002) (as explained in section 2.2) presented a two-period two-good 
model to demonstrate that trade can increase child labour among poor households; a 
possibility that decreases as their access to credit improves. They argue that trade 
sanctions reduce the price of exportable goods thereby reducing the demand for 
unskilled labour, including child labour (it is assumed in their model country is a net 
exporter of unskilled good). At the same time it also decreases the income of the 
unskilled family and increases the opportunity cost of schooling which leads to a higher 
supply of child labour. Hence trade sanctions end up with two opposing effects which 
they call substitution and income effect; the net effect depends on the respective 
magnitude of the two. More recently Dwibedi and Chaudhuri (2010) using three sector4 
general equilibrium model, demonstrate that an in-flow of foreign capital leads to (i) an 
increase in both adult unskilled wages and skilled wages; and, (ii) a decrease in child 
wage rate and (iii) a fall in the return to capital. The skilled±unskilled wage inequality 
worsens if the high-skill sector is capital intensive relative to the low-skill sector. An in-
flow of foreign capital lowers the incidence of child labour in the economy if the high-
skill sector is capital-intensive. This could be because saving on capital input in the 
high skilled sector is more than that in low skilled sector which increases the relative 
wage inequality. A fall in child wage implies a decrease in the opportunity cost of 
education. The wage inequality also raises return to education and incomes from the 
non-child source of both unskilled and skilled working families. This will lower the 
supply of child labour via positive income effect. Hence, if high-skill sector is capital 
intensive all these three effects work in the same direction and lower the incidence of 
child labour. 
 
While on the empirical sides, Cigno et al., (2002), using the non-attendance rate in 
primary schooling and child labour force participation rate, found out that trade 
openness5 is negatively associated with the child labour force participation rate, but not 
                                                 
4
 Sector 1 produces agriculture goods, sector 2 produces low skilled commodity while sector 3 produces 
high skilled good. 
5
 XVLQJ6DFKVDQG:DUQHU¶VLQGH[RIRSHQQHVV 
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with the primary school non-attendance rate. Using a panel of Vietnamese KRXVHKROGV¶ 
living standard measurement survey, Edmonds and Pavcnik (2002) found that greater 
market integration is associated with less child labour. Considering the possible 
endogeneity in trade, Edmonds and Pavcnik, (2006) analyse the effect of trade ratio on 
child labour for the year 1995. They address the endogeneity in openness by using trade 
based on geography as an instrument for openness. They assume that trade 
instrumented by geographical indicators has no relationship to child labour except 
through its effect on total trade flows. Their result shows that openness is negatively 
associated with child labour if income is excluded from the regression model, 
concluding that trade lowered child labour, but via its positive effect on per capita 
income.  
 
After rejecting the presence of possible endogeneity in their model, Neumayer and De 
Soysa (2005) examined the relationship between trade openness, FDI, and child labour 
in a cross-sectional setting using the data of 1995. From their findings it is quite evident 
that countries more open to trade and having a higher stock of FDI have a lower 
incidence of child labour. Davies and Voy, (2009) exploring the role of financial 
development (FDI) and trade, after correcting the endogeneity in both trade and FDI, 
concluded that FDI and Trade openness results in  reducing the incidence of child 
labour by increasing the income.  
 
The extent that child labour is caused by capital market imperfections is studied in great 
detail by Ranjan P. (2001), Beegle, Dehejia and Gatti (2005 and 2006). According to 
these studies, capitDO PDUNHW LPSHUIHFWLRQV LQWHUIHUH ZLWK WKH SDUHQWV¶ DELOLW\ WR PDNH
inter-temporal trade-offs. Child labour can arise due to credit constraints such as the 
absence of well-functioning capital markets. Ranjan P. (2001) presents a positive 
relationship among the inequality in income distribution, capital market imperfections, 
and the incidence of child labour. Beegle et al. (2006) examine the relationship between 
household income shocks and child labour. They observe how a transitory income 
shock (measured by accidental crop loss) leads to an increase in child labour and how 
household access to credit moderates the effects of these shocks [Beegle et al. (2006)]. 
Dehejia and Gatti (2005) look at the role of financial development and income 
variability across countries and their impact on child labour in a panel data setting. 
Their findings indicate that child labour is significantly and negatively related to 
51 
 
financial development. Their result also proves that income variability has a greater 
effect on child labour in countries where financial markets are under-developed 
[Dehejia and Gatti (2005)].  
 
The above mentioned studies can easily be sub-divided into two broad groups: one that 
incorporates the effect of trade (a few also include FDI as well) on child labour, while 
the second investigates the effect of income inequality and credit market imperfections 
on child labour. The end result is that studies have either looked into the effect of trade 
only, or the effect of credit only. For example, the three most recent studies on 
globalization which addressed the issue of endogeneity first time i.e. Edmonds and 
Pavcnik, (2006), Neumayer and De Soysa (2005) and Davies and Voy (2009) do not 
take into account the role of credit market. Although (as mentioned earlier) Jafarey and 
Lahiri (2002) theoretically demonstrate that countries more open to trade are more 
likely to have lower interest rates and a developed credit market which lowers the 
opportunity cost of schooling and thereby reduces  child labour. Further to this, another 
neglected issue is the presence of possible endogeneity in the credit variable, and 
although the issue is not explicitly raised in any of the studies, Dehejia and Gatti (2005) 
split the countries in their sample into low and high credit groups to control for the 
presence of endogeneity. 
 
Moreover all of the above-cited studies have either explored the role of international 
trade, FDI or credit market imperfections on the incidence of child labour, overlooking 
the effect of changes in export due to trade sanctions. The effect was first discussed by 
Maskus (1997) and is taken up more recently by Jafarey and Lahiri (2002). According 
to these two studies overall incidence of child labour may decline due to income effect 
of the trade but in export related industries child labour incidence could increase due to 
the result of an increase in demand for cheap labour. Hence it may be argued that the 
effect of trade could be different than the effect of export only. 
 
Keeping all these arguments into consideration the following chapter evaluates the 
effects of international trade, FDI and credit market imperfections on the incidence of 
child labour. It also tests empirically the model presented by Jafarey and Lahiri (2002) 
by taking into account the effect of changes in export on child labour. Particularly, the 
study addresses the following three sets of questions:  
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x After controlling for endogeneity does income remains a significant determinant of 
the child labour participation rate± Is the effect sensitive to different measures of 
income? What role does inequality in income play? 
x Do credit markets or financial development matter for the child labour incidence 
rate with particular reference to trade sanctions? Does the endogeneity in credit 
market matter?  
x What role does globalization (captured via trade volume and penetration of FDI in 
the economy) play? Does it lead to more child employment? ± Is the effect 
channelled through income? Does the effect of trade differ from the effect of 
exports? 
 
The rest of the chapter is organized into following sub-sections: section 3.2 discusses 
theoretical foundation for the study, section 3.3 explores the trends in the child labour 
data, section 3.4 sheds light on the estimation technique and data employed, section 3.5 
discusses the results and final section concludes. 
 
3.2 Theoretical Foundation 
 
Empirical analysis of this chapter is based on the theoretical model which was proposed 
by Jafarey and Lahiri (2002) and on arguments put forth by Edmonds (2009). The 
theoretical model of Jafarey and Lahiri is extensively elaborated upon in section 2.2 
part (a). Here, theoretical predictions of their model are summarised 6 . Jafarey and 
Lahiri (2002) considered a case of small open economy, net exporter of unskilled 
goods, having two periods and producing two goods per period. Assuming the 
normality in all goods, Jafarey and Lahiri evaluated the household education decision as 
a function of price and a given interest rate. They came up with the conclusion that with 
the increase in interest rate, the welfare of the lender rises while that of the borrower 
falls. Thus it may be argued that it tends to reduce the marginal benefits of education 
and induces a lower choice of schooling decision. For the lender, the welfare effect of 
an increase in interest rate is positive and works against the effect of a decline in 
pecuniary returns to education. This makes education increase with the interest rate for 
                                                 
6
 The one who has already gone through the detail model in chapter 2 could skip para 1 to 6 of section 
3.2. Although summary may repeat the points already discussed in chapter 2 but here in order to avoid 
the breaking up of the argument a brief summary is provided.    
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a household that lends. Jafarey and Lahiri precede their analysis by considering three 
scenarios in credit market. 
In scenario 1 all the households can borrow and lend freely in a perfectly competitive 
credit market that links to the international market. In this case the interest rate is 
exogenously given and is equal to world interest rate. Under Scenario 2 Jafarey and 
Lahiri assume that borrowing is subject to a quantitative constraint. In scenario 3 
households borrow from the domestic credit market. In this case rich and poor 
household exchange loan and discount rate for each household is equal to the 
equilibrium interest rate. Jafarey and Lahiri use the condition that education for rich 
household is equal to one. Therefore, rich households can increase their savings only 
through lending in the credit market, as FKLOGUHQ¶VHGXFDWLRQFDQQRWEHLQFUHDVHG 
After analysing the equilibrium in the credit market, Jafarey and Lahiri introduce the 
effect of trade sanction on the incidence of child labour. As country is a net exporter of 
unskilled goods, trade sanctions will result in a fall in the price of unskilled goods in 
period 1. A reduction in price reduces the welfare of the unskilled families. Jafarey and 
Lahiri have shown that a decrease in the price of the exportable, for a given level of real 
income, would reduce the opportunity cost of education (a substitution effect) and 
therefore might result in an increase in education. On the other hand a decrease in the 
price would also decrease real income thus encouraging a decrease in education (the 
income effect). Hence the two effects are opposite while changes in education out come 
via interest rate means an increase in interest rate reduces education outcome. 
Overall Jafarey and Lahiri suggest that a decrease in the price of unskilled goods has 
the potential to decrease education (increase child labour) if the income effect 
dominates the substitution effect. Their results hold even for the internationally perfect 
credit market as well. On the other hand, a decrease in the price increases the demand 
for consumption in period 1 relative to period 2. But it also reduces the income of 
unskilled families at period 1. Similarly, any increase in the level of schooling will also 
raise future income and therefore the demand for loans will also arise. This indirectly 
raises the interest rate. Jafarey and Lahiri demonstrate that a decrease in the price 
increases the supply of loans. According to them, a decrease in the price will result in a 
rise in the income of the rich household as they do not participate in the production of 
unskilled goods. This will increase the supply of loan because education cannot be 
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further increased. Jafarey and Lahiri compare the effects of a trade sanction using two 
scenarios: in the first case the borrowing constraint is assumed to be preventing loans 
from adjustment in response to changes in demand or supply of funds; in the second 
case, Jafarey and Lahiri assume that the market freely adjusts to a new equilibrium.  
According to Jafarey and Lahiri, in the first case, when a decrease in price raises the 
demand for loans for a given interest rate, education increases. As low initial value of 
education is associated with low parental income in their model therefore a trade 
sanction could possibly FDXVH D GHFOLQH LQ FKLOGUHQ¶V HGXFDWLRQ DW JLYHQ YDOXHV RI
interest rate) at least for those households that are poor. Summarizing the result for case 
1, -DIDUH\ DQG /DKLUL FRQFOXGH WKDW ³,Q WKHSUHVHQFHRI DERUURZLQJFRQVWUDLQW WUDGH
VDQFWLRQ LQFUHDVHV SRRU KRXVHKROG¶V GLVFRXQW UDWH ZKLFK QHJDWLYHO\ DIIHFWV LWV
FKLOGUHQ¶VHGXFDWLRQ´ 
Turning to the second case where supply of funds is adjusted in response to changes in 
demand, new equilibrium will arise where interest rate increases, thus still having 
negative effect on child labour. However, a comparison of both cases clearly exhibits 
that the trade sanction is less likely to lead to perverse effects on child labour if the 
supply of loans can adjust in a competitive domestic credit market than if it cannot. To 
VXPPDUL]HWKHDQDO\VLVRI-DIDUH\DQG/DKLULVXJJHVWHGWKDW³7KHGLVFRXQWUDWHRISRRU
households rises more strongly under borrowing constraints and rises less strongly or 
even falls under a domestic credit market. This implies that a perverse effect from trade 
sanctions to child labour in poor households is less likely if credit is available at the 
PDUJLQ´ 
However, Edmonds (2009) is of the view that trade affects children in developing 
countries by changing relative prices and altering living standards. Edmonds supports 
his proposition on the basis of two reasons. First, for the poor, the standard of living is 
the single most important determinants of child labour. Second, children are rarely 
engaged in work that is connected to trade. In poor developing countries, agriculture is 
the largest sector employing children. Outside agriculture, children are not that much 
intensively involved especially those related to trade sectors. While within 
manufacturing sectors, firms that trade usually hire skilled labour.  Hence, the direct 
effects of trade on child labour through wages paid in the trade sector will be minimal. 
According to Edmonds (2009), trade raises the income and in turn reduces child labour 
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while opponents of globalization are mostly concerned about the fact that trade 
increases the product demand and thus increases child labour. According to him this is 
unlikely to happen as proportion of children employed in trade sectors are negligible. 
 
Although the theoretical foundation and the argument placed by Edmonds (2009) sheds 
light on the relationship among trade, credit and child labour, but before preceding to 
the analysis it is considered necessary to summarize or provide an overview of the 
possible channels through which trade, FDI and credit may affect child labour.  
 
There are two possible channels through which trade can affect child labour: first, trade 
openings raise the price of unskilled (labour intensive) goods, thereby raising the wages 
of unskilled workers and also the wages of child labour. This may increase the 
opportunity cost of education and increases child labour incidence (substitution effect). 
On the other hand, trade also increases income of poorer families, thereby increasing 
child education and reducing incidence of child labour (income effect). Two effects are 
with opposite sign, hence, the net impact of trade on child labour is ambiguous. 
 
There is again ambiguity in determining the effect of FDI on child labour. Neumayer 
and De Soysa (2005) have presented two types of arguments. Firstly they explain that 
developing countries usually have low labour standards, low wages and an abundant 
supply of unskilled labour, including child labourers, and therefore are regarded as 
being a heaven for foreign investors. A higher extent of child labour could cut the cost 
of production which results in a competitive advantage. Hence, increases in FDI raises 
the relative wage of unskilled workers, including children, leading to an increase in 
child labour supply by increasing the opportunity cost of schooling. Secondly, they 
argue that the above case may not necessarily be realized, as foreign investors might not 
be enthusiastic in exploiting cheap labour than is assumed. Other factors such as market 
size, economic growth, political stability, infrastructure and abundance of skilled 
labourers are often as important as low wages. Evidence also indicates that foreign 
investors are on the lookout for relatively skilled workers rather than unskilled ones. If 
this is the case, then increased FDI would lower the relative wage of unskilled workers 
thereby reducing the demand of child labour [Neumayer and De Soysa (2005)]. 
 
Furthermore, as is evident from the Jafarey and Lahiri (2002) model, educating a child 
means a loss in present income and a gain in future consumption so at the margin, the 
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economic returns to education are negative and poor parents choose less education for 
their children. In such a case a reduction in the interest rate may raise the present 
discounted value of education. Hence, to the extent that openness implies access to 
credit at a rate below that prevailing on the domestic market, child labour will reduce 
and educational attainment will increase [Jafarey and Lahiri (2002)]. 
 
Finally, as child labour is a poverty driven phenomenon, any increase in income beyond 
the subsistence level of living will reduce child labour. Trade may increase the income 
of the poor families, this may help parents to reduce the work load of the children and 
send them to schools. Therefore there may exist a straight-forward negative relationship 
between income and child labour. However, Edmonds and Pavcnik (2006) and Dagemir 
and Acaroglu (2010) rejected the linearity in the effect. Both authors found a U-shaped 
relationship between income and child labour supply. This article also assumes the 
same.  
 
3.3 Trends in Child Labour  
 
The new estimates from the World Bank, predict that current economic and financial 
crises surrounding the world will result in a slower economic growth and will trap more 
people than expected living on less than 1.25 US$ a day (World Bank, 2009). Bearing 
in mind the previous experience of the East Asian Economic crisis that occurred during 
1998s this down turn is also expected to affect children. According to Mosel and Sarkar 
(2009), during the Asian financial crisis of 1998 many developing economies of Asia 
have already witnessed rising unemployment and growing share of workers in informal 
employment, reflecting the significant impact of declining growth. The recent crisis 
would also result in the closure of many formal sector businesses. One of the impacts of 
the crisis could be the workers being forced to seek alternative employment in informal 
activities leading to the growth in the informal economy. Child labour is often found in 
informal economy, in hidden and most hazardous forms of work, including forced 
labour and slavery [see Mosel and Sarkar (2009) for more detail].  
 
It is expected that the recent down turn in the economies, with rising food and fuel 
prices in the world market, will give rise to unemployment and poverty pushing more 
children towards employment. South Asian and Sub-Saharan African countries are the 
largest example of nations that are still plagued by the problem of child labour (ILO, 
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2010) and the burden of recent crises will be expected to worsen the situation further in 
these regions. However, these effects are yet to be analysed.  
 
Table 3.1: 5HJLRQDOHVWLPDWHVRIFKLOGUHQ·VZRUN -14) 
 
 
Population (000) Children at work (000) Incidence Rate (%) 
Change in Incidence 
Rate (%) 
2000 2004 2008 2000 2004 2008 2000 2004 2008 
2000-
04 
2004-
08 
2000-
08 
World 1199 1207 1217 211 196 176 17.6 16.2 14.5 -1.4 -1.7 -3.1 
Asia & Pacific 655 650 652 127 122 96 19.4 18.8 14.8 -0.6 -4.0 -4.6 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 
108 111 111 17 11 10 16.1 10 9 -6.1 -1.0 -7.1 
Sub-Saharan Africa 167 187 205 48 49 58 28.8 26.4 28.4 -2.4 2.0 -0.4 
Other Regions 269 259 249 18 13 11 6.8 5.2 4.3 -1.6 -0.9 -2.5 
 
Source: Global child labour developments: Measuring trends from 2004 to 2008 (IPEC, 2010) and Global trend in Child labour 
2000-04 (IPEC, 2006) 
 
 
International evidence indicates that child labour participation rate was almost 14.5% 
for children aged 5 to 14 in 2008. Table 3.1 provides an evidence of incidence of child 
labour across regions. Table 3.1 clearly indicates that during the era 2000-08, the world 
experienced a change of almost 3 percentage point in the incidence. Overall the rate of 
decline is highest in Latin America and Caribbean countries and lowest for Sub Saharan 
African countries. In Sub-Saharan African region the incidence rate declined during 
2000-04 but rose again in 2008 showing an increase of 2 percentage points. For Asia 
and Pacific region, where in absolute terms most of the child labour is found, the 
incidence rate declined during 2000-08. Asian and Pacific region is the only region 
where the rate of decline increased when one considers the two periods separately i.e. 
2000-04 and 2004-08. The situation is reversed for the rest of the regions. All the other 
regions experienced a slowdown in the rate of decline during the period 2004-08. 
Moreover, Sub-Saharan Africa experienced an increase in the rate of incidence during 
2004-08. Although the above situation clearly indicates the recent situation (2004-08) 
requires a detailed analysis of the situation but the effects of the recent downturn are yet 
to be analysed.  
 
For the purpose of empirical assessment, this study employs the data of economically 
active children aged 10-147. Here characteristics of the data set employed are also 
                                                 
7
 Although economically active children age 5-14 seems to be the interesting category but the country 
specific data provided by ILO is only for the age category 10-14. Hence the econometric analysis is based 
on the age category 10-14. 
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explored and incorporated to show the magnitude and spread of child labour. Figure 3.1 
illustrates average percentage of child labour across regions by gender. South Asia and 
Sub-Saharan Africa regions exhibit the highest concentration of child labour both for 
boys and girls. The magnitude of the problem in this region seems more than double 
than the rest of the world. North America, Europe and Central Asia regions exhibit 
much lower (almost negligible) incidence rate but still, whatever the magnitude is, it 
requires immediate corrective measures. 
 
Figure 3.1: Average % child Labour across Regions & Gender 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Average % child Labour Across Decades & Gender 
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Having explored the magnitude across regions, it is interesting to analyse the changes in 
the magnitude over time. Figure 3.2 provides average percentage of child labour across 
different time periods from 1960 to 2010 by gender while table 3.2 provides the detail 
of average percentage of child labour across regions and time periods. Although figure 
3.2 clearly indicates that the incidence rate declines over time, it is worth-while to note 
that the decline in the incidence rate for boys (from almost 23.5% to 9%) is much lower 
than for girls (from 17% to 8%). This suggests that any empirical analysis should be 
gender sensitive. Furthermore, table 3.2 again clearly indicates that the incidence rate 
declined in the entire region from 1960 to 2010 but the rate of decline differs 
considerably across regions. The change is large for the countries in South Asia and 
Sub Saharan Africa where originally most of child labour was found and lowest for the 
region of North America. 
 
Table 3.2: Average % Child Labour across Region & Time (10-14) 
 
Region 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Change 
(1960-10) 
East Asia & Pacific 20.52 17.72 14.34 10.83 8.19 5.56 -14.96 
Europe & Central Asia 4.41 2.53 1.06 0.47 0.21 0.06 -4.35 
Latin America & Caribbean 13.12 11.11 8.78 7.06 4.96 3.11 -10.01 
Middle East & North Africa 13.60 11.29 7.67 3.75 1.88 1.08 -12.52 
North America 1.81 1.69 - - - - -1.81 
South Asia 39.97 35.66 31.52 26.69 22.29 17.83 -22.14 
Sub-Saharan Africa 40.56 37.86 35.19 31.72 27.71 23.79 -16.77 
Table Total 20.13 17.75 15.20 12.71 10.47 8.44 -11.69 
 Source: ILO data ± UN common Database. 
 
 
This trend in the data raises certain questions such as in the era of globalization what 
are the general and specific causes of child labour? What role does income play in 
eliminating child labour? If income is the main determinant then what role does the 
credit market play in lowering the incidence of child labour? And what would be the 
magnitude of the effect of changes in trade related variable?  These questions could 
only be answered through a deep analysis of the problem.  
 
3.4 Methodology 
 
Child labour has always been considered as a phenomenon which is poverty driven but 
as mentioned earlier this study specifically explores the link between globalization, 
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income and credit with child labour. In order to do so the following simple model is 
estimated: 
 ܥ݈௜௧ ൌߚ଴ ൅ߚଵܶݎ݀௜௧ ൅ ߚଶܨܦܫ௜௧ ൅ ߚଷܥݎ݀ݐ௜௧ ൅ ߚସܫ݊ܿ݉௜௧ ൅ ߚହܫ݊ܿ݉௜௧ଶ ൅ ߚ଺ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߤ௜൅ ߝ௜௧݅ ൌ  ?ǥǥܰܽ݊݀ݐ ൌ  ?ݐ݋ܶሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
 
Where, ܥ݈௜௧ is the percentage of economically active children8 in the age group of 10 to 
14.ܶݎ݀௜௧ is a measure of trade openness which in the latter case was replaced by 
export (% GDP), ܨܦܫ௜௧ is the inflow of foreign direct investment, ܫ݊ܿ݉௜௧ and ܫ݊ܿ݉௜௧ଶ  
are the real GDP per capita and its square representing income which again in latter 
stages replaced by the income of the bottom quintile population (see section 3.4.2 for 
detail), ܥݎ݀ݐ௜௧ is the Domestic credit provided by the banking sector as a percentage of 
GDP9. All the variables of interest are in the log form. The log independent variables 
are used after checking AIC and BIC statistics and after running the Davidson and 
Mackinnon (1985) test for model specification10. ܺ௜௧is a set of control variables since 
in order to determine the strength of the relation one must control for other potentially 
important variables. The existing literature provides extensive guidance in this regard. 
This study includes share of agriculture sector in GDP ሺܣܩܴ௜௧ሻ, share of mining and 
manufacturing sector in GDP  ሺܯܣܰܨ௜௧ሻ, average year of adult schooling  ሺܻܴܵܥܪ௜௧ሻ, 
pupil teacher ratio (primary) ሺܷܲܲܶܧܥܪ௜௧ሻ , female labour force participation rate  ሺܨܮܨܴܲ௜௧ሻ and aid (% GNI) as control variables in the model. ߤ௜  represent country 
specific effect, µL¶ represent country and µW¶UHSUHVHQWWLPH 
 
Average year of adult schooling and pupil teacher ratio are included in the model in 
order to predict the effect of schooling on child labour. More explicitly pupil teacher 
ratio at primary level is included in the model to show the effect of quality of schooling, 
                                                 
8
 The definition of Economically Active children includes all forms of work in both the formal and 
informal economy; inside and outside family settings; work for pay or profit (in cash or in kind, part-time 
or full-WLPHRUDVDGRPHVWLFZRUNHURXWVLGHWKHFKLOG¶VRZQhousehold for an employer (with or without 
SD\7KHWHUPV³ZRUNLQJFKLOGUHQ´³FKLOGUHQLQHFRQRPLFDFWLYLW\´DQG³FKLOGUHQLQHPSOR\PHQW´DUH
used interchangeably by ILO (ILO, 2010). As it is the only comparable data available at the cross country 
level, the macro analysis is based on this definition.  
9
 Domestic credit to private sector refers to financial resources provided to the private sector, such as 
through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable, that 
establish a claim for repayment (World Bank Development Indicator-WDI). 
10
 Davidson-MacKinnon test indicate that both model with and without log form are equally important in 
explaining the relationship as neither of the two hypotheses rejected while AIC and BIC values with log 
independent variables (1424.6 and 1784.9 respectively) work out to be lower than without log (1535.5and 
1907.2 respectively).  
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as most of the children drop out before completing the primary schooling. The pupil 
teacher ratio, although not a good measure for evaluating quality of schooling, but in 
the absence of any other suitable variable capturing the effect of school quality, used 
here. The study hypothesizes the positive effect of this variable on child labour. 
Secondly, average year of adult schooling is included in order to evaluate the effect of 
skill attainment on child labour (number of years of schooling is often considered as a 
SUR[\IRUFRXQWU\¶VVNLOO OHYHO7KHUHDVRQEHKLQG WKLV LV WKDWFKLOGUHQRIWHQGURSRXW
from school to get involved into paid work. Therefore any increase in the educational 
attainment will increase the human capital formation and thereby skilled labour force. 
As discussed by Jafarey and Lahiri (2002), children are born unskilled but will receive 
training in period one and become skilled worker in period two. Hence countries with 
low educational attainment will have unskilled labour in abundance, including child 
labour. It is reasonable to expect that any increase in this variable would have negative 
effect on child labour.  
 
Female employment is likely to empower women by enhancing their status and 
increasing their decision-making power. This will tend to result in the improvement of 
child condition/welfare. Therefore any increase in this variable will reduce child labour 
incidence.  However, there could be an opposite effect if the variable captures the 
labour market effect. For example, there is evidence for the fact that usually women 
enter the job market when the earnings from their male counter parts decrease from the 
subsistence level of living. They are usually involved in home based work or self-
employment, where they often involve children in simple work, for example in the food 
processing industries of Pakistan, small children often accompany their mothers and 
help in peeling shrimps. While in some parts of India mothers involve children in beedi 
(tobacco rolling) work. Hence, for this variable, the study expects that if it captures the 
effect of gender and development it will have a negative sign while if it captures the 
effect of labour market it will have a positive sign. 
 
Furthermore, in order to predict the effect of sectoral composition on incidence of child 
labour, this study has included the share of agriculture sector and share of mining and 
manufacturing sector in the model. The share of agriculture sector is included in the 
model as child labour is often considered as a rural phenomenon hence share of 
agriculture sector is assumed to have a positive effect while manufacturing sector may 
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have either positive or negative effects depending upon the requirement of skill 
composition. For example, it may have a negative effect if the sector requires more 
skilled labour than unskilled while the effect could be positive if the production process 
involves unskilled labour in abundance.  
 
Finally, the role of aid in reducing child labour is also interesting, something that past 
studies have ignored. The reason behind inclusion is to evaluate the claim that child-
labour laws only worked in countries where the standards of living had risen to a level 
where it has no longer remained an economic necessity for children to work. Child 
labour has decreased in Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea as their 
economies have grown stronger. Child labour could automatically end with the 
economic development. Trade sanctions and boycotts are considered as counter-
productive because they retard economic growth. Foreign aid is considered as a growth 
promoting instrument or often seen as a tool helping countries in their development 
process. Although aid is not the only solution for long term development or growth, it is 
nevertheless an essential component. Furthermore, there exists mixed evidence on the 
effect of aid on social sector development programmes such as foreign aid promoting 
health and education expenditure but it is expected to have an indirect effect ± it 
provides support for the development process which helps poor countries in investing in 
their human development programmes which will affect the living standards of the poor 
people thus affecting poverty in the long run; which will definitely have its impact on  
child labour as well.   
3.4.1 Estimation Technique 
 
Simple OLS estimation of equation 3.1 relies on the assumption that explanatory 
variables are not correlated with the error term ߝ௜௧. If ܥ݈௜௧ and any of the variables of 
interest are simultaneously determined or if the model has omitted variable bias, then 
this assumption is violated, and OLS estimates will be biased. In this studyܶݎ݀௜௧, ܨܦܫ௜௧ 
and ܫ݊ܿ݉௜௧ have simultaneity bias while ܥݎ݀ݐ௜௧might have omitted variable bias. 
Income is endogenous as income explains presence of child labour while child labour 
also affects income. FDI is endogenous as it reduces child labour but it might be the 
case that child labour affects FDI. For example, countries with high incidence of child 
labour will also have low skilled labour in abundance and literature suggests that FDI is 
often attracted to countries where skilled labour is in abundance. Trade openness is 
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endogenous because availability of child labour and labour standards determines trade 
flows while trade expansion also affects child labour as explained earlier. Finally, credit 
is endogenous because in some countries it is easier to have access to credit as 
compared to others; this is the issue of omitted variables bias ± i.e. there are variables 
that could correlate with credit availability but are unobservable such as a well-
developed infrastructure. Menon (2010) working on Pakistan Integrated Household 
survey data for 1991 points out that credit could be endogenous for two reasons; firstly, 
household will borrow only when they consider themselves having experience in 
managing the funds [Menon (2010) considers this as an issue of self-selection bias]. 
Secondly, some areas have easier access to credit as compared to other areas; this might 
be because of the well-developed infrastructure [Menon considers this issue as having 
omitted variables bias at the community level]. Presence of self-selection problem and 
omitted variables bias results in endogeneity problem. Hence, OLS estimates will be 
biased. Instrumental variable regression method is an appropriate solution for the 
problem. Therefore for estimating equation 3.1 instrumental variable (IV) approach is 
followed. As the data is panel data, both time specific and country specific test are 
applied before estimating equation 3.1 in order to check if the country specific and time 
specific controls are needed. F-statistics 77.89 (p-0.000) and 3.22 (p-0.016) indicate that 
both country and time specific intercepts are needed.  
 
Furthermore, prior to the estimation, the presence of endogeneity is tested. The study 
performed the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test in order to see if endogeneity is present in the 
data. In the entire regressions Durbin-Wu-Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that 
variables are exogenous and thus confirms the presence of endogeneity in all the system 
of equations [see last rows of tables 3.4 to 3.7]. After confirming the endogeneity the 
next step is to find suitable instrument for the variables and to check whether or not the 
instrument used passed the over identification tests (OID). The insignificant OID test 
confirms that instruments are over identified [see last rows of tables 3.4 to 3.7].  
Another related issue is strength of the instrument used. In order to check, F-test is 
performed on the instrument selected. A probability of F-test less than 0.05 shows that 
the instruments used are not weak [see annex A-3.8 for reference].  
 
Finally, to handle the issue of presence of zero in the dependant variable the study 
applied Tobit model. This is because working on the ILO estimates of economically 
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active population aged 10-14, the study came across samples of countries having zero 
values11. The reason behind this is that in many countries, the legal age for working is 
 RU ROGHU DQG WKH FRXQWU\¶V ODERXU IRUFH VXUYH\ GRHV QRW FROOHFW ZRUN-related 
information on children under that age. Hence ILO database reports zero participation 
rates for children in these countries. Now the question arises as to how to treat these 
observations. On one hand, the zeros could be inteUSUHWHGDV³PLVVLQJYDOXHV´DQGWKHVH
observations could be discarded. However, this is likely to lead to biased estimates if 
the zero rates reflect reality in those countries. The vast majority of countries for which 
zeros are reported are wealthier, more developed ones, i.e., once classified by the World 
%DQNDV³XSSHU-PLGGOH LQFRPH´RU³KLJK LQFRPH´FRXQWULHV7KHVWXG\ILUVWH[FOXGHG
the countries that are classified by the World Bank as high or upper-middle income 
countries; the sample is now left with only low and middle income countries and the 
zeros left in the remaining sample are treated as censored data. This justifies the 
estimation of Tobit model using IV. Therefore, in order to control the censored data and 
to check the robustness of the estimated model, the study re-estimated the equation 3.1 
using random effect Tobit model as well. However, the Tobit model is not used here as 
a main estimation technique because it relies on two assumptions: heteroskedasticity 
and normality of the error term, and if these assumptions fail the estimates will be 
inconsistent.  Furthermore, Madala (1992) also pointed out that: 
  
³(YHU\WLPHZHKDYHVRPH]HURREVHUYDWLRQVLQWKHVDPSOHLWLVWHPSWLQJWRXVHWKe 
tobit model. However, it is important to understand what the model really says 
>0DGDOD3DJH@´ 
 
The zero child labour percentage in developing countries in our case may represent the 
real situation as well. Madala pointed out that if the observed zero values are not due to 
censoring but rather explaining the real situation then the appropriate procedure is to 
model the decision that produces the zero observation rather than to use tobit model. 
Deaton (1997) also argue that limited dependent model like tobit can lead to 
inconsistency in estimates because of the heteroskedasticity. According to him the 
standard likelihood function has the property that the derivatives of the log likelihood 
function with respect to Ⱦ¶VDUHLQGHSHQGHQWRIɐ, at-least in expectation, is not true for 
the log likelihood function of the tobit model. Deaton argues that the scale and location 
                                                 
11
 See Swinnerton and Rogers (2001) for more detail. 
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are independent in the OLS regression but dependent in the tobit model. This 
dependence causes the Ⱦ¶VWREHLQFRQVLVWHQW'HDWRQLdentified that the tobit procedure 
yields estimates that are biased upwards and there is no general guarantee that the 
attempt to deal with censoring, by replacing OLS with the tobit, will give estimates that 
reduces the bias. Moreover even if there is no heteroskedasticity the tobit estimates 
could still be bias because it requires distribution term to be normal. Since the 
distribution of the error term is unknown, it is unclear how likelihood function could 
specify in order to do better [see Deaton (1997) for more detail]. On the basis of the 
arguments placed by Madala and Deaton we estimated equation 3.1 using country Fixed 
effect test while tobit model is estimated only as a robustness check.  
3.4.2 Measurement Issue 
 
Till now the study has explained the theoretical foundations of the equation to be 
estimated and highlighted the statistical problem faced during the study, principally, 
endogeneity. This section highlights the problem related to measuring income of the 
poor before proceeding to identify the instruments applied.  
 
To measure the income of the poor, cross- national studies have often used real GDP 
per capita but researchers point out that GDP per capita could predict misleading effect. 
For example, Swinnerton and Rogers (1999) and Tanka (2003) stress that income 
inequality is more closely related to child labour than simple real GDP per capita. 
According to the authors, GDP per capita does not represent the economic equality 
among the population of the country and only a small percentage of the population 
holds PRVWRIWKHQDWLRQ¶VZHDOWK WKXV*'3SHUFDSLWDPD\not describe the situation 
accurately. Therefore based on the methodology given by Dollar and Kraay (2000), this 
study developed another proxy for income of the poor using data of Gini coefficient and 
bottom quintile income share ±Q1 i.e. income accruing to the bottom fifth population as 
a measure of income of the poor. Dollar and Kraay (2000) define the poor as those in 
the bottom fifth of the income distribution of a country.  
 
Dollar and Kraay (2000) used two approaches for measuring the income of the poor, 
they first defined the poor as the poorest 20% of the population. Then they obtained the 
information on the share of income accruing to the poorest quintile. They measured 
mean income in the poorest quintile directly, as the share of income earned by the 
66 
 
poorest quintile times mean income (Real GDP per capita), divided by 0.2. For the 
countries for which they have information on the Gini coefficient but not on the first 
quintile share, they assumed that the distribution of income is lognormal, and thus the 
share of income accruing to the poorest quintile as the 20th percentile of this 
distribution was obtained. According to them if the distribution of income is lognormal, 
i.e. log per capita income ~ N (ߤǡ ߪሻ and the Gini coefficient on a scale from 0 to 100 is 
G, the standard deviation of this lognormal distribution can be obtained by: 
 ߪ ൌ  ? ?Ǥ ׎ିଵ ቆ ? ൅ ܩ  ? ? ? ? ? ቇሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
 
Where ׎ሺǤ ሻ  denotes the cumulative normal distribution function [Aitchinson and 
Brown (1966)]. According to Dollar and Kraay (2002), by using the properties of the 
mean of the truncated lognormal distribution, the 20th percentile of this distribution can 
be given by: ׎ሺ׎ିଵሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ െ ߪሻ                               (3.3) 
 
On the basis of the methodology given in Dollar and Kraay (2002), this study also 
constructed the income of the poor by using the data sources such as UN-WIDER 
(World Income Inequality Database) and EHII 12  (Estimated Household Income 
Inequality Data Set). UN-WIDER is a substantial extension of the income distribution 
dataset constructed by Deininger and Squire (1996) and Lundberg and Squire (2000).  
 
Furthermore, when incorporating the above measure another problem emerges, i.e. for 
most of the countries, data for poorest quintile is not available. Using this variable thus 
means reducing the sample size substantially. For most of the countries, data of Q1 
beyond 2000 is also not available. Although it may best reflect income of the poor but 
in the absence of sufficient data, this study limited the main analysis by using Real GDP 
per capita as proxy for income. Nevertheless, realizing its importance, a separate 
analysis is done based on only those countries in the sample that have reported data of 
Q1 and Gini co-efficient.  
                                                 
12
 EHII is a global dataset, derived from the econometric relationship between UTIP-UNIDO, other 
conditioning variables, and the World Bank's Deininger & Squire data set. EHII 2008 has 3,513 
observations. This data set can be downloaded from: http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/data.html 
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3.4.3 Instrument for Foreign direct Investment (FDI), Credit and Income of the poor 
 
The basic strategy in instrumental variable estimation is to find an estimator that should 
be correlated to the endogenous variables but not with the dependent variable (child 
labour). It is hard to find valid instruments. As far as instrumenting income is 
concerned, in the literature widely used instruments include; growth rate in real GDP 
per capita, initial real GDP per capita, investment to GDP ratio, government 
consumption expenditure (measuring size of the government) or lagged values of real 
GDP per capita. For credit the literature has identified price of the credit or the costs 
associated with gaining access to credit, as valid instruments. The price of credit is interest 
rate on the loan but the data on real interest rate have large number of inconsistencies and 
missing values. Because of this limitation infrastructure development is used as an 
instrument. It is hypothesized to correlate with gaining information on borrowing. As far as 
valid instrument for FDI is concerned, the only study that controls endogeneity in FDI 
within the child labour framework is done by Davies and Voy (2009)13. Hence, finding 
instrumental variable for FDI turns out hard and tricky. Recent literature on FDI and 
growth indicates that FDI is greatly influenced by host country policies, infrastructure 
development, political situation etc.  
 
Thus, after a thorough review of literature available and based on the Wu-Hausman, 
OID and F-test14, the following instruments are selected: investment as percent of GDP, 
rural population as percentage of total population, index of Political rights [index of 
political right was first used by Davis and Voy (2009) as instrument for FDI] and 
number of telephone lines (indicator of infrastructure development) when real GDP per 
capita is in the model. Population growth instead of investment as percent of GDP is 
used to instrument income of the bottom quintile population. Inclusion of these 
variables significantly increases the explanatory power of the estimated coefficients. 
3.4.4 Instrument for Trade Openness and Export 
 
As far as instrument for trade openness and Export (% GDP) is concerned, the two most 
recent studies on the relationship between globalization and child labour have used the 
gravity model to identify the exogenous component of trade [Edmonds and Pavcnik 
(2006) and Davies and Voy (2009)]. In a gravity model, country size measures the 
                                                 
13
 To come up with the instrument they used gravity model approach. 
14
 See last rows of tables 3.4 to 3.7 for Wu-Hausman and OID test statistics. 
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output and benefits from trade while distance between trading partners used as a proxy 
for transportation costs. The studies on gravity model which explore the effects of trade 
on other variables rather than child labour have shown that both factors are robustly 
related to trade [Eichengreen and Leblang, (2008); Li and Reuveny, (2002); Lim and 
Decker, (2007); López- Córdova and Meissner, (2008)]. Gravity model has thus been 
recognized as a widely accepted tool for the creation of an instrument for trade i.e. to 
avoid endogeneity biases. Hence, the study adopted gravity model approach to create 
the instrument for trade openness and export. The equation estimated for the instrument 
is as follows: 
 ܮ݊ ሺܶݎ݀௜௝௧ ܩܦ ௜ܲ௧ሻ ? ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ߚଵܮ݊ሺ݀݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁௜௝௧ሻ ൅ߚଶܮ݊ሺ݌݋݌௝௧ሻ ൅ߚଷܿ݋݈݉݊ܽ݊݃௜௝௧൅ߚସܾ݋ݎ݀݁ݎ௜௝௧ ൅ߚହ݌ܽݎ݁ܽ௜௝௧ ൅ ߚ଺݈݈ܽ݊݀݋ܿ݇௜௝௧൅ߤ௜௝௧ሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
      
 
Where; ܮ݊ ሺܶݎ݀௜௝௧ ܩܦ ௜ܲ௧ሻ ? ൌ ሺ݁ݔ݌݋ݎݐ௜௝௧ ൅ ݅݉݌݋ݎݐ௜௝௧ሻ ܩܦ ௜ܲ௧ ?  
 ܮ݊ ሺܶݎ݀௜௝௧ ܩܦ ௜ܲ௧ሻ ?   is calculated as the natural log of the sum of trade flows between 
countries µL¶DQGµM¶GLYLGHGE\FRXQWU\µi
V¶*'3 ܮ݊ሺ݀݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁௜௝௧ሻ is log of the distance between countries µL¶DQGµM¶ ܮ݊ሺ݌݋݌௝௧ሻ LVFRXQWU\µj
V¶SRSXODWLRQ ݌ܽݎ݁ܽ௜௝௧ is the product of the area of country µL¶DQGµM¶in square kilometres.  ܿ݋݈݉݊ܽ݊݃௜௝௧ is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the countries share a common language.  ܾ݋ݎ݀݁ݎ௜௝௧ is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the countries share a common border. ݈݈ܽ݊݀݋ܿ݇௜௝௧ measures the number of landlocked countries (0, 1 or 2).  
µW¶ is time period (1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010). 
 
The same equation was re-estimated after replacing ܮ݊ ሺܶݎ݀௜௝௧ ܩܦ ௜ܲ௧ሻ ?  with ܮ݊ ሺܧܴܺܲ ௜ܶ௝௧ ܩܦ ௜ܲ௧ሻ ?  and after assuming that the variables that determine trade 
between two countries will also determine the export between the two countries. Thus, 
the instrument for trade openness also represents the instrument for export. We 
instrumented openness and export based on the geography of country Ǯ݅ǯ. The predicted 
values for the bilateral openness and export from the above equation are then summed 
for country Ǯ݅ǯ across its trading partners.  
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In order to check the endogeneity in trade and exports, the Hausman test approach is 
applied. Both endogenous trade and export together with the predicted values of trade 
and export are entered in the regression framework. Basic assumption is that if in the 
presence of endogenous variables predicted variable are significant then the variables 
are endogenous. In this case the predicted values are highly significant indicating 
presence of endogeneity in the two variables. Therefore this study uses the predicted 
value of trade and export in all the analysis. 
3.4.5 Data Sources 
 
The study uses the data on percentage of the population 10±14-year-olds that are 
actively engaged in work. Data is compiled by the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) and is available with 10-year intervals, beginning from 1950 for 174 countries. 
However, for empirical assessment, the study uses the data of 129 developing countries 
from 1970 onward15. ³$FWLYH SRSXODWLRQ´ LQFOXGHV SHRSOH ZKR ZRUNHG IRU ZDJH RU
salary, in cash or in kind, as well as for family unpaid works) for at least 1 hour during 
the reference period (International Labour Organization, 1996)16. Although the reported 
data may suffer underreporting problem as child labour is by law illegal and children 
usually work in hidden informal sector or work as unpaid family helper in agriculture 
sector. Nevertheless, the ILO datasets have been adjusted on the basis of internationally 
accepted definitions, therefore allowing cross-country comparisons (Ashagrie, 1993). 
The data can be downloaded from United Nation Common Database using ESDS.  
Domestic Credit to private sector (% GDP) is included to serve as a proxy for the 
degree of financial market imperfections and credit market constraints. In the absence 
of reliable data at cross country level this variable is assumed to serve as a good proxy 
because an environment with poor financial market institutions might not be favourable 
for the provision of domestic credit to the private sector. The data is taken from the 
World Bank Development indicator. 
 
In order to develop the income of the bottom quintile of the population, the data on Gini 
coefficients and Q1 (bottom quintile income share) are needed. The data on Q1 and 
Gini coefficient are hard to find. In order to come up with the desirable number of 
                                                 
15
 The reason behind not using the data of 1950 and 1960 is that most of the data on macro-economic 
indicator is not available before 1970 using the panel comprising of data 1950-60 leaves out the missing 
values.   
16
 The data for the age 5-14 is not available in the absence of which it was considered worth to explore 
the issue on the basis of available data. 
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observations, data is compiled using different sources. The main source is UN-Wider, 
world income inequality database developed by The World Bank. UN-Wider database 
includes the database of Deininger and Squire (1996) and Lundberg and Squire (2000). 
In addition to these, some more information is also taken from EHII (Estimated 
Household Income Inequality Dataset, Downloaded from: 
http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/data.html). To come up with the instrument for trade 
openness, the bilateral trade data is taken from Direction of Trade Statistics and UN 
Comtrade database while geographical characteristics are from CEPII database 
(website: http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/gravity.htm) and Rose 2004. Data on 
Real GDP per capita is taken from the Penn World Table 6.3 (adjusted on PPP). 
$YHUDJH \HDU RI DGXOW VFKRROLQJ LV IURP %DUUR DQG /HH¶V GDWDVHW 6KDUH RI GLIIHUHQW
sectors representing size of different sectors such as agriculture, mining and 
manufacturing comes from UN-Statistics Division. Data on pupil teacher ratio (primary 
level) is again compiled by using different sources such as UNESCO and World Bank 
Education Statistics. Rest of the data, such as data on FDI, Import (% GDP), population 
growth, life expectancy etc. is from World Bank Development Indicator. Most of the 
data is downloaded using the ESDS website [see annexure A-3.1 for further detail]. 
 
3.5 Results 
 
The result section is sub-divided into two parts; the first part discusses the simple 
correlation among the variables and highlights some determinants of income. It also 
discusses the main results and compares alternative measures of income and role of 
trade openness and exports.  The section also examines results based on gender of the 
child. The second part presents some sensitivity analyses.  
3.5.1 Core Results  
 
a) Simple Correlations  
 
In generalizing the effects of income, globalization and credit on the incidence of child 
labour, the study first sheds light on the simple correlation among the variables. Figures 
3.3 to 3.6 depict these relationships for the chosen 129 countries across the 4 decades.  
Figures 3.3 to 3.6 show negative association of log real GDP per capita, trade openness, 
FDI inflow and domestic credit to private sector with child labour. Negative association 
of trade and FDI with child labour could be because of the negative association of child 
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labour with income. Trade openness and FDI inflow generates employment 
opportunities in the economy which increases income. This increase in income may 
lead to reduction in child labour. Hence trade and FDI inflow may reduce child labour 
via income. Hence before exploring the impact of trade and FDI on child labour, the 
study first highlights some determinants of income including trade openness and FDI 
inflow. 
 
Figure 3.3: Relationship between Child Labour and Income 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Relationship between Child Labour and Trade openness 
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Figure 3.5: Relationship between FDI and Child Labour 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Relationship between Access to Credit and Child Labour  
 
 
 
b) Determinants of Income ² Effect of Trade and FDI inflow via Income 
 
From the discussion in section 3.2 it is evident that variables such as trade and FDI may 
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well. In this section we explore the variables having indirect affect via income. Table 
3.3 presents the results. Both FDI and openness to trade have positive and significant 
correlation on log real GDP per capita. Positive and significant effect of trade openness 
and FDI indicate that trade and FDI increase income. Therefore trade and FDI may 
affect child labour through income. The phenomenon as explained earlier may work in 
following way: expansion in trade and penetration of FDI generates employment 
opportunities that affect wages and thereby income, which in turn helps poor families to 
reduce child labour supply. But here one should remember that an increase in 
employment opportunity may increase child labour incidence as well. The overall effect 
of trade and FDI inflow hence depends on the magnitude of the effect of the two.  
 
Table 3.3: Determinants of Income 
(Country Fixed Effect) 
Dependent variable: Real GDP per capita 
Log FDI (inflow) 0.07(0.04)** 
Log Bank Credit to Private sector (% GDP) 0.13(0.13) 
Log of Trade Openness 12.11(0.10)*** 
Share of agriculture Sector in GDP -0.04(0.00)* 
Share of Manufacturing Sector in GDP -0.01(0.18) 
Adult Average year of Schooling 0.02(0.50) 
Pupil teacher Ratio Primary 0.00(0.71) 
Female labour force participation rate 0.00(0.27) 
Aid (% GNI) -0.01(0.05)** 
Region 2 0.34(0.09)*** 
3 0.26(0.16) 
4 0.17(0.51) 
6 0.04(0.87) 
7 0.03(0.88) 
Year 1980 0.63(0.26) 
1990 1.15(0.04)** 
2000 0.76(0.15) 
2010 0.92(0.09)*** 
Constant 5.94(0.00)* 
F /chi2 Test 23.16 
N 276 
R-squared 0.82 
Note: *,** and *** represents Coefficient is Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Numbers in parenthesis are p-values.   
 
In addition to the trade and FDI inflow, share of the agriculture sector shows a 
significant effect. The effect of share of the agriculture sector is negative. The negative 
effect on income means that any increase in the share of the agriculture sector will lead 
to lower economic development and thereby lower the income of the poor. This may 
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result in an increase in child labour incidence. As far as foreign aid is concerned, the 
study expects that it will promote economic growth and thus will assist in reducing 
child labour. Its negative effect on real GDP per capita is puzzling but not surprising. 
There exist two strands of literature; one claims that a positive relationship exists 
between aid and economic growth, while the other literature claims that the relationship 
is negative between the two. The positive relation is based on the argument that foreign 
aid supplements domestic resources and encourages savings thereby leading to 
economic growth. The second view (claiming negative effect) stresses that foreign aid 
substitutes rather than supplementing domestic resources. The negative relation 
between foreign aid and economic growth could exist because of the factors such as 
economic policies, state intervention, business cycles, and stability of foreign aid flows 
in the recipient countries. Furthermore, the results also indicate that average year of 
adult schooling, female labour force participation rate and credit availability have 
positive but insignificant effects on real GDP per capita.  
 
c) Results based on Real GDP per capita  
 
As explained earlier, the study investigates the role of real GDP per capita in reducing if 
not eliminating child labour by using the pooled data from 1970 to 2010. It was found 
that the role of income in reducing child labour is highly significant. The proposition 
that child labour is poverty driven seems to be a powerful justification. Explicitly, a 10 
percentage point increase in real GDP per capita was found to reduce the incidence of 
child labour by almost 8 percentage point after controlling for possible endogeneity17 
[while standardized beta coefficients predict that one standard deviation increase in 
income will reduce child labour incidence by almost 5%]. This answers the first part of 
the first question: income remains a significant determinant even after controlling for 
endogeneity. In addition to this, non-linearity in income variable is also tested by 
including the square of the log real GDP per capita. The positive and significant co-
efficient of the quadratic term shows the non-linear effect of income on child labour. 
Therefore it can be concluded from the analysis that the effect of income on the 
incidence of child labour is nonlinear but non-monotonic. 
 
                                                 
17
 The Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity [chi2 = 6.62 and p-value = 0.08] predicts the presence of 
endogeneity therefore study follows instrumental variable approach ± see section 3.4 for more detail.  
75 
 
Table 3.4: Determinants of child Labour 
(Country Fixed effect otherwise mention) 
Dependent variable: Child labour (All) 
Fixed Effect Test Tobit After Dropping the zeros  
With RGDP  Without RGDP  
Above Threshold 
Income sample 
With RGDP  
Without 
RGDP  
With RGDP  
Without 
RGDP  
Log RGDP per Capita -76.83(0.00)* - -5.69(0.24) -37.74(0.00)* - -70.9(0.02)** - 
Square of Log RGDP per Capita 4.04(0.00) * - - 1.26(0.01) * - 2.99(0.06)*** - 
Log FDI (inflow) -0.39(0.78) -2(0.07) *** 0.67(0.71) 1.75(0.28) -3.01(0.001)* 2.49(0.46) -2.59(0.04)** 
Log Bank Credit to Private sector (% GDP) -0.26(0.94) 4.46(0.16) -4.64(0.70) -0.15(0.12) -0.16(0.153) 0.50(0.90) 0.05(0.99) 
Log of Trade Openness -3.09(0.20) -5.35(0.02)** 1.92(0.72) -2.04(0.37) -7.16(0.00)* -4.09(0.29) -9.20(0.00)* 
Share of agriculture Sector in GDP -0.35(0.21) 0.27(0.09)*** -0.70(0.56) -0.42(0.006)* -0.05(0.666) -0.47(0.18) 0.10(0.65) 
Share of Manufacturing Sector in GDP -0.10(0.40) 0.01(0.90) -0.28(0.64) -0.15(0.02) * -0.13(0.05)* -0.05(0.73) -0.07(0.62) 
Adult Average year of Schooling -1.91(0.01) * -3.07(0.00)* 0.27(0.68) -2.16(0.00) * -3.01(0.00)* -1.19(0.24) -2.70(0.00)* 
Pupil teacher Ratio Primary 0.08(0.38) 0.14(0.14) 0.01(0.96) -0.05(0.45) 0.01(0.847) -0.04(0.74) 0.11(0.26) 
Female labour force participation rate 0.18(0.00) * 0.17(0.01)* -0.04(0.84) 0.14(0.00)* 0.11(0.002)* 0.26(0.01)* 0.14(0.06)*** 
Aid (% GNI) -0.39(0.00) * -0.24(0.00*) -0.95(0.75) -0.24(0.00)* -0.14(0.00)* -0.48(0.00)* -0.24(0.01)* 
Region 2 5.91(0.14) 10.38(0.01)* -6.11(0.53) 0.57(0.87) -1.9(0.61) 12.12(0.03)** 11.67(0.04)** 
3 3.12(0.34) 3.12(0.35) -3.16(0.70) 5.4(0.071)* -2.09(0.41) 7.21(0.24) 0.69(0.86) 
4 2.63(0.55) 4.24(0.36) 6.10(0.45) 0.51(0.85) -2.66(0.32) 10.13(0.11) 4.86(0.36) 
6 3.23(0.40) 4.10(0.31) - 6.75(0.05)** 0.7(0.827) 7.46(0.15) 3.40(0.44) 
7 7.36(0.03) ** 10.80(0.00)* -6.97(0.51) 9.08(0.00)* 6.71(0.01)* 11.70(0.00)* 10.69(0.01)* 
Year 1980 8.35(0.43) -9.12(0.33) - 11.15(0.00)* -1.29(0.50) 21.57(0.23) -7.27(0.34) 
1990 12.82(0.22) -4.52(0.63) - 16.57(0.00)* 1.52(0.46) 12.25(0.36) -8.50(0.30) 
2000 11.11(0.21) -2.25(0.79) -3.77(0.61) 14.2 (0.00)* 4.4 (0.12) 17.54(0.16) 0.22(0.98) 
2010 11.10(0.22) -1.30(0.87) - 16.34(0.00)* 8.6 (0.03)* 27.05(0.04)** 9.42(0.21) 
Constant 342.7(0.00) * -13.7(0.60) 90.82(0.42) 186.3(0.00)* 20.9(0.27) 282.8(0.03)** -19.50(0.57) 
F /chi2 Test 24.03 23.02 9.35 68.96 64.89 15.65 16.04 
N 328 328 25 274+ 54-Censored) 274 274 
R-squared 0.83 0.81 0.38 0.242 0.234 0.75 0.72 
OID Test 0.39 - - - - - - 
p-value OID Test 0.53 - - - - - - 
Endogeneity Test  chi2(3) 6.62(0.08) - - - - - - 
Note: *,** and *** represents Coefficient is Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  Estimation technique used is 2SLS based on countries fixed effect. Income, Credit and FDI 
are instrumented by Investment (% GDP), rural population as percent of total, index of political rights and number of telephone lines while instrument for trade openness is 
based on gravity model. 
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Turning to the next question i.e. whether globalization affects child labour or does the 
effect channels through income? It is evident from table 3.4 that the effect of trade and 
FDI is insignificant. However, Edmonds and Pavcnik (2006) argued that the effect of 
trade is only significant when income is excluded from the model. Hence, as a next 
step, the study re-estimated the model without income. In the absence of income the 
effect of trade and FDI now turns significant and negative. This shows that the effect of 
trade and FDI could channel through income i.e. the effect of globalization on reducing 
child labour incidence is indirect and works through income. The phenomenon may 
work like this: globalization increases the employment opportunities in an economy 
thereby increasing the income (recall table 3.3 for positive effect of trade and FDI on 
real GDP per capita) while increase in income reduces child labour incidence (see table 
3.4 for negative effect of income on child labour). Using estimates from equation 3.1, 
precisely one standard deviation increase in trade openness was found to be associated 
with the reduction of almost 0.21% child labour, while one standard deviation increase 
in FDI inflow was found to be reducing the child labour by almost 0.33%.  
 
d) Effect of Credit and other Control Variables 
 
 
After exploring the effect of income and globalization on child labour incidence, the 
study now turns to investigate the role of credit market. It is assumed that if the poor 
and unskilled families face the borrowing constraints then whenever trade lowers the 
wages of poor families, the incidence of child labour will increase. Consequently the 
study expects a negative association between credit market imperfections and child 
labour. However, the study does not find strong support for the assumption, as the co-
efficient of credit variable is negative but insignificant.  Hence, overall for credit market, 
study concludes that it may not have significant effect as both trade and FDI are already 
considered as important factors in reducing child labour through an increase the income. 
Therefore, demand for borrowing to cope up with the income shock does not show 
significant effect.  
 
After exploring the main variables we now examine the effects of some important 
control variables. Among the control variables, average year of adult schooling shows a 
significant negative effect on the incidence of child labour while the effect of pupil- 
teacher ratio shows a relatively insignificant effect. Countries with low educational 
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attainment usually have unskilled labour in abundance including child labour. 
Therefore, any increase in average adult of schooling means higher level of education 
attainment which may lead to a decline in the incidence rate.  
 
Results also exhibit negative association of Aid (% GNI) with child labour. This 
variable is incorporated to identify the channel through which growth can be promoted. 
Literature indicates that the aid could affect the growth and may increase the living 
standard of the people. This study hypothesizes that higher living standards may help in 
reducing child labour. Role of aid has never been explored under the framework of 
child labour and our result also predicts a negative effect of aid on GDP per capita, 
therefore, the study interpreted the negative effect of aid on child labour with caution. 
The study concludes that foreign aid may be effective in reducing the child labour 
incidence by promoting the social expenditure but in the absence of any past evidence 
(literature) no concrete conclusion could be drawn; aid may be effective in reducing 
child labour. 
 
As far as the effect of agriculture sector on child labour is concerned, agriculture sector 
was found to be reducing the income (see table 3.3 for reference) and after dropping the 
income from the model (see table 3.4) its effect on child labour seems to be positive and 
significant. The positive effect indicates that child labour is more of a rural 
phenomenon and any expansion in the agricultural activity may lead to increase in the 
child labour incidence. Agricultural activities that usually involve children include 
harvesting and planting of crops, weeding, looking after livestock, marketing and 
storage of farm produce. Children are rarely involved in activities like uprooting of 
trees and chemical spraying. 
 
Based on the argument that female empowerment leads to the welfare of the house 
especially children, the study expected that the effect of female labour force 
participation rate will be negative. But instead it is found to be increasing child labour 
incidence. One possible explanation might be that in most of the developing countries 
(especially in Asian countries) females often participate in the labour force when the 
income from the male earning drops from the subsistence level. If this is the case, then 
these poor households are also more likely to offer their children for child labour, 
especially girls. Hence, this variable might be capturing the effect of labour market 
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more than the empowerment effect. In order to investigate this, the study introduced 
male participation rate in the main model (see table 3.5). Both male and female labour 
force participation rates have positive and significant effect in overall sample and 
sample for girls. In the boys¶ sample only the male labour force participation rate is 
significant. This shows that the variable might be capturing the effect of labour market 
rather than empowerment effect.  
 
Table 3.5: Effect of Male and Female Labour Force Participation Rate 
(Country Fixed effect) 
Dependent variable: Child labour All Boys Girls 
Log RGDP per Capita -79.48(0.00)* -76.57(0.0)* -82.49(0.00)* 
Square of Log RGDP per Capita 4.52(0.00)* 4.26(0.00)* 4.79(0.00)* 
Log FDI (inflow) -1.27(0.34) -1.73(0.26) -0.79(0.55) 
Log Bank Credit to Private sector (% GDP) 2.46(0.47) 2.44(0.53) 2.46(0.46) 
Log of Trade Openness -3.37(0.15) -3.88(0.15) -2.85(0.21) 
Share of agriculture Sector in GDP -0.13(0.64) -0.24(0.45) -0.02(0.94) 
Share of Manufacturing Sector in GDP -0.01(0.93) -0.03(0.80) 0.01(0.91) 
Adult Average year of Schooling -1.95(0.00)* -2.42(0.00)* -1.47(0.03)** 
Pupil teacher Ratio Primary 0.06(0.48) 0.07(0.47) 0.05(0.56) 
Female labour force participation rate 0.13(0.04)** 0.07(0.32) 0.19(0.00)* 
Male labour force participation rate 0.44(0.00)* 0.45(0.01)* 0.44(0.00)* 
Aid (% GNI) -0.36(0.00)* -0.36(0.00)* -0.36(0.00)* 
Region 2 8.35(0.04)** 9.11(0.04)** 7.61(0.05)** 
3 1.34(0.67) 1.89(0.60) 0.79(0.80) 
4 3.38(0.42) -0.80(0.87) 7.64(0.07)*** 
6 1.95(0.59) -0.86(0.84) 4.77(0.19) 
7 8.13(0.01)* 7.08(0.05)** 9.27(0.00)* 
Year 1980 -4.43(0.69) -0.47(0.97) -8.61(0.43) 
1990 0.51(0.96) 0.40(0.97) 0.73(0.94) 
2000 1.82(0.84) 3.68(0.72) -0.08(0.99) 
2010 -0.19(0.98) 5.14(0.63) -5.63(0.54) 
Constant 311.45(0.00)* 316.7(0.01)* 306.18(0.00)* 
F /chi2 Test 25.75 21.59 25.07 
N 327 327 327 
R-squared 0.85 0.82 0.84 
Note: *,** and *** represents Coefficient is Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Numbers in parenthesis are 
p-values.  
 
Finally, due to the presence of zeros in the dependent variable this study has estimated 
the main model using the tobit model (although we have also dropped all zero 
observations from the sample as a comparator). The results of the tobit estimation is 
presented in the last columns of table 3.4. Results are not different to those obtained 
previously.  Income is highly significant in reducing the child labour but the effect is 
again non-linear. Trade and FDI are insignificant in presence of income while after 
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dropping income from the model both are significant and negative. Hence the tobit 
estimates, are similar to those previous obtained but owing to the reliance on 
assumptions of heteroskedasticity and normality we would not wish to consider tobit as 
our principal estimator. Further, dropping the zeros will also result in bias in estimates 
as Madala (1992) pointed out that the appropriate procedure is to model the decision 
that produces the zero observation. Therefore in the reminder of the sections we have 
kept country fixed effect as the main model. 
 
e) Exploring Alternative measures of Income 
 
Table 3.6 provides the analysis based on the alternative measures of income.  Income is 
represented by Real GDP per capita, income share held by bottom quintile of the 
population (hereafter Q1) and adult wage rate. As said earlier all the three proxies are 
instrumented before entering the model specifically Real GDP per capita model 
includes following instruments; investment as % GDP, rural population as percent of 
total, index of political rights and number of telephone lines while in the model where 
income is represented by poorest quintile income, investment as % GDP is replaced by 
population growth. The wage model includes fertility rate, annual percentage change in 
inflation and log of investment (% GDP) in addition to rural population as percent of 
total, index of political rights and number of telephone lines. In all the three models 
instrument for trade openness is based on gravity model [see section 3.4.1 and 3.4.3 for 
more detail].  
 
The basic expectation is the same: trade and FDI will affect income, which in turn 
affects incidence of child labour. Table 3.6 provides the same result for real GDP per 
capita and income held by bottom quintile of the population while the effect of adult 
wage rate is insignificant on child labour. Precisely, income held by bottom quintile 
population has significant non-linear effect on child labour as predicted by the real GDP 
per capita. A 10 percentage point increase in the income represented by Q1 found out to 
be reducing the incidence of child labour by almost 5.6 percent point [i.e. one standard 
deviation increase in income of the bottom quintile of the population reduces the 
incidence of child labour around 4%]. The nonlinear term further shows that a 10 
percentage point increase in the income share held by bottom quintile population is 
associated with the 0.3 percentage point increase in child labour [i.e. one standard 
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deviation increase in income of the bottom quintile increases the incidence of child 
labour around 3.6%].  
 
Trade openness and FDI again shows the same behaviour. In the presence of income 
both are insignificant, however, after dropping income from the model both turn 
significant. The effect of trade and FDI in reducing the incidence of child is slightly 
pronounced under the new measure. Specifically, one standard deviation increase in the 
trade reduces child labour by almost 0.29% (previously 0.21%) while one standard 
deviation increase in FDI inflow reduces the incidence by almost 0.61% (previously 
0.33%). As far as credit availability is concerned the effect is again insignificant. 
 
This study incorporated wages in the child labour model to elaborate upon the argument 
given by Jafarey and Lahiri (2002). According to them, trade sanctions reduce the price 
of unskilled products and lower the demand of unskilled labour including child labour. 
This reduces the wages paid to the unskilled workers, thus reducing the income of the 
impoverished families, leading to increase in child labour. If wages are the channel 
through which trade may affect child labour, then the question which arises in mind is 
what could be its impact? In order to evaluate the possible effect of wages on child 
labour real GDP per capita is replaced by the adult wages per month. Although the 
direct effect of wages is worth investigating using the variable but the problem with this 
YDULDEOH LV WKDW LQ D FURVV FRXQWU\ IUDPHZRUN LW¶V KDUG WR ILQG any data on wages. 
Furthermore, for the countries where data does exists, it is not easy to compare the data. 
Different countries report wage data in varied formats. For example, some report 
monthly wages while others report hourly or weekly wages. Some countries report 
wages for a particular group [like male or skilled wages in the country only ± see 
Freeman and Oostendorp (2005) for more detail]. Freeman and Oostendorp (2005) has 
standardized and adjusted the data to make it comparable across countries.  
 
Although using this data drops the sample size significantly to 77 observations only, 
nevertheless, it may provide greater insight into the problem. The effect of wages on 
child labour is analysed after controlling for endogeneity. In order to control the 
endogeneity, wages are instrumented by the fertility rate, log of investment to GDP 
ratio, annual percentage change in inflation rate, number of telephone lines and rural 
population as percentage of total population. After establishing the fact that wages are 
endogenous in the child labour model and instruments used to predict the effect of 
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wages on child labour are not weak instruments, the study proceeds with the analysis. 
The result shows that the effect of wages18 in reducing child labour is insignificant and 
the magnitude of the effect is lower than what the earlier two proxies of income have 
demonstrated. The insignificant effect of the wages may be because of the insufficient 
number of observation. Once again, in the presence of wages the effect of trade 
openness and FDI is insignificant but after dropping wages from the model the effect of 
both trade and FDI turns significant. Now one standard deviation increase in trade is 
found to be reducing child labour by almost 3%.  While one standard deviation increase 
in FDI reduces the incidence of child labour around 0.15% thus reinforcing our earlier 
conclusion that trade and FDI only affect child labour through income.  
 
In this section the study discussed the effect of both income of the bottom quintile 
population and wages as an alternative to real GDP per capita as proxies of income. 
Given the insignificance of wages, the study chose the best proxy by comparing only 
income of the bottom quintile population and real GDP per capita. To do so, the Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) were used to 
choose the best model: the lower the AIC and BIC values the better will be the model. 
The AIC and BIC values for the model using income of the bottom quintile are 626.8 
and 706.4 respectively, while for the model having real GDP per capita in the model the 
AIC and BIC values are 628.5 and 708.1 respectively. AIC and BIC values are slightly 
higher in case of real GDP per capita. Therefore, the study concludes that the income of 
the bottom quintile population rather than real GDP per capita is the better income 
proxy to use when analysing child labour incidence. As this alternative measure is 
computed by using income share of the bottom quintile population and Gini coefficient 
hence this may also show the prevalence of inequality in an economy. The significant 
effect of this measure therefore may also imply that policies to combat child labour 
incidence should take into account the inequalities that exist in an economy.   
 
 
   
 
                                                 
18
 We have also tested the effect of adult wages after dropping the nonlinear term but the effect remains 
insignificant. 
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Table 3.6: Effect of Income on child Labour 
(Country Fixed effect) 
Dependent variable: Child labour (All) With RGDP Without RGDP  With Q1 Without Q1 With Wages Without Wages 
Log RGDP per Capita -76.83(0.00)* - - - - - 
Square of Log RGDP per Capita 4.04(0.00)* - - - - - 
log Income of Bottom Quintile - - -56.27(0.00)* - - - 
Square of the log Income of Bottom Quintile - - 2.57(0.00)* - - - 
Log Wages Per month - - - - 33.73(0.18) - 
Square of Log Wages Per month - - - - -0.82(0.65) - 
Log FDI (inflow) -0.39(0.78) -1.98(0.07) * -1.80(0.52) -3.6(0.06)*** 17.17(0.28) -3.7(0.11)*** 
Log Bank Credit to Private sector (% GDP) -0.26(0.94) 4.46(0.16) 2.72(0.45) 4.16(0.26) -22.97(0.32) 7.33(0.31) 
Log of Trade Openness -3.09(0.20) -5.35(0.02) * -2.56(0.64) -7.35(0.03)** 43.54(0.35) -18.25(0.06)*** 
Share of agriculture Sector in GDP -0.35(0.21) 0.27(0.09) * 0.03(0.88) 0.13(0.47) 0.94(0.13) 0.19(0.44) 
Share of Manufacturing Sector in GDP -0.10(0.40) 0.01(0.90) 0.03(0.82) 0.02(0.89) 0.52(0.23) -0.03(0.82) 
Adult Average year of Schooling -1.91(0.01)* -3.07(0.00) * -3.06(0.00)* -3.69(0.00)* 0.78(0.82) -3.55(0.00)* 
Pupil teacher Ratio Primary 0.08(0.38) 0.14(0.14) 0.07(0.50) 0.06(0.56) 0.6(0.10)*** 0.18(0.17) 
Female labour force participation rate 0.18(0.00)* 0.17(0.01) * 0.14(0.06)*** 0.18(0.02)** 0.30(0.12) 0.07(0.32) 
Aid (% GNI) -0.39(0.00)* -0.24(0.00) * -0.38(0.04)** -0.3(0.07)*** 2.15(0.29) -0.55(0.07)*** 
Region 2 5.91(0.14) 10.38(0.01) * 5.70(0.27) 10.5(0.05)** -45.35(0.3) 16.68(0.10)*** 
3 3.12(0.34) 3.12(0.35) 2.63(0.53) 1.96(0.64) 2.29(0.75) -5.26(0.21) 
4 2.63(0.55) 4.24(0.36) 0.43(0.94) -0.45(0.94) 2.02(0.87) -9.34(0.23) 
6 3.23(0.40) 4.10(0.31) 3.86(0.48) 2.06(0.72) 30.09(0.25) -4.86(0.34) 
7 7.36(0.03)** 10.8(0.00) * 8.21(0.05)** 10.1(0.02)** -23.38(0.39) 12.56(0.14) 
Year 1980 8.35(0.43) -9.12(0.33) -9.84(0.27) -13.31(0.15) - - 
1990 12.82(0.22) -4.52(0.63) 3.24(0.75) -2.74(0.76) -1.21(0.88) 7.06(0.08)*** 
2000 11.11(0.21) -2.25(0.79) 2.25(0.77) -2.17(0.79) -45.36(0.36) 19.30(0.05)** 
2010 11.10(0.22) -1.30(0.87) 5.79(0.59) 6.45(0.57) - - 
Constant 342.7(0.00) * -13.7(0.60) 323.5(0.00)* 8.7(0.77) -47.93(0.66) -109.52(0.22) 
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Dependent variable: Child labour (All) With RGDP Without RGDP  With Q1 Without Q1 With Wages Without Wages 
F /chi2 Test 24.03 23.02 16.09 15.38 18.94 21.00 
N 328 328 196 196 77.00 77.00 
R-squared 0.83 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.87 0.87 
OID Test 0.39(0.53) 
 
0.15(0.69) 
 
0.83(0.66) 
 
Endogeneity Test  chi2(3) 6.62(0.08) 
 
10.19(0.02) 
 
9.82(0.02) 
 
Note: *,** and *** represents Coefficient is Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Numbers in parenthesis are p-values.  Estimation technique used 
is 2SLS based on countries effect. Income (based on Q1), Credit and FDI are instrumented by population growth, rural population as percent of total, 
index of political rights and number of telephone lines; instrument for trade openness is based on gravity model while wages per month are 
instrumented by fertility rate, annual percentage change in inflation, log of investment (%GDP), rural population as percent of total, index of political 
rights and number of telephone lines.  
 
 
 
 
Table 3.6 (a): Comparing the two proxies of Income  
 
Model RGDP per Capita Income of Bottom Quintile 
Number of observation 328 328 
ll(null) -389.35 -389.35 
ll(model) -293.22 -292.37 
Degrees of Freedom 21 21 
AIC 628.45 626.75 
BIC 708.10 706.40 
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f) Exploring an Alternate measure of Trade 
 
The idea behind including export in place of trade is based on the argument that trade 
sanctions reduce price of unskilled exportable goods which reduces wages and income, 
thereby affecting child labour. Therefore, the only channel through which trade could 
affect child labour is exports rather than trade openness (export plus import as ratio of 
GDP). Jafarey and Lahiri (2002) have shown that when trade sanctions reduce price of 
unskilled exportable good, the income of the poor decreases. This increases the demand 
for loan, consequently increasing the interest rate. This results in a higher supply of 
child labour, because poor families cannot borrow to meet the income shock. In their 
model, a reduction in the price of exportable goods may also increase the consumption 
demand of that good which may affect the imports, assuming that both export and 
import are substitutable.  
 
However, Edmonds (2009) argues that the dominant effect of an increase in 
international trade on children in developing economies is through changes in relative 
prices and living standards. Edmonds¶ (2009) argument is based on the fact that 
children in developing economies are not usually engaged in trade related sectors. They 
mostly work in agriculture sectors. Children are rarely involved in traded sectors 
because trade related sectors are relatively more skill intensive than agriculture and 
informal sectors. Hence, the effects of trade through wages in the trade related sector 
will be negligible. 
 
The above two points, one predicting the effect of export on child labour through 
changes in the wages paid and the second arguing that trade will only affect child 
labour by having its consequences on the living standard, force the study to compare the 
effects of the two to find out if any dissimilarity exists. In order to do so, the study first 
replaces trade openness measure with the exports to GDP ratio, while in the last column 
imports and interest rates are also introduced (dropping credit) 19  to give a better 
understanding of the Jafarey and Lahiri model.  
 
Result shows (table 3.7) no significant difference between the effect of trade openness 
and export. Both trade and exports have significant effect after dropping income from 
                                                 
19
 Credit variable is drop because interest rate usually consider as the cost of borrowing. Therefore, 
interest rate can be used to predict the role of credit market imperfection on child labour. 
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the model. One standard deviation increase in export reduces the child labour around 
0.42% which is higher than 0.21% when one considers the effect of trade openness. As 
export is also significant after dropping income from the model, it shows that exports 
also increase the income of the poor and increase in income reduces the supply of child 
labour. As said earlier the phenomenon may work like this: globalization increases the 
employment opportunities in an economy thereby increasing the income (recall table 
3.3 for positive effect of globalization on Real GDP per capita) while increase in 
income reduces child labour incidence. Hence we conclude that income may be the 
channel through which trade/export and FDI could affect child labour.  
 
As explained earlier, the last two columns incorporate the effect of imports and real 
interest rate as well. Before going into the detail of the analysis, two things need 
clarification: first of all, as data on real interest rates are hard to find, the sample size 
decreases to 306 observations. Second the real interest rate in the Jafarey and Lahiri 
model is endogenous. As a first step, this study checks the possible endogeneity of this 
variable. The Wu-Hausman test indicates the presence of endogeneity. Hence, this 
section uses the instrumental variable approach to predict the effect of real interest rate. 
Results show insignificant effect of real interest rate on incidence of child labour. The 
effect of FDI and imports show significant negative effect after dropping income from 
the model. However, now the effect of export (% GDP) is significant with income 
included in the model.  
 
Overall as the results shows that the effect of both trade and export share is significant 
only after dropping income from the model we conclude that income may be the 
channel through which trade could affect child labour. Our conclusion may rest on the 
argument given by Edmond (2009) that trade sanctions may not have significant effect 
on the incidence of child labour as proportion of child labour in export related industries 
is negligible. The channel though which trade could affect child labour is by increasing 
the living standard of the poor.  
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Table 3.7: Effect of Trade, Exports and Imports on child Labour 
(Country Fixed effect) 
Dependent variable: Child labour 
(All) 
With Trade openness With Export only With Export and Import 
With RGDP Without RGDP With RGDP Without RGDP With RGDP  Without RGDP 
Log RGDP per Capita -76.83(0.00)* - -75.78(0.00) * - -63.4(0.00)* - 
Square of Log RGDP per Capita 4.04(0.00)* - 4(0.00) * - 3.1(0.01)* - 
Log FDI (inflow) -0.39(0.78) -1.98(0.07) * -0.42(0.75) -1.92(0.07)*** -3.0(0.39) -6.39(0.01) * 
Log Bank Credit to Private sector (% 
GDP) 
-0.26(0.94) 4.46(0.16) -0.11(0.97) 4.49(0.16) - - 
Log of Trade Openness -3.09(0.20) -5.35(0.02) * - - - - 
Log Export as ratio of GDP - - -3.6(0.2) -5.73(0.02)** -4.6(0.07) *** -5.82(0.03) ** 
Log Import as ratio of GDP - - - - -4.9(0.50) -12.98(0.02) ** 
Log Real Interest Rate - - - - 2.0(0.76) -6.50(0.22) 
Share of agriculture Sector in GDP -0.35(0.21) 0.27(0.09)*** -0.34(0.23) 0.270.09)*** -0.7(0.00) * -0.42(0.03) ** 
Share of Manufacturing Sector in GDP -0.10(0.40) 0.01(0.90) -0.10(0.40) 0.01(0.91) -0.3(0.03) ** -0.21(0.07) *** 
Adult Average year of Schooling -1.91(0.01) * -3.07(0.00)* -1.96(0.01) * -3.11(0.00) * -1.4(0.05) ** -2.21(0.00) * 
Pupil teacher Ratio Primary 0.08(0.38) 0.14(0.14) 0.07(0.40) 0.13(0.15) 0.2(0.03) ** 0.21(0.04) ** 
Female labour force participation rate 0.18(0.00)* 0.17(0.01) * 0.18(0.01) * 0.17(0.01) * 0.1(0.09) *** 0.08(0.25) 
Aid (% GNI) -0.39(0.00)* -0.24(0.00) * -0.39(0.00) * -0.24(0.00) * -0.5(0.08) *** -0.03(0.88) 
Region 2 5.91(0.14) 10.38(0.01) * 6.14(0.13) 10.34(0.01) * 3.1(0.54) 4.69(0.31) 
3 3.12(0.34) 3.12(0.35) 3.15(0.34) 3.23(0.33) -6.3(0.34) -9.87(0.06) *** 
4 2.63(0.55) 4.24(0.36) 2.79(0.53) 4.22(0.36) -5.6(0.59) -15.(0.06) *** 
6 3.23(0.40) 4.10(0.31) 3.25(0.40) 4.05(0.32) -6.1(0.59) -16.4(0.06) *** 
7 7.36(0.03)** 10.80(0.00) * 7.56(0.02)** 10.85(0.00) * 0.2(0.97) -1.28(0.80) 
Year 1980 8.35(0.43) -9.12(0.33) 8.31(0.43) -8.82(0.35) 5.4(0.59) -2.95(0.77) 
1990 12.82(0.22) -4.52(0.63) 13.34(0.20) -3.54(0.71) 12.0(0.27) 10.82(0.32) 
2000 11.11(0.21) -2.25(0.79) 11.36(0.20) -1.85(0.82) 12.7(0.26) 13.12(0.24) 
2010 11.10(0.22) -1.30(0.87) 11.36(0.21) -0.88(0.91) 17.8(0.21) 21.55(0.11) 
Constant 342.7(0.00)* -13.7(0.60) 329.6(0.00) * -22.8(0.42) 351.9(0.00) * 150.7(0.06) *** 
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Dependent variable: Child labour 
(All) 
With Trade openness With Export only With Export and Import 
With RGDP Without RGDP With RGDP Without RGDP With RGDP  Without RGDP 
F /chi2 Test 24.03 23.02 24.03 23.14 19.45 19.08 
N 328 328 328 328 306 306 
R-squared 0.83 0.81 0.83 0.81 0.80 0. 79 
OID Test 0.39 
 
0.37 
 
1.6 
 
p-value OID Test 0.53 
 
0.55 
 
0.45 
 
Endogeneity Test  chi2(3) 6.62 
 
6.68 
 
15.26 
 
p-value 0.08 
 
0.08 
 
0.002 
 
Note: *,** and *** represents Coefficient is Significant at 1%, 5%,and 10% significance level respectfully. Numbers in parenthesis are p-values.  Estimation technique used 
is 2SLS based on countries effect. Income, interest rate and FDI are instrumented by Investment (% GDP), rural population as percent of total, index of political rights, 
general government gross fixed capital formation and number of telephone lines while instruments for trade openness and export (%GDP) are based on gravity model.  
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g) 'LVDJJUHJDWLQJWKHUHVXOWE\&KLOG·VGender  
 
The discrimination against women remains in debate throughout the world. For many 
girls, childhood is a period of taking responsibility for household and child care tasks. 
Gender discrimination is particularly evident in South Asia. In South Asia girls usually 
face a number of problems due to their gender identity. Keeping in mind gender 
discrimination across the world, this section estimated the model in equation 3.1 
separately for male child labour and for female child labour. The result is discussed 
below.    
Table 3.8: Determinants of child Labour by Gender 
(Country Fixed effect) 
Dependent variable: Child 
labour 
Boys Girls 
With RGDP  
Without 
RGDP  
With RGDP  
Without 
RGDP  
Log RGDP per Capita -73.89(0.00)* - -79.87(0.00)* - 
Square of Log RGDP per Capita 3.77(0.01)* - 4.31(0.00)* - 
Log FDI (inflow) -0.85(0.58) -2.69(0.03)** 0.09(0.95) -1.25(0.24) 
Log Bank Credit to Private sector 
(% GDP) 
-0.28(0.94) 4.70(0.18) -0.25(0.94) 4.20(0.18) 
Log of Trade Openness -3.62(0.19) -6.14(0.02)** -2.55(0.29) -4.55(0.05)** 
Share of agriculture Sector in 
GDP 
-0.46(0.15) 0.19(0.27) -0.24(0.38) 0.34(0.03)** 
Share of Manufacturing Sector in 
GDP 
-0.12(0.36) 0.00(0.98) -0.08(0.52) 0.03(0.78) 
Adult Average year of Schooling -2.39(0.00)* -3.63(0.00)* -1.43(0.04)** -2.51(0.00)* 
Pupil teacher Ratio Primary 0.09(0.39) 0.15(0.14) 0.07(0.44) 0.12(0.18) 
Female labour force 
participation rate 
0.12(0.08)*** 0.11(0.12) 0.24(0.00)* 0.24(0.00)* 
Aid (% GNI) -0.39(0.00)* -0.24(0.01)* -0.39(0.00)* -0.25(0.00)* 
Region 2 6.65(0.15) 11.01(0.02)** 5.17(0.19) 9.76(0.02)* 
3 3.70(0.32) 3.31(0.37) 2.53(0.43) 2.93(0.37) 
4 -1.52(0.76) -0.04(0.99) 6.86(0.12) 8.61(0.06)*** 
6 0.44(0.92) 1.09(0.81) 6.03(0.11) 7.11(0.08)*** 
7 6.32(0.09)*** 9.65(0.01)* 8.49(0.01)* 12.03(0.00)* 
Year 1980 12.48(0.30) -5.53(0.59) 4.01(0.70) -12.92(0.17) 
1990 12.88(0.27) -4.37(0.68) 12.88(0.21) -4.57(0.62) 
2000 13.12(0.19) -0.21(0.98) 9.06(0.30) -4.33(0.6) 
2010 16.59(0.10)*** 3.45(0.70) 5.52(0.53) -6.15(0.44) 
Constant 348.2(0.01)* -0.5(0.99) 337.3(0.00)* -27.4(0.29) 
F /chi2 Test 20.69 20.66 23.28 21.79 
N 328 328 328 328 
R-squared 0.81 0.79 0.82 0.80 
Note: *,** and *** represents Coefficient is Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Numbers in parenthesis are p-
values.  Estimation technique used is 2SLS based on countries effect. Income, Credit and FDI are instrumented by Investment (% 
GDP), rural population as percent of total, index of political rights and number of telephone lines while instrument for trade openness is 
based on gravity model.  
 
The effect of income is non-linear and significant for both girls and boys. Comparing 
the result by gender, the study shows that LQFRPHHIIHFWLVVOLJKWO\KLJKHUIRUWKHJLUOV¶
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VDPSOHWKDQIRUWKHER\V¶VDPSOH3UHFLVHO\DSHUFHQWDJHSRLQWLQFUHDVHLQLQFRPH
reduces child labour incidence among girls by 8%, while in case of boys the reduction 
is 7.4%. Turning to trade and FDI, the results again show notable  effect of the two after 
dropping income from the model in case of boys sample while for the girls sample only 
trade openness is significant after dropping the income. Comparing the result across 
gender shows that one standard deviation increase in trade openness reduces the child 
labour of girls by 0.19% while for boys the reduction is 0.23%. As far as FDI is 
concerned, one standard deviation increase in FDI inflow reduces child labour for boys 
by almost 0.42% while the effect of FDI on female child labour is insignificant.   
 
Overall, it can be concluded from the results that the effect of income is in favour of 
female child labour. However, FDI inflow remains insignificant for the girls sample 
while the effect of trade openness in reducing child labour is slightly more pronounced 
for boys.  
 
3.5.2 Some Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Although the above discussion answers all the research questions the chapter aimed to 
address, there are some regression analyses that are performed to have a greater insight 
of the issue. For example, the results discussed above do not show significant effect of 
credit market imperfection on child labour incidence. Before generalizing any 
conclusion based on insignificant effect, this study has taken into account Dehejia and 
*DWWL¶V  PRGHO >'* LQ VKRUW Kereafter].  Dehejia and Gatti (2005) explain that 
credit affects child labour significantly. Their baseline model is very simple. They 
regressed child labour percentage on log of real GDP per capita (both in its linear and 
quadratic form), child labour percentage in 1950, percent of rural population and a time 
trend. In the latter stages they further included a measure of income variability ± 
standard deviation of annual growth in real GDP per capita for the previous 10 years. 
Their result shows significant and negative effect of credit on child labour while a 
positive and significant effect of income volatility. As the DG model shows a 
significant effect of credit, the present study attempted to re-estimate the DG model. 
The motivation behind replicating the DG model is to investigate further the effect of 
credit on child labour. Result is presented hereunder in table 3.9.  
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Table 3.9: Access to Credit and child Labour under DG Model 
 
Replication of DG-Model 
DG-Model with 
Countries 
fixed effect 
Log RGDP per Capita -31.5(0.0) * -56.3(0.00)* 
Square of Log RGDP per Capita 1.85(0.0) * 3.27(0.00)* 
Bank Credit to Private sector -0.06(0.0) * -0.78(0.50) 
Log FDI (inflow) - -1.91(0.00)* 
Income Variability -7.4(0.01) * 27.96(0.32) 
Log of Trade Openness - -7.02(0.00)* 
Rural population as % total 
population 
0.08(0.002) * 0.24(0.00)* 
child labour in 1950 0.59(0.0) * - 
Time Trend -1.67(0.0) * - 
Note: *,** and *** represents Coefficient is Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  Numbers in 
parenthesis are p-values.  Estimation of DG model is based on OLS regression.  
 
The result predicts a significant and negative effect of credit as in the original DG 
model. Although credit, the variable of interest, now turns negative and significant but 
the drawback in using DG model is that it is not corrected for endogeneity and country 
specific fixed effect. Hence, as a next step, the DG model is corrected for country fixed 
effect. The result now shows insignificant effect of credit. As the data of the current 
study confirms the need of country specific estimation, a country- specific intercept is 
applied in the main regression model.  
 
Furthermore, in addition to the income variable, we have also investigated the presence 
of non-linearity among other variables as well. Table 3.10 shows the result after 
including nonlinear terms and interaction terms of all the variables of interest with real 
GDP per capita and trade and FDI with credit. Results demonstrate the insignificant 
effect of most of the interaction and quadratic terms except for interaction term of FDI 
with credit and interaction term of credit with real GDP per capita. The interaction term 
of FDI with credit and the non-linear credit term are also significant after dropping 
income from the model. In order to draw some conclusions we have conducted a set of 
joint significance tests. The joint significance test of the credit variable (credit, its 
square and all the interaction terms that include credit) is not statistically significant (F-
statistic 1.52 with p= 0.21). Application of the same test on the FDI variable and the 
trade variables finds a significant effect (F-statistics 3.37 with p-0.02) in the former and 
an insignificant effect (F-statistics 1.92 with p-0.14) in the latter.  
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Furthermore, inclusion of non-linear and interaction terms resulted in the loss of 
explanatory power of income variable. Hence, before proceeding further the BIC is 
applied to select the best model. The BIC value for the model without inclusion of non-
linear term and interaction terms work out to be lower (710.85) than with the inclusion 
of these terms (728.41). Therefore, on the basis of BIC test in the main analysis, these 
terms are not included but nevertheless the study does acknowledge that non-linearity 
may exist in FDI variable. 
 
Table 3.10: With Interaction & second order Terms 
Dependent variable: Child labour (All)  With RGDP  Without RGDP  
Log RGDP per Capita -68.56(0.15) - 
Square of Log RGDP per Capita 1.89(0.51) - 
Log FDI (inflow) -0.21(0.99) -13.60(0.20) 
Square of Log FDI (inflow) -0.97(0.13) 0.07(0.82) 
Log Bank Credit to Private sector (% GDP) 19.79(0.68) 24.16(0.50) 
Square of Log Bank Credit -2.10(0.53) -6.01(0.04)** 
Log Trade Openness -9.91(0.88) -9.29(0.88) 
Square of Log Trade Openness 0.71(0.82) 0.51(0.87) 
Interaction term: openness*Real GDP 1.76(0.59) - 
Interaction term: FDI*Real GDP 3.32(0.11) - 
Interaction term: Credit*Real GDP -7.27(0.09)*** - 
Interaction term: Trade*Credit  2.12(0.64) 4.86(0.14) 
Interaction term: FDI *Credit 3.56(0.06)*** 2.81(0.05)** 
Share of agriculture Sector in GDP -0.44(0.18) -0.07(0.77) 
Share of Manufacturing Sector in GDP -0.17(0.23) -0.10(0.46) 
Adult Average year of Schooling -1.69(0.07)**** -2.38(0.00)* 
Pupil teacher Ratio Primary 0.07(0.58) 0.18(0.05)** 
Female labour force participation rate 0.15(0.16) 0.06(0.42) 
Aid (% GNI) -0.26(0.11) -0.08(0.39) 
Region 2 3.47(0.44) 4.14(0.36) 
3 3.58(0.54) -1.07(0.78) 
4 1.26(0.84) -2.37(0.65) 
6 2.31(0.65) -0.02(0.99) 
7 7.16(0.09)*** 6.31(0.10)*** 
Year 1980 14.53(0.43) -13.48(0.16) 
1990 19.35(0.21) -4.59(0.65) 
2000 16.95(0.22) -3.07(0.73) 
2010 14.71(0.32) -5.18(0.56) 
Constant 251.52(0.49) 85.43(0.78) 
F /chi2 Test 17.05 19.36 
N 328 328 
R-squared 0.76 0.79 
Note: *,** and *** represents Coefficient is Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  Numbers in parenthesis are p-
values.  Estimation technique used is 2SLS based on countries effect. Income, Credit and FDI are instrumented by Investment (% 
GDP), rural population as percent of total, index of political rights and number of telephone lines while instrument for trade 
openness is based on gravity model.  
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3.6 Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to investigate the link between globalization, defined as 
increase in trade openness and penetration of FDI, and incidence of child labour, while 
taking into account the role of credit market imperfections. The empirical assessment 
was based on the cross- sectional analysis of 129 developing countries for four decades, 
from 1970 to 2010. The issue was relevant under the current scenario of financial crises 
especially for the policy makers for whom a major concern is the well-being of 
children. The most common view about child labour is that children are forced into 
labour as the family incomes fall. This chapter also showed that income does affects 
child labour. The only difference in this study and all the previous studies is that it 
predicts the negative effect of income using two different measures of income after 
correcting endogeneity bias. It also investigated the role of wages separately to predict 
WKHGLUHFWHIIHFWRIZDJHVRQFKLOGODERXU7RWKHEHVWRIWKHDXWKRU¶VNQRZOHGJHWKHVH
measures have not been incorporated in earlier studies at the cross- sectional level.   
 
The study first estimated the effect of income on child labour incidence by using real 
GDP per capita, and then estimated the effect by using two other alternative measures 
of income: income held by bottom quintile of the population and adult wages. Income 
held by bottom quintile of the population was estimated by using Gini coefficient and 
bottom quintile income share Q1 data. Thus this proxy may also help in understanding 
the income inequality argument given by Chenery et.al, (1974) and Tanaka (2003) i.e. 
under more equal income distribution with the same income per capita, countries 
experience low incidence of child labour. This argument was tested by comparing the 
estimates of different proxies of income. Among the three alternative measures, adult 
wages were found to have an insignificant effect (this may be because of the 
insufficient number of observation) while Real GDP per capita and income held by 
bottom quintile of the population showed a significant but nonlinear effect. On the basis 
of AIC and BIC test, the study concludes that the income of the bottom quintile of the 
population rather than real GDP per capita is the better income proxy to use when 
analysing child labour incidence. As this measure is based on Gini coefficient and 
income share of bottom quintile population, the study further concludes that an 
effective policy to reduce child labour incidence should also take into account 
inequality that exists in an economy.   
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As explained earlier, this chapter has also investigated the potential impacts of 
international trade and FDI on child labour after correcting for endogeneity. Evidence 
shows that countries more open to trade and having higher FDI inflow have lower 
incidence of child labour. But the effect of both the variables after correcting for the 
endogeneity is significant only after dropping the income variable. Therefore, the study 
concludes that expansion in trade and FDI increases employment opportunities thereby 
increasing the income of the poor. This increase in income will then reduce child labour 
incidence.  
 
Furthermore, this study has also evaluated the two arguments, one predicting the effect 
of export on child labour through changes in wages, while the other arguing that trade 
will only affect child labour through affecting the living standard, by comparing the 
results of exports and trade openness. The study concludes that trade sanctions may not 
have significant effect on the incidence of child labour as proportion of child labour in 
export related industries is negligible. The channel though which trade may affect child 
labour is by increasing income thereby affecting living standard. As evident from the 
analysis, not only trade and FDI, but also exports are significant only after dropping 
income from the model.  
 
As far as the effect of credit market imperfection is concerned, our analysis does not 
find any significant effect of credit on child labour. We incorporated credit variable in 
the model with the hypothesis that in order to overcome the income shock due to trade 
sanctions, poor people will borrow and thus credit will reduce child labour. Our results 
show a positive effect of trade and FDI on real GDP per capita while negative effect on 
child labour.  Therefore, for credit variable, the study concludes that the effect of credit 
is insignificant because both trade and FDI are promoting the income and reducing 
child labour. 
 
The result also shows a highly negative and significant effect of increase in average 
year of adult schooling on incidence of child labour. In developing countries, mainly 
because of the low level of educational attainment, unskilled labourers are in 
abundance. This includes child labour as well. Therefore any increase in average years 
of schooling will result in skilled labour formation leading to high wages and a 
reduction in the supply of child labour. Presence of high skilled labour increased labour 
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productivity and economic growth over the long run. It may also result in more equal 
and uniform distribution of income because of an increase in the relative wage for 
unskilled labour resulting from a reduced supply of unskilled labour. This may also help 
in attracting FDI, leading to further economic development.  
 
 
The result also provides empirical evidence of the negative relationship between aid and 
incidence of child labour. Increasing aid flow from developed countries to developing 
countries was found to reduce child labour. Hence, the study concludes that if the 
developed nations fund programs that target working children for rehabilitation and 
HGXFDWLRQOLNH81,&()SURJUDP³IRRGIRUHGXFDWLRQ´WKLVPD\KHOSLQUHGXFLQJFKLOG
labour in the developing countries. With the help of foreign aid, World Bank poverty 
reduction programs and UNICEF programs, a change could be made. Working children 
may end up going to school rather than working. With a ban on child labour and 
support for the education assistance programmes, children may benefit. 
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 Annexures 
 
Annex A- 3.1: Variables Description, sources and Availability of Data  
Variables Definition Source Effects Availability 
AGR 
Share of agriculture 
sector in GDP 
UN-Statistics Division (Shares of breakdown of 
GDP/Value Added at current prices in Percent) 
+ve 1970-2008 
MANF 
Share of Mining and 
Manufacturing sector 
in GDP 
Statistics Division (Shares of breakdown of GDP/ Value 
Added at current prices in Percent) 
-ve/ 
+ve 
1970-2008 
YRSCH 
Average years of total 
schooling, 15+ total 
World Bank online Databank of Education -ve 1960-2010 
CRDT 
Domestic Credit to 
Private Sector (% GDP) 
World Bank online Databank of WDI/GDF -ve 1960-2008 
FLFPR 
Labour Force 
Participation rate, 
female (age 15-64) 
World Bank online Databank of WDI/GDF 
-ve/ 
+ve 
1970-2008 
MLFPR 
Labour Force 
Participation rate, male 
(age 15-64) 
World Bank online Databank of WDI/GDF 
-ve/ 
+ve 
1970-2008 
PUPTECH 
Pupil-teacher ratio, 
primary 
World Bank Education Statistics/UNESCO Institute for 
Statistics (UIS) 
+ve 1970-2008 
RCGDP 
Real Gross Domestic 
Product per Capita, 
current price 
Penn World table 6.3 -ve 1950-2007 
FDI 
Foreign direct 
investment, net inflows 
(BoP, current US$) 
World Bank online Databank of WDI/GDF -ve 1970-2008 
REGON Region World Bank Development Report - 2009 
INCGROP Income group World Bank Development Report - 2009 
CHLDAB 
Economically Active 
children 10-14 percent 
of the total 
Economic Activity rate, 1950-2010 (ILO- 
estimate/Projection) using UN common Database 
through ESDS  
- 1950-2010 
IMPORT Import (% GDP) World Bank online Databank of WDI/GDF -ve 1960-2008 
RELINTR Real Interest rate UN common data base (UN estimate) +ve 1970-2009 
AIDGNIPERCT 
Net ODA received (% of 
GNI) 
World development Indicator through ESDS -ve 1960-2008 
TRD 
Bilateral trade data 
based on Export plus 
Import divided by GDP  
Direction of Trade by IMF and UN Comtrade Database -ve 1970-2009 
DISTANCE 
Distance between 
country i and j( used to 
calculate bilateral trade 
openness) 
The CEPII Gravity Dataset: downloaded from: 
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/gravity.htm 
- - 
POP Population World Bank online Databank of WDI/GDF - 1960-2008 
COMNLANG 
country i and j  share 
Common languages  
The CEPII Gravity Dataset: downloaded from: 
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/gravity.htm 
- - 
BORDER 
country i and j  share 
Common border  
The CEPII Gravity Dataset: downloaded from: 
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/gravity.htm 
- - 
AREA 
Area in (square 
kilometer) 
The CEPII Gravity Dataset: downloaded from: 
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/gravity.htm 
- - 
RURAL Rural Population 
The CEPII Distance Dataset: Downloaded from: 
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm 
- - 
PR_SCORES Index of political rights 
Freedom House: Freedom in the World Comparative 
and Historical Data: downloaded from:  
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439 
- 1973-2010 
INCMPOR 
Income of the poor; 
Computed using data of 
Gini and Q1  
UN-Wider (World Income Inequality Database), 
Deininger and Squire (1996), Lundberg and Squire 
(2000) and EHII (Estimated Household Income 
Inequality Dataset, Downloaded from: 
http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/data.html    
-ve 
Compiled 
from 1970 
to latest 
available 
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 Annex A- 3.2: Summary Statistics of Variables 
Variables Obs. Mean     Std. Dev. Min Max 
Child labour (All) 614 17.87 16.51 0 75.14 
Child labour (boys) 645 18.81 17.72 0.00 75.93 
Child labour (girls) 645 15.22 15.83 0.00 74.35 
Real GDP per Capita 576 3474 3981 150 25383 
Log Real GDP per Capita 576 7.58 1.11 5.01 10.14 
Foreign Direct Investment (Net inflow) 475 1.9E+9 9.1E+9 1.E+4 1.5E+11 
Log Foreign Direct Investment (Net inflow) 475 18.29 2.76 9.21 25.72 
Domestic Credit to Private Sector (% GDP) 476 25.18 21.97 1 145 
Export (% GDP) 507 32.03 20.65 0 154 
Trade Openness 578 72 40 2 220 
Log Trade Openness 578 4.11 0.65 0.70 5.40 
Log income of the bottom quintile 299 10.07 1.15 6.62 13.44 
Real Interest Rate 326 2.81 0.65 1.62 8.47 
Share of agriculture Sector 576 24.57 15.77 1.20 78.05 
Share of Mining & Manufacturing 576 23.89 14.18 0.52 88.52 
Average Year of Adult Schooling 479 5.14 2.61 0 11 
Pupil Teacher Ratio Primary 474 34.72 13.71 9 93 
Female Labour Force participation rate 574 50.00 21.37 2 92 
Aid ( % GNI) 502 7.75 13.27 0 186 
 
97 
 
 
 
Annex A- 3.3: Correlation matrix 
 
Child 
labour 
Real GDP 
per capita 
FDI Credit 
Export 
(%GDP) 
Trade 
Openness 
Share of 
agriculture 
Sector 
Share of Mining & 
Manufacturing 
Average Year 
of adult 
schooling 
Pupil 
Teacher 
ratio 
Primary 
Female labour 
force 
participation rate 
Aid (% 
GNI) 
Child labour 1 
           
Real GDP per capita -0.5912 1 
          
FDI -0.1818 0.3679 1 
         
Credit -0.4115 0.5395 0.2892 1 
        
Export (%GDP) -0.1678 0.2587 0.8875 0.294 1 
       
Trade Openness -0.4104 0.3138 0.0237 0.3892 0.0118 1 
      
Share of agriculture Sector 0.6817 -0.6364 -0.21 -0.469 -0.174 -0.2952 1 
     
Share of Mining & 
Manufacturing 
-0.412 0.2539 0.131 0.1903 0.1995 0.153 -0.5769 1 
    
Average Year of adult 
schooling 
-0.7703 0.6959 0.247 0.4227 0.1755 0.4498 -0.6037 0.2796 1 
   
Pupil Teacher ratio Primary 0.6509 -0.5329 -0.21 -0.395 -0.1812 -0.2732 0.4823 -0.2231 -0.574 1 
  
Female labour force 
participation rate 
0.2979 0.0475 0.1022 -0.051 0.0802 0.0513 0.2939 -0.1964 0.082 0.2221 1 
 
Aid (% GNI) 0.257 -0.2926 -0.10 -0.185 -0.1 0.0353 0.4475 -0.3017 -0.22 0.2451 0.247 1 
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Annex A- 3.4: First Stage Regressions (regressions with Real GDP per capita)  
Dependent variables: Log RGDP Log FDI Log Domestic Credit 
Investment to GDP ratio 0.00(0.69) -0.02(0.41) 0.00(0.72) 
Rural population as % total 
population 
-0.01(0.00)* -0.04(0.0)* 0.00(0.42) 
Number of Telephone Lines -3.E-09(0.41) 0.00(0.00)* 0.00(0.00)* 
Political Freedom Index -0.03(0.35) -0.10(0.38) -0.13(0.01)* 
Log of Trade Openness 0.01(0.95) -0.61(0.17) -0.02(0.91) 
Share of agriculture Sector in GDP -0.02(0.00)* -0.03(0.22) -0.03(0.00)* 
Share of Manufacturing Sector in 
GDP 
0.00(0.85) 0.00(0.92) -0.02(0.03)** 
Adult Average year of Schooling 0.04(0.24) -0.01(0.91) 0.05(0.25) 
Pupil teacher Ratio Primary -4.E-03(0.46) 0.01(0.72) 0.01(0.41) 
Female labour force participation 
rate 
0.00(0.44) -0.01(0.51) -5.E-03(0.4) 
Aid (% GNI) -0.01(0.02)** -0.01(0.37) 0.00(0.63) 
Region 2 0.04(0.86) -0.03(0.96) -0.54(0.07)*** 
3 -0.08(0.66) -1.61(0.01)* -0.49(0.05)** 
4 -0.08(0.79) -1.58(0.08)*** -0.12(0.76) 
6 0.00(1.00) -1.04(0.18) -0.29(0.36) 
7 -0.14(0.47) -1.16(0.06)*** -0.28(0.27) 
Year 1980 0.86(0.15) -1.38(0.44) -0.68(0.41) 
1990 0.83(0.16) 0.04(0.98) -0.93(0.27) 
2000 0.96(0.06)*** 0.97(0.53) -1.12(0.10)*** 
2010 1.38(0.01)* 2.30(0.15) -0.39(0.57) 
Constant 8.19(0.00)* 17.44(0.00)* 4.99(0.01)* 
F /chi2 Test 22.63 10.31 5.61 
N 323 292 321 
R-squared 0.82 0.67 0.50 
Note: *,** and *** represents Coefficient is Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Numbers in parenthesis are p-
values.  Estimation technique used is based on country fixed effect 
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 Annex A- 3.5: First Stage Regressions (regressions with Income of the bottom 
Quintile ² Q1) 
 
Dependent variables Log Income based on Q1 Log FDI 
Log Domestic 
Credit 
Population Growth Rate 0.02(0.77) -0.08(0.72) 0.05(0.59) 
Rural population as % total 
population 
-0.02(0.00)* -0.03(0.02)** -2.E-03(0.74) 
Number of Telephone Lines 0.00(0.82) 0.00(0.06)*** 0.00(0.00)* 
Political Freedom Index -0.04(0.40) 0.01(0.92) -0.12(0.01)* 
Log of Trade Openness 0.55(0.01)* -0.84(0.11) 0.02(0.92) 
Share of agriculture Sector in GDP -0.03(0.00)* -0.05(0.06)*** -0.03(0.01)* 
Share of Manufacturing Sector in 
GDP 
-0.01(0.42) -0.02(0.44) -0.02(0.01)* 
Adult Average year of Schooling -0.01(0.89) -0.08(0.49) 0.05(0.37) 
Pupil teacher Ratio Primary 0.00(0.82) 0.01(0.49) -2.E-03(0.8) 
Female labour force participation 
rate 
-3.E-03(0.53) -0.01(0.36) -0.01(0.08)*** 
Aid (% GNI) -0.02(0.17) -0.03(0.17) 0.02(0.21) 
Region 2 -0.07(0.82) -0.14(0.86) -0.72(0.04)** 
3 -0.63(0.04)** -1.65(0.02)** -0.54(0.09)*** 
4 -0.62(0.14) -2.19(0.03)** -0.39(0.38) 
6 -0.35(0.35) -1.7(0.07)*** -0.52(0.19) 
7 -0.87(0.00)* -1.45(0.03)** -0.46(0.14) 
Year 1980 0.90(0.17) 0.96(0.52) 1.31(0.06)*** 
1990 2.05(0.00)* 2.28(0.14) 1.32(0.06)*** 
2000 1.39(0.01)* 2.47(0.08)*** 0.82(0.16) 
2010 1.78(0.00)* 4.55(0.00)* 1.08(0.09)*** 
Constant 16.70(0.00)* 14.0(0.01)* 4.58(0.04)** 
F /chi2 Test 13.01 5.52 3.68 
N 196 177 194 
R-squared 0.74 0.52 0.39 
Note: *,** and *** represents Coefficient is Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Numbers in parenthesis are p-
values.  Estimation technique used is based on country fixed effect 
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Annex A- 3.6: Determinants of Child Labour (without Controlling Endogeneity) 
(Country Fixed Effect) 
Dependent variable: Child labour With RGDP  Without RGDP  
Log RGDP per Capita -37.43(0.02) ** - 
Square of Log RGDP per Capita 2.01(0.05) ** - 
Log FDI (inflow) -0.89(0.12) -1.10(0.06) *** 
Log Bank Credit to Private sector (% GDP) 3.29(0.02) ** 2.85(0.06) *** 
Log of Trade Openness -1.94(0.1) *** -2.30(0.04) ** 
Share of agriculture Sector in GDP 0.01(0.91) 0.22(0.07) *** 
Share of Manufacturing Sector in GDP -0.13(0.20) -0.07(0.51) 
Adult Average year of Schooling -2.77(0.00) * -2.99(0.00) * 
Pupil teacher Ratio Primary 0.24(0.01) * 0.23(0.02) ** 
Female labour force participation rate 0.15(0.01) * 0.13(0.04) ** 
Aid (% GNI) -0.21(0.01) * -0.14(0.08) *** 
Region 2 4.31(0.16) 3.59(0.26) 
3 1.38(0.62) 0.67(0.82) 
4 -0.87(0.83) -1.59(0.70) 
6 -1.08(0.78) -0.71(0.86) 
7 3.34(0.26) 5.75(0.05) ** 
Year 1980 15.16(0.08) *** 8.44(0.34) 
1990 11.03(0.20) 1.90(0.83) 
2000 13.63(0.09) *** 6.59(0.43) 
2010 15.60(0.06) *** 9.28(0.29) 
Constant 162.63(0.02) ** -0.89(0.96) 
F /chi2 Test 24.53 22.48 
N 328 328 
R-squared 0.81 0.77 
Note: *,** and *** represents Coefficient is Signif icant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Numbers in 
parenthesis are p-values.    
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Annex A- 3.7: Hausman Test for Trade openness 
(Country Fixed Effect) 
Dependent variable: Child labour With Trade openness With Export (%GDP) 
Log FDI -2.09(0.08)*** -2.40(0.04)** 
Log Bank Credit to Private sector (% GDP) 5.12(0.12) 5.47(0.09)*** 
Log Trade Openness/Export -0.95(0.33) -1.87(0.05)** 
Predicted  Log Trade openness/Export -5.02(0.05)** -6.08(0.02)** 
Share of agriculture Sector in GDP 0.26(0.12) 0.26(0.10)*** 
Share of Manufacturing Sector in GDP -0.02(0.86) -0.01(0.94) 
Adult Average year of Schooling -3.10(0.00)** -3.11(0.00)* 
Pupil teacher Ratio Primary 0.17(0.07)*** 0.15(0.11) 
Female labour force participation rate 0.16(0.02)** 0.17(0.01)* 
Aid (% GNI) -0.22(0.01)* -0.22(0.01)* 
Region 2 10.52(0.01)* 11.13(0.01)* 
3 2.75(0.42) 2.87(0.38) 
4 3.36(0.48) 3.54(0.44) 
6 3.15(0.44) 2.15(0.59) 
7 10.45(0.00)* 10.47(0.00)* 
Year 1980 -15.14(0.12) -13.09(0.17) 
1990 -1.77(0.84) -0.13(0.99) 
2000 -1.70(0.84) -0.14(0.99) 
2010 -1.60(0.85) 0.16(0.98) 
Constant -17.38(0.51) -37.63(0.19) 
F /chi2 Test 21.53 22.83 
N 311 311 
R-squared 0.81 0.82 
Note: *,** and *** represents Coefficient is Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Numbers in 
parenthesis are p-values.  Estimation technique used is based on country fixed effect 
 
 
Annex A- 3.8: Diagnostic Test (F-Test for Instrument) 
Instrument for F-test 
Model with Real GDP per Capita 
 
Real GDP per capita 3.60(0.01)* 
Credit 3.97(0.006)* 
FDI 7.35(0.00) * 
Model with Income of Bottom Quintile 
 
Income of Bottom Quintile 4.59(0.0025)* 
Credit 3.57(0.011)* 
FDI 2.52(0.05)** 
Model with Export, Import and Real Interest rate 
 
Real GDP per capita 2.45(0.043)** 
Credit 1.91(0.10)*** 
FDI 2.05(0.083)*** 
Real Interest rate 11.12(0.00)* 
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Annex A- 3.9: Literature on Child Labour 
Authors Variable Used Estimation Technique Major Objective Findings 
Mahmood 
Hussain and 
Keith. E. 
Muskan 
(2003) 
Child labour 10-14 
Average year of schooling, human 
capital stock (over age 25), GDP per 
capital, Pupil Teacher Ratio, cost of 
education, distance from school (as 
school quality indicators) 
Seemingly unrelated 
Regression using cross 
sectional data across 
time; 1960, 1970 and 
1980 of 64 countries 
(192 observation) 
Main objective of the 
paper was to relate the 
household decision to 
allocate the child time on 
labour and human capital. 
They proved their proposition by developing theoretical model 
based on production function, household constraint and 
preferences. 
Eric Neumayar 
and Indra De 
Soysa 
(2005) 
Labour force participation rate (10-14). 
GDP per capita, share of Agriculture 
sector, trade openness, trade policy 
(freedom exchange with foreigners) 
FDI, pupil teacher ratio (Grade 5), 
Health and Education Expenditure 
OLS, Hausman test for 
Endogeneity, using 
Data of 128 countries 
for the year 1995 
Explore the effect of 
openness on child labour 
Estimation predict the effect of openness on incidence of child 
labour the direction cannot be predicted thus authors suggest 
causality based analysis 
Robert C. 
Shelburne 
(2001) 
Children 10-14 (not active in labour 
force). Per capita income, openness, 
GNP, Dummy for countries having 
Communist rule. 
Log Linear Model. 
Estimated Box cox 
Transformation using 
Data of 113 low, lower 
middle and upper 
middle income 
countries from WDI 
for the year 1996 
Effect of trade openness 
on child labour 
Open economy reduces the incentives to allow child labour thus 
trade sanctions may be counterproductive, their result also shows 
that when the society become more democratic the process of 
change bring economic changes that will undermine the practice 
of child labour 
Rajeev H. 
Dehejia 
Roberta Gatti 
(2002) 
Child labour (10-14) as percentage of 
total population age 10-14.Credit to 
private sector, GDP per capita, rural 
population as % of total population, 
Gross primary/secondary school 
enrolment ratio, Fertility rate export 
share in GDP, import share in GDP, 
Ratification Dummy and dummy for 
legal origin 
OLS, Tobit, 
Robustness checks,  
fixed effect test and 
non-parametric choice 
of functional form 
using data of 172 
countries for the year 
1950,60,70,80,90 and 
95 
Effect of credit on child 
labour incidence 
Using the series of estimation and Robustness measure prove 
that the credit market effect child labour 
Carol Ann 
Rogers 
& Kenneth A. 
Swinnerton 
(2001) 
Economically active population 10-
14.Real GDP per worker, Inequality, 
relative size of the child to adult 
population and some instrumental 
variables (to avoid measurement error) 
Tobit using data of 89 
countries for the year 
1990 
Explore the effect of 
inequality, labour 
productivity on child 
labour incidence 
In economies, where there is more than enough aggregate 
income to eliminate child labour, and 
child labour exists it is largely because the distribution of income 
is sufficiently unequal 
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Authors Variable Used Estimation Technique Major Objective Findings 
Basu and Van 
(BV-model) 
(1998) 
None Theoretical model 
Child labour Demand and 
supply using multiple 
equilibrium approach. 
Exploring labour market 
situation;  Under what 
conditions imposing ban 
will not desirable 
Adult wage if less than the effective child wage firm will employ 
adult only, if greater it will employ child only and if equal it 
remain indifferent, rise in the relative # children child labour 
increases, ban will raise the adult wage but as long as it will be 
less than the adult wage plus the child wage it will only worst off 
the family. 
Swinnerton& 
Rogers (SR-
model) 
(1999) 
None Theoretical extension 
of BV model 
BV model extended to 
show child Labour exist 
because the return to 
capital are distributed 
unequally. 
Comment on BV (1998): BV model depend on luxury and 
substitution axiom but SR mention another axiom; distribution 
axiom, SR model show that if non labour income distributed 
with equity child labour in BV model would not exist. 
Basu & Van 
(Reply to SR 
comment) 
(1999) 
None Theoretical extension 
of earlier BV model 
Explain conditions under 
SR model not work. 
However the issue 
consider in SR model 
were considered and 
earlier BV model was 
extended 
SR model recommend that all profit must accrue to the worker 
but they do not show how the distribution brought about, their 
suggestion is interpreted as appealing thus BV consider it as 
deserve intension. The extended BV model report an equilibrium 
where some people work and some not as SR model focus on the 
equilibrium in which all children work or no children work 
however in their model either of these not hold. 
Shankha 
Chakraborty and 
Mausumi Das 
(2003) 
None Model/Charts 
Link Mortality, fertility, 
growth, human capital, 
child labour and credit 
In the presence of high Mortality rate, perfect credit market 
would not translate child labour into human capital across 
generation. 
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Authors Variable Used Estimation Technique Major Objective Findings 
Alan B. Krueger 
(1996) 
None 
. 
Review of theoretical 
Literature 
Review the theoretical 
arguments for and against 
linking international 
labour standards to trade. 
Discuss in detail the 
argument that 
international labour 
standards are merely 
disguised protectionism 
- Labour standards could enhance the efficiency of the labour 
market and improve the distribution of income in some 
situations, but could prove counterproductive for efficiency 
and equity in others. 
- Prove that the prevalence of child labour declines sharply 
with national income. 
- Provide support that an International labour standard in 
advanced nations does not necessarily represent disguised 
protectionism. 
Beegle, 
K.,Dehejia, R.H. 
and Gatti; R. 
(2005) 
Labour hour (wage + non-wage), school 
enrolment, highest grade completed, 
occupation, earnings, and health. 
Instruments used are rice prices and 
community disasters; other variables 
include household and community-level 
controls. 
 
 
OLS, IV-2SLS and 
Fixed Effect using 
Vietnam Living 
Standards Survey 
(VLSS), 1992-93 and 
1997-98 
Investigated the extent to 
which transitory income 
shocks lead to increases 
in child labour and 
whether household access 
to credit mitigates the 
effects of these shocks. 
- Child labour significantly reduces school attainment. 
- Loss from reduced education is more than fully offset by 
increased labour market experience as a child. 
- no significant effects of child labour on health 
- A community disaster is associated with an increased use of 
child labour, and rice prices are associated with reduced child 
labour. 
- instruments are not correlated with the incidence of illness 
among children 
- no evidence that the value of durable assets (a measure of 
wealth) is correlated with the occurrence of community 
disasters 
Beegle, 
K.,Dehejia, R.H. 
and Gatti; R. 
(2006) 
Child labour hours, a measure of income 
shocks (an indicator of crop lost to pests 
and other calamities; Share of the value 
of crop loss to total crop value), 
individual, household, and community 
characteristics, assets measure non-land 
KRXVHKROGZHDOWKPRWKHU¶VDQGIDWKHU¶V
schooling, the presence 
of the mother and father in the 
KRXVHKROGWKHFKLOG¶VDJHDQG
interview-wave and 
season fixed effects 
Fixed Effect using 
Kagera Health and 
Development Survey 
(KHDS) of the Kagera 
region in Tanzania 
from 1991 to 1994 
 
Effect of credit on child 
labour incidence 
- crop shocks are transitory shocks to household income 
- shocks are significant relative to household wealth 
- crop shocks lead to a significant increase in the level of child 
labour 
- Educational enrolment decreases in response to shocks 
- households with a typical level of asset holdings are able to 
fully offset the shock 
Ranjan P. 
(2001) None Theoretical model 
overlapping 
generations general 
equilibrium model to 
understand the 
determinants of child 
labour 
 
- There is a positive relationship between inequality in the 
distribution of income and the incidence of child labour. 
- credit constraints here means that either parents are unable to 
borrow with the promise by children that the parents will be 
reimbursed for this in the future; or, children are unable to 
borrow to reimburse their parents of the foregone earnings 
while going to school. Net result is that the borrowing against 
the future earnings of children is not possible. 
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Authors Variable Used Estimation Technique Major Objective Findings 
- The impact of trade sanctions on factor prices in a country 
reduce the unskilled wage and increase the skilled wage thus 
a decline in the unskilled wage reduces the income of the 
parents who are unskilled. In a world with credit constraints, 
this would increase the incidence of child labour for children 
of the unskilled. 
Cigno et al., 
(2002) 
10±14 labour participation rate, 
or by the primary school nonattendance 
rate. trade openness (the trade ratio 
(exports plus imports, divided by GDP) 
or by a dummy taking value one if the 
country is open according to the Sachs±
Warner 
definition, zero), real per-capita income, 
health policy (the share of public health 
expenditure in GDP) and skill 
composition the share of the workforce 
aged 25 or over which completed only 
primary education, and by that which 
attained secondary or higher education 
Fixed Effect using 
Data of Developing 
countries from World 
Development Indicator  
for the year 1980, 
1990, 1995 and 1998 
 
Effect of trade 
liberalization on child 
labour incidence 
- Parental decisions whether a child should work or go to 
school depend on the costs and benefits of education. 
- In a country that starts out with a largely uneducated 
workforce, globalization raises the wage rates of uneducated, 
relative to educated workers. That reduces the incentive to 
educate a child, and raises the incentive to make the child 
work at the earliest opportunity. On the other hand, if the 
wage rate of uneducated workers rises in absolute as well as 
relative terms, this will have a positive income effect on the 
demand for education. The net effects of globalization are 
thus ambiguous. 
- Controlling for GDP, skill composition of the adult 
workforce, and weight of public health expenditure in GDP, 
trade openness as measured by the Sachs±Warner index is 
found to have a negative effect on child labour 
Edmonds and 
Pavcnik 
(2006) 
3HUFHQWRIDFRXQWU\¶VSRSXODWLRQDJHV
10±14 that is economically active. 
Instrument for openness is trade by 
geography and instrument for income is 
15 year lag GDP-PC and Investment, 
other control variables include average 
years of schooling in the population, 
capital per worker, whether the country 
is a signatory on child labour 
FRQYHQWLRQVFRXQWU\¶VODWLWXGHVKDUHRI
the population that is rural, average 
import duty  and measure of political 
freedom 
IV-2SLS using data of 
113 countries 
For 1995 
Explores the effect of 
Income and Trade 
openness on child labour 
incidence. 
- there is a negative association between child labour and 
openness 
- After correcting for endogeneity, a 10% increase in openness 
is associated with a 7% decline in child labour at the data 
means. 
- For the average non-OECD country, a 10% increase in the 
ratio of trade with OECD countries to GDP is associated with 
a 9% decline in child labour 
- Decline in child labour with openness appears to stem entirely 
from the association between trade and income 
- Control for income differences across countries, result in no 
evidence of a substantive or statistically significant 
association between trade and child labour. 
Davies and Voy, 
(2009) 
Labour Force participation rate of 10±
14. Openness, FDI, Logged real GDP, 
average years of school completed over 
the age of 25, percentage of the 
population living in rural areas, political 
freedom index and a dummy if country 
had signed ILO Convention 138. 
IV-2SLS and Fixed 
effect for Robustness 
check using data of 
145 countries for the 
year 1995 
Explore the effect of 
Income, trade openness 
and FDI. 
- When an IV for FDI is used, the magnitude of the effect of 
FDI on child labours increases. 
- the effect of FDI is channelled through its impact on per 
capita income 
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Authors Variable Used Estimation Technique Major Objective Findings 
Dwibedi J.K. and 
Sarbajit 
Chaudhuri 
(2010) 
None 
 
 
Theoretical model 
Explain how foreign 
capital inflows might 
produce favourable effect 
on the incidence of child 
labour in a developing 
economy despite 
affecting wage inequality 
adversely. Developed 
three-sector general 
equilibrium model for the 
purpose. 
- An inflow of foreign capital leads to (i) increases in both adult 
unskilled wage and skilled wage; and, (ii) a decrease in child 
wage rate and (iii) a fall in return to capital. The skilled±
unskilled wage inequality worsens if the high-skill sector is 
capital intensive relative to the low-skill sector. 
- An inflow of foreign capital lowers the incidence of child 
labour in the economy if the high-skill sector is capital-
intensive relative to the low-skill sector. 
Swaminathan M. 
(1998) None 
Uses data on child 
labour in the city of 
Bhavnagar in the state 
of Gujarat from a 
survey conducted in 
the year 1995 
Analysed the features of 
child labour in in 
Bhavnagar, an area of 
high economic growth in 
western India. 
 
Major activities, occupations, wages and schooling. 
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Child labor is not a problem that can be solved with slogans and ringing declarations. 
Evidences make it clear that child labor cuts across policy boundaries: health, 
education, labor market, capital market, social security, criminal law, international 
peace keeping, income growth, and distribution all have a bearing on child labor. 
Therefore, reducing child labor cannot be regarded as just another policy issue alongside 
others; it is only one dimension of many, possibly all, policies in the field of development 
[Cigno, Rosati and Tzannatos-2002]. 
 
4. Labour Market Conditions and Incidence of Child labour: A case study of Pakistan 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The issue of child labour has attracted much attention from academics, policy makers, 
social activists and anthropologists in Pakistan over the years. There is an extensive 
literature available which addresses the economics of child labour but it has been 
observed that the literature overlooks the effects of local labour market conditions. A 
high proportion of the literature merely IRFXVHVRQSRYHUW\KRXVHKROGDQGWKHFKLOG¶V
own characteristics as major determinants ± mainly emphasizing on the supply side and 
overlooking the demand side. Demand for child labour usually arises due to the 
prevailing labour market conditions such as segmentation of economy between formal 
and informal sector, degree of substitution between adult and child labour (eventually 
leading to adult unemployment) and most importantly the wage structure. Although any 
slight improvement in the adult labour market condition will also have its effects on the 
supply side, for example improvement in the labour market conditions will definitely 
enhance the welfare of the people which in turn results in the decline of child labour 
supply as parents will be in a better position to take the decisions of getting their 
children out from work force20. Therefore the main objective of the chapter is to provide 
empirical evidences on the labour market conditions influencing incidence of child 
labour. More specifically it will analyse the effects of adult wages, unemployment rate 
and segmentation of economy between formal and informal sector affecting child 
labour. Empirical assessment has been done using the data of children aged between 10 
to 14 years.  The data set is selected from the national level surveys of Labour Force of 
Pakistan and covers the period from 1997-98 21  to 2007-08. A pseudo panel data 
                                                 
20
 See Goldin (1979); Horan and Hargis (1991); Bonnet (1993); Basu (2000) and Ranjan R. (1999). 
21
 In Pakistan Fiscal year began from July and ends in June. Usually surveys also design to cover the 
fiscal year. 
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approach is followed to assess the labour market conditions. Unlike all the previous 
studies, this study contributes in the existing literature by assessing the labour market 
conditions that affect demand and supply of child labour. It also traces the effect of 
changes in the labour market conditions on the incidence of child labour with respect to 
time. To the best of DXWKRU¶V knowledge, it is the first study that takes into account 
labour market conditions using the pseudo- panel approach.  
 
The analysis presented hereafter in this chapter will highlight the issues that have not 
yet addressed in Pakistan before. Historically speaking there exists an extensive 
literature22 exploring the supply side determinants of child labour (as explained earlier) 
few exceptions include Ghayur (1996); Hussain (1998); Bhalotra (2001 and 2007); 
Bhalotra and Heady (2003) and Rafia (2009).  
 
Ghayur (1996), working on the data of Child Labour Force survey of (1996)23 for the 
first time concluded that labour market in Pakistan is unable to absorb the current 
labour force causing problems of unemployment and under-employment. Moreover, a 
TXDUWHURIWKHHPSOR\HGODERXUIRUFH¶VHDUQLQJLQFRPHZDVVXIILFLHQWWRPHHWRQO\KDOI
of their subsistence level requirements. The employment in Pakistan is characterized 
below productivity with long working hours and few remunerative work opportunities. 
Poor working conditions are a normal feature at considerable number of work places. 
Hussain (1998) analysing a survey of 400 child workers in 200 small scale 
establishments in Lahore District during 1990 concluded that most of the working 
children are employed in small scale, unregistered establishments in the informal sector 
and are earning an average monthly income of around four hundred and sixty three24 
rupees only (US $ 21). The survey has also indicated that child workers in the 
construction- related industries faced at least 16 different hazards to their health and 
safety with approximately 12 casualties reported per work place during the preceding 
year of survey. Rafia (2009) working on a survey of 150 boys from Rawalpindi District 
concluded that the major determinant of child labor is poverty and the ownership of 
                                                 
22
 List includes Hussain (1985); Hamid (1994); Weiner & Noman (1995); Jafri & Rashid (1997); Burki & 
Fasih (1998); Burki & Shahnaz (2001); Khan (2001); Ranjan R. (2000 & 2001); Chaudhuri & Farzana 
(2002); Khalid & Shahnaz (2004); Toor (2005); Hai et.al. (2010); Hou (2009); Moazam & Ajmal (1994); 
Khan and Ali (1991); Khan (2003); Ali & Khan (2004); Hazarika & Bedi (2003); Bhalotra (2004) and 
Iram & Fatima (2009). 
23
 Child labour force survey was conducted by Federal Bureau of Statistics Pakistan in 1996, it is the first 
and the only survey conducted at national level to assess the situation of child labour. 
24Inflation adjusted ± with CPI around  22.42    
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asset has a negative impact on participation decisions. Sixty nine percent of her sampled 
children worked forty-eight hours during a week and fifty seven percent earned less 
than four hundred and seventy25 rupees (US $ 6). In addition to these Bhalotra and 
Heady (2003) clarify the roles of land, income and household size, allowing for labour 
and credit market imperfections. According to them the wealth paradox can be 
explained in terms of imperfections in the land and labour market. They argue that 
effect of labour market imperfections are reinforced by the ill- functioning of land 
markets while credit markets have opposite effect. In the presence of imperfect labour 
market, land owners will not be able to hire the adult labour needed hence they will rely 
on children and the child labour incidence will be higher among them. This is because 
the marginal product of labour increases with the increase in farm size. Furthermore the 
large land owners cannot sell the land if they fail to hire labour due to ill- functioning of 
the land market (land cannot be sold or purchased easily). The failure of the land market 
therefore reinforces labour market failure. In their article they have shown that farm 
size has highly significant and positive effect on both boys¶ and girls¶ labour even after 
controlling for endogeneity (see table 2.1 for further detail on the results).    
  
Bhalotra (2001 and 2007) estimated the wage elasticity of child labour supply using the 
data of rural household for the period 1991. According to her the wage elasticity is 
negative and significant for boys which show that boys work due to poverty 
compulsion. Her study further points out that substitution effects associated with the 
land ownership dominate wealth effects for girls but not for boys. Girls belonging to 
households with large land holding are likely to work more.  Household income in her 
model also emphasizes that the effect of income is negative and significant in the case 
of boys but not for girls. All the above mentioned studies are informative but also have 
their own limitations as their assessments are based broadly on descriptive analysis 
except for Bhalotra (2001 and 2007) and Bhalotra and Heady (2003). Their studies are 
based on the Pakistan Standard of Living measurement Survey for the period 1991 and 
much has changed since then. However, international evidence provides both 
theoretical and empirical support for the effect of labour market conditions on the 
incidence of child labour.   
 
                                                 
25Inflation adjusted ± with CPI around  212.4 
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For example, working on the wage structure, Cain and Mozumder (1980)26 argued that 
the economic value of children cannot be properly assessed without reference to the 
structure of the labour market. The structure of the labour market determines the level 
of wages, which in turn determines the contribution of child labour to household 
income. Basu and Van (2000) also stressed upon the role of adult market wages as one 
of the major determinant of child labour supply. They assumed that the household sends 
children to work only in those circumstances when adult market wages are below the 
wages required for subsistence level of living. Hence any increase in the adult market 
wages will reduce the supply of child labour to some extent. But what if there exists a 
demand side effect of adult market wages? In such a case any increase in the adult 
wages would ultimately reduce their demand (demand for adult labour). This situation 
might lead to an increase in the incidence of child labour at least in those sectors where 
adult labour can be substituted by child labour. Although children are an imperfect 
substitute for adult labour but evidence does suggests that higher adult wages create 
adult unemployment and higher incidence of child labour. A book published by ILO in 
1998 concluded that: 
 
³&KLOG ODERXU LV D FDXVH RI DQG PD\ HYHQ FRQWULEXWHV WR DGXOW
unemployment aQGORZZDJHV´,/2-1998). 
 
Furthermore, working on the adult minimum wage law, Basu (2000) concluded that 
although one route to curbing child labour is to intervene in the adult labour market, but 
this kind of intervention is only fruitful if it raises the marginal productivity of adult 
workers, thereby raising wages and employment (Basu, 2000). Otherwise it may result in 
an increase in adult unemployment. In the Basu (2000) model, a minimum wage can 
result in a higher supply of child labour which, in turn, may further cause a loss in adult 
employment and an increase in the supply of child labour. According to Basu (2000) 
the full impact of this multiplier-like process could be large. Moreover, adult wages are 
not homogenous. Dwibedi and Chaudhuri (2010) clearly showed that highly skilled 
ZRUNHUV¶ wages are sufficiently high and they are unlikely to send their children to work. 
In his framework, incidence of child labour falls as the wages of unskilled labour 
increases and as skilled wages relative to the unskilled labour changes. According to him 
any increase in the skilled wages makes education more attractive and in the overall 
                                                 
26
 As cited in Grootaert and Kanbur (1995)  
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economy incidence of child labour declines. Moreover, unskilled adult labour will only 
send their children to work if the wages earned is below the required subsistence level as 
suggested by Basu and Van (1999).  
 
Further to this, Kar et.al, (2003) pointed out that demand for child labour is mainly 
generated due to segmentation of the economy into formal and informal sectors. Kar 
et.al, (2003) highlighted the role of degree of informality and technology used in the 
production process as a major demand side factor. Formal sector, being closely 
monitored by the laws in the country, is less likely to employ a child for work, however, 
informal sector which itself does not adhere to any regulation for various interests of its 
own often rely on cheap child labour. In addition to this in many developing countries 
there is a tendency towards in-formalization of production methods, with formal 
enterprises either breaking up into smaller units or sub-contracting to households or 
informal enterprises (mainly to escape from social legislation and charges which add to 
the cost of labour). In such conditions the demand for child labour may increase [see 
Kar et.al, (2003) and Hussain (1998) for more detail]. Chaudhuri (2009) analysing the 
effect of labour policy on child labour by considering a two sector general equilibrium 
model also concluded that the labour policy affects the formal and informal sector 
differently.  Overall arguments provided above raise few questions in mind. Are 
households more likely to send their children to work if they live in regions where 
wages are low? Is there any demand side effect of higher adult wages? If the demand 
side effect does exist, does this lead to higher adult unemployment rate? And is the 
effect sensitive to the degree of segmentation between formal and informal economy? 
 
As explained earlier literature in Pakistan has not yet explored the effect of labour 
market conditions on child labour in greater detail. Although a few studies based on 
cross tabulations did try to highlight the labour market conditions but they failed to 
provide a comprehensive analysis of the effect of labour market conditions; especially 
those related to the presence of large number of unskilled workers, informal sector, 
prevailing wage rates [except for Bhalotra27(2001) and (2007)] and the unemployment 
                                                 
27Bhalotra (2001) and (2007) have presented both theoretical and empirical analysis on the issue, her 
work is very extensive and highly valuable but based on the Pakistan Living and Standard Measurement 
Survey of 1991. Much has changed since then especially after the child Deterrence Act of 1997 therefore 
her work need re-assessment.  
112 
 
situation on child labour. Moreover, none of the studies done so far have highlighted the 
differences across divisions/districts/cities and time. Therefore, the major objective of 
this chapter is to explore the labour market conditions by considering the following 
arguments: 
 
Higher adult market wage rates will either reduce the child labour incidence by 
enhancing the welfare of the household or else it could also attract more children to 
work. This will only happen if employers, to remain cost competitive, substitute adult 
labour with cheap child labour. Therefore, adult wages could have two opposite effects. 
One arises due to income effect while the other arises because of the substitution effect. 
The substitution effect results in the higher adult unemployment level. The adult 
unemployment again has two types of effects; the demand and the supply side effects. 
For example, the higher the adult unemployed proportion in an area 
(Divisions/Districts/Cities in this case) the lower will be the probability for a child to 
find employment or the demand for child labour decreases in the presence of higher 
adult unemployed proportion in an area. The supply side effect arises because of the 
loss in the household income i.e. the higher the adult unemployed proportion in a house, 
the lower will be the income of the household and the higher will be the supply of child 
labour. Finally, Informal sector being dis-organized in nature with low skilled 
requirement accommodate most of the child labour in an economy.  In the informal 
sector due to less skill requirement children easily substitute adult labour resulting in 
higher child labour incidence. Therefore, the higher the degree of in-formalization, the 
higher will be the demand for child labour.   
 
The arguments discussed above provide both supply and demand side picture of the 
labour market effects. This chapter tries to explore both demand and supply side of the 
story. For the assessment of the above arguments six cross -section data of Labour 
Force Surveys (1997-98 onward) is used to make a pseudo panel. The assessment is 
done across divisions/districts/cities and time. Hence it is the first study to explore the 
effects of labour market conditions across division/district/cities and time. The chapter 
is organized as follows; section 4.2 provides key features of labour market in Pakistan, 
section 4.3 provides some theoretical point raised in the literature, section 4.4 provides 
detail on data employed and construction of pseudo panel, section 4.5 specifies 
econometric technique, section 4.6 discusses results and the final section concludes. 
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4.2 Key Features of the Labour Market Structure in Pakistan 
 
Labour Market structure in Pakistan is mainly characterized by high unemployment 
rate, higher degree of informality and irregularity in the job structure, gender 
discrimination, high proportion of illiterate labour force and existence of large wage 
differential among sectors. Many of these key features are closely related to child 
labour incidence.   
 
a) In-formalization: 
 
The concept of informal economy28 was first brought in fore-front E\ ,/2 LQ¶V
Hart (1971) first brought up the discussion on an informal economy. In the earlier 
period it was characterized as the economy representing poor or black economy. It 
incorporates all the economic activities that cannot be classified under the 
organizational structure of formal sectors [see Burki and Afaqi (1996) for more detail]. 
Since 1970 the role of informal sector in generating employment, appropriate 
technology, skill generation and entrepreneurship development has been explored in 
many developing countries, as the concept is mainly embraced in the labour market of 
less developed countries. Despite the relative importance of informal sector in creating 
employment opportunities its effect on child labour cannot be overlooked especially in 
case of Pakistan where a high proportion of children are engaged in this sector. 
 
The economy of Pakistan is facing multiple problems of high population growth, 
urbanization, and unemployment of labour force. The supply of labour force has 
increased faster than the rate of job creation.  Migration to urban areas due to 
mechanization has made the problem even worse. A high proportion of the urban labour 
force is engaged in the informal sector, which provides income earning opportunities to 
small businesses and skilled and unskilled workers including apprentices [Burki and 
                                                 
28According to the Resolution adopted by the 15th International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS), the 
informal sector comprises units, such as households enterprises, engaged in the production of goods and services 
with the primary objective of generating employment and income to the persons concerned, not necessarily with the 
deliberate intention of evading the payment of taxes or other legislative or administrative provision. These units 
typically operate at a low level of organization, on small scale. The assets used do not belong to the production units 
as such but to their owners. This concept is formulated into an operational definition based on three criterions, first 
household enterprise, and the two others size and registration. These three criterions can be used optionally, alone or 
in combination. Given the ambiguity of the registration criterion in Pakistan, the definition of the informal sector is 
formulated in terms of the first two criterions, namely, household enterprise and size of employment. Hence; all 
household enterprises owned and operated by own-account workers and employee less than 10 persons are informal. 
It exclude all household enterprises engaged in agricultural activities (Labour Force Survey of Pakistan, (2007-08) ± 
Chapter concept and definitions). 
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Afaqi (1996)]. Children usually start working as apprentices under a system commonly 
known in Pakistan as ustad-shagird system (student-teacher system). The main purpose 
of sending the children to work is to equip them with the skills and to get some 
financial support for household as well. The children working under this system are 
often paid less and face extremely harsh working environments, often dangerous for 
their health. Slowing down of the economy, political instability, inconsistency of the 
policies and the rise in the energy prices (oil and electricity) has led to the closure of 
many industrial units. The shrinking formal sector has resulted in the expansion of the 
informal sector and has increased unemployment, both leading to high incidence of 
child labour.  
 
Table 4.1: Non- Agriculture worker in the informal sector 
(%) 
Year All Pakistan Rural Urban 
2001-02 64.6 68.3 61.1 
2003-04 70.0 72.9 67.2 
2005-06 72.9 74.8 71.0 
2006-07 71.9 73.1 70.7 
2007-08 72.8 75.1 70.5 
2008-09 73.3 76.2 70.6 
2009-10 73.3 76.3 70.4 
2010-11 73.8 76.5 71.2 
Source: Labour Force Survey of Pakistan (Various Issues), Federal Bureau of statistics, 
Government of Pakistan. Years represents fiscal years. 
 
Further to this, due to the world pressure on export, the number of working children in 
the large-scale formal sector has declined substantially after 1997 (in the first five years 
of 20th century especially) but child work still exists to a significant extent by means of 
WKH &RQWUDFW 6\VWHP´ >VHH +XVVDLQ  IRU PRUH GHWDLO@ ,Q WKLV V\VWHP FKLOGUHQ
remain employees of a contractor in the informal sector while actually working for 
larger industries. The proportion of working children may have increased or decreased 
as a result of changes in labour demand due to increase in trade. Hence in general 
growth in the informal sector may lead to child labour. Hussain (1998) has raised the 
issue of contract system but his work is based on simple descriptive analysis. The issue 
is worth exploring especially across time. Table 4.1 provide information on the 
employment share of the non-agriculture worker in the informal sector across time. It is 
evident from the table that almost 74% of the non-agricultural workers are engaged in 
the informal sector. Since 2001-02 there is considerable growth in the employment 
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share of informal sector. It has increased from 65% in 2001-02 to 74% in 2010-11. This 
needs careful examination as it is the informal sector that can absorb most child labour 
due to its nature; such as being unorganized, with no record keeping liability, operating 
in a small area and sometimes illegal in nature. 
 
b) Wage Structure: 
 
In developing countries due to the inadequate measurement of unemployment rate 
through labour force surveys, wage rates are often recommended for observing changes 
in the labour market [Godfrey (1993)]. Nasir (2000) provides an extensive review of the 
labour market conditions in Pakistan. According to Nasir (2000), labour market of 
Pakistan is dual in nature and possesses both flexibility as well as inflexibility in wages. 
The formal sector employing skilled labour force is found to be less flexible and resists 
downward movements in wages whereas informal sector is more flexible. The 
inflexibility in the formal sector is mainly because of the higher demand of the skilled 
workers. Skilled workers in Pakistan are relatively short in supply and in order to retain 
them, firms in the formal sector offer them higher wages. On the other hand informal 
sector is larger in size than the formal sector but is un-organized and unprotected. 
Workers employed in the informal sector do not possess the bargaining power. 
Production process in the informal sector does not require any sophisticated technology 
hence human capital requirement is low. Therefore majority of the work force in the 
informal sector is not only illiterate but also less skilled/unskilled. As a result, both the 
productivity and wages are low in this sector [Nasir (2000)]. 
 
As the informal sector accounts for almost 74% of the economy, the key factor of 
labour market in Pakistan is flexibility of wages. In a competitive market where wages 
are flexible children could easily be substituted for the adult labour. In Pakistan children 
participate in certain type of wage employment± for example, Ghayur (1996) indicates 
that occupational classification of child labour is such that two-thirds of them work in 
the agricultural sector mainly as unpaid family helpers, while in urban areas children 
are often engaged in the informal sector. Table 4.2 and 4.3 provide detail on the average 
monthly real wages of paid employee29 across time and industries. During the past nine 
                                                 
29Labour Force survey of Pakistan only provides information about the monthly wages of paid employees 
only; it does not include information about the income of the agriculture self-employees, own account 
workers and employers. 
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years (since 2001-02) real wages have experienced a growth of almost 21% with an 
average of 2% annual growth. Both urban and rural wages have increased. However 
growth in the urban wages is slightly lower (18%) than the rural wages (25%).  
 
Table 4.2: Average Monthly Real Wages 
(Rs.) 
Year All Pakistan Rural Urban 
2001-02 3316 2761 3972 
2003-04 3664 3011 4425 
2005-06 3795 3166 4533 
2007-08 4161 3492 4957 
2008-09 3979 3347 4711 
2009-10 4022 3376 4766 
2010-11 4009 3452 4699 
Source: Labour Force Survey of Pakistan (Various Issues), Federal Bureau of statistics, 
Government of Pakistan. 
 
As far as the wages across industrial divisions are concerned Table 4.3 shows large 
differences in wages across the major industries. Agricultural workers are earning the 
lowest average monthly wages around Rs. 2,331 while workers in the financial and 
electricity, gas and water sectors enjoy the highest average monthly wage (almost Rs. 
8,541 per month in financial sector while almost Rs. 7,113 per month for electricity, gas 
and water). For the rest of the sectors wags are reported around Rs. 3,000 to Rs. 5,000 
in 2010-11. 
 
Figure 4.1: Average Monthly Real Wages 
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Table 4.3:  Average Monthly Real Wages by Major Industry 
(Rs.) 
 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 
Agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing 2202 2919 2317 2331 
Mining & quarrying 4632 3992 3254 4953 
Manufacturing 3773 3527 3514 3496 
Electricity, gas & water 7371 6453 6785 7113 
Construction 3664 3392 3446 3414 
Wholesale, retail trade, restaurants & hotels 3173 3082 3083 2832 
Transport, storage and communication 4495 4205 4382 4283 
Financing, insurance, real estate services 10197 8346 8477 8541 
Community, social and personal services 4903 5007 5123 5415 
Source: Labour Force Survey of Pakistan (Various Issues), Federal Bureau of statistics, Government of Pakistan. 
 
 
c) Unemployment and working conditions: 
 
Basu (2000) presents a theoretical model in which imposing a minimum wage in the 
adult labour market causes adult unemployment to rise and further aggravates the 
problem of child labour. While considering the argument of trade sanctions, Basu and 
Van (1999) provide a theoretical model which relates adult unemployment and supply 
of child labour. However, no study has been done in Pakistan so far that tries to 
empirically test this proposition. Table 4.4 illustrates that the unemployment rate in 
Pakistan has been fairly stable in the last fifteen years. It peaked in 2001-02, falling 
until 2007-8. Thereafter it has risen slightly. Comparing the urban rural areas it is 
evident that the unemployment rate in the urban areas (8.8%) is higher than the rural 
areas (4.7%); almost double.  
Table 4.4: Unemployment Rate 
(%) 
Year All Pakistan Rural Urban 
1996-97 5.9 5.0 7.98 
1999-00 7.8 6.9 9.9 
2001-02 8.3 7.55 9.8 
2003-04 7.7 6.7 9.7 
2005-06 6.2 5.4 8.0 
2006-07 5.3 4.7 6.7 
2007-08 5.2 4.7 6.3 
2008-09 5.5 4.7 7.1 
2009-10 5.6 4.8 7.2 
2010-11 6.0 4.7 8.8 
Source: Labour Force Survey of Pakistan (Various Issues), Federal Bureau of statistics, 
Government of Pakistan. 
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Figure 4.2: Unemployment Rate 
 
 
Moreover, working conditions in Pakistan are dangerous and harm children by ruining 
their eyesight, causing bone deformations, chronic lung diseases, and also sometimes 
result in the death of children [see Chaudhuri and Farzana (2002)]. In the absence of the 
reliable data on work related injuries, studies often use working hours as a proxy for the 
working condition. Studies on Pakistan have documented that children often work 40-
50 hours per week. The hours of child work basically depends on the potential income 
from child work and the degree of labour substitution between child and parents. In the 
context of prevailing unemployment and flexible wages this issue is also worth 
exploring. Table 4.5 clearly shows that almost 25% of the employed labour force is 
working around 42 to 48 hours per week including children as well. Child Labour Act 
of Pakistan allows only 14 hours per week for children aged less than 14. 
 
Table 4.5: Distribution of Employed population by Hours of Work 
(%) 
 2010-11 
Not Worked 0.7 
Less than 15 Hours 1.6 
15-24 Hours 5.4 
25-34 Hours 7.4 
35-41 Hours 20.4 
42-48 Hours 24.5 
49-55 Hours 11.6 
56 or more Hours 28.4 
Source: Labour Force Survey of Pakistan 2010-11, Federal Bureau of statistics, Government 
of Pakistan. 
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4.3 Theoretical Framework 
 
In assessing the issue of child labour incidence, it is necessary to understand all the 
factors affecting supply and demand of child labour. Supply-side factors of the incidence 
of child labor range from social, cultural, household factors to poverty related causes. 
On the other hand demand for child labour arises as a consequence of specific features 
that children have. This is based on the nimble finger argument. Children¶V hands make 
them particularly effective at performing certain tasks such as stitching soccer balls, 
picking cotton etc. If the demand for child labour arises because of children¶V physical 
features it can easily be eliminated or reduced by technological advancement [Brown 
et.al, (2002)]. Technological advancement usually lowers the demand for unskilled labor 
including child labour; for example, demand for child labor in Egyptian farms declined 
with mechanization [see Levy (1985) for more detail] and during the British industrial 
revolution (after the technological change throughout the 19th century), the usefulness 
of child workers considerably reduced in the textile industry. 
 
These two examples also provide empirical support for the idea that demands for child 
labor could be affected by the changes in the demand for unskilled labour relative to 
skilled labor. Furthermore, the rise in the demand for skilled labor raises the returns to 
education and reduces the child labour incidence. Diamond and Fayed (1998) using 
Egyptian household survey data estimated the elasticities of complementarity between 
adult and child labor. They found that adult female labor is a substitute for adult male 
and child labor, but child and adult male labor are complements. 
 
Dwibedi and Chaudhuri (2010)30 using a three sector general equilibrium model have 
presented basic relationship among child labour, wages and skilled composition. Their 
child labour supply function shows that any increase in the current wages will raise 
consumption and hence lower child labour supply. It will also have positive income 
effect on the future consumption reducing child labour incidence further. However, 
according to them any increase in the child wage rate will increase the opportunity cost 
of schooling and will lead to more child labour supply. Moreover, any changes in the 
skilled and unskilled wages will influence the returns to education and the decision 
made by adults DERXW WKHFKLOG¶VVFKRROLQJ ,I WKHVNLOOHGZDJHV LQFUHDVHVRUXQVNLOOHG
                                                 
30
 See section 2.1 part (b) for more detail discussion on the model. 
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wages decreases it will make education more attractive and thus will increase child 
schooling.  They also propose that any change leading to the expansion in semi-skilled 
or skilled sector and contraction in unskilled sector would result in lowering the demand 
for labour (both child labour and unskilled labour) in the unskilled sector and an increase 
in the demand for skilled labour. This will decrease the unskilled wages and raise the 
skilled wages. A decrease in child wage rate means a decrease in the opportunity cost of 
schooling.  
 
Chaudhuri (2009)31considered a small open economy case to generalize the effect of 
changes in wage policy on child labour by considering a case of two sectors; formal 
and informal. According to him in the formal sector, workers received high wages due to 
the high bargaining power thus the formal sector does not rely on child labour, while 
workers in informal sector earned only a competitive wage thus they are compelled to 
supply child labour.  
 
Following Basu and Van (1998) µLuxury Axiom¶he assumes that there exists a critical 
level of family income, such that the families will send their children to work if and 
only if the adult wage rate is less than the critical level. Adult worker in the formal 
sector earns wages greater than this critical level. Hence, workers who are working in 
the formal sector will not send their children to work. On the other hand, an adult 
worker employed in the informal sector earns less than this amount and therefore is 
compelled to send his children to work in order to supplement the family income. 
Wages in the formal sector are higher than the informal sector because of the existence 
of well-organized trade unions to bargain with employer in respect of working 
condition, benefits and wages. According to Chaudhuri (2009), whenever wages in 
the formal sector fall,32demand for labour in the formal sector increases. As a result 
formal sector expands while the informal sector contracts. Contraction in the 
informal sector means fall in the production. This would further decrease the demand 
for adult labour and child labour in this sector. 
 
                                                 
31
 See section 2.1 part (c) for more detail discussion on the model 
32Adult wages can change directly because of some policy measures such as minimum wage law or 
because of the economic development or may be because of the changes in the trade policy. Here 
Chaudhuri (2009) assumes that wages falls because of the policy reform. 
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Both Dwibedi and Chaudhuri (2010) and Chaudhuri (2009) based their model on the 
condition that factors of production are fully employed. Thus rise in one factor means 
reduction in another factor. However, Basu (2000) points out that if there is a certain 
amount of unemployment expected to prevail in the labour market some risk averse adults 
fearing that they might lose jobs. Hence they may start sending more children for work 
than they would have done at the same wage rate if they were assured of the full 
employment in the economy. Moreover, a traditional argument against child labour is 
based on the fact that child labour substitutes adult labour and therefore increases the 
adult unemployment rate and lowers their wages.  
 
Galli (2001) addressing the economic consequences of child labour also argues that 
unemployment in the adult market is due to the presence of child labour which often 
displaces adult labour. In order to remain cost competitive employers prefer hiring 
children in place of adults. Children can be hired on relatively low wages as compared 
to adult labour for the same amount of work. The situation differs in urban and rural 
areas. In urban areas, where informal sector exists, child labour can have a negative 
impact on adult employment and wage rate. Activities performed in informal sectors 
require less skill or training - VXFK DFWLYLWLHV DUH PRVWO\ XQVNLOOHG 7KXV LW¶V HDV\ WR
substitute adult labour with child labour. Therefore, child labour leads to an increase in 
adult unemployment, which further forces adults to put their children to work thus 
generating a vicious circle. While in rural areas most of the child labourers work side-
by-side with adult. This complementarity between adult and child labour in agriculture 
has also been observed in the case of family enterprises. As pointed out by Grootaert 
and Patrinos (1999);  
 
³7KHUHLVDGDQJHUWKDWSURPRWLQJKRXVHKROGHQWHUSULVHV WKHLQIRUPDO
economy) will increase parents demand for their children to work in 
WKHVHHQWHUSULVHV´ 
 
In summary child labour is substitutable in the urban informal sector but in agriculture 
and household enterprises, children seem to complement rather than substitute adult 
workers. So the presumed negative impact of child labour on adult unemployment or 
wages is restricted to the urban informal sector only. The actual substitution of adults 
with children depends on whether the employers have reasons for preferring children to 
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adults. Ranjan R. (2000) concluded that child and adult labour are shown to be 
substitutes or complementary depending on their gender, age, region residing and sector 
employed. 
 
Furthermore, it has also been observed that rigid labour laws also lead to higher wages. 
This means investors may not be able to compete effectively with other countries 
where labour laws are relatively flexible. Consequently, they close down their 
businesses which lead to unemployment. Under this argument flexible labour law may 
provide the solution but flexible labour law also generally mean, wage reductions for the 
poor labour class. Hence, this aggravates wage inequality and unemployment problem. 
Consequently, this increases poverty and affects child labour problem [Chaudhuri 
(2009)]. 
 
Finally, considering the presence of child labour in the exporting sector, Kar et.al, 
(2003) argue that imposing import ban on the products made with the use of child labor 
will affect the exportable sector based on technology. If the technology used to produce 
exporting good is such that the children cannot be substituted, then exporting sector 
completely stops production. If instead child labor could be substituted by adult labor, 
then the production continues. But, as the sector was operating at the world prices due 
to presence of cost advantage generated from the use of child labor, any imperfect 
substitution of child labour will reduce the cost advantage and exporting sector may 
have to stop production creating unemployment further. Alternatively, in the absence of 
strictly enforced child labor laws, the sector may be producing non-traded goods 
instead.  However, it must produce at the world prices and thus may face insufficient 
demand within the country to sustain previous production level. In any case, output and 
employment in exporting sector fall due to imposition of import ban [Kar et.al, (2003)]. 
In case of Pakistan (as explained in section 4.2) Husain (1998) has argued that children 
mostly work for the exporting sector through contract system by engaging in the 
informal sector or in the subsidiary sectors which provide raw material to the exporting 
sectors. Hence, it is not necessary that children are directly employed in the exporting 
industry. 
 
The above arguments indicate the importance of the size of the informal sector, wages of 
adult labour and substitution/complementarity between adult labour and child labour 
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Total popoulation of 4 
Province 
Urban Population 
Divisions 
(excluding 
large cities) 
Large Cities 
Rural Poulation 
Districts 
(excluding 
Balochistan) 
Divisions for 
Balochistan 
(effecting adult unemployment) in explaining the child labour incidence. In summary, the 
contraction in the informal sector would result in reducing both adult and child labour 
demand. This situation aggravates the adult unemployment problem if the condition of 
full employment is relaxed. How much unemployment rate will be affected depends on 
the degree of substitution and complementarity between children and adult labour.  
4.4 Data and Methodology 
 
This chapter uses data from Pakistan Labour Force Survey (LFS). The LFS is a 
household survey, carried out by the Federal Bureau of Statistics (FBS) since 1963. It 
includes information concerning skill development, employment generation, size and 
the volume of informal sector, characteristics and nature of employment. The 
questionnaire and methodology of LFS have undergone pertinent improvements. The 
questionnaire was revised in 1990 and further improved to include questions on 
migration, informal sector, occupational safety and health in 1995 and 2001-02.  
 
Chart 4.1: Sampling Framework for LFS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The data set comprises of repeated cross sections since each year different households 
are surveyed. A household is selected using the two step stratified random sampling. 
The sample is about 36,000 households taken during the year 2007-8 and covers all 
urban and rural areas of the four provinces of Pakistan. Considering heterogeneity in the 
urban population, a higher proportion of sample size is allocated to urban domain. 
Moreover considering the small area and population, a higher proportion of sample is 
also assigned to province of NWFP and Balochistan. After fixing the sample size at 
provincial level, further distribution of sample is made to different strata in rural and 
urban domains. In the urban domain after excluding the population of large cities from 
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the administrative divisions the remaining urban population is grouped together to form 
a stratum. However in rural domain each administrative district in the Punjab, Sindh 
and NWFP is considered an independent stratum whereas in Balochistan, each 
administrative division constitutes a stratum. 
  
For the assessment purpose six cross section surveys; 1997-98, 1999-00, 2001-02, 
2003-04, 2005-06 and 2007-08 are pooled to from a pseudo panel. The advantage of 
using the pseudo- panel approach over the simple cross section data is its ability to 
explain the past characteristics while simultaneously predicting the future behavior.  
Cross-section data has its own limitations such as   non-availability of individual 
histories needed for constructing instruments or for transforming a model to first-
differences or in deviations from individual means. Pseudo- panel is not true panel but 
nevertheless it has its advantages over simple cross section or time series data.  The 
important point is that repeated cross-sections are substantially large, both in terms of 
number of individual or household covers and the time period that they span. Although 
to analyze the effect of labour market conditions over time one would definitely want a 
panel of individuals or households that can be traced back over time in order to 
investigate the changes in wages, unemployment rate, skill formation and other 
FRQGLWLRQV%XW WKHNH\PHWKRGRORJLFDO LVVXH LQXVLQJ WKH/)6 LV WKDW/)6¶VDUHRQO\
cross-sectional. Estimation of cross-section data can result in the unobserved individual 
heterogeneity problem. To overcome the problem Deaton (1985) has suggested use of 
FRKRUW LH HVWLPDWLQJ WKH HPSLULFDO UHODWLRQVKLSV EDVHG RQ µFRKRUW PHDQV¶ UDWKHU WKDQ
individual observations. Cohorts are defined as groups of individuals sharing some 
common characteristics like sex, date of birth, region etc.  According to Deaton (1985) 
pseudo-panels do not suffer from attrition problem that genuine panels have, and are 
usually available over longer time periods compared to genuine panels. 
4.4.1 Pseudo Panel 
 
Consider following simple model:  
 ݕ௜௧ ൌ ݔ௜௧ߚ ൅ ߙ௜ ൅ ߝ௜௧ݐ ൌ  ?ǥ Ǥ Ǥ  ܶ  (4.1) 
 
Where, ݔ௜௧ is a (K× 1) vector of explanatory variables, assumed to be exogenous, ݅ is an 
index of individuals (children aged 10-14 in this case) and ݐrefers to time periods. As 
LFS does not follow the same individuals every time, true panel data is not available to 
125 
 
estimate the above equation. Following Deaton (1985) cohorts ܥ , based on 
divisions/districts/city (based on the sampling framework adopted by FBS) are therefore 
identified, such that child ݅  is a member of one and only one cohort for each ݐ . 
Averaging over the cohorts gives: ݕത௖௧ ൌ ݔത௖௧ߚ ൅ ߙഥ௖௧ ൅ ߝ௖௧ ܿ ൌ  ?ǥܥ                    (4.2) 
Let the size of the group ܿ at time ݐ be ݊௖௧ such that average value of all observed ݔ௜௧¶VLQFRKRUWܿat time ݐ can be written as: ݔҧ௖௧ ൌ ݊௖௧ିଵ  ? ݔ௜௦௦ୀ௧௜א௖    (4.3) 
The resulting data set is a pseudo- panel with repeated observations over ܶ periods and ܥ cohorts. The main problem in estimating equation (4.2) is that ߙഥ௖௧ depends on t and 
could be correlated with  ݔ௖௧ . Considering ߙഥ௖௧  as random error would lead to 
inconsistent estimator while considering them fixed unknown parameter would 
result in an identification problem unless the variation over ݐ  can be ignored ሺߙഥ௖௧ ൌ ߙഥ௖ሻ . This assumption will only holds if the number of individual 
observation used to create cohort averages are large. Verbeek and Nijman (1993) 
KDYHPRGLILHG'HDWRQ¶VHVWLPDWRUWRDFKLHYHFRQVLVWHQF\IRUDIL[HGt and a fixed i per 
cohort. If the number of children in each cohort is large, then the size of the cohort ݊௖ ൌ ܰ ܥ ?  tends to infinity and the measurement errors as well as their estimates tend 
to zero. This yields WKHFRKRUWHVWLPDWRUȕZKLFKLVDV\PSWRWLFDOO\LGHQWLFDOWR'HDWRQ
HVWLPDWRURIȕ ߚመ ൌ ሺ ?  ? ݊௖௧௧்ୀଵ ሺݔҧ௖௧ െ ݔҧ௖ሻଶ஼௖ୀଵ ሻିଵሺ ?  ? ݊௖௧ሺݔҧ௖௧ െ ݔҧ௖ሻሺݕത௖௧ െ ݕത௖ሻሻ௧்ୀଵ஼௖ୀଵ            (4.4) 
 
Where, ݔҧ௖ ൌ ሺ ? ݊௖௧ሻିଵ  ? ݔҧ௖௧݊௖௧௧்ୀଵ௧்ୀଵ , it is the time average of the observed cohorts 
means for cohort ܿ . The properties of ȕ estimator depend upon the asymptotic 
properties employed. Deaton (1985) considers the asymptotic properties when the 
number of cohorts ܥ tends to infinity i.e. the number of individuals tends to infinity 
with constant cohort sizes. Moffitt (1993) assumes that the number of cohort is fixed 
while the cohort sizes increases with the increase in the number of individuals. In the 
Moffitt approach errors in variables problems disappear. This study also takes 
advantage of the assumption given in Moffitt. The number of cohort is fixed to 114 
divisions/districts/cities while cohort sizes increases with the increase in the number of 
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children. The selection of division/districts/cities as cohorts is defined on the basis that 
it will not vary over time and observed for all individuals in the sample [see Verbeek, 
(2007) for more detail on selection of cohorts]. Studies have often used variables like 
age (date of birth), gender, race, or region as identifying cohorts. It requires that across 
the groups explanatory variables change deferentially over time. The choice of 
division/districts/cities fulfills this condition.  
 
Finally, Verbeek and Nijman (1993) have suggested that when cohort size is at least 
100 individuals, and the time variation in the cohort means is sufficiently large, the bias 
in the standard fixed effects estimator is small enough so that the measurement error 
FDQ EH LJQRUHG *LYHQ WKH VL]H RI WKH /)6¶V DQG divisions/districts/cities chosen as 
cohort fulfill this size criterion in most of the cohorts. But still there are few cohorts 
mainly small districts which compromise of individuals less than 100. In order to check 
the bias that could arise because of the small size, another cohort was established i.e. 
districts and cities were merge to divisions. As results do not show a great difference 
hence in the final estimation divisions/districts/cities are kept as cohort.   
 
Overall, 123,925 individual observations i.e. children aged 10-14 are selected from six 
of the cross section data of LFS. The construction of pseudo-panel data is done by 
computing cohort or cell means in each available cross-section, where the cells are 
defined by the four-digit district codes. This yields a balanced panel consisting of 114 
groups (cohorts) for six time period, having a total of 684 observations (see annex A-
4.6 for detail on cohorts and number of observation across cohorts).  
4.4.2 Econometric Specification  
 
Based on the discussions in section 4.3, labour market indicators such as wages33, 
degree of informality, unemployment and sectoral composition are considered to be 
effective in explaining the demand and supply of child labour. The aim of the study 
therefore is to comprehensively look into these indicators as causes of child labour 
incidence.  In order to conduct an in-depth analysis and to see how labour market 
factors influence child labour behavior fixed effect approach as suggested by Verbeek 
and Vella (2005) is applied. Verbeek and Vella (2005) suggested that the fixed effect 
                                                 
33
 Although literature has identified the role of both adult wages and child wages but as child wages are 
endogenous in the child labour supply function for simplicity in the empirical assessment it was drop.  
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estimator based on pseudo panel of cohort averages provides an attractive choice for 
estimation. When the sizes of cohorts are large, the sample mean of the fixed effects 
provides a consistent estimator of the time-invariant population mean. Therefore, when ݊௖ is large, the errors-in-variables problem caused by possible time variation in ߙഥ௖௧ is 
usually ignored and standard estimators like the fixed effect (within) estimators are 
used. Our study falls into this category as well because the average cohort size is 
reasonably large34 except in few districts as explained earlier. Therefore, relationship 
among the variable of interest is estimated by the standard fixed effects estimator on the 
cohort means that eliminates any unobserved differences between individual cohorts. 
Specifically study has estimated following simple model:  
 ܥܮ௖௧ ൌ ܹܩ௖௧ߚଵ ൅ ܷ ௖ܰ௧ߚଶ ൅ ܫܨܵ௖௧ߚଷ ൅ ܧܺ ௖ܲ௧ߚସ ൅ ܣܩܴ௖௧ߚହ ൅ ܥ ௖ܶ௧ߚ଺ ൅ ߝ௖௧ሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
 
Where, WG35, UN, ܫܨܵ, ܧܺܲǡ ܣܩܴ and CT are the time-varying exogenous variables 
(averages over cohorts) representing adult wages, unemployment rate, size of the 
informal sectors, exporting sectors,  agriculture sector and some control variables such 
as child¶V own and household characteristics respectively. Here, sizes are measured in 
terms of proportion of adult employment in the respective sectors. ߚԢݏ are the set of co-
efficient and ߝ is the unobservable error term. 
 
The dependent variable child labour ܥܮ comprises of children aged 10-1436 engaged in 
work, including both paid and unpaid employment and work at household enterprises 
(including farms). Although the most often used definition of child labour in the 
literature is economically active children, aged 10-14, but as reports on Pakistan often 
document considerable school drop out after age 11 and 17, i.e. either after completion 
of primary or secondary education, study has also chosen age 17 as the cut-off point as 
                                                 
34Further to this A Monte Carlo experiment by Verbeek and Vella (2005) also shows that the bias that is 
present in the within estimator for the dynamic model using genuine panel data, is much larger than what 
is found for similar estimators employed upon cohort aggregates [see Verbeek, (2007) for more detail] 
35
 %DVHGRQ WKH'DYLGVRQ¶V and Mackinnon and AIC/SIC information the log function of the wages is 
included.   
36
 The definition of child labour includes children in the worst form of employment and children in 
employment below the minimum age, excluding children in permissible light work, if applicable. It is 
WKHUHIRUH D QDUURZHU FRQFHSW WKDQ ³FKLOGUHQ LQ HPSOR\PHQW´ H[FOXGLQJ DOO WKRVH FKLOGUHQ ZKR DUH
working only a few hours a week (14 hours a week in the case of child labour Law in Pakistan) in 
permitted light work and those above the minimum age whose work is not classified as a worst form of 
FKLOGODERXU³KD]DUGRXVZRUN´LQSDUWLFXODU,/2$VDWWKHPHVROHYHOWKHµOLJKWZRUN¶DOORZHG
for by the definition can be excluded therefore meso level analysis is based on this definition. 
128 
 
well. The main analysis is therefore carried out for children aged 10-14 however, to 
show that the main results are robust to the age range a separate analysis is also done 
for the age group between 10-17.   
 
As far as independent variables explaining the effects of labour market are concerned, 
first effect of monthly adult wages is explored. Monthly adult wages for the paid 
employees are used as LFS reports the wages of the paid employees only. This results 
in missing data problem. To overcome this problem individual monthly wages of adults 
are regressed on personal and household characteristics. More specifically explanatory 
variable of the wage equation includes age; age square, gender, household size, gender 
of the head of the household and education level. The predicted wages from the wage 
equation are then aggregated at household level to come up with household wages.  
 
The main hypothesis concerning wages is that the higher the wages the lesser will be 
child labour supply. But this is the supply side effect; there may exist the demand side 
effect. Demand side effect will be generated when higher wages results in the higher 
cost of production pushing employers to substitute adult labour with cheap child labour 
causing increase in the demand for child labour. This could result in an ambiguous net 
effect. Children either substitute adults in case of unskilled labour or may enter in the 
employment as the parents get unemployed. In order to check whether or not the 
demand side effect exists, median wages at division/district/city level is also included in 
the model.  
 
Further to this real wages are used instead of nominal wages. In order to compute the 
wages in real terms, wages are deflated by CPI values. CPI values are taken from the 
Economic Survey of Pakistan. Moreover, as wages could be endogenous in child labour 
model (wages effect child labour while child labour also effect wages) before running 
the model, endogeneity in the wage variable is tested by using the FE-GMM. To check 
the possible endogeneity37, lag wages are used as instrument. On the basis of Davidson 
and Mackinnon test of exogeneity (see annex A-4.11 for the test statistics) study 
rejected the presence of endogeneity in wage variables. Hence in all the preceding 
analysis real wages are used as an exogenous variable.  
                                                 
37Endogeneity may arise because of the simultaneity problem. Child labour is affected by the adult wages 
while child labour could also affect the adult wages by affecting their demand.   
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Furthermore, as indicated in section 4.3 that the effects of wages may differ because of 
the skill composition (skilled labour often enjoys high wages thus do not rely on child 
work); in the preliminary analysis both median wages of the skilled and unskilled 
labour was also included in the model. Skilled wages are represented by median wages 
earned by the labour having secondary education across divisions/districts/cities while, 
unskilled wages are represented by median wages of illiterate labour force across 
divisions/districts/cities. A number of regression analyses was performed by keeping 
and dropping the skilled unskilled wages in real and nominal term but as the effect is 
insignificant thus in  main analysis only adult wages at division/district/city level in real 
term is included (capturing demand side effect). In the latter stages household wages are 
also dropped from main analysis as well because the household level wages do not 
show any significant effect in any of the regression equations. Furthermore, study also 
acknowledges that household wages also include contribution of child unpaid family 
work as well. Inclusion of this variable may over-estimate the effects of household 
wages on child labour supply. Therefore, to avoid the problem, adult wages at 
division/district/city level are only kept in the main model.   
 
Unemployment rate in equation 4.5 represents the ratio of unemployed adult labour 
force to the total adult labour force. Adult unemployment could again exert two types of 
effects; supply side and demand side. First the higher the adult unemployed proportion 
in an area, the harder it is for the children to find an employment especially in the 
sectors where they are substituted. Therefore the higher the adult unemployed 
proportion in an area, the lower will be the demand for child labour. Second, the higher 
adult unemployment rate also means the lower household income forcing parents to 
send more and more children to work. In order to overcome loss in income, household 
increases supply of child labour. In order to check how adult unemployment affects 
child labour supply, proportion of unemployed adults within the household (showing 
supply side effect) is also included in the model. Due to simultaneity problem, both 
variables are first checked for the endogeneity bias as well using the lag variables as 
instrument. Davidson and Mackinnon test again rejects the endogeneity among the 
variables. 
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Points discussed above also raises a question regarding the availability of work 
opportunities i.e. from where do children get jobs? Variables that could best reflect the 
available opportunity for the children is the degree of in-formalization in the economy. 
Degree of informality represents segmentation of economy between organized (formal) 
and unorganized works (informal). As explained earlier this is the sector which absorbs 
a high proportion of child labour. Children often start working in this sector to acquire 
skill but after some time become regular worker. The system, as indicated before, is 
called ustad-shagird system (student teacher system). LFS defines informal sector as 
enterprises owned and operated by employers with less than 10 persons engaged on 
occasional or on a continuous basis, or as apprentice basis. Such enterprises have no 
system of keeping written records. Workers are often paid very low wages and working 
environment is sometimes dangerous to health. As there is low skilled requirement in 
this sector children easily get employed and sometime substitute adult unskilled labour. 
Therefore, the higher the proportion of the informal sector in an economy, the higher 
will be the probability of child labour. However the relation could be the other way 
around as well. For example due to the high incidence of child labour the informal 
sector may experience growth. In order to overcome this problem the size of the 
informal sector is measured as adult employment (excluding child labour) in the 
informal sector as a ratio of total adult employed labour force across 
divisions/districts/cities.  
 
In relation to above, in Pakistan, like in other developing countries, to remain cost 
competitive, exporting industries employers often rely on child labour. Although due to 
world pressure on the exports especially after Child Deterrence Act of US, industries 
such as food beverages, clothing and apparel, sports goods and surgical instrument  
have now started substituting children with  adult unskilled labour but still, in order to 
remain competitive, employers are now using a contract system approach. Children 
work for the exporting sector through contract system by engaging in the informal 
sector or in subsidiary sectors which provide raw material to exporting sectors. As it is 
hard to identify the presence of child labour in these sectors a proxy variable is included 
in the model showing the proportion of adult employed labour force in  exporting sector 
or proportion of adult labour performing activities related to export sectors across 
divisions/districts/cities. The higher the proportion of adult employment in export 
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related industries38 the higher will be the probability for children to be substituted or 
engaged in work through contract system. In order to empirically analyse the effect of 
above stated indicators, one cannot ignore the importance of agriculture sector as well. 
As in Pakistan almost 67% of the children aged 10-14 are working in agriculture sector 
and almost 64% of the total employed children work as unpaid family workers. Such a 
high proportion indicates that the larger the size of this sector, the higher will be the 
probability of child work (whether unpaid or paid).  
 
In addition to the above stated labour market indicators, some control variables are also 
included in the model. These control variables could be grouped to capture the 
variations at the household and child level. To control the effects of household 
characteristics following variables are included; household size39, the average years of 
schooling of male and female heads of the house, average years of schooling of the 
spouse of male heads and the gender of household head. To control the effects of the 
FKLOG¶VRZQFKDUDFWHULVWLFVDJHDQGJHQGHURIWKHFKLOGwere also included. (For more 
detail on the variables used, their definitions and expected relation see annex A- 4.3 for 
reference.)  
 
Furthermore, study does acknowledge the presence of endogeneity in four variables, 
first adult wages. Adult wages are endogenous as higher the adult wages, the higher will 
be the demand for child labour as explained earlier. Recall the substitution effect 
discussed previously i.e. higher adult wages leads to higher cost of production hence 
employer substitute cheap chid labour to costly adult labour. Hence the higher wages 
will reduce adult labour demand thus affecting their wages. This simultaneity issue is 
also present with adult unemployment variable. Another variable household size was 
also checked for presence of endogeneity as well because parents often prefer more 
children to supply child labour.  
 
As the data is panel in nature panel FE-GMM is applied using lag wages and adult 
unemployed proportions to instrument adult wages and adult unemployment rate while 
sex of first two born children is used as an instrument for household size. The 
                                                 
38
 See Annex 4.17 for detail about export related industries in Pakistan. 
39
 Household size could have endogeneity problem ± child labour often affects decision of household to 
prefer more children. But test of endogeneity do not show the presence of endogeneity in the variable 
(see annex 11 for more detail). 
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hypothesis behind this inclusion is that if the first two born are of different gender then 
there is a probability that the household may not prefer further siblings and the lower 
the siblings, the lower will be the probability of child work. The result is annexed 
(annex A- 4.11). FE-GMM shows significant effect of only adult unemployment rate at 
KRXVHKROG OHYHO DQG DJULFXOWXUH VHFWRU 7KH 'DYLGVRQ¶V DQG 0DFNLQQRQ WHVW RI
exogeneity after FE-GMM also rejects the endogeneity (chi2 = 0.666 with p-value = 
0.62) among the variables therefore the main analysis is performed considering the 
exogeneity among the variables. Finally, although our study does not predict the 
presence of endogeneity in the system but this could be because of the absence of 
suitable instruments. In the absence of good instruments we rely on lag values and the 
model is exactly identified. The over-identification test cannot be performed therefore 
so the validity of instruments remains an open question. Nevertheless LFS data does 
provide us with a good opportunity to explore the effect of labour market indicators on 
child labour.     
 
4.5 Results: 
 
We began this section by providing some stylized facts about the sampled children aged 
between 10-14 and by giving some descriptive analysis of variables used in the 
estimation process.  This section further proceeds by discussing estimated results of 
equation 4.5. The sensitivity/robustness analysis based on age range, working hours, 
Tobit and division based analysis is followed by the discussion on equation 4.5. Tobit 
model is estimated because of the presence of zero child labour in a cohort while 
estimation based on divisions is performed to check the error in variable bias due to the 
small cell sizes in few districts. Section on the robustness check also includes short 
discussion on estimation results of random effect and pooled OLS model as well. After 
checking the robustness of the model, study then proceeds to check the variations across 
provinces and time. The final sub-section discusses the results of some earlier periods, 
pooled from 1990-91 to 1994-5. Four data sets namely, LFS 1990-91, 1991-92, 1992-93 
and 1994-95 are pooled to form another pseudo panel. Due to changes in the sampling 
methodology and the non-availability of codes for the divisions/districts/cities for 
earlier SHULRGVWKHVHFDQQRWEHPHUJHGZLWKWKHODWH¶VSHULRGV-98 onward). 
Hence, a separate analysis is done just to see if there exists any difference among the 
two sets of periods before and after 1997-98.  
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4.5.1 Descriptive Analysis 
 
The percentage of economically active children after decreasing to 7% in 1999-00 from 
9% in 1997-98 rose again first to 9% in 2003-4 and then to 12% in 2005-6 while, in 
2007-08 it declined to 11%. The average working hour per week by children recoded in 
overall sample is around 39 hours. As far as education status is concerned, out of the 
total economically active sampled children (12,275) 91% are not currently enrolled. 
64% of these economically active children are working as an unpaid family worker 
(either in agriculture sector or in household enterprises). 
 
Table 4.6: Economically active children in Pakistan 
Year of survey Not in LF In LF Total 
1997-98 
12161 1247 
13408 
(91) (9) 
1999-00 
13640 1049 
14689 
(93) (7) 
2001-02 
14450 1259 
15709 
(92) (8) 
2003-04 
15124 1536 
16660 
(91) (9) 
2005-06 
25398 3350 
28748 
(88) (12) 
2007-08 
30877 3834 
34711 
(89) (11) 
Total 
111650 12275 
123925 
(90) (10) 
1RWH¶VLQ3DUHQWKHVLVDUHWKHURZpercentages. 
 
Figure 4.3: Economically active children across Time in Pakistan 
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Districts to 6417 observations in Karachi district, above the minimum required number 
of observations in a cohort except for some districts in yearly years as explained before. 
$IWHUFODVVLI\LQJWKHVDPSOHLQWRFRKRUWV¶YDULDEOHVRILQWHUHVWZHUHDYHUDJHGRXWRYHU
the cohorts. Annex A- 4.1 presents summary statistics of the main variables used in the 
pseudo panel analysis. Some of the variables present increasing trends across time, for 
example average real wages increases from around Rs. 3000 to Rs. 4500. Average year 
of schooling of male head also increases from 3 years to 5 years (primary level of 
schooling). Average years of schooling of the spouse of male heads revolve around 1 or 
2 years of schooling.  The size of informal sector remains fairly stable throughout the 
year on an average employing around 46% adult labour force while exporting sector is 
employing around 8% adult labour force on average. Adult unemployment rate at 
district level also revolves around on an average between 8% to 12%.  
 
Annex also illustrates  that proportion of child labour first decreases as one moves from 
1997-98 to 1990-2000 and it then increases till 2005-06 while 2007-08 record a slight 
decrease in child labour proportion on average. It is also interesting to note that as the 
proportion of child labour decreases from 9% in 1997-98 to 7% in the year 1999-00, 
average working hours increase from around 40 hours per week to 43 hours per week. 
Further to this, figure 4.6 shows that Jacobabad district has the highest proportion of 
child labour. 
 
4.5.2 Main Results 
 
Estimation of equation 4.5 (see table 4.7 for reference) demonstrates that all the 
indicators of labour market have significant effects on the incidence of child labour. 
Specifically adult wages, household unemployment rate, size of informal, agriculture 
and exporting sectors have positive and significant effect while adult unemployment 
rate at district level has negative and significant effect on the incidence of child labour. 
 
Here informal sector excludes agriculture sector, although agriculture sector is also 
informal in nature but as ILO and Federal Bureau of Statistics (FBS) Pakistan considers 
this sector separately than the informal sector, this study has also explored the effects of 
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the two separately40. Literature points out that, due to its nature being not recognized or 
protected under the legal and regulatory frame works, informal sector provides high 
probability for child work. The positive and significant effects show that the higher the 
size of this sector, the higher will be the probability for child work. Precisely 1 
percentage point increase in size of this sector increases the demand for child labour 
around 0.1 percentage points [one standard deviation increase in the size of the informal 
sector increases the demand for child labour around 1.73 percent]. Comparing the 
effects across the two regions shows that in rural areas a 1 percentage point increase in 
the size of the informal sector increases the child labour incidence around 0.1 
percentage points while in urban areas it increases the child labour incidence by almost 
0.06 percentage points.  
 
Next, the effects of agriculture and exporting sectors were also explored by keeping in 
view  that the presence of agriculture sector and  exporting sector in an area results in  
higher probability of child work (as indicated by the past literature). Table 4.7 shows 
the positive effect of both agriculture sector and exporting sector on the probability of 
child work. Specifically a 1 percentage point increase in the size of the agriculture and 
exporting sector increases the demand for child labour around 0.22 and 0.15 percentage 
points respectively [one standard deviation increase in the size of agriculture and 
exporting sector increases the child labour incidence around 6.3 and 1.2 percent 
respectively]. The table confirms the proposition raised by Brown et. al., (2002) that in 
agriculture sector adult labour and child labour usually work together (complementary) 
hence, any increase in adult employment rate in agriculture sector will result in higher 
employment opportunity for the children as well. Higher employment share of adults in 
the exporting sector in a division/district/city, representing size of the exporting sector, 
also shows that higher size of this sector could leads to higher opportunities available 
for children to work in the hidden informal sector, producing intermediate products for 
the exporting sector. The adult employment share in the exporting sector (here 
employment of children in the exporting sector is not considered as it will create 
endogeneity problem) is included in the model as one cannot identify the presence of 
child labour in this sector from the data. The employment of children in this sector is 
                                                 
40Here, informal sector is defined as all the activities performed by the own account worker in small 
household enterprises by engaging small number of employees (less than 10 by definition adopted by 
ILO and FBS) - excluding agricultural activities. 
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mostly hidden. Hence, in order to show its effect, size of the sector is used as proxy. 
The positive and significant coefficient at 99% confidence interval shows that presence 
of this sector in an area could increase the probability of child work. 
 
Table 4.7: Labour Market Conditions and Child Labour (From 1997-98 -2007-08) 
(Fixed effect Test) 
Dependent Variable: Child 
Labour 
All Pakistan Urban Rural 
Labour Market Conditions       
Size of the informal sector 0.097(0.001)* 0.061(0.046)** 0.101(0.022)** 
Size of the Agriculture sector 0.217(0.000)* 0.066(0.083)*** 0.237(0.000)* 
Size of the Exporting sector 0.149(0.008)* 0.155(0.002)* 0.208(0.064)*** 
District Unemployment -0.247(0.000)* -0.042(0.483) -0.289(0.000)* 
Household Unemployment 0.122(0.009)* 0.113(0.015)** 0.109(0.045)** 
Log of District wages 0.023(0.002)* 0.009(0.147) 0.029(0.009)* 
Child Characteristics      
Child Age 0.019(0.376) -0.011(0.64) 0.022(0.389) 
Child if male 0.091(0.138) 0.070(0.138) 0.095(0.236) 
Household Characteristics       
House headed by male 0.012(0.814) -0.003(0.965) 0.006(0.927) 
Education of the male head -0.006(0.079)*** -0.001(0.671) -0.009(0.094)*** 
Education of the female head -0.008(0.387) -0.001(0.926) -0.007(0.726) 
Education of the Spouse -0.009(0.012)* -0.008(0.025)** -0.014(0.086)*** 
Household Size 0.006(0.078)*** 0.002(0.464) 0.006(0.181) 
Year Dummies       
Year 1999-00 -0.022(0.005)* -0.005(0.37) -0.027(0.037)** 
Year 2001-02 -0.013(0.089)*** -0.008(0.221) -0.012(0.353) 
Year 2003-04 0.020(0.077)*** 0.014(0.227) 0.033(0.094)*** 
Year 2005-06 0.030(0.006)* 0.018(0.054)** 0.038(0.026)** 
Year 2007-08 0.009(0.347) 0.003(0.768) 0.020(0.214) 
Constant -0.369(0.169) 0.067(0.805) -0.430(0.197) 
R-Square: within 0.28 0.33 0.30 
Between 0.53 0.15 0.61 
Overall 0.43 0.22 0.45 
Number of obs. 684 222 462 
Number of groups 114 37 77 
F-test (Prob. F-test) 9.21 (0.00) 4.97 (0.00) 7.15 (0.00) 
Note: *,*DQGUHSUHVHQWVVLJQLILFDQWDWDQGVLJQLILFDQFHOHYHOUHVSHFWLYHO\¶VLQSDUHQWKHVLVDUHS-
values. The estimation technique employed is fixed model. The cohort consists of four digit district codes. See Annex 
4.9 for complete Estimation results. 
 
In order to separate the demand and supply side effect of adult unemployment rate two 
variables were included in the framework. Firstly, household unemployed adult 
proportion was measured to predict the supply side effect and secondly adult 
unemployed proportion at division/district/city level was measured to predict the 
demand side effect as indicated in section 4.4.2. The effect of adult unemployment rate 
at division/district/city level (predicting the demand side effect) is negative and 
significant. The negative and significant effect of adult unemployment rate clearly 
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shows that the higher the adult unemployment in an area the lower will be the demand 
for child labour as adult labour will be seeking employment actively. Thus the 
probability for a child to find employment will be lower. Specifically 1 percentage point 
increase in this variable reduces the demand for child labour around 0.25 percentage 
points at all Pakistan level and 0.29 percentage points in rural areas [one standard 
deviation increase in proportion of adult unemployed labour force reduces the demand 
for child labour by 1.94 percent at all Pakistan level while it reduces the demand for 
child labour around 2.57 percent in the rural areas]. The result is consistent with the 
discussions provided in Brown et.al (2002); Galli (2001) and Ranjan R. (2000). 
However its effect remains insignificant in urban areas of Pakistan. The insignificant 
effect of adult unemployment rate at division/district/city level indicates that, in the urban 
areas of Pakistan supply side effect of adult unemployment rate may be more dominating 
then its demand side effect. 
 
As far as adult unemployment rate at household level is concerned it has shown the 
positive significant effect in predicting the supply side phenomenon. Income loss due to 
the adult becoming unemployed usually pushes families to rely on the child labour, 
therefore supply of child labour increases. A 1 percentage point increase in the household 
adult unemployed proportion increases the supply of child labour around 0.12 percentage 
points at all Pakistan level (in terms of standard deviation, 1 SD increase in the household 
adult unemployed proportion increases the supply of child labour around 1.4 percent). 
The effect of household unemployed proportion is significant in explaining the supply 
side effect both in urban and rural areas.  
 
The same strategy as indicated above was used  to predict the effects of adult wages as 
well i.e. to capture the demand and supply side effect separately, adult wages at 
household level and the aggregate level were introduced in the model.  As the effect of 
adult wages at household level is insignificant throughout the regression models (see for 
example annex 4.15) hence it was then dropped from the framework (as explained 
earlier). The result therefore may be interpreted as; the demand side effect of adult wages 
might be more pronounced in Pakistan than the supply side effect. The demand side 
effect shows significant positive effect of adult wages on the incidence of child labour. 
The positive and significant effect may be interpreted as the higher the market wages for 
the adult, the higher will be the probability that the employer will substitute adult labour 
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to cheap child labour in order to remain cost competitive. Therefore the higher the adult 
wages the higher will be the demand for child labour.  
 
The positive effect capturing the demand side effect is not difficult to understand if one 
assumes that the higher wages have the demand side effect on adult labour. In countries 
like Pakistan where formal sector is shrinking (due to low economic growth, political 
instability, rising energy prices etc.), any increase in wages would definitely decrease 
the demand for adult labour as the firm will not remain cost competitive. This leaves no 
choice for the firms but either to downsize or shut down or sub-contract to informal sector 
where adult labour can easily be substituted to cheap child labour. The shutdown of 
business or downsizing or sub-contracting will result in the expansion of informal sector 
and any expansion in the informal sector increases the demand for child labour. Hence, 
any strategy taken by the employer to remain cost competitive will definitely result in an 
increase in the child labour demand. As pointed out in Chaudhuri (2009), sometimes rigid 
labour laws (such as minimum wage law) lead to higher wages. Hence, investors may 
not be able to compete effectively with other countries where labour laws are 
relatively flexible. Consequently, they either close down their businesses creating 
unemployment or substitute adult labour with cheap child labour.  
 
The higher wages leading to higher child labour demand may have a non-linear effect as 
well. Therefore, the non-linearity in this variable was also explored. As the results do not 
predict the presence of non-linearity in the variable (see annex 4.14 for more detail), in 
the final estimation framework study assumes linearity in the wage variable. Further on 
adult wages, discussion given in Dwibedi and Chaudhuri (2010) effect of wages on the 
basis of skilled composition is also explored (see annex A- 4.13 for reference). Both 
skilled and unskilled wages do not show any significant effect (as explained earlier). 
Hence in the main analysis, effects of adult wages at division/district/city level are 
explored only.       
 
Finally, in estimating equation 4.5, in addition to labour market indicators a set of 
control variables has also been included. The controls include FKLOG¶V own and 
household¶V characteristics as explained in section 4.4.2. The result indicates that 
FKLOG¶VRZQFKDUDFWHULVWLFVGR not influence the probability of child work significantly 
but the probabilities of child work is significantly affected by the household level 
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variables such as years of schooling of the male head and his spouse and household 
size. A 1 percentage point increase in the number of years of schooling of the male head 
and his spouse reduces the child labour incidence around 0.01 percentage point. While a 
1 percent increase in the household size increases the incidence of child labour around 
0.01 percentage point. 
 
In summary study concludes that the labour market conditions in Pakistan have a 
significant effect on the child labour incidence either affecting their demand or supply. 
The demand for child labour arises mainly due to adult unemployment rate at aggregate 
level and due to an expansion in the informal, agriculture and exporting sector while 
positive and significant effect of adult unemployment rate at household level shows the 
supply side effect. Adult wages are also found to have significant affect which captures 
demand side effect.  
4.5.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
In order to strengthen the arguments provided in the above sub- section 4.5.2 study has 
performed some sensitivity checks using an extended sample children aged (10-17), by 
changing the definition of dependent variable (hours of child work), by changing the 
estimation technique to Tobit and by changing the cohort to divisions. Table 4.8 
presents the results. Tale 4.8 shows that the main results remain unchanged after using 
the extended sample of child labour i.e. economically active children age 10-17. More 
specifically, real adult wages, adult unemployment rate at household level, sizes of the 
informal, agriculture and exporting sector once again have positive and significant 
effects as found earlier while adult unemployment rate at district level shows significant 
negative effect. A 1 percentage point increase in  adult unemployment rate at district 
level decreases the demand for child labour aged 10 to 17 years by 0.34 percentage 
points (One standard deviation increase in the adult unemployment rate at district level 
decreases  child labour incidence slightly less than 3 percent). While 1 percentage point 
increase in  size of the informal, agriculture and exporting sector increases  child labour 
incidence by 0.1, 0.25 and 0.28 percentage points respectively (specifically one 
standard deviation increase in the size of the informal, agriculture and exporting sector 
increases  child labour incidence by 1.85, 7.2 and 1.96 percent respectively).  
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Although the analysis does not show any differences in the effects of labour market 
indicators no matter what sample is used but researchers sometime have applied 
average hours of weekly work as a suitable indicator of child labour instead of 
proportion of economically active children. Here in order to further confirm the main 
results this definition is also applied. The result again does not show any variation 
except that size of the coefficients are higher than what the earlier two definitions 
(working children aged 10-14 and 10-17) of child labour have estimated. For example 
one standard deviation increase in size of the informal sector increases child labour 
around 1.73 points when age 10-14 is considered while it increases hours of child work 
around 67 points. On the basis of the similarities, i.e. both extended sample and  
working hours of children showing the same effect of labour market indicators that 
earlier definition, child aged 10-14, has estimated, study concludes that the estimates 
found earlier are  robust to whatever sample and definition used.  
 
To further check the robustness of the result study has re-estimated the model using 
Tobit, random effect and pooled OLS techniques as well. Tobit model is estimated 
because of the presence of zero proportion of child labour in a cohort. The number of 
censored observation is 28, the zeros cannot be LQWHUSUHWHG DV ³PLVVLQJ YDOXHV´ DQG
observations could not be discarded as one could also argued that the discarded 
information could lead to biased estimates if not reflect reality. Hence, considering the 
issue equation 4.5 was re-estimated using the Tobit model for panel data (i.e. Random 
effect Tobit model). Table 4.8 presents the results. Tobit model again demonstrates the 
positive and significant effect of the real adult wages, adult unemployment rate at 
household level, sizes of the informal, agriculture and exporting sector while also 
showing the negative and significant effect of adult unemployment rate at district level. 
Once again illustrating that the effect of labour market indicators estimated by fixed 
effect model are robust for whatever definition and estimation technique used. Random 
effect and Pooled OLS estimates (annex 4.9) further confirms the above stated effects 
except that the effects of adult wages under pooled OLS is not significant.  
 
In order to compare the estimates of fixed effect and random effect models Hausman 
test was performed. Null hypothesis of Hausman test indicates that individual effects 
are uncorrelated with the regressors [Hausman (1978)]. Therefore, if found correlated 
(H0 will be rejected), random effect model will produce biased estimators. Hence fixed 
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effect model will be preferred. The Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis, on the 
basis of the significant chi2 values; therefore study preferred fixed effect over random 
effect estimates.  
 
Finally, Verbeek and Nijman (1993) have suggested that when the cohort size is at least 
100 individuals, and the time variation in the cohort means is sufficiently large, the bias 
in the standard fixed effects estimator is small enough only then the measurement error 
can be ignored. Although almost all the cohorts fulfill the size criteria but still there are 
few districts which have less than 100 individuals. In order to check that the results are 
not affected by the measurement bias, large cities and districts were merged into 
divisions. This resulted in the 52 cohorts for 6 years.  The overall number of 
observation although reduces to 312 as compared to 684 observation earlier but the 
individual cell size significantly increases to fulfill the cell size criteria. The results 
reported in the last column of table 4.8 reveals no significant difference once again. All 
the labour market indicators are significant at 5% significance level except for the 
household adult unemployment rate which is significant at 10% significant level. In 
sum study concludes that the effects reported in table 4.7 for the labour market 
indicators are robust for whatever, sample, definitions, techniques and cohort is used. 
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Table 4.8: Sensitivity Analysis 
Dependent variable: Hours 
Worked/Child Labour (10-17) 
Child Labour 10-17 (Fixed effect Test) Working Hours (Fixed effect Test) Tobit Changing Cohort 
All Pakistan Urban Rural All Pakistan Urban Rural All Pakistan All Pakistan 
Labour Market Conditions         
Size of the informal sector 0.103(0.00) * 0.07(0.12) 0.097(0.03)** 3.75(0.00) * 3.01(0.03) ** 3.724(0.034) ** 0.113(0.0) * 0.111(0.004) * 
Size of the Agriculture sector 0.247(0.00) * 0.13(0.02) ** 0.26(0.00) * 8.4(0.00) * 2.84(0.09) *** 8.941(0.000) * 0.223(0.0) * 0.251(0.000) * 
Size of the Exporting sector 0.275(0.00) * 0.23(0.0) * 0.35(0.003) * 5.79(0.017) ** 6.65(0.007) * 6.950(0.131) 0.228(0.0) * 0.199(0.008) * 
District Unemployment -0.34(0.00) * -0.096(0.26) -0.379(0.00) * -9.96(0.00) * -2.23(0.402) -11.140(0.001) * -0.310(0.0) * -0.322(0.019) ** 
Household Unemployment 0.13(0.007) * 0.14(0.03) ** 0.12(0.035) ** 4.3(0.03) ** 4.1(0.062) *** 3.942(0.081) *** 0.160(0.0) * 0.213(0.074) *** 
Log of District wages 0.025(0.005) * 0.011(0.12) 0.03(0.022) ** 0.73(0.008) * 0.44(0.144) 0.882(0.035) ** 0.020(0.01) * 0.022(0.046) ** 
Child Characteristics         
Child Age 0.023(0.034) 0.01(0.49) 0.03(0.054) ** 1.03(0.22) -0.83(0.392) 1.359(0.185) 0.030(0.06) ** -0.005(0.899) 
Child if male 0.16(0.014) ** 0.16(0.01) * 0.15(0.082) *** 4.7(0.05)** 3.67(0.06) *** 4.908(0.117) 0.070(0.07) *** 0.113(0.061) *** 
Household Characteristics         
House headed by male 0.066(0.195) 0.05(0.38) 0.065(0.317) 1.63(0.4) -0.48(0.875) 1.967(0.451) 0.088(0.07) *** 0.100(0.309) 
Education of the male head -0.007(0.04) ** -0.005(0.18) -0.008(0.161) -0.19(0.16) -0.03(0.824) -0.260(0.234) -0.009(0.00) * 0.000(0.964) 
Education of the female head -0.005(0.68) -0.004(0.72) -0.005(0.829) -0.38(0.34) 0.11(0.782) -0.623(0.439) -0.014(0.34) -0.001(0.961) 
Education of the Spouse -0.01(0.005) * -0.01(0.00) * -0.01(0.10)*** -0.41(0.007) * -0.41(0.012) * -0.57(0.079) *** 0.001(0.7) -0.005(0.253) 
Household Size 0.009(0.006) * 0.004(0.432) 0.01(0.035) ** 0.198(0.15) 0.12(0.424) 0.211(0.267) 0.008(0.00) * 0.007(0.026) ** 
Year Dummies         
Year 1999-00 -0.02(0.006) * -0.004(0.69) -0.03(0.019) ** -0.648(0.04) ** -0.14(0.594) -0.840(0.123) -0.020(0.01) * -0.01(0.099) *** 
Year 2001-02 -0.01(0.152) -0.01(0.44) -0.014(0.279) -0.333(0.29) -0.21(0.487) -0.306(0.56) -0.015(0.06) *** -0.009(0.154) 
Year 2003-04 0.029(0.02) ** 0.045(0.00) * 0.028(0.172) 0.83(0.09) *** 0.83(0.09) *** 1.069(0.19) 0.011(0.3) -0.004(0.752) 
Year 2005-06 0.043(0.00) * 0.038(0.00) * 0.043(0.014) * 1.170(0.009) * 0.99(0.017) ** 1.343(0.056) *** 0.032(0.00) * 0.030(0.017) ** 
Year 2007-08 0.017(0.129) 0.03(0.02) ** 0.019(0.301) 0.273(0.495) 0.19(0.652) 0.519(0.445) 0.005(0.6) -0.01(0.447) 
Constant -0.54(0.001) * -0.28(0.209) -0.591(0.008) * -19.2(0.07) *** 6.97(0.539) -24.1(0.066) *** -0.590(0.00) * -0.239(0.666) 
R-Square: within 0.365 0.49 0.37 0.24 0.33 0.25 - 0.31 
Between 0.584 0.06 0.66 0.48 0.09 0.60 - 0.60 
Overall 0.510 0.18 0.53 0.38 0.18 0.43 - 0.50 
Number of obs. 
684 222 462 684 222 462 
684(28 
censored) 
312 
Number of groups 114 37 77 114 37 77 114 52 
F-test (Prob. F-test) 15.8(0.00) 15.56(0.00) 11.26(0.00) 7.73(0.00) 3.86(0.00) 5.68(0.00) - 5.51 (0.00) 
Wald chi2 (Prob. > chi2) - - - - - - 378.79(0.00)  
Log Likelihood Ratio - - - - - - 904.78  
Note: *,** and *** represents significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level UHVSHFWLYHO\¶VLQSDUHQWKHVLVDUHS-values. The main estimation technique employed is fixed model otherwise mentioned. The 
cohort consists of four digit district codes or divisions. Based on the LFS data from 1997-98 to 2007-08. 
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4.5.4 Incorporating Earlier Periods 
 
The entire above estimated models provides empirical support for the effect of labour 
market indicator such as wages, adult unemployment rate and sizes of different sectors 
on determining the child labour incidence. The above estimated relations are based on 
WKH/)6¶VDYDLODEOHDIWHU5-96. Although earlier data sets are also available but due 
to changes in the sampling frame work and non-availability of coding scheme for  
divisions/districts/cities these cannot be mergHGZLWKWKH/)6¶VDYDLODEOHDIWHU5-96. 
FBS only started giving coding scheme for the divisions/districts/cities after 1994-95. 
Previously only codes for provinces and regions were provided by the FBS 41 . 
Nevertheless, availability of the earlier data set provides good opportunity to realize the 
HIIHFWRIODERXUPDUNHWLQGLFDWRUVLQHDUO\¶V7KHHVWLPDWHZLOODOVREHLPSRUWDQWWR
analyse the effects of Child Deterrence act of US-1997. Earlier LFS data sets available 
are for the period 1990-91, 1991-92, 1992-93 and 1994-95. These data sets are again 
pooled to make a pseudo- panel and the four digit district code is again used as 
identifying cohorts. Based on the division/districts/cities 87 cohorts are identified for 
four years, yielding 384 number of observation. Fixed effect model is once again used 
to empirically estimate equation 4.5. Table 4.9 presents the results. 
 
Table 4.9 does not exhibit any significant effect of adult wages, size of the informal 
sector and exporting sector. Only size of the agriculture sector and the adult 
unemployment rate illustrates some significant positive effect on child labour incidence. 
Among household and child characteristics child age and child if male shows 
significant effect. In urban areas agriculture sector shows insignificant effect as well 
while wages shows significant positive effect, in addition to the adult unemployment 
rate. Rural areas exhibit same results as predicted at all Pakistan level. 
 
                                                 
41During the study FBS was contacted many times but after many attempts only one reply received that 
the codes are not available in the Department. 
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Table 4.9: Labour Market Conditions and Child Labour (From 1990-91 - 1994-95) 
(Fixed effect Test) 
Dependent Variable: Child 
Labour 
All Pakistan Urban Rural 
Labour Market Conditions       
Size of the informal sector 0.029(0.522) -0.038(0.484) 0.040(0.494) 
Size of the Agriculture sector 0.228(0.000) * 0.062(0.305) 0.243(0.000) * 
Size of the Exporting sector 0.016(0.866) -0.004(0.954) 0.039(0.823) 
District Unemployment -0.373(0.016) ** -0.195(0.097) *** -0.463(0.034) ** 
Household Unemployment 0.290(0.012) * 0.370(0.02) ** 0.310(0.029) ** 
Log of District wages -0.012(0.467) 0.027(0.029) ** -0.017(0.468) 
Child Characteristics       
Child Age 0.074(0.008) * 0.048(0.039) ** 0.081(0.021) ** 
Child if male 0.160(0.006) * 0.080(0.139) 0.162(0.017) ** 
Household Characteristics       
House headed by male -0.024(0.69) -0.062(0.484) -0.024(0.751) 
Education of the male head -0.001(0.819) 0.001(0.726) -0.002(0.777) 
Education of the female head 0.000(0.895) -0.001(0.739) 0.000(0.997) 
Education of the Spouse -0.001(0.911) -0.005(0.420) 0.002(0.905) 
Household Size 0.002(0.736) 0.002(0.685) 0.004(0.558) 
Year Dummies       
Year 1991-92 0.007(0.309) -0.010(0.099) *** 0.012(0.242) 
Year 1992-93 -0.005(0.500) -0.011(0.05) ** -0.004(0.689) 
Year 1994-95 -0.015(0.034) ** -0.514(0.10) *** -0.019(0.064) *** 
Constant -0.958(0.01) * -0.010(0.099) *** -1.089(0.020) ** 
R-Square: within 0.29 0.392 0.310 
Between 0.45 0.027 0.423 
Overall 0.41 0.032 0.388 
Number of obs. 346 116 230 
Number of groups 87 29 58 
F-test (Prob. F-test) 8.16 (0.00) 6.73(0.00) 6.55 (0.00) 
Note: *,*DQGUHSUHVHQWVVLJQLILFDQWDWDQGVLJQLILFDQFHOHYHOUHVSHFWLYHO\¶VLQSDUHQWKHVLVDUH
p-values. The estimation technique employed is fixed model. The cohort consists of four digit district codes.  
 
 
The substantial difference in two periods is may be because of the adoption of Child 
Deterrence Act that exerts pressure on the export in many developing countries which 
employ children. This has created unemployment not only in child labour market but 
also in adult labour market. In the earlier periods of 1990 adult unemployment rate at 
district level was revolving around 5 to 7% which goes up to 11.5% on average in the 
recent periods. Moreover, the insignificant effect of the informal sector in the earlier 
period is may be because of the fact that before Child Deterrence Act child labour was 
spread across both formal and informal sector. The fear of a trade ban has forced the 
formal sector not to employ children. As Kar et. al, (2003) theoretically shown that if 
formal sector imperfectly substitutes children with adult labour they do not remain cost 
competitive which leaves them no choice but to either shut down or sub-contract to the 
informal sector. This increases the demand for child labour in the informal sector. 
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Therefore after the Act, child labour is more concentrated in the informal sector that 
provides hidden employment to children. Hence because of this reason in earlier 
periods informal sector has an insignificant effect while in the recent periods it is 
significant. 
4.5.5 Labour Market Conditions at Provincial Level 
 
As explained in the sampling methodology Pakistan has four provinces. These 
provinces differ in size, population, agro-climatic nature and economic structure. 
Balochistan is the largest province in terms of size but in terms of population Punjab is 
the most populous province. As far as agrarian structure is concerned Punjab has the 
most irrigated area thus have agriculture as a predominant activity. After Punjab, Sindh 
has the second largest share in agriculture production. Balochistan although most 
deprived province, is famous for oil, gas and mineral production. The coastal areas of 
Balochistan are famous for marine fishing and have the second largest sea port of the 
country as well. NWFP province is a mountainous province and remains famous for 
tourism. The beautiful valleys have remained an attraction for the tourist around the 
world since the time of independence. The hilly areas of Balochistan and NWFP are 
famous for fruit production as well. The geographical differences across the province 
result in variation in the labour market structure as well. That might affect child labour 
situation in a different way.. 
 
In order to compare the effect of labour market conditions of a province on incidence of 
child labour, equation 4.5 was estimated by disaggregating the sample by provinces. 
The results shows that the informal sector significantly increases the demand for child 
labour in Punjab and NWFP province while in other two provinces its effect is 
insignificant. Agriculture sector is significant across the entire four provinces in 
explaining the demand for child labour. Adult unemployment rate across 
division/district/cities, except NWFP province, significantly reduces the demand for 
child labour in rest of the three provinces. Adult unemployed proportion at household 
level significantly increases the supply of child labour in Punjab and Balochistan 
province only. Real adult wages significantly affect the demand for child labour only in 
Punjab province while exporting sector influence the demand for child labour in 
Balochistan province only.  
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Table 4.10: Labour Market Conditions and Child Labour by Province 
(Fixed effect Test) 
Dependent Variable: 
Child Labour 
Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan 
Labour Market 
Conditions 
     
Size of the informal 
sector 
0.152(0.00)* 0.014(0.842) 0.07(0.067)*** 0.053(0.646) 
Size of the Agriculture 
sector 
0.100(0.01)* 0.395(0.00)* 0.148(0.000)* 0.330(0.011)* 
Size of the Exporting 
sector 
0.076(0.295) 0.262(0.157) 0.002(0.987) 0.64(0.07)*** 
District Unemployment -0.46(0.00)* -0.38(0.02)** -0.089(0.199) -0.63(0.04)** 
Household 
Unemployment 
0.18(0.013)* 0.049(0.491) 0.025(0.695) 0.482(0.000)* 
Log of District wages 0.03(0.006)* 0.023(0.279) 0.002(0.780) -0.007(0.90) 
Child Characteristics      
Child Age 0.019(0.548) 0.071(0.149) -0.010(0.789) -0.044(0.445) 
Child if male 0.033(0.618) 0.249(0.134) -0.033(0.627) -0.011(0.927) 
Household 
Characteristics 
     
House headed by male -0.098(0.265) 0.061(0.918) 0.069(0.354) 0.285(0.336) 
Education of the male 
head 
-0.01(0.02)** -0.007(0.497) 0.001(0.812) -0.01(0.08)*** 
Education of the female 
head 
-0.017(0.215) -0.056(0.694) 0.021(0.262) 0.64(0.09)*** 
Education of the Spouse -0.009(0.124) -0.001(0.950) -0.005(0.574) 0.019(0.232) 
Household Size 0.006(0.457) 0.017(0.188) 0.002(0.603) 0.005(0.457) 
Year Dummies      
Year 1999-00 -0.033(0.00) * -0.021(0.358) -0.001(0.968) -0.001(0.981) 
Year 2001-02 -0.015(0.165) -0.016(0.459) -0.002(0.845) -0.025(0.456) 
Year 2003-04 0.048(0.01) * 0.015(0.679) -0.008(0.711) 0.019(0.641) 
Year 2005-06 0.041(0.00) * 0.012(0.705) 0.04(0.037) ** 0.026(0.573) 
Year 2007-08 0.006(0.65) 0.014(0.696) 0.003(0.853) 0.016(0.728) 
Constant -0.158(0.664) -1.260(0.182) 0.038(0.937) 0.124(0.857) 
R-Square: within 0.35 0.53 0.20 0.50 
Between 0.47 0.77 0.29 0.75 
Overall 0.42 0.61 0.24 0.64 
Number of obs. 306 132 168 78 
Number of groups 51 22 28 13 
F-test (Prob. F-test) 7.29 (0.00) 4.78 (0.00) 2.23 (0.0054) 1.83 (0.00) 
1RWHDQGUHSUHVHQWVVLJQLILFDQWDWDQGVLJQLILFDQFHOHYHOUHVSHFWLYHO\¶VLQSDUHQWKHVLVDUH
p-values. The estimation technique employed is fixed model. The cohort consists of four digit district codes. 
Based on the LFS data from 1997-98 to 2007-08.  
 
The significant effect of exporting sector can be found at all Pakistan level, while 
insignificant effect can be seen in the three out of four provinces which further leads us 
investigate the effect of labour market indicator across urban areas of the provinces as 
well (see annex A-4.12). This is because exporting industries are mostly concentrated in 
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urban regions although these firms usually sub-contract at small scale in semi urban and 
in rural areas as well but the concentration is still high in urban areas then the rest of the 
areas.  The result indicates that except urban areas of Sindh in all the rest of the 
province the effect of exporting sector is significant and positive. Table also illustrates 
significant effect of real wages on incidence of child labour in urban areas of the three 
provinces except Punjab province although in the overall Punjab the effect was 
significant. The significant effect of real wages in the overall sample of Punjab is 
capturing the effect of rural wages.  In summary results based on provinces predict 
significant variation across provinces. The effect of labour market indicators which 
were highly significant at all Pakistan level, affect the demand and supply condition of 
child labour across provinces differently. If one indicator has significant effect in one 
province, the other has significant effect in the second province. Study therefore 
concludes by deducing that policies adopted by the government to reduce the child 
labour incidence should take into account the provincial and regional variations too.    
 
4.5.6 Variations across Time: 
 
In order to incorporate the effect of time variation on child labour incidence equation 
4.5 was first estimated keeping the year dummies only. The result is reported in column 
1 of table 4.11. The result shows a positive trend for the year 2005-06 only, while for 
the rest of the periods the effect is negative.  Here it is worth to note that the last two 
periods have insignificant effect on the incidence of child labour while the first three 
periods showing the downward trend is significant.  
 
After including the labour market indicators although overall significance of the model 
increases from 2% to 43% (the overall R-square value of two models) but the effect of 
year dummies changes. Now only the dummies for the period 1999-00 and 2005-6 is 
significantly affecting the child labour incidence. More precisely the effect of period 
1999-00 is significant and negative on child labour incidence while period 2005-06 
shows significant positive effect on child labour incidence.   
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Table 4.11: Exploring the Time Variations 
(Fixed effect Test) 
Dependent Variable: Child Labour 
Without Labour 
Market  Indicators 
With Labour 
Market  Indicators 
Labour Market Conditions   
Size of the informal sector - 0.108(0.000) * 
Size of the Agriculture sector - 0.243(0.000) * 
Size of the Exporting sector - 0.181(0.001) * 
District Unemployment  - -0.271(0.000) * 
Household Unemployment  - 0.137(0.005) * 
Log of District wages - 0.017(0.021) ** 
Year Dummies   
Year 1999-00 -0.032(0.000) * -0.020(0.011)* 
Year 2001-02 -0.024(0.005) * -0.009(0.226) 
Year 2003-04 -0.014(0.078) ** -0.001(0.864) 
Year 2005-06 0.003(0.733) 0.032(0.003) * 
Year 2007-08 -0.005(0.552) -0.005(0.51) 
Constant 0.111(0.000) * -0.082(0.001) * 
R-Square: within 0.05 0.24 
Between 0.00 0.54 
Overall 0.02 0.43 
Number of obs. 684 684 
Number of groups 114 114 
F-test (Prob. F-test) 6.77 (0.00) 10.17 (0.00) 
Note:*,** and *** represents significant at 1%,  DQG  VLJQLILFDQFH OHYHO UHVSHFWLYHO\ ¶V LQ
parenthesis are p-values. The estimation technique employed is fixed model. The cohort consists of four 
digit district codes. Based on the LFS data from 1997-98 to 2007-08. 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
 
The arguments and the evidences provided in this chapter clearly indicate that child 
labour is affected by labour market conditions substantially. Labour market indicators 
can produce both supply side and demand driven affects. The demand for child labour 
arises mainly due to adult wages, adult unemployment in an area, size of the informal, 
agriculture and exporting sector while supply of child labour usually arises because of the 
high proportion of adult unemployed in the household. The main point raised and 
empirically tested in this study includes: 
 
1) The negative effect of adult unemployment rate at district level shows that the 
higher the adult unemployed proportion in a division/district/city, the lower will 
be the probability for a child to find an employment as adult labour will be 
actively seeking employment. They will be willing to work at lower wages as 
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well. Hence it will be very difficult for a child to find an employment. Hence, 
demand for child labour decreases.  
 
2) The significant and positive effect of adult unemployed proportion at household 
level shows the supply side picture. The higher the unemployed adult in a house 
the lower will be the income of the household thus the higher will be child 
labour supply. That is household will supply more child labour to overcome 
income loss. 
 
3) The effect of the size of informal sector is positive and significant.  As 
explained earlier this sector absorbs a high proportion of child labour due its 
nature of being not recognized or protected under the legal and regulatory 
frameworks. Furthermore, the skill requirements is low in this sector hence 
children easily get employed and sometime substitute adult unskilled labour. 
The growth in this sector is tremendous in the first five years of 20th century; 
from 65% in 2001-2 to 73% in 2005-6. Results confirm that the higher the size 
of this sector the higher will be the demand for child labour. 
 
4) Presence of the export related industries in an area increases the probability of 
child work mainly due to the subcontracting system that exists in Pakistan. In 
Pakistan, like in other developing countries, to remain cost competitive in the 
world market producers are using subcontracting system for the production 
process. Children usually remain engaged in informal sector or in subsidiary 
sectors which provides raw material to the exporting sectors. Therefore the 
higher will be the export related work in a division/district/city the higher will 
be the probability for a child to find an employment. 
 
5) Presence of agriculture sector also positively influences the child labour 
incidence. Agriculture is one sector where adult and children work side by side, 
mostly as unpaid family worker. Children¶V employment in agriculture sector 
also points out that the labour market in rural areas is poorly functioning. 
Households prefer family labour instead of hiring labour. Hence the higher the 
size of this sector the higher will be the demand for child labour. 
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6) As household wages do not show any significant effect, study concludes that in 
Pakistan demand side effect of wages is more prominent in Pakistan then the 
supply side effect. This is because of the significant effects of adult wages at 
division/district/city on child labour incidence. The result shows that the higher 
the wages in a division/district/city, the higher will be the demand for child 
labour. The logic behind this is that higher adult wages increase the cost of 
production. In Pakistan due to high energy prices, cost of production is already 
very high hence any increase in the adult wage rate will definitely push 
employer to substitute adult labour with cheap child labour. Therefore demand 
for child labour increases. 
 
As far as policy implication is concerned, first supply side effect could be reduced by 
providing vocational training based on education with some small compensation.  In 
Pakistan the most common reason given by parents for sending the children to work is 
to equip the children with skill. Realizing the fact government has already started 
establishing the vocational training institute. But the work is more concentrated in 
urban areas (mainly large cities) and is targeting unskilled adult. This may be fruitful in 
the long run as it will help in enhancing the skills and income of adult labour which will 
GHILQLWHO\ DIIHFW FKLOG ODERXU VXSSO\6RPH1*2¶V DUH DOVRZRUNLQJ DW the grass root 
level to provide skilled based education at school level with some compensation such as 
a tin of oil, meal for one time a day or some small amount as compensation. But the 
work is still in progress and the fruit is yet to be analysed. 
 
Secondly, how to reduce the demand side effect? Our result indicates that demand is 
basically affected positively by size of informal, agriculture and exporting sector. 
Exporting sector employing children is also informal in nature, as one cannot found 
children in large scale manufacturing while agriculture is by nature informal. Overall 
these three sectors employing the children can be considered as basically informal.  
Now the question arises as to how to reduce the effect of informal sector on child 
labour? This is a very critical question. In Pakistan 74% of the economy is informal. Its 
role in generating employment, income and growth cannot be ignored. There is a paper 
by Burki and Afaqi (1996) on the role of informal sector in Pakistan economy. By 
considering its importance he concluded that it is necessary to develop these sectors 
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through inter or intra- industry technology transfer. If this is the case then technology 
transfer could reduce child labour demand as there is impulse evidence from the 19th 
century industrial revolution that technology reduced child labour demand considerably.  
 
Finally, this study acknowledges the presence of endogeneity in some of the labour 
market indicators. While it does not predict the presence of endogeneity in the system 
this could be because of the absence of suitable instruments. In the absence of good 
instruments we have relied on lagged values and because of this our model is exactly 
identified so the over identification test cannot be performed. Hence, the validity of the 
instruments remains an open question. Therefore we end our discussion with a 
recommendation that future studies exploring the effect of labour market indicators on 
child labour should try to control for the presence of endogeneity as well.  
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Annexure: 
Annex A- 4.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Following three tables provide summary statistics of the variables of interest. Table 
A1.1 and A 1.3 provide overall summary statistics for the period 1997-98 onward and 
1990-91 to 1994-95 respectively while Table A1.2 and A1.4 provide summary statistics 
by Year.  
 
Table A-4.1.1 
Descriptive Analysis (for the period 1997-98 onward) 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Child Labour 0.10 0.09 0.00 0.64 
Child Age 11.95 0.17 11.34 12.57 
Child if male 0.54 0.06 0.31 0.86 
House headed by male 0.95 0.07 0.63 1.00 
Education of the male head 4.18 1.94 0.45 10.16 
Education of the female head 0.14 0.24 0.00 1.60 
Education of the Spouse 1.28 1.43 0.00 7.61 
Size of the informal sector 0.42 0.18 0.08 0.82 
Size of the Agriculture sector 0.45 0.29 0.00 2.04 
Size of the Exporting sector 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.41 
District Unemployment  0.10 0.08 0.00 0.59 
Household Unemployment  0.13 0.12 0.00 1.19 
Log of District wages 1.25 0.35 -0.69 2.63 
Household Size 8.29 1.20 5.77 15.28 
 
 
Table A-4.1.2 
Descriptive Analysis by Years (Recent Years) 
 
Mean SD Min Max 
Year = 1997-98 
    
Child Labour 0.11 0.10 0.00 0.40 
Child Age 11.85 0.18 11.34 12.22 
Child if male 0.55 0.07 0.38 0.82 
House headed by male 0.94 0.08 0.65 1.00 
Education of the male head 3.10 1.86 0.45 9.63 
Education of the female head 0.10 0.18 0.00 0.93 
Education of the Spouse 0.87 1.14 0.00 5.06 
Size of the informal sector 0.52 0.15 0.12 0.82 
Size of the Agriculture sector 0.47 0.30 0.00 1.42 
Size of the Exporting sector 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.40 
District Unemployment  0.08 0.06 0.00 0.38 
Household Unemployment  0.10 0.10 0.00 0.66 
Log of District wages 1.09 0.28 -0.28 1.58 
Household Size 7.81 0.86 6.31 10.34 
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Mean SD Min Max 
Year = 1998-99     
Child Labour 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.41 
Child Age 11.98 0.18 11.55 12.45 
Child if male 0.54 0.08 0.34 0.86 
House headed by male 0.93 0.08 0.70 1.00 
Education of the male head 3.39 1.68 0.47 10.16 
Education of the female head 0.09 0.17 0.00 0.93 
Education of the Spouse 0.84 1.15 0.00 6.05 
Size of the informal sector 0.40 0.19 0.08 0.79 
Size of the Agriculture sector 0.47 0.28 0.00 1.11 
Size of the Exporting sector 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.32 
District Unemployment  0.09 0.06 0.00 0.33 
Household Unemployment  0.12 0.08 0.00 0.42 
Log of District wages 1.15 0.31 -0.06 2.08 
Household Size 7.82 0.81 5.77 10.54 
Year = 2001-02     
Child Labour 0.09 0.07 0.00 0.35 
Child Age 11.98 0.19 11.37 12.57 
Child if male 0.54 0.07 0.31 0.75 
House headed by male 0.94 0.07 0.64 1.00 
Education of the male head 3.34 1.35 0.72 6.97 
Education of the female head 0.09 0.19 0.00 1.37 
Education of the Spouse 0.95 1.07 0.00 4.45 
Size of the informal sector 0.44 0.17 0.13 0.77 
Size of the Agriculture sector 0.43 0.26 0.01 0.99 
Size of the Exporting sector 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.37 
District Unemployment  0.10 0.06 0.00 0.36 
Household Unemployment  0.14 0.09 0.00 0.48 
Log of District wages 1.18 0.23 0.55 1.68 
Household Size 8.29 1.27 6.00 15.28 
Year = 2003-04     
Child Labour 0.10 0.08 0.00 0.41 
Child Age 11.98 0.15 11.60 12.38 
Child if male 0.53 0.05 0.42 0.66 
House headed by male 0.99 0.02 0.89 1.00 
Education of the male head 6.12 1.66 2.00 9.89 
Education of the female head 0.24 0.36 0.00 1.60 
Education of the Spouse 2.11 1.76 0.00 7.61 
Size of the informal sector 0.45 0.17 0.12 0.78 
Size of the Agriculture sector 0.43 0.26 0.00 1.03 
Size of the Exporting sector 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.33 
District Unemployment  0.10 0.06 0.01 0.47 
Household Unemployment  0.14 0.11 0.00 0.80 
Log of District wages 1.26 0.49 -0.69 2.63 
Household Size 8.75 1.33 6.16 15.08 
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Mean SD Min Max 
Year = 2005-06     
Child Labour 0.11 0.09 0.00 0.41 
Child Age 11.98 0.13 11.68 12.51 
Child if male 0.53 0.04 0.39 0.64 
House headed by male 0.93 0.07 0.63 1.00 
Education of the male head 3.92 1.50 1.48 8.56 
Education of the female head 0.11 0.16 0.00 0.84 
Education of the Spouse 1.15 1.21 0.00 5.71 
Size of the informal sector 0.46 0.17 0.16 0.79 
Size of the Agriculture sector 0.45 0.30 0.00 1.73 
Size of the Exporting sector 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.41 
District Unemployment  0.11 0.10 0.01 0.52 
Household Unemployment  0.14 0.14 0.02 0.90 
Log of District wages 1.33 0.27 0.47 1.80 
Household Size 8.56 1.30 6.46 14.10 
Year = 2007-08     
Child Labour 0.11 0.10 0.00 0.64 
Child Age 11.93 0.13 11.45 12.33 
Child if male 0.54 0.05 0.43 0.68 
House headed by male 0.96 0.04 0.79 1.00 
Education of the male head 5.20 1.47 2.60 9.08 
Education of the female head 0.21 0.29 0.00 1.13 
Education of the Spouse 1.75 1.62 0.06 7.07 
Size of the informal sector 0.46 0.17 0.15 0.80 
Size of the Agriculture sector 0.47 0.34 0.00 2.04 
Size of the Exporting sector 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.33 
District Unemployment  0.12 0.11 0.00 0.59 
Household Unemployment  0.15 0.16 0.01 1.19 
Log of District wages 1.46 0.33 0.34 2.12 
Household Size 8.52 1.18 6.73 11.49 
 
156 
 
Table A-4.1.3 
Descriptive Analysis (Overall for the period 1990-91 to 1994-95) 
 
Mean SD Min Max 
Child Labour 0.11 0.08 0.00 0.37 
Child Age 11.95 0.17 11.18 12.74 
Child if male 0.56 0.06 0.33 0.77 
House headed by male 0.93 0.08 0.54 1.00 
Education of the male head 3.21 1.63 0.32 8.27 
Education of the female head 1.12 1.83 0.00 12.00 
Education of the Spouse 0.68 0.87 0.00 4.13 
Size of the informal sector 0.86 0.14 0.21 1.22 
Size of the Agriculture sector 0.44 0.27 0.00 1.01 
Size of the Exporting sector 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.40 
District Unemployment  0.06 0.04 0.00 0.29 
Household Unemployment  0.04 0.06 0.00 0.50 
Log of District wages 0.91 0.26 0.24 1.68 
Household Size 8.20 0.93 5.77 11.48 
 
Table A-4.1.4 
Descriptive Analysis by Year (Earlier Years) 
 
Mean SD Min Max 
Year = 1990-91 
    
Child Labour 0.11 0.08 0.00 0.37 
Child Age 11.98 0.18 11.59 12.74 
Child if male 0.56 0.08 0.33 0.77 
House headed by male 0.94 0.07 0.66 1.00 
Education of the male head 3.15 1.53 0.88 6.89 
Education of the female head 1.05 1.77 0.00 8.00 
Education of the Spouse 0.61 0.79 0.00 3.42 
Size of the informal sector 0.85 0.15 0.32 1.21 
Size of the Agriculture sector 0.45 0.26 0.01 0.89 
Size of the Exporting sector 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.38 
District Unemployment  0.07 0.05 0.01 0.29 
Household Unemployment  0.05 0.06 0.00 0.42 
Log of District wages 0.89 0.28 0.26 1.68 
Household Size 8.22 0.95 5.92 10.45 
Year = 1991-92 
    
Child Labour 0.09 0.07 0.00 0.32 
Child Age 11.94 0.17 11.18 12.26 
Child if male 0.55 0.06 0.38 0.70 
House headed by male 0.94 0.07 0.59 1.00 
Education of the male head 3.21 1.77 0.62 8.27 
Education of the female head 1.08 1.82 0.00 10.00 
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Mean SD Min Max 
Education of the Spouse 0.78 0.95 0.00 4.13 
Size of the informal sector 0.87 0.11 0.58 1.22 
Size of the Agriculture sector 0.44 0.28 0.00 1.01 
Size of the Exporting sector 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.32 
District Unemployment  0.06 0.05 0.00 0.27 
Household Unemployment  0.03 0.06 0.00 0.50 
Log of District wages 0.90 0.24 0.42 1.49 
Household Size 8.19 0.92 6.39 11.14 
Year = 1992-93     
Child Labour 0.11 0.08 0.00 0.37 
Child Age 11.92 0.17 11.44 12.25 
Child if male 0.55 0.05 0.45 0.68 
House headed by male 0.93 0.09 0.54 1.00 
Education of the male head 3.13 1.59 0.32 7.17 
Education of the female head 1.19 1.92 0.00 12.00 
Education of the Spouse 0.65 0.85 0.00 3.82 
Size of the informal sector 0.87 0.15 0.21 1.11 
Size of the Agriculture sector 0.45 0.27 0.01 0.90 
Size of the Exporting sector 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.34 
District Unemployment  0.07 0.04 0.00 0.20 
Household Unemployment  0.04 0.06 0.00 0.36 
Log of District wages 0.93 0.24 0.24 1.50 
Household Size 8.18 0.98 5.77 11.48 
Year = 1994-95     
Child Labour 0.11 0.09 0.00 0.36 
Child Age 11.94 0.17 11.48 12.32 
Child if male 0.56 0.05 0.40 0.73 
House headed by male 0.93 0.08 0.59 1.00 
Education of the male head 3.33 1.63 0.37 6.63 
Education of the female head 1.12 1.80 0.00 10.00 
Education of the Spouse 0.69 0.89 0.00 3.42 
Size of the informal sector 0.86 0.14 0.26 1.10 
Size of the Agriculture sector 0.44 0.27 0.01 0.92 
Size of the Exporting sector 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.40 
District Unemployment  0.06 0.04 0.00 0.20 
Household Unemployment  0.04 0.06 0.00 0.33 
Log of District wages 0.91 0.26 0.30 1.53 
Household Size 8.23 0.90 6.49 11.20 
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Annex A- 4.2: Correlation Matrix 
 
Child 
Labour 
Child 
Age 
Child if 
male 
House 
headed 
by 
male 
Education 
of the 
male 
head 
Education 
of the 
female 
head 
Education 
of the 
Spouse 
Size of 
the 
informal 
sector 
Size of the 
Agriculture 
sector 
Size of 
the 
Exporting 
sector 
District 
Unemployment 
Household 
Unemployment 
Log of 
District 
wages 
Household 
Size 
Child Labour 1.00              
Child Age -0.11 1.00             
Child if male 0.13 -0.14 1.00            
House headed 
by male 
0.20 -0.18 0.12 1.00           
Education of 
the male head 
-0.36 0.24 -0.19 0.24 1.00          
Education of 
the female 
head 
-0.26 0.20 -0.18 -0.26 0.42 1.00         
Education of 
the Spouse 
-0.34 0.21 -0.22 0.07 0.79 0.60 1.00        
Size of the 
informal sector 
-0.28 0.06 -0.16 -0.07 0.32 0.33 0.48 1.00       
Size of the 
Agriculture 
sector 
0.57 -0.24 0.23 0.09 -0.52 -0.36 -0.64 -0.66 1.00      
Size of the 
Exporting 
sector 
-0.12 0.16 -0.29 -0.05 0.32 0.34 0.55 0.49 -0.54 1.00     
District 
Unemployment 
0.04 0.08 0.04 -0.16 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.14 -0.03 1.00    
Household 
Unemployment 
0.27 0.02 0.07 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.07 -0.03 0.29 -0.02 0.79 1.00   
Log of District 
wages 
-0.20 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.44 0.22 0.38 0.04 -0.27 0.08 0.15 0.09 1.00  
Household Size 0.04 0.03 -0.07 0.11 0.09 -0.16 -0.08 0.03 -0.12 0.02 0.23 0.13 0.05 1.00 
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Annex A- 4.3: Definitions and effect hypothesized 
Variable Definition/ Measurement 
Effect 
hypothesized 
Child Age Number of years + 
Child if male 
Dummy Variable if male =1 otherwise 
zero 
+ 
House headed by male 
Dummy Variable if household head is 
male =1 otherwise zero 
+ 
Education of the male head Number of years of education - 
Education of the female head Number of years of education - 
Education of the Spouse of the 
male head 
Number of years of education - 
First and second born are with 
different gender 
Dummy variable if the first two born have 
different gender =1 otherwise zero 
- 
Proportion of Adult employed LF 
in informal sector 
Adult labour force working in the informal 
sector as proportion of total employed 
adult in a division/district/city 
+ 
Proportion of Adult employment 
in Exporting sector 
Adult labour force working in the 
Exporting sector as proportion of total 
employed adult in a division/district/city 
+ 
Proportion of Adult employment 
in Agriculture sector 
Adult labour force working in the 
Agriculture sector as proportion of total 
employed adult in a division/district/city 
+ 
Proportion Adult unemployed LF 
at Division/District/City level 
Adult unemployed Labour Force as 
proportion to total Adult labour force in a 
division/district/city 
- 
Proportion Adult unemployed LF 
at Household level 
Adult unemployed Labour Force as 
proportion to total Adult labour force in a 
household 
+ 
Real Adult Wages at District 
Level 
Median wages of Adult labour force in a 
division/district/city 
+ 
Real Adult wages at Household 
Level 
Predicted wages at Household level. 
Where wages are assumed as a function 
of age, age square, gender, household 
size, household head gender and 
education level. 
- 
Real Wages of Skilled labour 
Median wages of Adult labour force with 
matriculation in the division/district/city 
+ 
Real Wages of Unskilled Labour 
Median wages of illiterate Adult labour 
force in the division/district/city 
+ 
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Annex A- 4.4: Child Own Characteristics 
Table A4.1 to A4.6 provides some characteristics of the children included in the 
analysis. The tables are based on the individual information. 
 
Table A-4.4.1 
Incidence of Child Labour by Gender 
 
Not  in LF In LF Total 
Male 56,696 9,411 66,107 
 
(86) (14)  
Female 54,954 2,864 57,818 
 
(95) (5)  
Total 111,650 12,275 123,925 
 
Table A-4.4.2 
Incidence of Child Labour by Age 
Age Not  in LF In LF Total 
10 27,849 1,405 29,254 
 (95) (5)  
11 16,138 948 17,086 
 (94) (6)  
12 28,939 3,428 32,367 
 (89) (11)  
13 18,901 2,427 21,328 
 (89) (11)  
14 19,823 4,067 23,890 
 (83) (17)  
Total 111,650 12,275 123,925 
 
Table A-4.4.3 
Education Status of working Children 
 
Not  in LF In LF Total 
Currently not enrolled 43766 11171 54937 
 
(80) (20) 
 
Nursery or KG 1 0 1 
 
(100) (0) 
 
Primary 28,372 437 28,809 
 
(98) (2) 
 
Middle 39,511 667 40,178 
 
(98) (2) 
 
Total 111,650 12,275 123,925 
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Table A-4.4.4 
Employment Status of Working Children 
 Frequency Percent 
Regular paid employee with fixed wage? 682 6 
Casual paid employee 900 7 
Paid worker by piece rate or service performed 794 6 
Paid non-family apprentice 372 3 
Employer 2 0 
Own account worker Ȃ non- agriculture 552 5 
Own account worker agriculture 144 1 
Owner cultivator 84 1 
Share cropper 26 0 
Contract cultivator 868 7 
unpaid family worker 5445 44 
Unpaid family worker agriculture* 1892 15 
Unpaid family worker non Ȃ agriculture* 491 4 
Other 23 0 
Total 12275 100 
Note: * For few survey Years Unpaid Family workers are reported as Unpaid Family worker agriculture 
and Non agriculture. 
 
 
Table A-4.4.5 
Average Hours of Child Work 
Age 
1997-
98 
1999-
00 
2001-
02 
2003-
04 
2005-
06 
2007-
08 
Overall 
average 
10 37 41 39 40 34 36 36 
11 35 40 40 40 33 35 35 
12 40 41 42 40 37 38 38 
13 40 42 41 39 38 39 39 
14 43 45 43 43 41 40 42 
Overall 
average 
40 43 42 41 38 38 39 
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Table A-4.4.6: Nature of Activity performed by Children 
 
 In LF Percent 
Activities not Adequately Defined 1 0.01 
Agriculture, Livestock and Hunting 8220 66.97 
Forestry and Logging 32 0.26 
Fishing 15 0.12 
Coal Mining 1 0.01 
Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas Production 2 0.02 
Crude Metal Ore Mining & Other Mining 1 0.01 
Manufacture of Food, Beverage and Tobacco 113 0.92 
Manufacture of Textile, Wearing Apparel and Leather Industry 736 6.00 
Manufacture of Wood and Wood Products including Furniture 125 1.02 
Manufacture of Paper and Papers Products, Printing and Publication 23 0.19 
Manufacture of Chemicals and Chemical Petroleum, Coal, Rubber 20 0.16 
Manufacture of Non-metallic Mineral Products except of Petroleum 148 1.21 
Basic Metal Industries 12 0.10 
Manufacture of Fabricated Metal Products, Machinery and 
Equipment 
81 0.66 
Other Manufacturing Industries and Handicrafts 102 0.83 
Building Construction 266 2.17 
Construction, Repair, Maintenance of Streets, Roads, Highway 4 0.03 
other Construction, Repair and Maintenance projects 2 0.02 
Wholesale Trade 35 0.29 
Retail Trade 983 8.01 
Restaurants and Hotels 226 1.84 
Transport and Storage 275 2.24 
Communication 10 0.08 
Financial Institutions 1 0.01 
Insurance 1 0.01 
Real Estate and Business Services 5 0.04 
Public Administration and Defense Services 7 0.06 
Sanitary and Similar Services 10 0.08 
Social and Related Community Services 27 0.22 
Recreation and Cultural Services 17 0.14 
Personal and Household Services 774 6.31 
Total 12275 100 
163 
 
Annex A- 4.5: Diagnostic Tests 
 
a) AIC and BIC Test for Model Selection: 
In order to check the robustness of with and without log models, AIC and BIC tests 
were performed with the hypothesis that the lower the AIC and BIC values, the better 
will be the model. AIC and BIC values indicate that the model with log wages are more 
robust than the alternative model (without log wages). 
 
Table A-4.5.1 
 
 Without Log Wages With Log Wages 
ll(null) 1027.7 1027.7 
ll(model) 1138.1 1139.8 
Degrees of Freedom 19 19 
AIC -2238.3 -2241.6 
BIC -2152.3 -2155.6 
 
b) Variance Inflation Factors for the Independent variables 
 
 
Table A-4.5.2 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Education of the male head 4.860 0.206 
Education of the Spouse 5.210 0.192 
Size of the Agriculture sector 4.740 0.211 
Size of the Informal sector 3.890 0.257 
District Unemployment 3.260 0.307 
Household Unemployment 3.130 0.319 
Year 2005-06 3.190 0.313 
Year 2003-04 2.920 0.343 
Year 2007-08 2.400 0.417 
Education of the female head 2.010 0.497 
Year 2001-02 2.070 0.483 
Year 1999-00 2.070 0.484 
Size of the Exporting sector 1.990 0.502 
House headed by male 1.610 0.622 
Log of wages 1.540 0.648 
Household Size 1.460 0.686 
Age of the child 1.260 0.791 
Child if Male 1.170 0.858 
Mean VIF 2.710 
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c) Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
Child labour [Cohort,Year] = Xb + u[Cohort] + e[Cohort, Year] 
 
Estimated results: 
 
 
 Var. Sd.=Sqrt. (Var.) 
Child labour .0075075 .0866458 
e .0026057 .0510461 
u .0008894 .0298232 
 
 
Test:   Var. (u) = 0:  
chi2. (1) =   114.75, Prob.> chi2 =     0.0000 
 
d) Testing for heteroskedasticity 
 
Modified Wald test for group wise heteroskedasticity in fixed effect regression model 
 
H0: sigma (i) ^2 = sigma^2 for all i: 
 
chi2 (114) =   13433.29, Prob.>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
$ERYHZHUHMHFWWKHQXOODQGFRQFOXGHKHWHURVNHGDVWLFLW\KHQFHRSWLRQµUREXVW¶LVXVHG
to control for heteroskedasticity  
 
e) Testing for time-fixed effects 
 
 (1)  Year 1999-00 = 0 
 (2)  Year 2001-02= 0 
 (3)  Year 2003-04= 0 
 (4)  Year 2005-06= 0 
 (5)  Year 2007-08= 0 
 
       F (5,   552) =    9.2 
       Prob. > F  =    0.000 
 
We reject the null that all years coefficients are jointly equal to zero therefore time 
fixed effects are needed. 
 
f) Test of cross sectional independence 
 
Pesaran's test of cross sectional independence   =    -0.534, Prob. = 0.5934 
Average absolute value of the off-diagonal elements  =     0.390 
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g) Hausman Test for FE and RE 
 
b= consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg (FE) 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg (RE) 
 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
chi2 (18) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B) ^ (-1)] (b-B)  =     108.17  
Prob. > chi2   =      0.0000 
 
Indicate that estimates of Fixed Effect test is preferred over Random Effect 
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Annex A- 4.6: Number of Children Aged 10-14 within each Cohort 
 
Cohorts Survey Periods # Obs. 
Per 
Cohort 
Divisions/Districts/Cities Codes 1997-8 
1998-
9 
2001-2 2003-4 2005-6 2007-8 
Lahore City 1001 448 477 324 362 660 630 2901 
Faisalabad City 1002 226 234 232 218 421 375 1706 
Rawalpindi City 1003 154 215 206 163 329 287 1354 
Multan City 1004 127 200 153 163 268 269 1180 
Gujranwala City 1005 180 161 147 142 238 235 1103 
Sargodha City 1006 139 114 118 134 224 203 932 
Sialkot City 1007 132 116 86 79 207 206 826 
Islamabad City 1009 80 231 164 145 195 209 1024 
Karachi City 1010 909 877 816 805 1438 1572 6417 
Hyderabad City 1011 294 272 296 294 445 625 2226 
Peshawar City 1013 266 273 284 260 638 668 2389 
Quetta City 1014 203 218 272 305 443 494 1935 
Rawalpindi Division 1016 176 213 156 126 206 204 1081 
Gujranwala Division 1017 317 283 319 328 469 426 2142 
Sargodha Division 1018 134 125 127 163 230 238 1017 
Faisalabad Division 1019 220 222 150 167 235 250 1244 
Lahore Division 1020 187 293 220 244 408 408 1760 
Multan Division 1021 261 257 246 220 382 322 1688 
DG Khan Division 1022 148 182 134 130 238 220 1052 
Bahawalpur Division 1023 207 262 289 299 347 330 1734 
Sukkur Division 1024 292 287 328 326 419 631 2283 
Larkana Division 1025 155 195 134 188 235 312 1219 
Hyderabad Division 1026 190 201 229 214 220 235 1289 
Mirpurkhas Division 1027 115 100 97 129 202 236 879 
Malakand Division 1028 120 81 134 73 182 184 774 
Peshawar Division 1029 151 164 127 129 156 198 925 
Kohat Division 1030 154 168 88 111 161 303 985 
DI Khan Division 1031 89 134 169 136 243 321 1092 
Hazara Division 1032 140 145 126 139 138 207 895 
Bannu Division 1033 34 57 83 101 78 149 502 
Mardan Division 1034 162 185 192 167 91 206 1003 
Quetta Division (Urban) 1035 93 120 74 93 168 392 940 
Sibbi Division (Urban) 1036 77 80 83 98 132 286 756 
Kalat Division (Urban) 1037 86 115 82 91 258 436 1068 
Makran Division (Urban) 1038 84 72 61 81 109 228 635 
Zhob Division (Urban) 1039 26 26 76 108 145 218 599 
Nasirabad Division (Urban) 1040 66 61 96 97 195 364 879 
Quetta Division (Rural) 10351 170 194 389 453 414 713 2333 
Sibbi Division (Rural) 10361 70 175 179 221 250 558 1453 
Kalat Division (Rural) 10371 77 160 212 219 496 769 1933 
Makran Division (Rural) 10381 112 116 81 101 149 372 931 
Zhob Division (Rural) 10391 112 177 170 240 404 588 1691 
Nasirabad Division (Rural) 10401 99 124 203 203 431 865 1925 
Islamabad District 1041 68 110 172 138 317 316 1121 
Attock District 1042 43 54 102 109 146 154 608 
Rawalpindi District 1043 94 93 122 93 200 187 789 
Jehlum District 1044 49 39 39 48 79 116 370 
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Cohorts Survey Periods # Obs. 
Per 
Cohort 
Divisions/Districts/Cities Codes 1997-8 
1998-
9 
2001-2 2003-4 2005-6 2007-8 
Chakwal District 1045 44 38 94 76 132 126 510 
Sargodha District 1046 110 126 136 172 333 289 1166 
Khushab District 1047 41 35 51 42 116 101 386 
Mianwali District 1048 23 30 31 44 77 76 281 
Bhakar District 1049 20 22 56 87 104 113 402 
Faislabad District 1050 169 158 219 199 382 364 1491 
TT Singh District 1051 145 152 129 188 255 297 1166 
Jhang District 1052 121 131 125 140 267 303 1087 
Gujranwala District 1053 139 122 121 116 290 270 1058 
Gujrat District 1054 102 106 109 105 209 198 829 
Sialkot District 1055 161 167 166 203 353 341 1391 
Hafizabad District 1056 40 47 52 51 155 147 492 
Mandi Bahuddin District 1057 87 107 98 96 168 165 721 
Narowal District 1058 135 94 141 126 166 195 857 
Lahore District 1059 57 43 115 113 231 217 776 
Kasur District 1060 136 167 152 167 291 309 1222 
Sheikhupura District 1061 95 141 156 149 375 382 1298 
Okara District 1062 132 138 131 170 263 245 1079 
Vehari District 1063 144 171 147 163 280 267 1172 
Sahiwal District 1064 69 90 96 116 203 191 765 
Multan District 1065 75 109 168 156 265 231 1004 
Khanewal District 1066 76 105 100 113 272 253 919 
Pakpattan District 1067 93 110 102 123 130 123 681 
Lodhran District 1068 46 50 55 44 181 165 541 
DG Khan District 1069 77 78 92 93 291 356 987 
Rajanpur District 1070 28 37 38 43 189 208 543 
Muzffargarh District 1071 82 79 154 179 283 268 1045 
Layyah District 1072 42 53 133 118 148 188 682 
Bahwalpur District 1073 82 79 150 187 263 287 1048 
Bhawalnagar District 1074 56 99 94 106 290 271 916 
Rahim Yar Khan District 1075 105 151 206 200 378 384 1424 
Khairpur District 1076 96 94 104 157 334 305 1090 
Sukkur District 1077 32 37 42 40 152 256 559 
Nawabshah District 1078 85 85 65 92 165 251 743 
Nowshero Feroz District 1079 63 73 127 114 209 269 855 
Ghotki District 1080 62 85 72 75 126 280 700 
Jaccobabad District 1081 71 69 71 105 278 613 1207 
Shikarpur District 1082 83 73 40 49 166 242 653 
Larkana District 1083 65 86 158 144 397 424 1274 
Dadu District 1084 171 142 146 177 301 377 1314 
Hyderabad District 1085 85 128 124 153 242 372 1104 
Badin District 1086 64 64 95 97 193 281 794 
Thatta District 1087 61 79 192 140 243 298 1013 
Tharparker District 1088 50 71 51 97 120 212 601 
Sanghar District 1089 78 68 52 96 308 399 1001 
Mirpurkhas District 1090 55 67 160 115 206 351 954 
Karachi District 1091 86 87 26 135 164 250 748 
Swat District 1092 201 174 230 209 267 343 1424 
lower dir District 1093 188 158 105 142 343 336 1272 
Chitral District 1094 42 50 47 60 112 123 434 
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Cohorts Survey Periods # Obs. 
Per 
Cohort 
Divisions/Districts/Cities Codes 1997-8 
1998-
9 
2001-2 2003-4 2005-6 2007-8 
Bonair District 1095 68 63 65 66 158 178 598 
Malakand District 1097 39 47 47 78 145 160 516 
Charsada District 1098 113 109 117 144 286 327 1096 
Nowshero District 1099 96 64 59 67 191 281 758 
Peshawar District 1100 68 90 123 151 307 287 1026 
Kohat District 1101 49 51 157 122 330 417 1126 
Karak District 1102 51 36 93 92 137 156 565 
DI Khan District 1105 83 43 47 70 204 268 715 
Manshera District 1106 134 162 182 177 119 183 957 
Abbottabad District 1107 92 113 116 129 106 172 728 
Harripur District 1108 120 99 105 124 94 129 671 
Batagram District 1109 22 47 45 59 123 131 427 
Kohistan District 1110 64 66 57 63 138 148 536 
Mardan District 1111 102 100 129 144 309 308 1092 
Swabi District 1112 96 121 116 106 109 193 741 
Bannu District 1113 51 42 68 60 135 195 551 
Lakki Marwat District 1114 54 53 72 73 152 151 555 
  13408 14689 15709 16660 28748 34711 123925 
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Annex A- 4.7: Correlation with labour Market Indicators 
Following figures provided simple correlation among the indicators representing 
Labour Market Conditions and proportion of Child Labour across 
Division/District/Cities and time. 
 
Figure A-4.7.1: Child labour and Size of the Informal Sector  
 
 
 
Figure A-4.7.2: Child labour and Size of the Exporting Sector  
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Figure A-4.7.3: Child labour and Size of the Agriculture Sector  
 
 
Figure A-4.7.4: Child labour and Adult Unemployment in an Area 
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Figure A-4.7.5: Child labour and Household Unemployed proportion 
 
 
 
 
Figure A-4.7.6: Child labour and Real Wages in an Area 
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Annex A- 4.8: Dropping the Jacobabad District 
 
In all the above figures Jacobabad districts seems to be the outlier, having high 
proportion of child labour. The proportion of child labour in Jacobabad district 
increased gradually from around 28% in the year 1997-98 to 64% in the year 2007-08 
(see table A 8.1). 
 
Table A-4.8.1 
Child Labour Proportion in Jacobabad District across Time 
Year Averages 
1997-98 0.282 
1999-00 0.174 
2001-02 0.127 
2003-04 0.333 
2005-06 0.410 
2007-08 0.644 
 
The high proportion of child labour in just one cohort could affect the overall analysis. 
Keeping this in mind and considering the high percentage as outlier, study tries to 
explore the effects of labour market indicators after dropping the cohort from the 
analysis. The result does not change much except that household unemployment rate in 
the rural areas is affected by dropping the district. The household unemployment rate 
which was significant earlier is now insignificant. Result at all Pakistan level is picking 
up this effect as well. The household unemployment rate which was significant at 1% 
significance level now shows some significance at 13% significant level. As all the 
other labour market indicators remain unchanged, study precedes the analysis by having 
Jacobabad district in the model.   
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Table A-4.8.2: Labour Market Conditions and Child Labour Incidence after dropping 
Jacobabad District 
(Fixed effect Test) 
Dependent Variable: Child 
Labour 
All Pakistan Urban Rural 
Labour Market Conditions    
Size of the informal sector 0.105(0.0)* 0.061(0.08) *** 0.115(0.008) * 
Size of the Agriculture sector 0.201(0.0) * 0.066(0.07) *** 0.223(0.00) * 
Size of the Exporting sector 0.140(0.01) * 0.155(0.007) * 0.186(0.09) *** 
District Unemployment -0.22(0.006) * -0.042(0.53) -0.258(0.009) * 
Household Unemployment 0.088(0.13) 0.113(0.04) ** 0.071(0.298) 
Log of District wages 0.021(0.008) * 0.009(0.11) 0.027(0.02) ** 
Child Characteristics    
Child Age 0.018(0.44) -0.011(0.6) 0.022(0.43) 
Child if male 0.091(0.18) 0.070(0.18) 0.091(0.31) 
Household Characteristics    
House headed by male 0.012(0.82) -0.003(0.96) 0.006(0.93) 
Education of the male head -0.006(0.09) *** -0.001(0.61) -0.009(0.12) 
Education of the female head -0.007(0.41) -0.001(0.92) -0.005(0.79) 
Education of the Spouse -0.009(0.015) ** -0.008(0.02) ** -0.014(0.09) *** 
Household Size 0.005(0.11) 0.002(0.45) 0.005(0.25) 
Year Dummies    
Year 1999-00 -0.020(0.006) * -0.005(0.39) -0.025(0.05) ** 
Year 2001-02 -0.012(0.09) *** -0.008(0.11) -0.009(0.44) 
Year 2003-04 0.021(0.07) *** 0.014(0.27) 0.035(0.08) *** 
Year 2005-06 0.032(0.002) * 0.018(0.05) ** 0.042(0.02) ** 
Year 2007-08 0.009(0.39) 0.003(0.79) 0.021(0.24) 
Constant -0.344(0.23) 0.067(0.78) -0.412(0.26) 
R-Square: within 0.23 0.33 0.25 
Between 0.48 0.15 0.56 
Overall 0.38 0.22 0.39 
Number of obs. 678 222 456 
Number of groups 113 37 76 
F-test (Prob. F-test) 8.62 (0.00) 5.61 (0.00) 6.93 (0.00) 
1RWHDQGUHSUHVHQWVVLJQLILFDQWDWDQGVLJQLILFDQFHOHYHOUHVSHFWLYHO\¶VLQSDUHQWKHVLV
are p-values. The estimation technique employed is fixed model. The cohort consists of four digit district 
codes. 
174 
 
Annex A- 4.9: Random Effect and Pooled OLS Estimates 
Dependent Variable: Child Labour Random Effect Pooled OLS 
Labour Market Conditions     
Size of the informal sector 0.103(0.000) * 0.109(0.000) * 
Size of the Agriculture sector 0.215(0.000) * 0.216(0.000) * 
Size of the Exporting sector 0.219(0.000) * 0.190(0.000) * 
District Unemployment -0.296(0.000) * -0.342(0.000) * 
Household Unemployment 0.166(0.000) * 0.210(0.000) * 
Log of District wages 0.015(0.033) ** 0.003(0.694) 
Child Characteristics     
Child Age 0.035(0.063) *** 0.060(0.002) * 
Child if male 0.062(0.327) 0.022(0.737) 
Household Characteristics     
House headed by male 0.114(0.008) * 0.219(0.000) * 
Education of the male head -0.009(0.001) * -0.013(0.000) * 
Education of the female head -0.016(0.092) *** -0.015(0.128) 
Education of the Spouse 0.003(0.386) 0.010(0.003) * 
Household Size 0.008(0.004) * 0.010(0.000) * 
Year Dummies     
Year 1999-00 -0.022(0.005) * -0.022(0.018) ** 
Year 2001-02 -0.018(0.02) ** -0.021(0.023) ** 
Year 2003-04 0.006(0.573) -0.001(0.916) 
Year 2005-06 0.027(0.017) ** 0.028(0.021) ** 
Year 2007-08 0.002(0.835) 0.002(0.867) 
Constant -0.658(0.007) * -1.030(0.000) * 
R-Square: overall 0.49 0.50 
Number of obs. 684 684 
Number of groups 114 - 
F-test (Prob. F-test) - 29.18(0.00) 
Wald chi2 (Prob. > chi2) 989.02(0.00) - 
Note: *,** and **** represents significant at 1%, 5% and 10% VLJQLILFDQFHOHYHOUHVSHFWLYHO\¶V
in parenthesis are p-values. The cohort consists of four digit district codes. Based on the LFS 
data from 1997-98 to 2007-08. 
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Annex A- 4.10: Regressions Based on Household enterprise and farm ownership 
(Fixed effect Test) 
 With Household Own Enterprises or Farm 
Labour Market Conditions 
 
 
Household own farm 0.174(0.643) 
Household own enterprise -0.167(0.541) 
Size of the informal sector 0.096(0.001) * 
Size of the Agriculture sector 0.217(0.000) * 
Size of the Exporting sector 0.152(0.008) * 
District Unemployment -0.245(0.000) * 
Household Unemployment 0.121(0.010) * 
Log of District wages 0.023(0.002) * 
Child Characteristics   
Child Age 0.018(0.386) 
Child if male 0.092(0.135) 
Household Characteristics   
House headed by male 0.018(0.734) 
Education of the male head -0.006(0.079) *** 
Education of the female head -0.008(0.427) 
Education of the Spouse -0.009(0.012) * 
Household Size 0.006(0.077) *** 
Year Dummies   
Year 1999-00 -0.021(0.005) * 
Year 2001-02 -0.013(0.087) *** 
Year 2003-04 0.020(0.079) *** 
Year 2005-06 0.029(0.006) * 
Year 2007-08 0.009(0.357) 
constant -0.370(0.168) 
R-Square: within 0.28 
between 0.53 
overall 0.43 
Number of obs. 684 
Number of groups 114 
F-test (Prob. F-test) 8.44 (0.00) 
1RWH  DQG  UHSUHVHQWV VLJQLILFDQW DW   DQG  VLJQLILFDQFH OHYHO UHVSHFWLYHO\ ¶V LQ
parenthesis are p-values. The estimation technique employed is fixed model. The cohort consists of four 
digit district codes. Based on the LFS data from 1997-98 to 2007-08. 
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Annex A- 4.11: Testing endogeneity among the Variables 
Dependent Variable: Child Labour Xtivreg, fe 
Labour Market Conditions  
Size of the informal sector 0.084(0.473) 
Size of the Agriculture sector 0.215(0.04) ** 
Size of the Exporting sector 0.130(0.197) 
District Unemployment -0.572(0.152) 
Household Unemployment 0.593(0.082) *** 
Log of District wages 0.081(0.25) 
Child Characteristics  
Child Age -0.005(0.92) 
Child if male 0.103(0.127) 
Household Characteristics  
House headed by male 0.075(0.476) 
Education of the male head -0.006(0.676) 
Education of the female head -0.036(0.312) 
Education of the Spouse -0.009(0.582) 
Household Size -0.011(0.819) 
Year Dummies!  
Year 1999-00 -0.021(0.552) 
Year 2001-02 -0.009(0.652) 
Year 2003-04 0.027(0.172) 
Constant -0.106(0.904) 
R-Square: within 0.046 
between 0.467 
overall 0.399 
Number of obs. 438 
Number of groups 114 
Wald chi2 1359.08 (0.00) 
Note:! Year dummies for 2005-6 and 2007-8 drop due to collinearity problem. *, ** and *** represents significant 
HIIHFW DW   DQG  UHVSHFWLYHO\ ¶V LQ SDUHQWKHVLV DUH S-values. The estimation technique employed is 
mentioned at the top row. The cohort consists of four digit district codes. Household size is instrumented by the 
gender of the first two while real wages, unemployment rate at household and district level is instrumented by the 
first lag of the variables. A Test of endogeneity is also done after running xtivreg. The test statistics rejects the 
presence of endogeneity among the variables. Hence in the main analysis all the variables are treated as 
exogenous. Based on the LFS data from 1997-98 to 2007-08.   
 
Endogeneity Tests: 
Davidson-MacKinnon test42:  0.666; F (5,320); P-value = 0.62  
 
 
 
                                                 
42Davidson-MacKinnon exogeneity test (dmexogxt) computes a test of exogeneity for a panel regression 
estimated via instrumental variables, the null hypothesis for which states that an ordinary least squares 
estimator of the same equation would yield consistent estimates. A rejection of the null would have 
indicated that endogenous regressors' effects on the estimates are meaningful. Davidson and MacKinnon 
test is similar to the (Durbin-Wu) Hausman test. Here insignificant p-value except the null. It indicates 
that the effects of endogenous regressors are not meaningful.  
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Annex A- 4.12: Labour Market Conditions and Child Labour in the Urban Areas 
across Province 
(Fixed effect Test) 
Dependent Variable: Child 
Labour 
Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan 
Labour Market Conditions     
Size of the informal sector 0.189(0.00)* -0.108(0.41) 0.223(0.01)* -0.13(0.31) 
Size of the Agriculture sector 0.1(0.07)*** -0.074(0.74) 0.140(0.22) 0.04(0.72) 
Size of the Exporting sector 0.15(0.009)* -0.033(0.82) 0.2(0.09)*** 0.4(0.09)*** 
District Unemployment 0.034(0.696) -0.5(0.10)*** -0.134(0.29) 0.14(0.524) 
Household Unemployment -0.012(0.85) 0.147(0.21) 0.196(0.13) -0.19(0.296) 
Log of District wages 0.006(0.52) 0.05(0.03)** 0.03(0.07)*** -0.08(0.07)*** 
Child Characteristics     
Child Age 0.019(0.43) -0.13(0.111) -0.047(0.45) 0.028(0.438) 
Child if male -0.001(0.98) 0.129(0.475) 0.18(0.08)*** 0.151(0.169) 
Household Characteristics     
House headed by male 0.055(0.583) -1.1(0.06)*** 0.061(0.57) -0.076(0.88) 
Education of the male head -0.005(0.26) -0.012(0.36) 0.003(0.64) -0.01(0.06)*** 
Education of the female head -0.001(0.91) -0.116(0.38) -0.005(0.85) 0.14(0.419) 
Education of the Spouse -0.005(0.37) 0.004(0.69) 0.001(0.93) 0.009(0.436) 
Household Size -0.008(0.13) 0.021(0.24) 0.006(0.51) -0.003(0.484) 
Year Dummies     
Year 1999-00 -0.001(0.87) 0.016(0.47) -0.003(0.85) 0.009(0.64) 
Year 2001-02 -0.009(0.16) -0.0001(0.9) -0.009(0.56) 0.006(0.77) 
Year 2003-04 0.015(0.20) 0.09(0.02) ** -0.030(0.27) 0.044(0.04)** 
Year 2005-06 0.05(0.002) * -0.014(0.78) 0.048(0.16) 0.008(0.792) 
Year 2007-08 -0.006(0.55) 0.038(0.23) -0.035(0.19) 0.07(0.005) * 
Constant -0.29(0.37) 2.5(0.07) *** 0.201(0.77) -0.108(0.87) 
R-Square: within 0.64 0.78 0.48 0.60 
Between 0.23 0.30 0.11 0.62 
Overall 0.38 0.41 0.31 0.56 
Number of obs. 96 36 48 42 
Number of groups 16 6 8 7 
F-test (Prob. F-test) 6.69(0.00) 9.75(0.00) 1.91(0.075) 1.93(0.092) 
Note: *,** and **** represents significant at 1%, 5% and VLJQLILFDQFHOHYHOUHVSHFWLYHO\¶VLQSDUHQWKHVLVDUHS-
values. The estimation technique employed is fixed model. The cohort consists of four digit district codes. Based on 
the LFS data from 1997-98 to 2007-08. 
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Annex A- 4.13: Effect of Skilled and Unskilled Wages 
(Fixed effect Test) 
Dependent Variable: Child Labour All Pakistan Level 
Labour Market Conditions   
Size of the informal sector 0.069(0.015) ** 
Size of the Agriculture sector 0.223(0.000) * 
Size of the Exporting sector 0.186(0.001) * 
District Unemployment -0.234(0.000) * 
Household Unemployment 0.125(0.008) * 
Log of Skilled Wages 0.014(0.393) 
Log of Unskilled Wages -0.004(0.784) 
Child Characteristics   
Child Age 0.020(0.345) 
Child if male 0.098(0.105) *** 
Household Characteristics   
House headed by male 0.018(0.720) 
Education of the male head -0.004(0.189) 
Education of the female head -0.005(0.628) 
Education of the Spouse -0.009(0.016) ** 
Household Size 0.004(0.238) 
Year Dummies   
Year 1999-00 -0.023(0.002) * 
Year 2001-02 -0.015(0.062) *** 
Year 2003-04 0.017(0.150) 
Year 2005-06 0.025(0.022) ** 
Year 2007-08 0.010(0.347) 
Constant -0.360(0.179) 
R-Square: within 0.28 
Between 0.54 
Overall 0.44 
Number of obs. 677 
Number of groups 114 
F-test (Prob. F-test) 8.47 (0.00) 
Note: *,** and **** represents significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level 
UHVSHFWLYHO\¶VLQSDUHQWKHVLVDUHS-values. The estimation technique employed 
is fixed model. The cohort consists of four digit district codes. Based on the LFS 
data from 1997-98 to 2007-08. 
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Annex A- 4.14: Exploring Non Linearity in Adult Real Wages 
(Fixed effect Test) 
Dependent Variable: Child Labour All Pakistan 
Labour Market Conditions   
Size of the informal sector 0.098(0.001) * 
Size of the Agriculture sector 0.218(0.000) * 
Size of the Exporting sector 0.144(0.011) * 
District Unemployment -0.249(0.000) * 
Household Unemployment 0.123(0.009) * 
Log of District wages 0.035(0.047) ** 
Square of the log of District Wages -0.006(0.397) 
Child Characteristics   
Child Age 0.019(0.379) 
Child if male 0.092(0.136) 
Household Characteristics   
House headed by male 0.013(0.796) 
Education of the male head -0.006(0.082) *** 
Education of the female head -0.008(0.403) 
Education of the Spouse -0.009(0.021) ** 
Household Size 0.006(0.078) *** 
Year Dummies   
Year 1999-00 -0.021(0.005) * 
Year 2001-02 -0.013(0.094) *** 
Year 2003-04 0.021(0.073) *** 
Year 2005-06 0.030(0.005) * 
Year 2007-08 0.010(0.324) 
Constant -0.378(0.161) 
R-Square: within 0.28 
Between 0.53 
Overall 0.43 
Number of obs. 684 
Number of groups 114 
F-test (Prob. F-test) 8.66 (0.00) 
Note: *,** and **** represents significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level 
UHVSHFWLYHO\¶VLQSDUHQWKHVLVDUHS-values. The estimation technique employed is fixed 
model. The cohort consists of four digit district codes. Based on the LFS data from 1997-
98 to 2007-08. 
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Annex A- 4.15: Exploring the effect of Household Adult Real Wages 
(Fixed effect Test) 
Dependent variable: Hours 
Worked/Child Labour (10-14) 
Child Labour 10-14 
All Pakistan Urban Rural 
Labour Market Conditions    
Size of the informal sector 0.095(0.001) * 0.060(0.05) ** 0.136(0.004) * 
Size of the Agriculture sector 0.213(0.000) * 0.068(0.08) *** 0.241(0.000) * 
Size of the Exporting sector 0.151(0.007) * 0.154(0.001) * 0.203(0.066) *** 
District Unemployment -0.242(0.000) * -0.031(0.608) -0.247(0.002) * 
Household Unemployment 0.120(0.012) * 0.102(0.03) ** 0.104(0.058) ** 
Log of District wages 0.022(0.002) * 0.009(0.16) 0.028(0.008) * 
Log of Household Wages -0.007(0.274) -0.013(0.265) -0.008(0.292) 
Child Characteristics    
Child Age 0.021(0.323) -0.007(0.766) 0.025(0.331) 
Child if male 0.095(0.123) 0.068(0.141) 0.097(0.228) 
Household Characteristics    
House headed by male 0.006(0.912) -0.005(0.936) -0.01(0.871) 
Education of the male head -0.005(0.119) -3.E-04(0.916) -0.008(0.124) 
Education of the female head -0.010(0.328) -0.001(0.929) -0.007(0.738) 
Education of the Spouse -0.010(0.01) * -0.008(0.037) ** -0.013(0.09) *** 
Household Size 0.006(0.089) *** 0.003(0.342) 0.006(0.215) 
Year Dummies    
Year 1999-00 -0.023(0.003) * -0.006(0.301) -0.024(0.061) ** 
Year 2001-02 -0.016(0.05) ** -0.012(0.116) -0.011(0.388) 
Year 2003-04 0.025(0.045) ** 0.019(0.106) *** 0.042(0.040) ** 
Year 2005-06 0.026(0.017) ** 0.013(0.219) 0.041(0.017) ** 
Year 2007-08 0.010(0.304) 0.002(0.836) 0.025(0.131) 
Constant -0.376(0.159) 0.042(0.874) -0.452(0.172) 
R-Square: within 0.277 0.339 0.304 
Between 0.525 0.099 0.606 
Overall 0.426 0.183 0.455 
Number of obs. 684 222 462 
Number of groups 114 37 77 
F-test (Prob. F-test) 9.04(0.00) 5.07(0.00) 7.04(0.00) 
1RWH  DQG  UHSUHVHQWV VLJQLILFDQW DW   DQG  VLJQLILFDQFH OHYHO UHVSHFWLYHO\ ¶V LQ
parenthesis are p-values. The estimation technique employed is fixed model. The cohort consists of four 
digit district codes. 
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Annex A- 4.16: Exploring the Time Trends 
(Fixed effect Test) 
Dependent Variable: Child Labour 
Without LM 
Indicators! 
With LM 
Indicators 
Labour Market Conditions   
Size of the informal sector - 0.108(0.000) * 
Size of the Agriculture sector - 0.243(0.000) * 
Size of the Exporting sector - 0.181(0.001) * 
District Unemployment - -0.271(0.000) * 
Household Unemployment - 0.137(0.005) * 
Log of District wages - 0.017(0.021) ** 
Year Dummies   
Year 1999-00 -0.032(0.000) * -0.020(0.011) 
Year 2001-02 -0.024(0.005) * -0.009(0.226) 
Year 2003-04 -0.014(0.078) ** -0.001(0.864) 
Year 2005-06 0.003(0.733) 0.032(0.003) * 
Year 2007-08 -0.005(0.552) -0.005(0.511) 
Constant 0.111(0.000) * -0.082(0.001) * 
R-Square: within 0.05 0.24 
Between 0.00 0.54 
Overall 0.02 0.43 
Number of obs. 684 684 
Number of groups 114 114 
F-test (Prob. F-test) 6.77 (0.00) 10.17 (0.00) 
Note: ! LM refers to Labour Market Indicators.*,** and *** represents significant at 1%, 5% 
DQG  VLJQLILFDQFH OHYHO UHVSHFWLYHO\ ¶V LQ SDUHQWKHVLV DUH S-values. The estimation 
technique employed is fixed model. The cohort consists of four digit district codes. Based on 
the LFS data from 1997-98 to 2007-08. 
 
 
Annex A- 4.17: Identification of Export Related Industries in Pakistan 
 
As explained earlier, children are hard to find in large scale manufacturing sectors 
of Pakistan. Children mostly work in the informal sector/subsidiary sectors 
supplying raw material to the large scale manufacturing sector. Therefore analysing 
the effect of exporting sector in generating the demand for child labour is 
problematic. In order to overcome this difficulty, as a first step, it was decided that 
instead of identifying the exporting sector employing children, the size of the 
sector, measure in terms of adult employment share (it also help in avoiding the 
endogeneity problem as well), within  a region (division/district/city) will be 
estimated. Secondly export related industries will be identified. This is because the 
Labour Force Survey of Pakistan although provides information about the 
employment status of individual by industry, but it does not provides information 
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whether individuals are employed in exporting firms or not. This is not relevant as 
well, because children work in export related industries that are concerned with 
providing raw materials. Therefore any activity that could produce export related 
goods can be used to measure the size of the industry operating in an area. Thirdly 
major industries, where children are usually engaged, will be identified. Finally 
among those industries the major exporting industries will then be identified. 
Finally the size will be measured in terms of adult employed proportion in only 
those industries. 
 
In order to identify the major activity children perform Pakistan National Survey of 
Child Labour Force (1996) was used. It indicate that during 1996-97 about 67 
percent of the employed children were engaged in agricultural activity; 11% were 
employed in manufacturing sector; 9% employed in wholesale and retail trade 
sector while 8% were engaged in community, social and personal services.  The 
detail industrial classification that emerges from the pseudo panel formed (from the 
year 1997-98 to 2007-08 ± see Table A-4.4.6) further indicates that among the 
manufacturing sectors; textile, wearing apparel and leather industry employee 6% 
of the children; non-metallic mineral products industry engaged almost 1.2% 
children; wood and wood products industry employee 1.02% children; food, 
beverage and tobacco industry and Other Manufacturing Industries (includes, 
sports goods, surgical instrument, jewelry, handicrafts, musical instruments etc.) 
employee around 1% children. Among these only three industries identified as 
export related; textile, wearing apparel and leather industry (57% of total exports); 
food, beverage and tobacco industry (17% of total exports) and Other 
Manufacturing Industries (14.9% of total exports). Considering that these industries 
performing major export related activities and children employed among these 
industries are also high, the size of these industries was measure in terms of adult 
employment share. The estimated size was then used as a measure of the size of 
export related activity in an area affecting child labour demand. 
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Table A-4.17: Export Performance of Pakistan by Major Industries 
Major Exporting Industry % Share 
Food Group 17.2 
Rice 11.4 
Fish & Fish Preparation 1.1 
Fruits 1.3 
Meat & Meat Preparation 0.5 
All other Food Items 2.5 
Textile Manufactures 53.3 
Raw Cotton 1.2 
Cotton Yarn 7.6 
Cotton Cloth 9.2 
Knitwear 9 
Bed Wear 8.8 
Towels 3.5 
Readymade Garments 6.7 Ǧ 2.8 
Other Textile Materials 4.5 
Petroleum Group 4.9 
Petroleum Products 2.9 
Petroleum Top Naphtha 2 
Other Manufactures 18.8 
Carpets. Rugs & mats 0.7 
Sports Goods 1.5 
Leather Tanned 1.6 
Leather Manufactures 2.3 
Surgical G. & Medical Instrument 1.2 
Chemicals & Pharmaceutical Production. 3.9 
Engineering Goods 1.2 
Jewellery 2.5 
Cement 2.5 
All other manufactures 1.3 
All Other Items 5.9 
Total Exports (Million $) 15,884.1 
 Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan 2009-10. 
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¶$QXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKH>LQWUD-household] allocation of resources and responsibilities is 
essential to predict the consequences of policy decisions and the impact of development 
SURMHFWV·(Rogers, 1983 cited in Bolt and Bird, 2003) 
 
5. The Influence of 0RWKHU·V'HFLVLRQPDNLQJ3RZHURQKHUFKLOG·V/DERXU and 
Schooling: Evidence from Pakistan 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The traditional approach of modelling household on the basis that its memberV¶ 
preference can be categorized by single utility function, has been challenged in recent 
years.  Now the utility function of the household models incorporates divergence and 
even conflicting preferences among the family members. This chapter is an attempt to 
identify this intra- household relationship among its members and its effects on child 
welfare. This chapter is specifically designed to look at the effects of a PRWKHU¶V
GHFLVLRQPDNLQJSRZHURQKHUFKLOG¶V ODERXU DQG schooling. This collective model of 
the household is explored by using the Living Standard Measurement Survey data 
(largest data set) of Pakistan (PSLM hereafter). 
 
As the foundation is based on the collective household model approach, this chapter 
begins by providing a brief history about household models - beginning from the 
unitary model to co-operative collective model. Intra-household allocation is relevant in 
all parts of the world but particularly so in countries such as Pakistan. Amin (1995) and 
Hakim and Aziz (1998) have rejected the collective model approach for Pakistan. 
Because of the prevailing traditional and cultural norms that restrict women¶V position 
in the household and the male head considered as the household decision- maker, they 
argue that it is reasonable to assume that the unitary model dominates in Pakistan. But 
as in recent years Pakistan has experienced VRPHFKDQJHVLQZRPHQ¶VUROHVERWh within 
and outside household. Realizing the fact, Hou (2011) using the PSLM data of 2005 has 
rejected the existence of unitary model for Pakistan. Hou (2011) has examined the 
effect of women decision making power on the budget share, caloric intake and 
FKLOGUHQ¶V VFKRRO HQUROOPHQW +H IRXQG RXW WKDW ZKHQ ZRPHQ KDYH PRUH GHFLVLRQ
PDNLQJ SRZHU DW KRPH KRXVHKROG WHQGV WR VSHQG PRUH RQ ZRPHQ¶V SUHIHUUHG JRRGs 
such as clothing, education, non-grain items and children¶V education particularly girls 
who are more likely to be enrolled in the school.  
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The evidence from around the world also suggests that when women have more 
decision- making power they spend more on food. For example; Hoddinott and Haddad 
(1995) found that women¶V income is positively related to food items while negatively 
related to alcohol and cigarettes.  However, Lancaster et.al., (2006) working on an 
Indian data set found out that the budget share and women¶V decision making power is 
U-shape. Basu (2006), using a theoretical framework of intra-household model, predicts 
that if a woman has more decision- making power she will have access to a greater 
share of the income produced by child labour and thus may benefit from child labour. 
School enrollment might therefore decline as a result of increased child labour. Maitra 
and Ranjan (2006) found that, in South Africa, there is no clear evidence that the 
identity of income earners affects household expenditures; and Felkey (2005) suggests 
WKDW LQ %XOJDULD WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ ZRPHQ¶V EDUJDLQLQJ SRZHU DQG KRXVHKROG
well-being is nonlinear and non-monotonic. 
 
Hence, the objective of this chapter is not only to explore the effects of a PRWKHU¶V
decision- making power on her child¶V schooling and labour decision, but also to 
confirm the non-linear and non-monotonic relation for Pakistan. More specifically this 
study will look for the answers of following questions: what are the principal 
determinants of power of mothers in making decisions or what is an appropriate way to 
measure decision- making power? How does this decision- making power of mothers in 
the household affects child welfare? Is this effect non-linear and non-monotonic as 
predicted by all recent literature? If the answer turns out to have significant effects then 
it would have considerable policy implications. Therefore, the paper tries to explore the 
answers of all these questions. 
 
The rest of the chapter is sub-divided into following sections: section 5.2 provides the 
brief history of the household decision- making models, section 5.3 provides a review 
of literature on the effect of a PRWKHU¶V GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ SRZHU on child related 
outcome, section 5.4 provides detail on the data set employed, methodology used to 
measure the decision- making power and outlines the econometric specification, section 
5.5 discusses the main findings while section 5.6 presents a conclusion.  
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5.2 Review of Household Decision making Models 
 
There have been three major developments in the household base analysis after 1970 
[Chen and Dunn, (1996) cited in Bolt and Birds, (2003)]. Firstly, models of the 
household based on sharing, altruism and co-operation, changes to models that include 
negotiation, bargaining and even conflict. Secondly WKHUH KDV EHHQ ³D VKLIW IURP WKH
analysis of the household as a bounded unit towards a view which stresses its 
SHUPHDELOLW\´>0RRUHFLWHGLQ%ROWDQG%LUG@7KLUGly, there has been 
recognition of the enormous variability in household composition and structure both 
between and within societies as well as over time. Bolt and Bird (2003) have provided 
the extensive review of these household models. This section is substantially based on 
their review.  
 
Bolt and Bird (2003) consider the household as an important but complex unit of 
analysis that can be defined in numerous ways. If the individuals share a common 
residence; or share a joint function such as consumption, production, investment or 
ownership,  the family is considered as a nuclear family [Chen & Dunn, (1996)]. 
Another definition identifies the household as a place of exchange while Becker (1965) 
considers a household as a place where commodities are produced and utility is 
generated. The United Nations, defines a household as µa group of people who live and 
HDWWRJHWKHU¶7KLVGHILQLWLRQLVZLGHO\DFFHSWHGDOORYHUWKHZRUOGZLWKVRPHYDULDWLRQV
The household is mostly defined as a place where members share a common source of 
income and food, and sleep under the same roof. Federal Bureau of Statistics in 
Pakistan also defines a household as a group of persons living together and sharing 
income and food. These persons individually may vary in abilities and preferences. 
 
Chen & Dunn, (1996) argued that instead of developing formal models of household 
behaviour traditional neo-classical economists have applied a unitary model approach to 
household decision-making. In the unitary approach the household is considered as a 
collection of individuals behaving like they are in an agreement on how to combine 
their time, goods purchased and goods produced at home to produce commodities that 
maximize common utility [Quisumbing & Maluccio, (2000)]. The unitary approach is 
also sometimes referred to as the benevolent dictator model. Benevolent dictator in the 
sense that some time a single (presumably male) decision-maker takes all the decisions 
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for the goods that entire household consumes. Kabeer (1994) criticized the unitary 
PRGHOVE\SUHVHQWLQJLWDVD³EODFNER[´RIKRXVHKROGFROOHctivity.  
 
According to Quisumbing & Maluccio, (2000) the existence of a single household 
welfare function reflecting the preferences of all other members is an inoffensive 
assumption if all the members have common preferences.  However, if individual 
members have different preferences, then these preferences must be taken into 
consideration. Therefore, instead of assuming unity within the household, one must 
consider the existence of multiple voices, gender interests, and an unequal distribution 
of resources within the households [Wolf, (1997)]. The alternative models that allow for 
preference difference among the members are Collective models. These assume that 
households allocate resources in such a way that the outcomes are Pareto optimal or 
Pareto efficient. Chiappori (1992) indicated that collective models have two common 
features: firstly, they allow different decision makers to have different preferences, and, 
secondly, they do not require a unique household welfare index. Thereby the index is 
dependent on the prices and incomes as well as "tastes". Doss (1996) considers the 
household as a site of conflict as well as co-operation. 
 
Chart 5.1: Household Decision Making Models 
 
 
Source: Adopted from Bolt and Bird (2003). 
 
Quisumbing & Maluccio, (2000) divides the collective model into two sub-groups; co-
operative and non-cooperative. Co-operative model put emphasis on the decision 
making process. In this model individuals are assumed to have free choices, with utility 
as the basis of the decision. Within this category there are again two models. The first 
presents decisions as the outcome of a bargaining power. Bargaining power is a process 
with the help of which individuals push for their preferences, but compromising with 
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WKH µIDOO-baFN¶ SRVLWLRQ LI WKH DJUHHPHQW ZHUH QRW UHDFKHG upon and break-up of the 
household and division of the household assets arise. Haddad (1994) analyses the 
situation as; once a household is formed, decisions within the household are therefore 
made on the basis of who would gain, and who would have the most to lose if the 
household broke up.  
 
Co-operative conflict model claims that these differences in preferences are based on 
the perceived role and obligation within the family. These perceptions fundamentally 
lead to conflict resolution (Ellis, 1988). An example of this model is the Maternal 
Altruist approach which sees women as being often under more social pressure than 
men to subordinate their basic needs to those of other family members, resulting in 
displD\VRIµPDWHUQDODOWUXLVP¶ [Bolt and Bird (2003)]. 
 
Non-co-RSHUDWLYHPRGHOVFDQEHUHSUHVHQWHGE\%HFNHU¶V6XSHU-trader household model 
[Becker, (1981)]. In this model individuals never enter into binding and enforceable 
contracts with each other, and are QRWFRQVWUDLQHGE\VRFLDOQRUPV7KH\µWUDGH¶LHWKH\
bargain, barter and negotiate using implicit prices to determine resource allocation, with 
their actions conditional on the actions of others [Bolt and Bird (2003)]. With this 
review on the household decision making models, we now proceed to the review of 
literature that examines the effects of a PRWKHU¶V decision making power on the child 
related outcomes. 
 
5.3 0RWKHU·V'HFLVLRQ0DNLQJ3RZHUDQG&KLOGUHODWHGRXWFRPHV- Review 
 
The theoretical literature on child labour is usually based on the assumption that parents 
have common preferences and are altruistic. For example theoretical foundation of 
Baland and Robinson (2000); Bell and Gersbach (2000); Dessy (2000); Emerson and 
Souza (2003); Basu and Van (1998) are all based on unitary model. Empirical literature 
therefore have also explored child labour outcome on the basis of unitary model [see for 
example Emerson and Souza (2003); Ranjan R. (2000); Grootaert and Patrinos (1999) 
and Jensen and Nielsen (1997)]. The unitary model provides a good starting point to 
focus on the effects of poverty on child labour, but it does not take into account other 
potentially important factors [Emerson and Souza (2007)]. In order to understand what 
motivates parents to send their children to work, recent studies have started examining 
the effect of complex structure of the household (intrahousehold decision making 
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behaviour) on child related outcomes. This is implemented by exploiting the collective 
model approach.  
 
For example, Basu (2006) extended the intrahousehold behaviour to child labour supply 
decision. Basu (2006) suggested that the impact of father¶s and mother¶s behaviour is 
very different on the child labour supply and that depends on their relative bargaining 
power. According to him the relation between a woman¶V bargaining power and the 
amount of child labour is U-shaped. He argues that a parent who has relatively more 
power in the house would be more attractive to child labour because of the extra income 
that child work brings. He/she can spend this extra income on the consumption of 
his/her favourite goods. His finding let him conclude that: 
 
 ³7KHUHVSRQVHRIFKLOGODERXUWRWKHFKDQJHVLQWKHEDODQFHRISRZHUPD\QRWEH
merely nonlinear but non-monotonic. Theory does not give any unequivocal prediction 
RI WKH QDWXUH RI WKLV UHODWLRQ ,W MXVW SURYLGHV ³FRQGLWLRQDO´ SURSRVLWLRQV 7KLV
underlines the importance of empirical work in this area. In order to design policies 
that control child labour by influencing the balance of power within the household, it is 
important to conduct empirical research to get a finer view of the broad and 
FRQGLWLRQDOK\SRWKHVHVWKDWWKHRU\JLYHVXV´[Basu (2006)]. 
 
Lancaster et.al (2006), working on an Indian data set provides some interesting facts 
about the share of male bargaining power and its effect on household expenditure on 
items like food, transport, child education etc. They rejected the concept that the 
identity of the income recipient is not relevant in determining the household 
expenditure outcomes. According to them there exists an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between bargaining power and household expenditure on goods that are 
necessary, i.e. Food and Fuel and Light, and a U-shaped relationship in case of the 
µOX[XU\¶LWHPVLH7UDQVSRUWDQG(GXFDWLRQ7KH\H[SODLQWKDWZKHQPDOHEDUJDLQLQJ
power first increases to moderate values, preferences moves from the luxury goods to 
the necessary goods but a further increase would bring males in superior bargaining 
power over their wives DQG  KRXVHKROG SUHIHUHQFHV DJDLQ VKLIW IURP µQHFHVVLW\¶ WR
µOX[XU\¶JRRGV 
 
7KH\H[SODLQWKLVUHODWLRQVKLSE\DUJXLQJWKDWERWKSDUWQHUVKDYHSUHIHUHQFHIRUµOX[XU\¶
RYHU µQHFHVVLWLHV¶7KHUHIRUH DW WKHLU H[WUeme values of bargaining power, they move 
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the household preferences towards the luxury items that she/he likes to consume leading 
to a fall in the spending on necessary items. In the middle range of bargaining power 
both partners compromise in favour of necessary goods. Hence in the middle range of 
bargaining power the budget share of necessities tends to rise. Their results also point to 
the non-monotonic relationships between budget share of such items and bargaining 
power. As the bargaining power rises, WKHKRXVHKROG¶VSUHIHUHQFHVLQLWLDOO\VZLWFKIURP
luxuries to necessities and then back to the former. Therefore, it is not the case that 
household where female partners dominate in decision-making, will direct its purchases 
towards items that are necessities. Instead in a household where power is more evenly 
spread between the spouses are more likely to experience such an outcome i.e. spending 
more on necessity and less on luxuries [Lancaster et.al, (2006)]. 
 
Felkey (2005) provides both theoretical and empirical support to the point that the 
effect of additional female power on household outcomes depend on initial level of 
bargaining power and it is not always positive. She demonstrates that the first order 
bargaining power term has a positive effect on chiOGUHQ¶V HGXFDWLRQ H[SHQGLWXUHV
(consider as good) and the effect of the quadratic term is negative. This implies that the 
positive effect of bargaining power decreases as the power rises. In her analysis, 
Tobacco and alcohol consumption (consider as bad) is negatively affected by first order 
bargaining power term but positively affected by quadratic term. According to her the 
non-monotonic relationship between bargaining power and consumption of items that 
are considered as good provides evidence that it is due to bargaining rather than 
differing preferences between men and women. Over all her study has provided 
evidence of concavity and non-monotonicity in the relationship between female 
decision making power and the consumption of items that are good and this 
relationships according to her is the result of household bargaining power rather than 
preference differences between men and women. 
 
Gitter and Barham (2008) are of the view that more female power generally leads to 
higher school enrolment and greater spending on education and is consistent with 
emerging literature, for households with extremely powerful women, more female 
power begins to reduce schooling or at least have no additional marginal impact. 
Furthermore, running the enrolment regressions separately for girls and boys their study 
UHYHDOVWKDWWKHPRWKHU¶VUHODWLYHHGXFDWLRQOHYHODOZD\VKDVDSRVLWLYHLPSDFWRQER\V¶
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education outcomes. The results for girls are consistent with non-linear relation as 
suggested by Basu (2006) i.e. whenever womeQ¶V SRZHU SDVVHV D FHUWDLQ WKUHVKROG, 
JLUOV¶ HQUROPHQW IDOOV $V H[SODLQHG HDUOLHU, Basu (2006) hypothesizes that parental 
power may influence the percentage of benefits received by each adult from child 
labour. This percentage may also depend on the child¶V JHQGHU *LWWHU DQG %DUKDP
(2008) realized that the non-monotonic relation hold for the girls sample but not for the 
boys sample. They suggested that when girls leave school, the percentage of benefit 
received by female head of the household is larger than it is for boys. Therefore the 
relationship is non-monotonic in case of girls but not in case of boys. 
 
Among the literature that does not consider the non-linearity; Galasso (1999) using data 
from Indonesia analyses the impact of the intra-household bargaining power on child 
ODERXU6KHILQGVWKDWDQLQFUHDVHLQDPRWKHU¶VEDUJDLQLQJSRZHULVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKD
lower probability of child labour [Galasso (1999) cited in Reggio (2010)]. Emerson and 
Souza (2007) working on the Brazilian data conclude that WKHIDWKHU¶VHGXFDWLRQKDVD
JUHDWHUQHJDWLYHLPSDFWWKDQWKHPRWKHU¶VHGXFDWLRQRQWKHODERXUVWDWXVRIVRQV5HJJLR
(2010) working on Mexican data concluded that one should carefully consider the 
distribution of bargaining power within the household while analysing household's 
decisions. Reggio found out that an increase in the mother's bargaining power is 
associated with fewer hours of work for her daughters but not for her sons [Reggio 
(2010)].  
 
Literature on effect of gender differences on child related outcome (not explicitly 
addressing child labour) has shown that sons are often favoured in the intrahousehold 
allocation of nutrients [Behrman (1988) and Sen (1984)]. Sen (1990) has reported that 
males significantly out- number females in Asia and North Africa, while an opposite 
pattern is observable in North America and Europe. Thomas (1994) working on Brazil, 
*KDQDDQG8QLWHG6WDWHIRXQGRXWWKDWFKLOGUHQ¶VKHDOWKDFKLHYHPHQWLVDVVRFLDWHGZLWK
educational attainment and non-labour income of  parent of the same sex as the child is 
[Thomas (1994) cited in Emerson and Souza (2007)]. Thomas (1990) has shown that 
XQHDUQHG LQFRPH FRQWUROOHG E\ PRWKHUV KDV VWURQJHU LPSDFWV RQ IDPLO\¶V KHDOWK WKDQ
LQFRPHXQGHUIDWKHUV¶FRQWURO/XQGEHUJ3ROODNDQG:DOHV (1997) exploiting  changes 
in the UK Child Benefit policy in 1977,  that transferred resources from fathers to 
mothers conclude that a higher income held by the mother leads to an allocation of 
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household resources beneficial to the children. Rangel (2006) working on the data from 
Brazil, concluded that women's decision making power is positively related to the 
human capital formation of their children, especially for  first-born girls. Analysing the 
impact of group-based participation in credit programs in rural Bangladesh Chowdhury 
et.al (2003) concluded that women's credit has statistically significant impact while 
FUHGLWSURYLGHGWRPHQKDVQRLPSDFWRQFKLOGUHQ¶VKHDOWK 
 
5.4 Data and Methodology 
 
In order to measure the decision making power of individual mothers within the 
household, literature often focuses on control over economic resources as proxy of 
power. For example, Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1997) and Rubaclava and Thomas 
(1997) have used public provision of resources to women and exogenous policy 
changes affecting intrahousehold distribution to generalize the effect; Hoddinott and 
Haddad (1995) used the share of income earned by women; Thomas (1990) and Schultz 
(1990) used the unearned income share; Quisumbing (1994) used the inherited assets; 
Thomas, Frankenberg and Contreras (1997) used assets at the time of marriage; and 
Doss (1996) used  current assets. 
 
The choice of proper approach among other things also depends on availability of the 
data. Here, the data of Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey 
(PSLM) 2007-08 is used to analyse the effect of PRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQ- making power on 
her child¶V labour and schooling. The limitation of the PSLM data set is that it does not 
specifically inquire about individual ownership of assets although it contains a detailed 
module on household ownership of the assets. Therefore, indicators based on control 
over resources cannot be used for this specific study. Nevertheless PSLM is a national 
level household survey having information on a range of social issues, such as 
HGXFDWLRQ KHDOWK LPPXQL]DWLRQ ZRPHQ¶V GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ SUHSRVW natal care, and 
household consumption. A separate module in PSLM on women decision making status 
provides a good opportunity to investigate the effects of a PRWKHU¶V GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ 
power. But another setback in using this data set is that this module is based on a sub-
sample of women who are married and are 15 to 49 years old43. Moreover, we are 
interested in knowing the effects of a PRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQ- making SRZHURQKHUFKLOG¶V
                                                 
43
 For measuring the decision making power it is also considered necessary to include only those mothers 
who have partner living in the house. The sample therefore does not consist of mothers who are divorced 
and widower.  
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labour and schooling and the most common definition of child labour used in the 
literature is economically active children aged between 10 to 14 years. We further 
restrict the sample to all those women who have children aged between 10 to 14 years. 
Hence this study is based on a subset of the PSLM data. The women¶V decision making 
module44 has 5 questions related to employment, purchases of household food and 
clothing, taking medical treatment and recreation decision. Women were specifically 
asked about: 
 
i) Who takes the decision whether you can seek or remain in employment? 
ii) Who takes the decision about purchase of the following items: 
a. Food 
b. Clothing 
c. Medical Treatment 
d. Recreation and Travel 
 
The answers to these questions were categorized as: 
 
i) Women alone decide 
ii) Both Women and Husband decide 
iii) Husband or other members of the household Decide 
 
A mother is considered to have decision making power on a particular issue if she 
jointly or by herself takes s the decision. Specifically 3 points are assigned to all the 
decisions that are taken by the mother herself while 2 points are assigned to all the 
activities in which joint decision takes place. This is because a mother is considered to 
have some degree of power if she jointly decides with her husband about certain 
decisions for example in issues such as getting into an employment and decision 
regarding recreation and travel. Such decisions cannot be taken by mother alone. 1 
point is assigned to all the decisions taken solely by the husbands or the elders of the 
house. A composite score is thus constructed on the bases of all 5 decisions. A scale 
hence consists of score ranges from 1 to 3 in each decision category.  
                                                 
44Although PSLM also includes questions regarding the women own education decision, use of birth 
control and decision about having more children. But as education decision is mostly taken by the parents 
of the mothers at a very early age, where one cannot influence the decision hence it is highly unlikely that 
this will affect the decision making power of her today while, the decision about birth control and having 
more children concern religious, social and cultural norms. Hence these factors are not considered 
relevant here. 
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After applying an appropriate scale to all categories, principal component analysis 
(PCA) is used to determine the weights that each decision category should carry. 
Applying PCA after making a scale from 1 to 3 for all the decisions is due to the fact 
that PCA is not applicable to the variables that are categorical. The literature often 
points out that creating dummy variables from categorical variables can solve the 
problem. But here to avoid creating a number of dummies, a scale ranges from 1 to 3 
were assigned to all indicators. In this way we come up with a set of indicators that 
represent that, the higher the value the higher will be the decision making power. Each 
indicator differs in terms of the small and large decisions i.e. purchasing food is mainly 
done by women in Pakistan and in this category a woman has the highest decision- 
making power over rest of the members while travelling and going for recreation 
decisions are mostly done jointly by household or elders of the household, hence in 
such decisions women would have low decision- making power. Keeping the fact that 
all these indicators of decisions vary in terms of small and big decisions, PCA is applied 
to assign the weights across different indicators of decision making.  
 
PCA is a famous statistical technique commonly used for data reduction process i.e. it 
reduces large number of variables of a data set to a set of smaller number of variables. 
For example, from a set of correlated variables to uncorrelated components often 
termed as indices. Each component is a linear weighted combination of initial variables 
that captures the common patterns. The strategy followed is very simple: we have 5 
decisions and 3 categories about who takes the decision (mothers alone, jointly by both 
parents and by husband or other family members), that are all together used to 
GHWHUPLQH PRWKHU¶s decision making power; their linear combination would then be 
written as: 
 ܯܦܯଵ ൌ ܾଵଵܺଵ ൅ ܾଵଶܺଶ ൅ ܾଵଷܺଷ ൅ ܾଵସܺସ ൅ ܾଵହܺହ ܯܦܯଶ ൌ ܾଶଵܺଵ ൅ ܾଶଶܺଶ ൅ ܾଶଷܺଷ ൅ ܾଶସܺସ ൅ ܾଶହܺହ ܯܦܯଷ ൌ ܾଷଵܺଵ ൅ ܾଷଶܺଶ ൅ ܾଷଷܺଷ ൅ ܾଷସܺସ ൅ ܾଷହܺହ ܯܦܯସ ൌ ܾସଵܺଵ ൅ ܾସଶܺଶ ൅ ܾସଷܺଷ ൅ ܾସସܺସ ൅ ܾସହܺହ ܯܦܯହ ൌ ܾହଵܺଵ ൅ ܾହଶܺଶ ൅ ܾହଷܺଷ ൅ ܾହସܺସ ൅ ܾହହܺହ 
 
Where ܺ௞  denotes who takes the decision in the kth category. In our case,  ݇ = {1, 2 
«`DQGܺ א  ሼ ?ǡ  ?ǡ  ?ሽ. For example if only mothers takes the decision regarding her 
employment then ܺଵ will takes the value of 3. Otherwise ܺଵ will take the value of 2 if 
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the decision is jointly taken and it will take the value of 1 if husband and other family 
decide about her employment.  
 
The eigenvectors of the co-relation matrix is used to determine weights for the principal 
component. The eigen values of the corresponding eigenvector is the variance ߪ for 
each principal component. The components are ordered such that the first principal 
component explains the largest variation in the data. This is subject to the constraint 
that the sum of the squared weights (ܾଵଵଶ ൅ ܾଵଶଶ ൅ ڮ൅ ܾଵହଶ ) is equal to one. The number 
of variables in the initial data set is equal to the sum of eigenvalues. The proportion of 
total variation in original data set is given by ߪ௜ ݊ ? . The first and second components are 
uncorrelated and second component explains the additional variation which is less than 
what the first component has explained. The same way, each subsequent component is 
un-correlated with the previous one and captures additional variation in the data. Every 
additional component explains smaller variations as compared to the preceding one. 
The higher the degree of correlation among the variables the fewer will be the 
components extracted. 
 
Hence, the first principal component is used to PHDVXUH PRWKHU¶V decision making 
power. The first principal component explains about 64% of the variability in data. 
Hence consider as suitable to represent decision- making power of women. Annex A-
5.2 provides the summary of index and detail about the first principal component, in the 
sample. As each decision category takes a value of 1, 2 or 3, depending on who is 
taking the decision hence, if a category moves from 1 to 2 (or 2 to 3) the index 
increases by the amount of its weight. 
 
Furthermore, women share in household income45 used by earlier studies, to capture 
mothers decision making power is not considered here because the female labour force 
participation rate is very low (roughly 20 percent) in Pakistan, hence using the earning 
share as a measure is not possible. 
5.4.1 Issue of Endogeneity in Decision Making Index 
 
Recent economic literature working on relative income share of females and the ratio of 
years of female to male schooling has predicted the presence of endogeneity in the two. 
For example Emerson and Souza (2007) argue that male and female may have different 
                                                 
45
 See for example, Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) 
196 
 
preferences for the outcomes for their children. Their preference depends on many 
factors such as gender of the child. Hence allocation of resources within a household 
may be seen as the result of some kind of resolution of the preference differences. This 
resolution further depends on their relative bargaining power. This power again depends 
on many factors and hence considered as endogenous. For example, women who bring 
more income to households are most likely to have greater decision- making power. 
Roushdy and Namoro (2007) also argue that the extent to which male and female 
preferences affect the decision making process that in turn determines child welfare is 
itself endogenously determined. According to them male and female relative decision- 
making power depends on their individual and some common household or social 
characteristics that may again be determined within the model. Moreover, according to 
Basu (2006) the literature modelling the impact of intra-household balance of power on 
decision- making also tends to ignore the opposite relation i.e., the effect of household 
decisions on balance of power.  
 
In short, in order to generalize the effect of a PRWKHU¶V decision making power on child 
labour and schooling, first presence of endogeneity is checked. After checking the 
endogeneity, PRWKHU¶V GHFLVLRQ- making power is estimated and then the predicted 
values from the PRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQPDNLQJmodel are used to estimate the child labour 
and schooling function. More specifically after checking the endogeneity problem in the 
mother¶s decision making power for the two decisions, first mother¶s decision- making 
power is estimated as the linear function of the distribution factors (that affect the 
decision through bargaining power) and the factors that affect the decision directly 
(such as household size, gender of the head, living conditions and durable asset index). 
In the second stage the estimated values of decision making power are used to predict 
child labour and schooling.  
 
The distribution factors are the variables that affect distribution of power within the 
household but have no direct effect on individual preferences. Following Reggio (2010)  
two variables are considered as affecting the distribution of power in the household (i) 
difference between husband and wife¶V ages; if the wife is younger than the husband 
she will have less power (ii) Difference between education attainment level between 
women and men; the higher the difference the lower will be the women¶V decision- 
making power.  The model also includes the square terms of each distribution factor as 
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well. Reggio (2010) has also used sex ratio (proportion female vs male) as distribution 
factor. Following Reggio we have also included it as a factor influencing the 
distribution of power but as it does not pass the over- identification restriction it was 
dropped from the model.   
 
7KH PRWKHU¶V GHFLVion- making power is computed under the framework of 
instrumental variable regression. The factors that influence decision- making power of 
mothers directly include household size, gender of household head, and ownership of 
agriculture land, household living standard, durable asset index and provincial 
dummies. The provincial variations are included because in Pakistan, in some areas due 
to development, women are now more empowered than the women who are living in 
remote areas such as rural areas of Balochistan (most deprived province of Pakistan). 
 ܯܦܯ ൌ ߙ ൅ߚଵܼ ൅ ߚଶܺ ൅ ߤሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
 
Where; ܯܦܯ UHSUHVHQWV PRWKHU¶V GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ SRZHUܼ represents distributional 
factors while ܺ are the factors that affect decision- making directly (such as household 
size, gender of the household head, living conditions, durable asset index, provincial 
dummies etc.). 
 
5.4.2 0RWKHU·V'HFLVLRQPDNLQJ3RZHUDVD'HWHUPLQDQWRI&KLOGODERXUDQGVFKRROLQJ 
 
In the second stage the decision with regards to FKLOG¶V schooling and labour supply is 
estimated. The estimated values RI PRWKHU¶V decision- making power from the first 
stage regression are regressed on the child¶V schooling and labour decision after 
checking the endogeneity.  
 ܥܮ ?ܵܶ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܯܦܯ ൅ ߚଶܲܧܦܷ ൅ ߚଷܥܪܮܦ ൅ ߚସܪܧܣܦ ൅ ߚହܪܪܦ൅ ߚ଺ܴܱܸܲ ൅ ߨሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
 
Where, ܯܦܯ  UHSUHVHQWV PRWKHU¶V GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ LQGH[ܲܧܦܷ  represents sum of 
parents years of schooling, ܥܪܮܦ  represents child characteristics, ܪܧܣܦ  represents 
household head gender, ܪܪܦ  represents household characteristics and ܴܱܸܲ  are 
provincial dummies. ܥܮ ?ܵܶ here refers status of the children age 10-14 i.e. either in 
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school or economically active46 (both in paid or unpaid work). Effect of the PRWKHU¶V
decision- making power on the two decisions (i.e. in labour or in school) is estimated 
separately using the probit model. Probit model is applied as the dependent variables 
are binary in nature. Furthermore there could be a substantially different influence of 
WKH PRWKHU¶V GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ SRZHU RQ FKLOGUHQ WKDW DUH ZRUNLQJ DV XQSDLG IDPLO\
helpers or on those who are in paid employment. Out of the 849 economically active 
children sampled, 28% are found to be in paid employment. A child usually enters into 
paid employment when the household income level drops to support the subsistence 
level of living. In such case the PRWKHU¶V GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ SRZHU PD\ QRW KDYH
significant influence. Keeping this in mind a separate analysis is performed on the basis 
of children in paid and unpaid employment. The dependent variables are again binary in 
nature; children work in paid employment equal 1 otherwise zero or children working 
as unpaid family worker equal 1 otherwise zero hence once again probit model is 
applied.  
 
Among the independent variable, first child¶V own characteristics i.e. his/her age, 
gender and birth order is explored. The birth order here is measured in ascending order 
i.e. the first born is with the value of one. The main hypothesis is that the incidence of 
child labour is more common among the first born than the subsequent siblings. This is 
because of the fact that in the presence of income constraints, parents are unable to 
invest in older children but can invest in younger children with the aid of income earned 
by first born. Therefore, the higher the birth order, the lower will be the probability of 
child work and higher will be the probability of schooling. The literature basically 
suggests two types of effects. First as more children are born, to a household where 
resources are constrained, fewer resources will be available per child. Hence younger 
siblings will receive less education than the older siblings. Alternatively, older children 
may enter the labour market and contribute towards household income, and as 
household income stabilizes the young siblings would get a chance to go to schools as 
explained earlier. As the effect could be non-linear a squared term is also included in 
the model. For the age again we assume that the higher the age, the higher will be 
incidence of child labour and lower will be the probability of schooling. But the 
                                                 
46
 The micro level analysis is again based on economically active children. This is because we are 
concerned with the effect of MDM on schooling and the labour, irrespective of how many hours a child is 
working. Furthermore only 1% children combine schooling and labour hence hours worked does not 
matter here.    
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relationship again could be non-linear. Therefore, the non-linearity is also explored as 
well.  
 
Secondly, household characteristics include household size, household composition 
(proportion of male and female in different age groups), gender of the household head, 
household ownership of agriculture land47 and indices of living standard and durable 
assets (see annexure A-5.1 for details about the computation). For household size this 
study acknowledges the presence of endogeneity in it. Therefore, before including it in 
the model the endogeneity was checked by using the probit model for endogenous 
variables. The instrument used is the gender of first two born. The Wald test of 
exogeneity (at the end of the table 5.11 to table 5.17) predicts the presence of 
endogeneity IRUERWKFKLOGVFKRROLQJDQGODERXUGHFLVLRQLQUXUDOVDPSOHDQGLQER\V¶
sample for the child schooling only. Hence in these samples the endogeneity is 
controlled by applying the two stage instrumental variable approach while in the rest of 
the samples this variable enters as exogenous. The effect hypothesised is positive due to 
the fact that household prefers more children in order to earn more from children thus 
household usually have large size. Alternatively the larger the size the lower will be the 
probability for a child to work. In the presence of older sibling (age greater than 14) the 
younger sibling are less likely to work. As our sample is based on the children aged 10 
to 14 only, the presence of older sibling in the house is possible; therefore, the effect of 
the household size on the children age 10 to 14 could be negative. The opposite would 
be true for the child schooling behaviour.  
 
In order to capture the effect further, household composition is also included in the 
model. The household composition variable consists of nine variables showing the 
proportion of male and females in different age groups. The control group is the 
proportion of male age 15-65. Moreover, as the household composition variables along 
with household size and birth order may also be endogenous because of the fertility 
theory (i.e. household have large sizes or prefer to have higher number of children to 
earn more form each child) we estimated equation 5.3 variously by keeping and 
                                                 
47
 Before entering agriculture land ownership variable into the model, a separate regression was run 
having ownership of household enterprise and land (see annex A-5.7) as explanatory variables. 
Household ownership of enterprise does not show significant effect on two decisions while ownership of 
agri-land shows significant effect on child schooling decision. Hence only ownership of agri-land was 
considered suitable as explanatory variable. 
 
200 
 
dropping these variables. Hence, for each decision two regressions are estimated, one 
without household size, birth order and household composition variable while the other 
by including all these variables. The two models hereafter represent one without 
controlling for fertility and demographic variables, the other with fertility and 
demographic variables. 
 
Finally parents¶ characteristics; the model includes sum of father and mother¶s years of 
education and the decision- making power of mothers (the variable of interest). Parents¶ 
education is measured in terms of sum of number of completed years of schooling and 
it is hypothesised to have negative relationship with child labour while it has a positive 
relationship with child schooling. For mother¶s decision making power we again expect 
that its relationship with the child labour would be negative while its effect on 
schooling will be positive. But keeping in mind all recent studies we also expect that the 
relation could be non-linear and non-monotonic. Therefore a separate analysis is 
conducted by including square and quadratic terms to check whether the effect of 
additiRQDOSRZHURIPRWKHU¶V LQ WKHKRXVHKROG LV FRQFDYHDQGQRQ-monotonic for the 
items that are considered as good for the household (in this case child schooling) and 
convex and non-monotonic for the items that are consider as bad (in this case child 
labour). Consumption of items that are considered as good provides positive 
externalities to both parents. Hence decision- making power has positive effect on these 
goods.  On the contrary, items that are considered as bad incur cost to both parents 
when consumed and KHQFHKDYHQHJDWLYHDVVRFLDWLRQ&KLOGUHQ¶VHGXFDWLRQis classified 
as good that generates positive externalities under the reasonable assumption that both 
parents are concerned with the wellbeing of their children and benefit personally from 
the purchase of this item. While child labour is considered as a good that generates 
negative externalities to both parents under the same assumption that both parents are 
concerned about their child. But these two effects are for the linear term as far as the 
quadratic term is concerned as defined in Felkey (2005) and Basu (2006) study expect 
that a further improvement in the mother¶V relative decision- making power will again 
attract more child labour and will reduce the schooling of their children as she will be in 
superior position now and she could influence the decision to buy her own preferred 
items. 
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5.5 Results 
 
This section will begin by providing some descriptive statistics. The first section is 
about the situation of children in labour and in school and second deals with the 
indicators used in making the index. It will also highlight the summary statistics and 
correlations among key variables. This section then proceeds to regression results. First 
the determinants of the decision making index will be discussed and then its effects on 
child labour supply and schooling will be explored. 
 
5.5.1 Descriptive Analysis 
 
a) Child Characteristics 
 
As explained earlier the analysis is based on the children aged 10 to 14. The sample 
consists of 11,209 children. Out of these 8% are economically active. The incidence of 
child labour in urban areas and for girls is 4% and 5% respectively while in rural areas 
and for boys the incidence rate is 10%. As far as provincial distribution is concerned, 
the incidence of child labour is highest for Sindh (10%), then Punjab (8%) while in 
NWFP and Balochistan provinces it is just over 5%.  
 
Table 5.1: The incidence of Child labour by Region 
Children in Labour Force 
Region 
Urban Rural Total 
Not in LF 
4,181 6,179 10,360 
(96.07) (90.11) (92.43) 
in LF 
171 678 849 
(3.93) (9.89) (7.57) 
Total 4,352 6,857 11,209 
 
Table 5.2: The incidence of Child labour by Gender 
 
Children in Labour Force 
Gender 
Boys Girls Total 
Not in LF 
5,135 
(90.36) 
5,225 
(94.55) 
10,360 
(92.43) 
in LF 
548 
(9.64) 
301 
(5.45) 
849 
(7.57) 
Total 5,683 5,526 11,209 
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Table 5.3: The incidence of Child labour by Province 
Children in Labour Force 
Provinces 
Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan Total 
Not in LF 
3,983 
(91.82) 
2,296 
(90.07) 
2,180 
(94.45) 
1,901 
(94.39) 
10,360 
(92.43) 
in LF 
355 
(8.18) 
253  
(9.93) 
128 
(5.55) 
113 
(5.61) 
849 
(7.57) 
Total 4,338 2,549 2,308 2,014 11,209 
 
 
The sample includes almost 6% children who are economically active only, 68% are 
enrolled in school only and 1% combines both work and schooling. As the percentage 
of children combining work and school is very low we do not distinguish them from 
other children that are economically active. Table 5.4 shows that 24% of the sampled 
children neither work nor study. Such a high percentage of children neither in school 
nor working is not surprising, because of the low quality of schooling, children in 
remote areas of Pakistan often do not attend school. These children usually perform 
domestic responsibilities like taking care of younger sibling, fetching water, buying 
groceries etc. However, as these activities do not generate any income for the household 
these children are classified here as economically inactive. 
 
Table 5.4: Status of children 
Status of Children # Children Percentage 
Children in LF only 708 6.32 
Children in School only 7,648 68.23 
Combining School and labour 141 1.26 
Neither in school or in LF 2,712 24.19 
Total Children 11,209 
 
 
b) Mother·s Decision Making Indicators 
 
The descriptive statistics (see table 5.5 for reference) on the distribution of mother¶s 
decision making power shows that for decisions about mother¶s paid employment, only 
12% decide themselves, 21% claim that the decision is jointly taken while 68% respond 
that husbands or other members of the household takes the decision. Mothers have more 
say in purchases of food and clothing, but husband and other members still play major 
roles; about 40% and 34% mothers consult husbands or other members before the 
purchase of food and clothes respectively. Medical and recreation decisions are mostly 
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taken jointly by both (42% decisions for taking medical treatment and 41% decisions 
for travelling and recreation are done jointly). These two decisions also show high 
involvement of either husband only or husband with rest of the family member as well.  
 
As explained in section 5.4 that, after applying a scale of 1 to 3 to all the indicators an 
overall index was constructed with weights determined using principal component 
analysis. Table 5.6 provides the descriptive statistics and the weights assigned to all the 
indicators used to construct the decision making index. The weights, in the last column, 
indicate the relative importance of each variable used in making the index.  
 
Table 5.5: Decision MDNLQJ,QGLFDWRUVDQG0RWKHU·V3RZHU  
 
Decision taking Paid Employment Points Frequency Percent 
Husband only or husband with other members decide 1 7808 68 
Both husband and wife jointly decide 2 1394 21 
Women herself decides 3 805 12 
Decision about Purchasing food  Frequency Percent 
Husband only or husband with other members decide 1 4658 40 
Both husband and wife jointly decide 2 1886 28 
Women herself decides 3 2144 32 
Ƭǯ  Frequency Percent 
Husband only or husband with other members decide 1 3963 34 
Both husband and wife jointly decide 2 2240 33 
Women herself decides 3 2226 33 
Decision about medical Treatment  Frequency Percent 
Husband only or husband with other members decide 1 4947 43 
Both husband and wife jointly decide 2 2839 42 
Women herself decides 3 1048 15 
Decision about Recreation and Travel  Frequency Percent 
Husband only or husband with other members decide 1 5513 48 
Both husband and wife jointly decide  2 2814 41 
Women herself decides 3 745 11 
Total  6,797 100 
 
Table 5.6 show high weights assigned to the following indicators: decisions regarding 
the purcKDVLQJ RI FORWKHV DQG IRRWZHDU¶V taking medical treatment and travelling. 
Decisions regarding getting into paid employment have the lowest weight. In Pakistan 
decisions over women getting into paid employment are largely either taken jointly or 
by the husbands in consultation with elders of the house (these elders are mostly parents 
of the husband). Both husband and wife alone do not have much power if the parents 
are alive and living together in a joint family system especially in rural areas of 
Pakistan.  
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Table 5.6: Summary of Indicators used in Mother ·s Decision making Index 
 
 Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Factor 
Score 
Weights 
(F/SD) 
Decision about Paid Employment 1.04 1.01 0.190 0.19 
Decision about Purchasing food 1.74 1.07 0.246 0.23 Ƭǯ 1.83 1.03 0.258 0.25 
Decision about medical Treatment 1.53 0.95 0.275 0.29 
Decision about Recreation and Travel 1.41 0.93 0.269 0.29 
 
c) Summary Statistics of Independent Variables 
 
Table 5.7 provides descriptive statistics. It shows that the average score of the mother¶V
decision making index is around 1. Average score point out that decisions are usually 
taken either by husbands or jointly by husband with other members. The sum of 
parents¶ years of schooling shows that parents are on an average primary pass (or have 
education less than middle). Birth order of the child on average is 4 while on average 
his/her age is 12. In Pakistan due to combined family system household size is usually 
high. An average family size in Pakistan is 9.  
 
Table 5.7: Summary Statistics  
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Child In LF 0.08 0.26 0 1 
Child in School 0.69 0.46 0 1 
Mother Decision Making (MDM) Index 1.22 0.98 0 3 
Sum of parents years of Schooling 6.66 7.56 0 38 
Age of the child 11.86 1.45 10 14 
Birth order of the child 3.54 1.63 1 10 
Child if male 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Household headed by Male 0.94 0.24 0 1 
Log of Household Size 2.10 0.36 0.69 3.61 
Proportion of Female age 0-5 0.06 0.08 0 0.57 
Proportion of Female age 6-9 0.07 0.08 0 0.50 
Proportion of Female age 10-14 0.13 0.11 0 0.50 
Proportion of Female age 15-65 0.23 0.10 0.07 0.80 
Proportion of Female age 65 or more 0.01 0.03 0 0.33 
Proportion of Male age 0-5 0.06 0.08 0 0.57 
Proportion of Male age 6-9 0.07 0.09 0 0.60 
Proportion of Male age 10-14 0.13 0.11 0 0.75 
Proportion of Male age 65 or more 0.01 0.03 0 0.33 
Living Standard Index -0.05 0.96 -1.46 2.37 
Durable Asset Index 0.06 0.99 -2.51 2.10 
Agricultural Land Ownership 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Age Difference 5.42 4.55 -8 37 
Education Difference 2.93 4.94 -16 17 
First two born are of different gender 0.58 0.49 0 1 
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Distribution factors shows that on average mothers are 5 years younger than husbands 
and are less educated then the husbands. Living standard index which consists of 
indicators of housing conditions shows an average value of -0.5 while the durable asset 
index shows an average value less than 1. 
 
As far as the correlations among the variables are concerned (table 5.8) the mother¶s 
decision- making power, years of parental education, agriculture land ownership and 
the indices measuring the living standard and durable assets have negative association 
with child labour while age and gender of the child shows positive associations. All the 
independent variables have opposite associations with the child¶V schooling except for 
the child being male. This implies that the child labour and schooling decisions are 
alternatives: as previously discussed, only 1% of children in Pakistan combine 
schooling and labour. 
 
Table 5.8 shows very low correlation coefficients between mother¶s decision- making 
index and both child schooling and child labour (0.11 and -0.02 respectively). To 
explore the relationships further before going into the depth of the regression results 
simple t-WHVWV ZHUH DSSOLHG :H WHVWHG ZKHWKHU WKH PHDQ PRWKHU¶V GHFision making 
index was the same among children in labour force and not in labour force; and among 
those in school and those out of school.  
 
Table 5.8: Correlation Matrix 
 
 
Child 
Labour 
Child 
In 
School 
MDM 
Index 
Parents 
Years of 
Education 
Age of 
Child 
Child 
if 
Male 
Male 
head 
Living 
Standard 
Index 
Durable 
Assets 
Index 
Agri- 
Land 
Child Labour 1.00 
    
 
   
 
Child In School -0.33 1.00 
   
 
   
 
MDM Index -0.02 0.11 1.00 
  
 
   
 
Parents Years of 
Education 
-0.17 0.34 0.13 1.00 
 
 
   
 
Age of Child 0.13 -0.11 0.03 0.00 1.00  
   
 
Child if Male 0.08 0.20 -0.01 0.004 -0.01 1.00     
Male Head 0.02 -0.06 -0.15 0.13 -0.01 0.02 1.00 
  
 
Living Standard 
Index 
-0.13 0.25 0.16 0.43 0.02 -0.02 0.02 1.00 
 
 
Durable Assets 
Index 
-0.18 0.35 0.18 0.43 0.04 -0.02 -0.06 0.55 1.00  
Agri-Land  -0.01 0.04 -0.04 0.06 -0.01 -.001 -0.04 -0.08 0.01 1.00 
 
The t-WHVWLQGLFDWHVWKDWWKHREVHUYHGGLIIHUHQFHLQWKHPHDQPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ
power between children in labour force and not in labour force is significant with t-
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value 2.27 and p-YDOXHRI6SHFLILFDOO\PRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQPDNLQJLQGH[DYHUDJHV
0.1 point higher for children not in work than for children in work. There were also 
VLJQLILFDQWGLIIHUHQFHVLQWKHPHDQPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQ- making power between children 
in school or not in school. A t-test indicates that the observed difference in the mean for 
the two groups is significant with a t-value of -11.78 and p-YDOXHRI7KHPRWKHU¶V
decision making index is approximately 0.23 points lower for the group of children not 
in school than among the children in school. After confirming that there exist 
significant differences in mean value within the two groups of children, the study 
proceeds to the regression analysis. 
Table 5.9: T-Test 
Group Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. 
[95% Confidence 
Interval] 
Not in LF 10360 1.22 0.01 0.98 1.20 1.24 
In LF 849 1.14 0.03 0.95 1.08 1.21 
Combined 11209 1.22 0.01 0.98 1.20 1.23 
Difference  0.08 0.03  0.01 0.14 
 Difference = mean(not in L) - mean(in LF) t = 2.2679 
Ho.: diff = 0 Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 1001.72 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
Pr. (T < t) = 0.9882 Pr. (|T| > |t|) = 0.0235 Pr. (T > t) = 0.0118 
Group Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. 
[95% Confidence 
Interval] 
Not in School 3420 1.06 0.02 0.90 1.03 1.09 
In School 7789 1.28 0.01 1.01 1.26 1.31 
Combined 11209 1.22 0.01 0.98 1.20 1.23 
Difference  -0.23 0.02  -0.26 -0.19 
 Difference = mean(not in L) - mean(in LF) t = -11.7813 
Ho.: diff = 0 Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 7291.83 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
Pr. (T < t) = 0.0000 Pr. (|T| > |t|) = 0.0000 Pr. (T > t) = 1.0000 
 
 
5.5.2 Main Results 
 
a) 'HWHUPLQDQWVRI0RWKHU·VGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ3RZHU 
 
Measuring PRWKHU¶V decision making power is a difficult task, not just in terms of 
finding suitable indicators to measure this power but also in terms of finding suitable 
instruments for these indicators. As explained earlier following Reggio (2010), we use 
two instrumental variables (IV); the difference between husband and wife¶V age and 
education. Reggio (2010) also points out that the effect of these factors could be 
nonlinear; we also include the squared terms of the two IVs as well. F-test and the over 
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identification teVW DUH ILUVW SHUIRUPHG WR FRQILUP WKDW WKH ,9¶V XVHG DUH YDOLG
instruments. The f-test shows that the instruments used are not weak (see annex A-5.10 
SDUW µE¶ IRU PRUH GHWDLO. All the instruments representing PRWKHU¶V GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ
power also passed over identification test (see last two rows of tables 5.11 to 5.17) as 
well. Using probit models for the endogenous variables we then check the presence of 
endogeneity.  The Wald test for exogeneity [chi2 = 2.99 and p-value = 0.22 with 
fertility and demographic controls; chi2 = 1.19 and p-value = 0.275 without fertility and 
demographic controls] does not reject exogeneity in the all Pakistan sample. However, 
LQ UXUDODUHDVDQG IRUER\¶V VFKRROLQJ WKH:DOG WHVW UHMHFWVH[RJHQHLW\7KHUHIRUH the 
PRWKHU¶V GHFLsion making index is entered in these samples after controlling for 
endogeneity. 
 
Table 5.10 presents the ILUVW VWDJH UHJUHVVLRQ UHVXOWV IRU PRWKHU¶V GHFLVLRQ- making 
power as dependent variable. Table 5.10 illustrates that both age difference and the 
education difference between husband and wife have significant effects on PRWKHU¶V 
decision making power. The square term of age is also significant while the square term 
of education difference is insignificant. In the urban sample, only education difference 
and the squared term of education difference is significant while in the rural areas all 
four instruments are significant.  Looking at the estimated determinants of mother 
decision making index we find that, the gap between the education of the father and 
mother significantly reduces the mother¶V decision- making power. By contrast the sum 
RI SDUHQWDO HGXFDWLRQ LQFUHDVHV WKH PRWKHU¶V GHFLVLRQ- making index thus suggesting 
that education brings change in the society by affecting the cultural and social norms 
influencing mother¶s autonomy. Hence more educated partners may provide their wife 
greater autonomy. As far as age difference is concerned, generally wives are younger 
than husbands in Pakistan. It was expected that the wives would have less power when 
their husbands are older than them but the quadratic plot in figure 5.1 shows a non-
monotonic relationship that is often contrary to this expectation. For age gaps upto 7.7 
years, increasing the fathHU¶VDJH DERYH WKHPRWKHU¶V LQFUHDVHV WKHPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQ- 
PDNLQJSRZHU,WLVRQO\ZKHUHDIDWKHU¶VDJHH[FHHGVWKHPRWKHU¶VEHQHDUO\DGHFDGH
RUPRUHWKDWIXUWKHULQFUHDVLQJWKHJDSDSSHDUVWRUHGXFHWKHPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ
power.  
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Aside from the IVs, some of other factors included in equation 5.3 also significantly 
influence PRWKHU¶V decision-making power. For example the proportion of children 
aged between 6-14, living standard and durable asset indices found to enhance the 
decision- making power of women while RZQHUVKLS RI ODQG FKLOG¶V ELUWK RUGHU and 
being in a male- headed house, all significantly UHGXFHV PRWKHU¶V decision- making 
power. The effects are more or less same for both rural and urban areas. As far as 
provincial variation is concerned, Punjab and Sindh province significantly enhance the 
PRWKHU¶V GHFLVLRQ-making power while Balochistan significantly reduces it; this may 
reflect the influence of varying cultural norms. 
 
Table 5.10'HWHUPLQDQWRI0RWKHU·V'HFLVLRQ0DNLQJ3RZHU  (OLS) 
Dependent Variables All Pakistan Urban Rural 
Age Difference 0.01(0.1)*** -0.003(0.62) 0.01(0.02)** 
Education Difference -0.01(0.00)* -0.01(0.02)** -0.02(0.00)* 
Square of the  age difference -0.0004(0.03)** -0.0001(0.63) -0.001(0.02)** 
Square of the Education difference -0.0001(0.78) -0.001(0.05)** 0.001(0.03)** 
First two born are of different gender -0.03(0.05)** -0.04(0.12) -0.02(0.22) ǯEducation 0.01(0.00)* 0.01(0.00)* 0.01(0.00)* 
Child Age -0.02(0.87) -0.07(0.72) -0.003(0.98) 
Square of Child Age 0.001(0.81) 0.003(0.65) 0.0003(0.96) 
Birth Order of the child -0.05(0.04)** -0.08(0.04)** -0.02(0.40) 
Square of Birth Order 0.002(0.33) 0.003(0.42) 0.00(0.66) 
Child if Male -0.01(0.71) 0.02(0.52) -0.02(0.40) 
Household headed by Male -0.43(0.00)* -0.45(0.00)* -0.42(0.00)* 
Proportion of Female age 0-5 0.01(0.92) 0.14(0.56) -0.04(0.79) 
Proportion of Female age 6-9 0.36(0.01)* 0.59(0.01)* 0.26(0.14) 
Proportion of Female age 10-14 0.52(0.00)* 0.59(0.00)* 0.52(0.00)* 
Proportion of Female age 15-65 -0.10(0.33) -0.27(0.09)*** 0.03(0.82) 
Proportion of Female age 65 or more 0.35(0.15) 0.35(0.39) 0.45(0.14) 
Proportion of Male age 0-5 0.05(0.71) 0.26(0.28) -0.06(0.74) 
Proportion of Male age 6-9 0.49(0.00)* 0.50(0.02)** 0.51(0.00) * 
Proportion of Male age 10-14 0.61(0.00)* 0.73(0.00)* 0.52(0.00)* 
Proportion of Male age 65 or more -0.13(0.62) -0.39(0.36) 0.02(0.94) 
Living standard Index 0.06(0.00)* 0.01(0.43) 0.09(0.00)* 
Durable Asset Index 0.04(0.00)* 0.06(0.00)* 0.01(0.44) 
Agricultural Land Ownership -0.05(0.06)*** -0.09(0.11) -0.02(0.45) 
Provincial Dummies: Punjab 0.97(0.00)* 0.93(0.00)* 1.01(0.00)* 
Sindh 0.47(0.00)* 0.45(0.00)* 0.48(0.00)* 
Balochistan -0.09(0.00)* -0.19(0.00)* -0.03(0.37) 
constant 1.15(0.08)*** 1.60(0.13) 0.94(0.25) 
Number of Observation 11209 4352 6857 
Adjusted R-square 0.28 0.28 0.28 
F-statistics 168.71 98.28 64.26 
Prob. F-test 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: *, ** & *** represents significant at 1%, 5% & 10% significance level. Numbers in 
parenthesis are P-values.  
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Figure 5.1: MDM index and Age Difference 
 
 
 
b) Effect on child Labour 
 
Table 5.11 SUHVHQWV WKH GHWDLOHG UHVXOWV DERXW WKH HIIHFW RI PRWKHU¶V GHFLVLRQ-making 
SRZHU RQ KHU FKLOG¶V ODERXU 7KH HIIHFW LV KLJKO\ VLJQLILFDQW DQG QHJDWLYH RQ FKLOG
labour in the all Pakistan sample. A 10 percentage point increase in the decision- 
making power reduces the incidence of child labour by 0.05 percent points. The effect 
is same for with and without fertility and demographic controls. Comparing the results 
across regions it may be said that WKH HIIHFW RI PRWKHU¶V GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ- power is 
significant only in rural sample. In the rural sample a 10 percentage point increase in 
the decision making power reduces child labour incidence by around 1.8 percentage 
points. Our findings are consistent with the proposition that mothers in Pakistan are 
more concerned about child welfare and hence the higher the decision making power of 
mothers, the lower will be the probability for a child to work. The results seem to be in 
line with the argument given by Felkey (2005) for the Bulgaria that the effect of 
PRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQPDNLQJSRZHU LVQHJDWLYH IRU WKHJRRGV VXFKDVFKLOG ODERXU WKDW
generate negative externalities to the household. $V IDU DV SDUHQWV¶ HGXFDWLRQ LV
concerned, the sum of PRWKHU¶V DQG IDWKHU¶V \HDUV RI VFKRROLQJ appears to have a 
significant negative effect on the incidence of child labour. The negative effect shows 
that educated parents usually prefer that their children do not work suggesting that 
education does bring a change in society.  An additional year of parental education 
reduces child labour incidence by 1 percentage point. Among the child characteristics, a 
higher birth order lowers the probability for a child to work but the effect is non-linear 
and significant only in urban sample. 
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
-10 0 10 20 30 40
Age Difference between Father an Mother
210 
 
Table 5.11: Probit model of Child Labour 
(Estimated Coefficients) 
Variables 
Without Fertility and demographic Control With Fertility and demographic Control 
All Pakistan Urban Rural All Pakistan Urban Rural 
MDM Index -0.05(0.02)** 0.03(0.5) -1.1(0.05)** -0.05(0.03)** 0.02(0.62) -1.40(0.03)** ǯ -0.06(0.00)* -0.06(0.0)* -0.06(0.0)* -0.06(0.00)* -0.06(0.00)* -0.06(0.00)* 
Child Age -0.32(0.24) 0.01(0.99) -0.34(0.30) -0.33(0.23) 0.09(0.88) -0.36(0.29) 
Square of Child Age 0.02(0.06)*** 0.01(0.66) 0.02(0.12) 0.02(0.06)*** 0.01(0.7) 0.02(0.14) 
Birth Order of the child    -0.09(0.15) -0.2(0.04)** 0.02(0.83) 
Square of Birth Order    0.02(0.01)* 0.03(0.02)** 0.01(0.31) 
Child if Male 0.35(0.00)* 0.6(0.00)* 0.26(0.00)* 0.33(0.00)* 0.59(0.00)* 0.24(0.00)* 
Household headed by Male 0.17(0.06)*** 0.24(0.23) -0.32(0.27) 0.24(0.01)* 0.31(0.14) -0.26(0.39) 
Log of Household Size    -0.10(0.19) 0.3(0.08)*** -0.71(0.24) 
Proportion of Female age 0-5    0.55(0.10)*** 1.17(0.11) -0.03(0.83) 
Proportion of Female age 6-9    0.51(0.14) 1.42(0.05)** 0.02(0.94) 
Proportion of Female age 10-14    -0.05(0.88) 1.49(0.02)** -0.42(0.53) 
Proportion of Female age 15-65    0.60(0.03)** 0.69(0.20) 0.6(0.13) 
Proportion of Female age 65 or more    -0.35(0.59) 0.63(0.65) 0.03(0.94) 
Proportion of Male age 0-5    0.63(0.07)*** 0.96(0.20) 0.18(0.82) 
Proportion of Male age 6-9    0.20(0.57) 0.79(0.26) 0.001(0.9) 
Proportion of Male age 10-14    0.07(0.83) 1.68(0.01)* -0.37(0.6) 
Proportion of Male age 65 or more    -0.65(0.34) -0.94(0.55) -0.41(0.66) 
Living standard Index -0.02(0.45) -0.03(0.52) 0.13(0.07)** -0.03(0.32) -0.04(0.46) 0.10(0.18) 
Durable Asset Index -0.26(0.00)* -0.24(0.0)* -0.25(0.00)* -0.24(0.00)* -0.22(0.00)* -0.16(0.03)** 
Agricultural Land Ownership 0.01(0.94) -0.13(0.57) -0.02(0.84) 0.01(0.85) -0.14(0.54) -0.01(0.98) 
Provincial Dummies: Punjab 0.41(0.00)* 0.42(0.0)* 1.46(0.01)* 0.42(0.00)* 0.47(0.00)* 1.70(0.0)* 
Sindh 0.43(0.00)* 0.5(0.00)* 0.91(0.00)* 0.43(0.00)* 0.52(0.00)* 1.02(0.0)* 
Balochistan -0.08(0.25) 0.17(0.25) -0.2(0.1)*** -0.07(0.31) 0.18(0.26) -0.2(0.07)*** 
constant -1.06(0.51) -3.96(0.27) 0.42(0.83) -1.05(0.52) -5.62(0.12) 2.13(0.42) 
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Variables 
Without Fertility and demographic Control With Fertility and demographic Control 
All Pakistan Urban Rural All Pakistan Urban Rural 
Number of Observation 11209 4352 6857 11209 4352 6857 
Log Likelihood Ratio -2519.30 -570.52 -1934.79 -2498.32 -561.22 -1915.87 
LR-statistics 974.94 301.11 554.67 1016.9 319.71 592.52 
Prob. LR-statistics 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pseudo R-square 0.16 0.21 0.13 0.169 0.22 0.13 
Wald test of exogeneity: chi2 1.83 0.02 4.11 3.39 0.85 5.59 
Prob. > chi2 0.18 0.90 0.04 0.18 0.65 0.06 
Amemiya-Lee-Newey chi2 (OID-Test) - - 4.69 - - 4.18 
P-value (OID-Test) - - 0.20 - - 0.24 
Note: *, ** & *** represents significant at 1%, 5% & 10% significance level. Numbers in parenthesis are P-values. The endogeneity in the Decision making power and household size is 
checked using Wald tests of Exogeneity. As the test values are insignificant i.e. not predicting the endogeneity, both household size and decision making index considered exogenous.  
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Among the household characteristics, being in a household headed by a male shows 
positive association with the probability of child work at all Pakistan level. This result 
LVFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHHIIHFWRIPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQ- making power and could be given the 
same interpretation. Children living in a male- headed household are estimated to be 
only 2 percent more likely than those living in a female headed household to work 
ceteris paribus. 
 
The durable assets index has a significant and negative effect.  A one point increase in 
the durable asset index decreases the predicted probability of a child working by around 
2 percentage point. The log of household size has significant effect in urban sample 
only. As far as the provincial dummies are concerned only Sindh and Punjab province 
shows significant effects throughout while the effect of Balochistan province is 
significant only in rural areas. Residence in Sindh and Punjab provinces enhances the 
probability of children working. The effect of household composition shows that the 
presence of girls aged 6 to 14 and boys aged 10 to 14 significantly increases the 
probability of a child work. This shows that the higher the proportion of children either 
girls or boys, the higher will be the probability for a child to be engaged in work. 
Children as indicated mostly work as the unpaid family worker hence households prefer 
more children in order to fulfill the labour demand. The household composition 
variables also show the significant and positive effect of proportion of females age 15-
65 on child labour incidence in all Pakistan and in rural areas only. Furthermore, our 
results do not show any variation in the two models i.e. model with and without fertility 
and demographic control variables (household composition variables). However, some 
of the control variable related to household composition like proportion of girls aged 6-
14, boys aged 10-14 and females aged 15-65 shows significant effect. Therefore in the 
reminder of the section we keep the model with fertility and demographic controls as 
the main model. 2YHUDOOVWXG\GRHVSUHGLFW WKHVLJQLILFDQWHIIHFWRIPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQ
mDNLQJ SRZHU RQ KHU FKLOG¶V ODERXU 7KH HIIHFW LV QHJDWLYH DV VXJJHVWHG E\ )HONH\
(2005) for Bulgaria and theoretically predicted by Basu (2006). 
 
c) Effect on child Schooling 
 
$IWHUDQDO\]LQJWKHHIIHFWRIPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQ- PDNLQJSRZHURQKHUFKLOG¶VODERXU, the 
study now explores its effect on her FKLOG¶VVFKRROLQJ7DEOH2 shows that the effect 
is significant and positive in the model without control for household size and 
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composition. A  SHUFHQWDJH SRLQW LQFUHDVH LQ PRWKHU¶V GHFLVLRQ- making power 
increases child schooling around 0.1 percentage point in all Pakistan sample. In urban 
DUHDVDSHUFHQWDJHSRLQWLQFUHDVHLQPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQ- making power increases child 
schooling slightly by 0.1 percentage point while in the rural areas a 10 percentage point 
LQFUHDVH LQ PRWKHU¶V GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ SRZHU LQFUHDVHV FKLOG VFKRROLQJ DURXQG  
percentage points7KHHIIHFWRIPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQ- making power is significant only in 
urban areas, once the fertility and demographic variables (see section 5.4.2 for more 
detail) are entered in the model. In urban areas after entering the fertility and 
demographic variables D  SHUFHQWDJH SRLQW LQFUHDVH LQ PRWKHU¶V GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ
power increases child schooling slightly by 0.1 percentage point.  
 
As far as other explanatory variables are concerned the sum of mother and father¶V 
years of schooling appears to have significant positive effect on the child¶V schooling. 
An additional year of parental education increases the child schooling about 2 
percentage points in all Pakistan sample while it increases the probability of child 
schooling about 1 percentage point in urban sample and 3 percentage point in rural 
VDPSOH $PRQJ WKH YDULDEOHV UHSUHVHQWLQJ FKLOG¶V RZQ FKDUDFWHULVWLFV age shows 
significant nonlinear effect in all Pakistan and in rural sample. In all Pakistan level 
precisely a one year increase in the age increases the probability of child schooling 
around 17 percentage points but as said earlier the effect is nonlinear. The result holds 
for both with and without fertility and demographic control models. As far as birth 
order is concerned, the effect is significant and nonlinear in all Pakistan and in urban 
areas only. In all Pakistan and in urban areas the probability of child schooling first 
increases with the number of sibling in the house but after a certain threshold it 
decreases the probability of a child to be in school.  
 
Household accumulation of durable assets shows significant positive effect on child 
schooling. Ownership of agriculture land is also found to have significant and positive 
effect. Both ownership of asset and agriculture land represent household economic 
condition. The better the condition the higher is the probability for a child to be in 
school. Provincial dummies are also significant but negative in all Pakistan and in rural 
sample only except for Punjab province. However, the effect of Sindh province is also 
significant in urban areas as well.  
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Table 5.12: Probit model of Child Schooling 
(Estimated Coefficients) 
Variables 
Without Fertility and demographic Control With Fertility and demographic Control 
All Pakistan Urban Rural All Pakistan Urban Rural 
MDM Index 0.03(0.09)*** 0.1(0.04)** 0.64(0.07)*** 0.02(0.22) 0.05(0.09)*** 0.7(0.11) ǯ 0.07(0.00)* 0.06(0.0)* 0.07(0.00)* 0.07(0.00)* 0.06(0.00)* 0.07(0.00)* 
Child Age 0.53(0.01)* 0.35(0.30) 0.60(0.01)* 0.5(0.01)* 0.34(0.32) 0.60(0.01)* 
Square of Child Age -0.03(0.00)* -0.02(0.12) -0.03(0.00)* -0.03(0.0)* -0.02(0.12) -0.03(0.00)* 
Birth Order of the child     0.1(0.01)* 0.22(0.00)* 0.13(0.22) 
Square of Birth Order     -0.01(0.0)* -0.02(0.00)* -0.01(0.15) 
Child if Male 0.68(0.00)* 0.28(0.00) 0.88(0.00)* 0.75(0.00)* 0.38(0.00)* 0.95(0.00)* 
Household headed by Male -0.42(0.00)* -0.3(0.01)* -0.18(0.36) -0.3(0.0)* -0.20(0.1)*** -0.03(0.86) 
Log of Household Size    -0.15(0.0)* -0.25(0.00)* -0.36(0.42) 
Proportion of Female age 0-5    0.06(0.79) -0.66(0.14) 0.20(0.64) 
Proportion of Female age 6-9    -0.05(0.86) -0.60(0.17) -0.29(0.61) 
Proportion of Female age 10-14    0.74(0.00)* 0.56(0.15) 0.23(0.67) 
Proportion of Female age 15-65    1.09(0.00)* 0.76(0.02)** 1.17(0.00)* 
Proportion of Female age 65 or more    1.45(0.00)* 1.76(0.05)** 1.2(0.06)*** 
Proportion of Male age 0-5    -0.01(0.98) -0.65(0.14) 0.12(0.78) 
Proportion of Male age 6-9    0.20(0.41) -0.06(0.90) -0.34(0.56) 
Proportion of Male age 10-14    0.17(0.44) -0.28(0.46) -0.32(0.59) 
Proportion of Male age 65 or more    0.9(0.05)** -0.58(0.49) 1.87(0.00)* 
Living standard Index 0.07(0.00)* 0.04(0.18) -0.03(0.52) 0.06(0.00)* 0.03(0.29) -0.05(0.30) 
Durable Asset Index 0.32(0.00)* 0.29(0.0)* 0.32(0.00)* 0.32(0.00)* 0.29(0.00)* 0.34(0.00)* 
Agricultural Land Ownership 0.13(0.01)* 0.3(0.02)** 0.13(0.03)** 0.14(0.01)* 0.34(0.01)* 0.1(0.04)** 
Provincial Dummies: Punjab -0.04(0.30) -0.04(0.63) -0.68(0.06)** -0.07(0.11) -0.06(0.47) -0.8(0.05)** 
Sindh -0.43(0.00)* -0.28(0.0)* -0.80(0.00)* -0.4(0.00)* -0.29(0.00)* -0.81(0.00)* 
Balochistan -0.28(0.00)* -0.10(0.21) -0.37(0.00)* -0.3(0.00)* -0.07(0.36) -0.36(0.00)* 
constant -1.85(0.10)*** -0.62(0.76) -3.06(0.04)** -2.3(0.05)** -0.53(0.80) -2.94(0.13) 
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Variables 
Without Fertility and demographic Control With Fertility and demographic Control 
All Pakistan Urban Rural All Pakistan Urban Rural 
Number of Observation 11209 4352 6857 11209 4352 6857 
Log Likelihood Ratio -5317.41 -1691.52 -3562.46 -5280.59 -1670.27 -3539.34 
LR-statistics 3155.26 787.83 1990.17 3228.9 830.35 2036.41 
Prob. LR-statistics 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pseudo R-square 0.23 0.19 0.22 0.23 0.20 0.22 
Wald test of exogeneity: chi2 0.91 0.12 3.41 1.28 0.69 5.18 
Prob. > chi2 0.34 0.73 0.06 0.52 0.71 0.08 
Amemiya-Lee-Newey chi2 (OID-Test) - - 1.47 - - 3.64 
P-value (OID-Test) - - 0.20 - - 0.30 
Note: *, ** & *** represents significant at 1%, 5% & 10% significance level. Numbers in parenthesis are P-values. The endogeneity in the Decision making power and household size is 
control in all Pakistan and rural samples, where Wald tests of Exogeneity is significant i.e. predicting the endogeneity. 
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Furthermore, result also shows that children being in the male headed household are 
less likely to go to school. However the effect is insignificant in urban areas. Higher 
household size means lower will be the resources available for each child to be invested 
on his/her human capital formation. As far as household composition is concerned, 
SURSRUWLRQRI JLUOV¶ DJHG -14 increases the probability of schooling at all Pakistan 
level only. Proportion of female age 15 or higher and male aged 65 or higher 
significantly increases child schooling. This could imply that the higher the number of 
adult in the house the higher will be the probability of adult to be at work then children.  
 
Overall finding indicates that WKHHIIHFWRIPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQ- making power on child 
schooling is highly significant and positive. Therefore we conclude that our results are 
consistent with the main hypothesis that mothers are more concerned for the welfare of 
the children than male members of the household.  
 
5.5.3 Extension in Results 
 
a)     Disaggregating by paid and unpaid Employment  
 
This section will H[SORUHWKHHIIHFWRIPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQPDNLQJSRZHURQKHUFKLOG¶V 
ODERXUE\FRQVLGHULQJWZRW\SHVRIFKLOG¶VZRUNLHSDLGZRUNDQGXQSDLGZRUN7KLV
is because Reggio (2010) using Mexican data had empirically shown that the effect of 
mother¶V GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ power on her child¶V paid employment is statistically 
insignificant. In order to test the argument given in Reggio (2010) for Pakistan we 
group the children as: children in paid employment equal one otherwise zero and 
children in unpaid work equal one otherwise zero, as explained in section 5.4.2. We 
estimated the model by keeping all independent variables used in estimating equation 
5.3. Table 5.13 presents the result. 
 
Table 5.13 shows that the effect of mother¶V decision- making power is endogenous on 
her child¶VSDLGHPSOR\PHQWEXWH[RJHQRXVRQKHUFKLOG¶VXQSDLGHPSOR\PHQW5HVXOWV
further indicate that WKH HIIHFW RQ ERWK GHFLVLRQV KHU FKLOG¶V SDLG DQG unpaid 
employment is negative and significant$SHUFHQWDJHSRLQWLQFUHDVHLQWKHPRWKHU¶V
decision- PDNLQJ SRZHU UHGXFHV KHU FKLOG¶V XQSDLG ZRUN VOLJKWO\ E\ 0.1 percentage 
SRLQWZKLOH UHGXFHVKHU FKLOG¶VSDLG HPSOR\PHQWE\ DURXQG percentage points. In 
summary, children either work for pay or as family worker, the decision making power 
of mother significantly reduce their labour. However the effect is more pronounced for 
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FKLOG¶V SDLG ZRUN 1HYHUWKHOHVV IRU 3DNLVWDQ ZH FRQFOXGH that PRWKHU¶V GHFLVLRQ
making power HIIHFWFKLOG¶VSDLGDQGXQSDLGHPSOR\PHQWsignificantly.  
 
Table 5.13: Probit model by Paid and Unpaid Employment 
 
(Estimated Coefficients) 
Variables Unpaid Child Labour Paid Child Labour 
MDM Index -0.09(0.00)* -4.47(0.02)** ǯ -0.05(0.00)* -0.04(0.00)* 
Child Age -0.23(0.43) -0.09(0.89) 
Square of Child Age 0.01(0.23) 0.01(0.66) 
Birth Order of the child -0.04(0.53) 0.19(0.51) 
Square of Birth Order 0.01(0.07)*** 0.0001(0.99) 
Child if Male 0.23(0.00)* 0.44(0.00)* 
Household headed by Male 0.20(0.06)*** -1.48(0.08)*** 
Log of Household Size -0.17(0.05)** -2. 2(0.08)*** 
Proportion of Female age 0-5 0.19(0.61) -0.26(0.82) 
Proportion of Female age 6-9 0.06(0.88) 0.18(0.90) 
Proportion of Female age 10-14 -0.37(0.30) 0.32(0.82) 
Proportion of Female age 15-65 0.30(0.34) 0.84(0.22) 
Proportion of Female age 65 or more -0.49(0.50) 2.6(0.15) 
Proportion of Male age 0-5 0.21(0.59) 0.18(0.87) 
Proportion of Male age 6-9 -0.09(0.82) 0.06(0.97) 
Proportion of Male age 10-14 -0.36(0.31) 0.70(0.67) 
Proportion of Male age 65 or more -0.33(0.66) -1.93(0.34) 
Living standard Index -0.16(0.00)* 0.44(0.00)* 
Durable Asset Index -0.23(0.00)* 0.20(0.19) 
Agricultural Land Ownership 0.08(0.28) -0.408(0.07)*** 
Provincial Dummies: Punjab 0.29(0.00)* 4.74(0.01)* 
Sindh 0.37(0.00)* 2.29(0.01)* 
Balochistan -0.19(0.01)* -0.26(0.32) 
constant -0.98(0.59) 4.9(0.41) 
Number of Observation 11209 11209 
Log Likelihood Ratio -2007.61 -954.04 
LR-statistics 739.51 381.13 
Prob. LR-statistics 0.00 0.00 
Pseudo R-square 0.156 0.167 
Wald test of exogeneity: chi2 0.83 26.9 
Prob. > chi2 0.66 0.00 
Amemiya-Lee-Newey chi2 (OID-Test) - 1.39 
P-value (OID-Test) - 0.71 
Note: *, ** & *** represents significant at 1%, 5% & 10% significance level. Numbers in parenthesis are P-
values. The endogeneity in the Decision making power and household size is checked using Wald tests of 
Exogeneity. As the test values are insignificant i.e. not predicting the endogeneity, both household size and 
decision making index considered exogenous.  
 
b) Disaggregating by Child Gender 
 
So far we KDYHH[SORUHGWKHHIIHFWRIPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQ- making power on hHUFKLOG¶V
labour and schooling at all Pakistan level and in urban and rural areas. However this 
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effect may vary by gender. Gitter and Barham (2008) for Nicaragua find out that the 
mother relative education level to father had D SRVLWLYH LPSDFW RQ ER\¶V HGXFDWLRQ
outcomes only. They also found that non-monotonic relation holds for girls but not for 
boys. Reggio (2010) working on Mexican data also observed that increase in mother's 
bargaining power is associated with fewer hours of work for her daughters but not for 
her sons. Keeping these in miQG ZH DOVR H[SHFW WKDW WKH HIIHFW RI PRWKHU¶V GHFLVLRQ- 
making power may differ for boys and girls in Pakistan as well. Table 5.14 presents the 
result. 
 
7DEOH  VKRZV WKDW WKH HIIHFW RI PRWKHU¶V GHFLVLRQ- PDNLQJ SRZHU RQ KHU FKLOG¶V
labour is significant only in girls sample providing the support to the argument given in 
5HJJLR+RZHYHUWKHHIIHFWRIPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQPDNLQJSRZHURQKHUFKLOG¶V
education is significant for both boys and girls sample. The effect is negative for labour 
while positive for schooling.  
 
Furthermore, Gitter and Barham (2008) DOVRIRXQGWKDWWKHHIIHFWRIPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQ
making power is non-monotonic for girls sample only. The Study also tries to explore 
the proposition by including quadratic and cubed terms in the model. Table 5.15 
presents the result. The result shows that the effect may be non-monotonic for the 
labour decision only. The non-PRQRWRQLF HIIHFW LV IDU PRUH HYLGHQW IRU ER\¶V ODERXU
GHFLVLRQWKDQWKHJLUO¶VODERXUGHFLVLRQ7KLVLVEHFDXVHWKHOLQHDUWHUm is insignificant 
IRUJLUO¶VODERXUGHFLVLRQVZKLOHVTXDUHGDQGFXEHGWHUPVDUHVLJQLILFDQW%DVHGRQWKH
UHVXOWV ZH FRQFOXGH WKDW WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ PRWKHU¶V GHFLVLRQ- making power 
may be non-PRQRWRQLFIRUWKHJLUO¶VODERXUGHFLVLRQZKLOHIRUWKHER\¶VODERXUGHFLVLRQ
the effect is non-monotonic.  
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Table 5.14: Probit model of child labour and schooling by Gender 
 
(Estimated Coefficients) 
Dependent Variables 
Child Labour Child Schooling 
Boys Girls Boys Girls 
MDM Index -0.03(0.37) -0.09(0.01) * 0.92(0.03) ** 0.07(0.00) * ǯ -0.07(0.00) * -0.04(0.00) * 0.06(0.00) * 0.07(0.00) * 
Child Age -0.53(0.14) -0.01(0.99) 0.83(0.00) * 0.43(0.11) 
Square of Child Age 0.03(0.03) ** 0.005(0.78) -0.04(0.00) * -0.03(0.02) ** 
Birth Order of the child -0.24(0.00) * 0.13(0.20) -0.02(0.89) 0.18(0.00) * 
Square of Birth Order 0.03(0.00) * -0.01(0.54) 0.0001(0.99) -0.02(0.00) * 
Household headed by Male 0.47(0.00) * -0.01(0.95) -0.03(0.92) -0.22(0.02) ** 
Log of Household Size -0.12(0.22) -0.08(0.52) 0.41(0.54) -0.27(0.00) * 
Proportion of Female age 0-5 0.8(0.08) *** 0.20(0.70) 0.9(0.08)*** -0.35(0.30) 
Proportion of Female age 6-9 1.03(0.02) ** -0.26(0.65) 0.22(0.80) -0.11(0.77) 
Proportion of Female age 10-14 0.37(0.38) -0.66(0.21) 0.52(0.36) 0.65(0.04) ** 
Proportion of Female age 15-65 0.84(0.02) ** 0.23(0.61) 1.20(0.00) * 1.15(0.00) * 
Proportion of Female age 65 or more -1.0(0.27) 0.39(0.68) 1.84(0.01) * 0.89(0.16) 
Proportion of Male age 0-5 1.06(0.02) ** 0.06(0.92) 0.73(0.17) -0.32(0.35) 
Proportion of Male age 6-9 0.55(0.22) -0.34(0.55) 0.50(0.57) 0.04(0.90) 
Proportion of Male age 10-14 0.37(0.37) -0.61(0.24) 0.39(0.76) 0.42(0.18) 
Proportion of Male age 65 or more -0.83(0.36) -0.57(0.59) 0.86(0.35) 1.17(0.08) *** 
Living standard Index 0.02(0.62) -0.10(0.04) ** -0.08(0.08) *** 0.18(0.00) * 
Durable Asset Index -0.23(0.00) * -0.26(0.00) * 0.22(0.00) * 0.37(0.00) * 
Agricultural Land Ownership 0.05(0.59) -0.01(0.90) 0.24(0.01) * 0.10(0.17) 
Provincial Dummies: Punjab 0.39(0.00) * 0.48(0.00) * -1.28(0.00) * 0.19(0.00) * 
Sindh 0.41(0.00) * 0.46(0.00) * -0.96(0.00) * -0.35(0.00) * 
Balochistan 0.09(0.29) -0.47(0.00) * -0.16(0.05) ** -0.37(0.00) * 
constant 0.08(0.97) -2.40(0.35) -5.21(0.04) ** -1.54(0.34) 
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Dependent Variables 
Child Labour Child Schooling 
Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Number of Observation 5683 5526 5683 5526 
Log Likelihood Ratio -1475.96 -985.76 -2462.02 -2674.83 
LR-statistics 652.95 365.67 961.20 2088.14 
Prob. LR-statistics 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pseudo R-square 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.28 
Wald test of exogeneity: chi2 3.67 2.53 5.60 1.36 
Prob. > chi2 0.16 0.28 0.06 0.51 
Amemiya-Lee-Newey chi2  - - 1.4 - 
P-value (OID-Test) - - 0.71 - 
Note: *, ** & *** represents significant at 1%, 5% & 10% significance level. Numbers in parenthesis are P-values. The endogeneity in the 
Decision making power and household size is checked using Wald tests of Exogeneity. As the test values are insignificant i.e. not predicting the 
endogeneity, both household size and decision making index considered exogenous. 
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Table 5.15: Exploring the Non-linearity and Non Monotonicity in MDM by Gender using Probit 
Variables: 
Child Labour Child Schooling 
Boys Girls Boys Girls ǯ 0.35(0.06) ** 0.28(0.21) 0.92(0.21) -0.18(0.22) ǯ -0.37(0.02) ** -0.34(0.07) *** 0.22(0.70) 0.13(0.27) ǯ 0.08(0.01) * 0.07(0.07) *** -0.10(0.49) -0.01(0.56) ǯ -0.07(0.00) * -0.04(0.00) * 0.06(0.00) * 0.07(0.00) * 
Child Age -0.54(0.13) -0.004(0.99) 0.83(0.00) * 0.42(0.12) 
Square of Child Age 0.03(0.03) ** 0.005(0.78) -0.04(0.00) * -0.03(0.03) ** 
Birth Order of the child -0.23(0.00) * 0.12(0.21) 0.003(0.98) 0.19(0.00) * 
Square of Birth Order 0.03(0.00) * -0.01(0.56) -0.001(0.96) -0.02(0.00) * 
Household headed by Male 0.49(0.00) * 0.0002(1.00) -0.08(0.79) -0.2(0.06) *** 
Log of Household Size -0.11(0.26) -0.08(0.55) 0.27(0.69) -0.28(0.00) * 
Proportion of Female age 0-5 0.72(0.10) *** 0.18(0.74) 0.95(0.09)*** -0.36(0.30) 
Proportion of Female age 6-9 1.02(0.02) ** -0.26(0.65) 0.05(0.95) -0.11(0.77) 
Proportion of Female age 10-14 0.36(0.40) -0.68(0.20) 0.44(0.44) 0.65(0.04) ** 
Proportion of Female age 15-65 0.83(0.02) ** 0.21(0.63) 1.24(0.00) * 1.14(0.00) * 
Proportion of Female age 65 or more -1.02(0.26) 0.33(0.73) 1.94(0.01) * 0.88(0.17) 
Proportion of Male age 0-5 1.03(0.02) ** 0.05(0.93) 0.67(0.21) -0.33(0.33) 
Proportion of Male age 6-9 0.55(0.22) -0.38(0.50) 0.33(0.71) 0.03(0.94) 
Proportion of Male age 10-14 0.36(0.39) -0.60(0.25) 0.16(0.90) 0.40(0.20) 
Proportion of Male age 65 or more -0.77(0.40) -0.59(0.57) 0.96(0.29) 1.14(0.09)*** 
Living standard Index 0.02(0.55) -0.10(0.04) ** -0.1(0.07)*** 0.18(0.00) * 
Durable Asset Index -0.23(0.00) * -0.26(0.00) * 0.22(0.00) * 0.37(0.00) * 
Agricultural Land Ownership 0.05(0.61) -0.02(0.84) 0.25(0.01) * 0.10(0.18) 
Provincial Dummies: Punjab 0.39(0.00) * 0.49(0.00) * -1.35(0.00) * 0.18(0.00) * 
Sindh 0.40(0.00) * 0.45(0.00) * -1.03(0.00) * -0.33(0.00) * 
Balochistan 0.07(0.41) -0.48(0.00) * -0.1 (0.10)*** -0.37(0.00) * 
Constant 0.07(0.98) -2.44(0.34) -4.9(0.05) ** -1.45(0.37) 
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Variables: 
Child Labour Child Schooling 
Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Number of Observation 5683 5526 5683 5526 
Log Likelihood Ratio -1472.88 -984.069 -2460.56 -2669.9 
LR-statistics 659.11 369.05 964.12 2097.97 
Prob. LR-statistics 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 
Pseudo R-square 0.183 0.158 0.164 0.28 
Note: *, ** & *** represents significant at 1%, 5% & 10% significance level. Numbers in parenthesis are P-values. 
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c) Economically In-$FWLYH&KLOGUHQDQG0RWKHU·V'HFLVLRQ0DNLQJ3RZHU 
 
Table 5.4 of section 5.1 shows that almost 24% children in Pakistan are neither in 
school and nor working. There is vast literature available on exploring the 
characteristics and reasons behind such a high percentage of children being inactive in 
developing countries. Children could remain inactive either because of the high cost of 
schooling or low quality of schooling but Maitra et.al., (2006) have argued that 
household prefer children to remain inactive in order to meet the unexpected family 
labour demand. They FRQVLGHU µLGOH FKLOGUHQ¶ as buffers to meet demand for family 
labour. Therefore in their model children remain inactive for a long period not because 
of the high cost of schooling but because they work only w-hen needed.  
 
For Pakistan recently Khan et.al., (2011) have suggested that children are absent from 
school and not performing economic activity as well because they are involved in 
home-care activities. Children either playing a role of reserved worker or engaged in 
home care activities could be considered as economically inactive. Considering the 
points raised by Maitra et.al., (2006) we merged the two categories of children; children 
that are economically active and children nor in school or nor in labour. Again probit 
model was estimated using first MXVWWKHOLQHDUWHUPRIPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQ- making power 
and then by entering the quadratic and cubed term. Table 5.16 presents the result. 
 
,W LV HYLGHQW IURP WKH WDEOH WKDW WKH HIIHFW RI PRWKHU¶V GHFLVLRQ- making power is 
insignificant in explaining the supply of child labour based on this broader definition. 
On the basis of the result, study concludes WKDWWKHHIIHFWRIPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ
SRZHU RQ KHU FKLOG¶V ODERXU DIWHU FRPELQLQJ HFRQRPLFDOO\ DFWLYH DQG LQDFWLYH UROH LV
insignificant.  
 
224 
 
Table 5.16: Probit model for Economically Inactive Children 
Variables Economically Inactive Children 
Mother's DM Index -0.02(0.22) 0.16(0.11) 
Square of the Mother's DM Index - -0.11(0.21) 
Cube of the Mother's DM Index - 0.01(0.43) ǯ -0.06(0.00) * -0.06(0.00) * 
Child Age -0.69(0.00) * -0.69(0.00) * 
Square of Child Age 0.04(0.00) * 0.04(0.00) * 
Birth Order of the child -0.11(0.01) * -0.11(0.01) * 
Square of Birth Order 0.01(0.01) * 0.01(0.00) * 
Household headed by Male 0.30(0.00) * 0.28(0.00) * 
Log of Household Size 0.14(0.00) * 0.15(0.00) * 
Proportion of Female age 0-5 -0.03(0.91) -0.02(0.92) 
Proportion of Female age 6-9 0.02(0.93) 0.03(0.92) 
Proportion of Female age 10-14 0.67(0.00) * 0.67(0.00) * 
Proportion of Female age 15-65 -0.85(0.00) * -0.84(0.00) * 
Proportion of Female age 65 or more -1.25(0.01) * -1.25(0.01) * 
Proportion of Male age 0-5 0.07(0.76) 0.08(0.72) 
Proportion of Male age 6-9 -0.18(0.45) -0.17(0.47) 
Proportion of Male age 10-14 -1.42(0.00) * -1.41(0.00) * 
Proportion of Male age 65 or more -0.83(0.08) *** -0.81(0.08) *** 
Living standard Index -0.07(0.00) * -0.07(0.00) * 
Durable Asset Index -0.32(0.00) * -0.32(0.00) * 
Agricultural Land Ownership -0.13(0.01) * -0.13(0.01) * 
Provincial Dummies: Punjab 0.04(0.32) 0.05(0.23) 
Sindh 0.40(0.00) * 0.38(0.00) * 
Balochistan 0.19(0.00) * 0.19(0.00) * 
Constant 2.79(0.01) * 2.77(0.02) ** 
Number of Observation 11209 11209 
Log Likelihood Ratio -5539.02 -5534.87 
LR-statistics 2935.82 2944.12 
Prob. LR-statistics 0.00 0.00 
Pseudo R-square 0.2095 0.21 
Wald test of exogeneity: chi2 1.84 - 
Prob. > chi2 0.398 - 
Amemiya-Lee-Newey chi2 (OID-Test) - - 
P-value (OID-Test) - - 
 Note: *, ** & *** represents significant at 1%, 5% & 10% significance level. Numbers in 
parenthesis are P-values. 
 
 
d) An alternate ,QGH[RI0RWKHU·V'HFLVLRQ0DNLQJ3RZHU 
 
From table 5.11 and 5.12 LWLVHYLGHQWWKDWWKHHIIHFWRIPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQPDNLQJSRZHU
RQ KHU FKLOG¶V ODERXU GHFLVLRQ LV QHJDWLYH ZKLOH IRU KHU FKLOG¶V VFKRROLQJ LV SRVLWLYH
The result shows that the association between mother decision making power and the 
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JRRGVWKDWLQFXUFRVWWRKRXVHKROGLVQHJDWLYHZKLOHWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQPRWKHU¶V
decision- making power and the goods that generates positive externalities is positive. 
These results although point out that mothers are concerned for the welfare of their 
children but to confirm further study also performed a simple sensitivity analysis. The 
sensitivity analysis was performed by changing the construction of PRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQ- 
making index. Instead of basing the index on the weights assign through PCA now we 
based the index on average scores earned by a mother in all five decisions. Recall that 
we have 5 decisions and for each decision there are three categories for who takes the 
decision. On the bases of who takes the decision, a score of 1 to 3 was assigned with 
three being the highest. It gives a total score of 15 that a mother can achieve.  We then 
take thHDYHUDJHVFRUHDZRPDQFDQDFKLHYHDQGXVHLWDVDQLQGH[RIPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQ- 
making power.  
 
The two tables 5.17 and 5.18 H[SORUHWKHHIIHFWRIPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQPDNLQJLQGH[RQ
KHUFKLOG¶VVFKRROLQJDQGODERXUGHFLVLRQEDVHGRQWKLVQHZLQGH[7KHVDPe exercise is 
followed i.e. first the presence of endogeneity in the overall and in sub sample is 
confirmed and then the probit model for the two decisions is estimated. The results 
show exactly the same effects except that the effect is now insignificant in the urban 
DUHDV IRU FKLOG VFKRROLQJ 7KH HIIHFW RI PRWKHU¶V GHFLVLRQ- making power was 
significant previously at 10% significance level for the child¶V schooling decision in 
urban areas. There is no further discrepancy in the results of the two indices; the result 
VKRZV WKH VDPH HIIHFW 3UHFLVHO\ WKH HIIHFW RI PRWKHU¶V GHFLVLRQ- making power is 
LQVLJQLILFDQWIRUKHUFKLOG¶VODERXUGHFLVLRQLQXUEDQDUHDVZKLOHLWVHIIHFWLVVLJQLILFDQW
in rural areas as predicted before. As far as the effect on gender is concerned, the effect 
LV KLJKO\ VLJQLILFDQW IRU JLUOV DQG ER\V VFKRROLQJ DQG JLUO¶V ODERXU GHFLVLRQV RQO\ DV
predicted earlier). Therefore we conclude that our results are robust.  
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Table 5.17: Effect of Average Scores on Child Labour Using Probit Model 
 
Variables All Pakistan Urban Rural Boys Girls ǯ -8.53(0.00)* 0.02(0.62) -6.9(0.02)** -0.03(0.37) -0.09(0.01) * ǯ -0.05(0.00)* -0.06(0.00)* -0.06(0.0)* -0.07(0.00) * -0.04(0.00) * 
Child Age -0.19(0.50) 0.09(0.88) -0.27(0.40) -0.53(0.14) -0.01(0.99) 
Square of Child Age 0.01(0.22) 0.01(0.76) 0.02(0.21) 0.03(0.03) ** 0.005(0.78) 
Birth Order of the child 0.10(0.42) -0.23(0.04)** 0.16(0.32) -0.24(0.00) * 0.13(0.20) 
Square of Birth Order 0.01(0.19) 0.03(0.02)** 0.01(0.51) 0.03(0.00) * -0.01(0.54) 
Child if male 0.33(0.00)* 0.59(0.00)* 0.22(0.0)* - - 
Household headed by Male 0.28(0.02)** 0.31(0.14) 0.44(0.01)* 0.47(0.00) * -0.01(0.95) 
Log of Household Size -1.61(0.01)* 0.3(0.08)*** -1.6(0.05)** -0.12(0.22) -0.08(0.52) 
Proportion of Female age 0-5 -0.23(0.65) 1.17(0.11) -0.43(0.46) 0.8(0.08) *** 0.20(0.70) 
Proportion of Female age 6-9 -0.11(0.86) 1.42(0.05)** -0.49(0.54) 1.03(0.02) ** -0.26(0.65) 
Proportion of Female age 10-14 -0.04(0.95) 1.49(0.02)** -0.66(0.34) 0.37(0.38) -0.66(0.21) 
Proportion of Female age 15-65 -0.01(0.97) 0.69(0.20) 0.18(0.61) 0.84(0.02) ** 0.23(0.61) 
Proportion of Female age 65 or more 0.75(0.33) 0.63(0.65) 0.29(0.74) -1.0(0.27) 0.39(0.68) 
Proportion of Male age 0-5 -0.04(0.94) 0.96(0.20) -0.15(0.80) 1.06(0.02) ** 0.06(0.92) 
Proportion of Male age 6-9 -0.20(0.76) 0.79(0.26) -0.55(0.50) 0.55(0.22) -0.34(0.55) 
Proportion of Male age 10-14 0.33(0.61) 1.68(0.01)* -0.42(0.58) 0.37(0.37) -0.61(0.24) 
Proportion of Male age 65 or more -2.42(0.02)** -0.94(0.55) -2.1(0.05)** -0.83(0.36) -0.57(0.59) 
Living standard Index 0.06(0.18) -0.04(0.46) 0.03(0.61) 0.02(0.62) -0.1(0.04) ** 
Durable Asset Index -0.14(0.01)* -0.22(0.00)* -0.15(0.02)** -0.23(0.00) * -0.26(0.00) * 
Agricultural Land Ownership -0.11(0.20) -0.14(0.54) -0.04(0.66) 0.05(0.59) -0.01(0.90) 
Provincial Dummies: Punjab 2.26(0.00)* 0.47(0.00)* 1.85(0.00)* 0.39(0.00) * 0.48(0.00) * 
Sindh 1.34(0.00)* 0.52(0.00)* 1.07(0.00)* 0.41(0.00) * 0.46(0.00) * 
Balochistan -0.12(0.09)*** 0.18(0.26) -0.14(0.12) 0.09(0.29) -0.47(0.00) * 
constant 4.41(0.09)*** -5.62(0.12) 4.33(0.14) 0.08(0.97) -2.4(0.35) 
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Variables All Pakistan Urban Rural Boys Girls 
Number of Observation 11209 4352 6857 5683 5526 
Log Likelihood Ratio -2496.84 -561.22 -1916.06 -1475.96 -985.76 
LR-statistics 1019.87 319.71 592.12 652.95 365.67 
Prob. LR-statistics 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pseudo R-square 0.17 0.22 0.13 0.18 0.157 
Wald test of exogeneity: chi2 7.94 1.64 5.25 3.87 0.20 
Prob. > chi2 0.019 0.44 0.07 0.1443 0.903 
Amemiya-Lee-Newey chi2 (OID) 1.99 - 3.6 - - 
P-value (OID-Test) 0.57 - 0.31 - - 
Note: *, ** & *** represents significant at 1%, 5% & 10% significance level. Numbers in parenthesis are P-values. The endogeneity in the Decision making power and 
household size is checked using Wald tests of Exogeneity. As the test value is insignificant the variables are considered as exogenous. 
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Table 5.18: Effect Average Scores on Child Schooling using Probit Model 
Variables All Pakistan Urban Rural Boys Girls ǯ 0.02(0.22) 0.05(0.09)*** 2.79(0.16) 3.47(0.04) ** 0.07(0.00) * ǯ 0.07(0.00)* 0.06(0.00)* 0.07(0.00)* 0.06(0.00) * 0.07(0.00) * 
Child Age 0.54(0.01)* 0.34(0.32) 0.6(0.02)** 0.75(0.01) * 0.43(0.11) 
Square of Child Age -0.03(0.00)* -0.02(0.12) -0.03(0.0)* -0.04(0.00) * -0.03(0.02) ** 
Birth Order of the child 0.12(0.01)* 0.22(0.00)* 0.08(0.50) -0.07(0.64) 0.18(0.00) * 
Square of Birth Order -0.01(0.01)* -0.02(0.00)* -0.01(0.21) 0.002(0.83) -0.02(0.00) * 
Child if male 0.75(0.00)* 0.38(0.00)* 0.96(0.00)* - - 
Household headed by Male -0.30(0.00)* -0.20(0.11) -0.34(0.0)* -0.40(0.02) ** -0.22(0.02) ** 
Log of Household Size -0.15(0.00)* -0.25(0.00)* -0.06(0.91) 0.73(0.29) -0.27(0.00) * 
Proportion of Female age 0-5 0.06(0.79) -0.66(0.14) 0.33(0.45) 1.07(0.06) *** -0.35(0.30) 
Proportion of Female age 6-9 -0.05(0.86) -0.60(0.17) -0.13(0.83) 0.40(0.64) -0.11(0.77) 
Proportion of Female age 10-14 0.74(0.00)* 0.56(0.15) 0.30(0.57) 0.53(0.35) 0.65(0.04) ** 
Proportion of Female age 15-65 1.09(0.00)* 0.76(0.02)** 1.34(0.00)* 1.31(0.00) * 1.15(0.00) * 
Proportion of Female age 65 or more 1.45(0.00)* 1.76(0.05)** 1.2(0.07)*** 1.83(0.01) * 0.89(0.16) 
Proportion of Male age 0-5 -0.01(0.98) -0.65(0.14) 0.22(0.61) 0.82(0.14) -0.32(0.35) 
Proportion of Male age 6-9 0.20(0.41) -0.06(0.90) -0.15(0.80) 0.65(0.46) 0.04(0.90) 
Proportion of Male age 10-14 0.17(0.44) -0.28(0.46) -0.33(0.55) 0.50(0.70) 0.42(0.18) 
Proportion of Male age 65 or more 0.92(0.05)** -0.58(0.49) 2.58(0.00)* 1.60(0.14) 1.17(0.08) *** 
Living standard Index 0.06(0.00)* 0.03(0.29) -0.02(0.65) -0.06(0.16) 0.18(0.00) * 
Durable Asset Index 0.32(0.00)* 0.29(0.00)* 0.34(0.00)* 0.23(0.00) * 0.37(0.00) * 
Agricultural Land Ownership 0.14(0.01)* 0.34(0.01)* 0.1(0.02)** 0.26(0.01) * 0.10(0.17) 
Provincial Dummies: Punjab -0.07(0.11) -0.06(0.47) -0.7(0.09)*** -1.18(0.00) * 0.19(0.00) * 
Sindh -0.42(0.00)* -0.29(0.00)* -0.8(0.00)* -0.94(0.00) * -0.35(0.00) * 
Balochistan -0.27(0.00)* -0.07(0.36) -0.4(0.00)* -0.23(0.00) * -0.37(0.00) * 
constant -2.3(0.05)** -0.53(0.80) -3.6(0.10)*** -5.69(0.03) ** -1.54(0.34) 
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Variables All Pakistan Urban Rural Boys Girls 
Number of Observation 11209 4352 6857 5683 5526 
Log Likelihood Ratio -5280.58 -1670.26 -3539.77 -2462.196 -2674.83 
LR-statistics 3228.90 830.35 2035.55 960.86 2088.14 
Prob. LR-statistics 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 
Pseudo R-square 0.23 0.20 0.22 0.16 0.281 
Wald test of exogeneity: chi2 2.37 0.67 4.46 5.29 0.88 
Prob. > chi2 0.306 0.71 0.107 0.071 0.6436 
Amemiya-Lee-Newey chi2 (OID) - - 4.07 1.697 - 
P-value (OID-Test) - - 0.25 0.6375 - 
Note: *, ** & *** represents significant at 1%, 5% & 10% significance level. Numbers in parenthesis are P -values. The endogeneity in the Decision making power and household size is 
control in all Pakistan and rural samples, where Wald tests of Exogeneity is significant i.e. predicting the endogeneity. 
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e) Exploring the effect of Individual Component of Mother Decision Making Index 
 
Although the decision-making index has similar effects whether using PCA or a simple 
average score, the individual effects of the components could be very different. To 
explore this, we model child labour and schooling using the individual components 
directly as regressors rather than aggregating them into an index.  Table 5.19 presents 
the results. Table 5.19 also includes a variant of the model which drops the parental 
education variable. This is because sometimes researchers have used level of education 
as a proxy for decision-making power and the education itself could be highly 
FRUUHODWHGZLWKFKLOG¶VODERXUDQGVFKRROLQJGHFLVLRQ2XUUHVXOWVVKRZWKDWWKHHIIHFWV
of the individual indicators of mother's decision-making are robust to whether or not 
parental education is controlled for. 
 
$PRQJ WKH ILYH LQGLFDWRUVRIPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQPDNLQJSRZHU WKUHHKDYH VLJQLILFDQW
effects on child labour while only two have a significant effect on child schooling. It 
will be recalled from the main results presented in table 5.12 that the aggregate 
PRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQ-making power index was insignificant in determining child schooling 
decision once fertility and demographic variables were controlled for. Of the three 
indicators tKDWDUHVLJQLILFDQWLQWKHFKLOGODERXUPRGHOWKHPRWKHU¶VSDLGHPSOR\PHQW
and her deciding food purchases appeared to reduce the incidence of child labour while 
her having decision-making power over purchases of clothes and footwear appeared to 
increase child labour. It is very interesting that when a woman has the power to decide 
whether she herself enters paid employment, the household tends to reduce the labour 
supply of her children. This echoes some of the arguments in the literature that female 
employment may improve child welfare due to maternal altruism. More generally, a 
woman's control of her own labour supply and of food purchases may indicate 
significant general bargaining power within the household and as such, the favourable 
effects on child labour are in line with expectations from the literature.  
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Table 5.19: Effect of Individual Component of Mother·s Decision Making Index Using Probit Model 
Variables 
With Education Without Education 
Child Labour Schooling Child Labour Schooling 
Decision about Paid Employment -0.04(0.08)*** -0.001(0.94) -0.04(0.07)*** 0.01(0.41) 
Decision about Purchase of Food -0.13(0.0)* 0.05(0.02)** -0.14(0.00)* 0.06(0.00)* 
Decision about Purchase of Clothes and Footwear 0.06(0.05)** -0.04(0.10)*** 0.07(0.02)* -0.04(0.04)** 
Decision About Medical Treatment -0.04(0.40) 0.02(0.51) -0.04(0.37) 0.02(0.55) 
Decision about Recreation & Travel 0.07(0.11) -0.01(0.82) 0.06(0.16) 0.00(0.99) ǯEducation -0.06(0.00)* 0.07(0.00)* - - 
Child Age -0.32(0.24) 0.53(0.01)* -0.32(0.23) 0.54(0.00)* 
Square of Child Age 0.02(0.06)*** -0.03(0.00)* 0.02(0.06)*** -0.03(0.00)* 
Birth Order of the child -0.09(0.13) 0.10(0.01)* -0.09(0.13) 0.09(0.03)** 
Square of Birth Order 0.02(0.01)* -0.01(0.01)* 0.02(0.01)* -0.01(0.02)** 
Child if male 0.33(0.00)* 0.75(0.00)* 0.32(0.00)* 0.72(0.00)* 
Household headed by Male 0.28(0.00)* -0.32(0.00)* 0.12(0.22) -0.09(0.16) 
Log of Household Size -0.01(0.06)*** -0.01(0.00)* -0.01(0.21) -0.02(0.00)* 
Proportion of Female age 0-5 0.55(0.10)*** 0.11(0.65) 0.57(0.08)*** 0.18(0.45) 
Proportion of Female age 6-9 0.46(0.18) 0.02(0.93) 0.50(0.13) 0.12(0.63) 
Proportion of Female age 10-14 -0.02(0.94) 0.76(0.00)* -0.07(0.83) 0.85(0.00)* 
Proportion of Female age 15-65 0.59(0.03)** 1.11(0.00)* 0.46(0.09)*** 1.21(0.00)* 
Proportion of Female age 65 or more -0.43(0.51) 1.43(0.00)* -0.58(0.37) 1.64(0.00)* 
Proportion of Male age 0-5 0.68(0.05)** 0.02(0.93) 0.63(0.06)*** 0.19(0.42) 
Proportion of Male age 6-9 0.18(0.60) 0.27(0.27) 0.20(0.54) 0.34(0.15) 
Proportion of Male age 10-14 0.13(0.67) 0.19(0.37) 0.13(0.66) 0.24(0.25) 
Proportion of Male age 65 or more -0.70(0.31) 0.93(0.05)** -0.93(0.17) 1.33(0.00)* 
Living standard Index -0.03(0.26) 0.07(0.00)* -0.10(0.00)* 0.15(0.00)* 
Durable Asset Index -0.25(0.00)* 0.33(0.00)* -0.35(0.00)* 0.45(0.00)* 
Agricultural Land Ownership 0.01(0.93) 0.14(0.01)* -0.09(0.20) 0.25(0.00)* 
Provincial Dummies: Punjab 0.46(0.00)* -0.09(0.04)** 0.44(0.00)* -0.07(0.10)*** 
Sindh 0.44(0.00)* -0.45(0.00)* 0.36(0.00)* -0.33(0.00)* 
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Variables 
With Education Without Education 
Child Labour Schooling Child Labour Schooling 
Balochistan -0.05(0.46) -0.29(0.00)* -0.07(0.33) -0.26(0.00)* 
Constant -1.21(0.46) -2.40(0.04)** -1.27(0.43) -2.40(0.03)** 
Number of Observation 11209 11209 11209 11209 
Log Likelihood Ratio -2484.55 -5276.85 -2593.88 -5618.75 
LR-statistics 1044.44 3236.36 825.78 2552.55 
Prob. LR-statistics 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pseudo R-square 0.17 0.23 0.14 0.185 
Note: *, ** & *** represents significant at 1%, 5% & 10% significance level. Numbers in parenthesis are P-values. 
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The positive effect of mother's control over purchases of clothes and footwear can be 
explained using the Basu (2006) model. Basu posited that if mothers have power they 
would prefer to spend the extra income that her child will bring on the consumption of 
her own preferred good. Clothing can be taken as the best example of the good that 
women often prefer. Hence if women have decision making power to decide about the 
purchase of clothes and footwear, it may lead to an increase in the child labour 
incidence. Moreover, as child labour and schooling are substitutes (as only around 1% 
children combine work and schooling) the effects of the indicators have the opposite 
signs in the respective models for these outcomes. For example the effect of mother's 
power over the purchase of clothes and footwear is positive for child labour and 
negative for child schooling.  
 
f) Exploring the Nonlinearity and Non-Monotonicity in Decision Making Power 
 
Theoretical arguments given by Basu (2006) claim that if, the power is concentrated in 
the hand of one partner than the partner who has more power in the house would be 
more attracted to child labour. This is because of the extra income that child work 
brings. He/she can now spend this extra income generated through the use of child 
labour on the consumption of her favourite goods. If this argument is true then the 
HIIHFWRIPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQPDNLQJSRZHUZRXOGEHQRQ-linear and may also be non-
monotonic. Felkey (2005), argued that if one does not assume that the relationship 
EHWZHHQPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQPDNLQJSRZHUDQGFKLOGODERXULVOLQHDULWLVUHDVRQDEOHQRW
to assume the relationship is quadratic either. The theoretical claims of Basu (2006) and 
empirical findings of Felkey (2005) for Bulgaria and Lancaster et.al (2006) for India 
have suggested looking for higher order effects. Exploring the higher order effects of 
PRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQPDNLQJSRZHURQKHUFKLOG¶VODERXUDQGVFKRROLQJGHFLVLRQVPD\EH
informative. Keeping this in mind we entered the squared and the cubed terms in the 
model. 
 
Table 5.20 VKRZV WKDW WKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQ- making power and 
WKH FKLOG¶V ODERXU GHFLVLRQ LV QRQ-monotonic in the all Pakistan and in rural sample 
only. Table 5.20 does not clearly predicts the non-PRQRWRQLFLW\LQWKHPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQ
making index for child schooling. As the non-monotonic effect is evident only for child 
labour we further investigated the non-monotonic nature by plotting the predicted 
YDOXHV RI FKLOG ODERXU DJDLQVW PRWKHU¶V GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ SRZHU VHH ILJXUH  IRU
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reference). Figure 5.2 shows that out of the total working children 53 percent belongs to 
mothers whom decision- making power is in the range of 0.65 to 2.6 while 38 percent 
children belongs to mothers having index value below 0.65. Regression analysis based 
on these two samples (below 0.65 and in range of 0.65 to 2.6) shows significant effect 
of PRWKHU¶V decision- making power RQ KHU FKLOG¶V ZRUN as well. However, on the 
region where mother¶s decision- making power exceeds value 2.6 WKHHIIHFWRIPRWKHU¶V
decision- PDNLQJSRZHURQKHUFKLOG¶VZRUNremains insignificant.  
 
Figure 5.2: Non-0RQRWRQLFHIIHFWRI0'0RQKHU&KLOG·V/DEour  
 
 
 
Overall we conclude that, we have tested the non-linear and non-monotonic effect of 
PRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQ- making power and found that the effect is linear on child schooling 
but could be non-linear and non-monotonic for child labour. Contrary to child 
VFKRROLQJ WKH FKLOG ODERXU PRGHO VKRZV WKDW WKH HIIHFW RI PRWKHU¶V GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ
SRZHURQKHUFKLOG¶VODERXUGHFLVLRQLVQRQ-monotonic in all Pakistan and rural sample 
RQO\7KLV LPSOLHV WKDW WKH HIIHFW RIPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ- power would be very 
different at different stages of decision making process. As Basu (2006) has 
theoretically shown that at some starting point and at the point where mother and father 
equally share the power child labour incidence will be lower. The positive effect of 
PRWKHU¶VSRZHURQFKLOG¶VODERXUGHFLVLRQZLOORQO\EHUHDOL]HGDWWKHSRLQWZKHUHVKH
has gain more power than her husband. At this point she will be in a position to spend 
the income generated through child labour on her own preferred goods hence child 
labour will further increase (see section 2.2 part d for further argument).           
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Table 5.20: Non-Linearity & Non Monotonicity in MDM  
 
(Estimated Coefficients) 
Variables 
Child Labour Child Schooling 
All Pakistan Urban Rural All Pakistan Urban Rural 
MDM Index 0.32(0.02)** -0.05(0.85) 0.46(0.01)* -0.15(0.13) -0.29(0.11) -0.68(0.5) 
Square MDM Index -0.36(0.00)* -0.03(0.90) -0.49(0.00)* 0.10(0.24) 0.3(0.09)*** 0.90(0.27) ǯ 0.08(0.00)* 0.02(0.69) 0.10(0.00)* -0.01(0.47) -0.05(0.13) -0.18(0.39) ǯ -0.06(0.00)* -0.06(0.00)* -0.06(0.00)* 0.07(0.00)* 0.06(000)* 0.07(0.0)* 
Child Age -0.33(0.22) 0.12(0.84) -0.39(0.21) 0.54(0.01)* 0.34(0.32) 0.6(0.01)* 
Square of Child Age 0.02(0.06)*** 0.01(0.80) 0.02(0.07) -0.03(0.00)* -0.02(0.12) -0.03(0.0)* 
Child if male -0.08(0.15) -0.2(0.05)** -0.05(0.47) 0.12(0.01)* 0.22(0.0)* 0.13(0.2) 
Birth Order of the child 0.02(0.01)* 0.03(0.02)** 0.01(0.05)** -0.01(0.01)* -0.02(0.0)* -0.01(0.13) 
Square of Birth Order 0.34(0.00)* 0.60(0.00)* 0.27(0.00)* 0.75(0.00)* 0.4(0.00)* 0.95(0.0)* 
Household headed by Male 0.26(0.01)* 0.35(0.1)*** 0.24(0.03)** -0.28(0.00)* -0.19(0.14) -0.02(0.9) 
Log of Household Size -0.09(0.23) 0.3(0.06)*** -0.2(0.02)** -0.16(0.00)* -0.26(0.0)* -0.38(0.37) 
Proportion of Female age 0-5 0.52(0.13) 1.16(0.12) 0.22(0.57) 0.06(0.79) -0.65(0.14) 0.19(0.63) 
Proportion of Female age 6-9 0.51(0.14) 1.4(0.05)** 0.20(0.62) -0.05(0.85) -0.58(0.19) -0.27(0.63) 
Proportion of Female age 10-14 -0.06(0.85) 1.5(0.02)** -0.60(0.12) 0.73(0.00)* 0.55(0.15) 0.27(0.60) 
Proportion of Female age 15-65 0.59(0.03)** 0.66(0.21) 0.49(0.14) 1.08(0.00)* 0.8(0.02)** 1.18(0.0)* 
Proportion of Female age 65 or more -0.39(0.55) 0.65(0.64) -0.74(0.32) 1.45(0.00)* 1.8(0.04)** 1.2(0.05)** 
Proportion of Male age 0-5 0.61(0.08)*** 0.92(0.22) 0.45(0.25) -0.02(0.94) -0.64(0.15) 0.12(0.77) 
Proportion of Male age 6-9 0.17(0.62) 0.82(0.25) -0.10(0.81) 0.19(0.43) -0.04(0.93) -0.30(0.6) 
Proportion of Male age 10-14 0.06(0.85) 1.69(0.01)* -0.51(0.17) 0.16(0.47) -0.29(0.44) -0.28(0.61) 
Proportion of Male age 65 or more -0.63(0.35) -0.91(0.56) -0.65(0.40) 0.9(0.06)*** -0.62(0.46) 1.8(0.01)* 
Living standard Index -0.03(0.38) -0.04(0.47) 0.01(0.77) 0.07(0.00)* 0.03(0.33) -0.04(0.44) 
Durable Asset Index -0.24(0.00)* -0.23(0.00)* -0.23(0.00)* 0.32(0.00)* 0.29(0.0)* 0.35(0.0)* 
Agricultural Land Ownership 0.01(0.90) -0.15(0.52) 0.02(0.79) 0.14(0.01)* 0.3(0.01)* 0.1(0.04)** 
Provincial Dummies: Punjab 0.43(0.00)* 0.46(0.00)* 0.45(0.00)* -0.1(0.08)*** -0.07(0.34) -0.7(0.06)*** 
Sindh 0.42(0.00)* 0.5(0.00)* 0.40(0.00)* -0.41(0.00)* -0.3(0.00)* -0.7(0.00)* 
Balochistan -0.09(0.21) 0.16(0.29) -0.2(0.06)*** -0.26(0.00)* -0.07(0.36) -0.4(0.00)* 
constant -1.07(0.51) -5.80(0.11) -0.09(0.96) -2.24(0.05)** -0.49(0.81) -2.44(0.19) 
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Variables 
Child Labour Child Schooling 
All Pakistan Urban Rural All Pakistan Urban Rural 
Number of Observation 11209 4352 6857 11209 4352 6857 
Log Likelihood Ratio -2493.44 -559.95 -1906.15 -5276.57 -1668.26 -3537.34 
LR-statistics 1026.68 322.24 611.94 3236.93 834.35 2040.42 
Prob. LR-statistics 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pseudo R-square 0.17 0.22 0.14 0.23 0.20 0.22 
Note: *, ** & *** represents significant at 1%, 5% & 10% significance level. Numbers in parenthesis are P-values. The endogeneity in the Decision making power and household size is control in all Pakistan 
and rural samples for the schooling decision only, where Wald tests of Exogeneity is significant i.e. predicting the endogeneity. For the cKLOG¶ODERXUGHFLVLRQERWKKRXVHKROGVL]HDQGPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ
index enters as exogenous. 
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5.6 Conclusions 
 
Household has remained an integral part of the cash transfer policies that aims to 
improve child welfare especially through improvement in education and health. 
Therefore, understanding the process by which households takes decisions regarding 
their child¶V labour and schooling is critical for the effective design of child labour 
and schooling policies. Recently studies have H[DPLQHG WKH HIIHFW RI PRWKHU¶V
decision making power on schooling decision (mainly the effect of bargaining power 
on household expenditures including education expenditures).  
 
In Pakistan strict social and cultural norms imply that men are often considered to 
have dominating roles in decision- making while women are often perceived to have 
limited impacts on decisions. But this perceived role is now changing and 
researchers are turning to collective approaches to model the effect of women¶V 
decision- making power on child related outcomes. For example Hou (2011) had 
rejected the unitary model approach for Pakistan and found that the effect of women 
bargaining power on education expenditure is positive and significant. Our work can 
be considered in line with the study done by Hou (2011). Hou (2011) looks at the 
HIIHFW RI ZRPHQ¶V power on the household expenditure pattern on food, lighting 
transport and education expenditure. But in this study we have explored explicitly its 
effect on child schooling and labour decisions.  
 
Further to this, acknowledging the theoretical prediction of Basu (2006), this study 
has also examined whether effect RIPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQPDNLQJSRZHURQKHUFKLOG¶V
schooling and labour decisions is non-monotonic. Using the Pakistan Standard of 
Living Measurement Survey Data for 2007-8 this chapter has provided evidence that 
the intrahousehold distribution of power does affects child schooling and labour. The 
chapter shows that the effect of any additional power given to mothers increases 
child schooling and decreases the incidence of child labour. However, this effect is 
non-monotonic in nature for child labour only 7KHUHIRUH WKH HIIHFW RI PRWKHU¶V
decision- making power may not always be positive or negative. There is a turning 
point, beyond which additional power gain by mothers may have a different effect 
on child labour. +HUH LQ RXU FDVH WKH WXUQLQJ SRLQW DIWHU ZKLFK PRWKHU¶V GHFLVLRQ
PDNLQJSRZHUKDVSRVLWLYHHIIHFWRQKHUFKLOG¶V ODERXUGHFLVLRQ LV Our results 
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are consistent with the empirical evidence given by Lancaster et.al (2006) for India 
and Felkey (2005) for Bulgaria. 
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Annexures: 
 
Annex A-5.1: Construction of Wealth Indices 
In order to measure the economic and social status of the household two indices were 
developed (1) living standard index and (2) durable assets index. Each index itself 
compromises of number of indicators. The weights for the indicators were assigned 
using the Principal Component Analysis (PCA). Below tables provides the detail of 
Indices calculated using the PCA.  
 
1. Living Standard Index: 
 
a) Own Residential Building 
b) Have Electricity Connection 
c) Have Gas Connection 
d) Have Access to piped water 
e) Have Access to Covered drainage System 
 
Descriptive Statistics Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Factor 
Score 
F/SD 
Own Residential Building .8724 .33370 -.210 -0.63 
Have Electricity Connection .8872 .31638 .235 0.74 
Have Gas Connection .3163 .46506 .403 0.87 
Have Access to piped water .3807 .48558 .330 0.68 
Have Access to Cover drainage System .2065 .40480 .369 0.91 
 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % Variance Cumulative % Total % Variance Cumulative % 
1 1.974 39.479 39.479 1.974 39.479 39.479 
2 .945 18.895 58.374    
3 .850 16.995 75.369    
4 .735 14.709 90.078    
5 .496 9.922 100.000    
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2. Durable Assets Index: 
Durable assets index consists of many household items, small and large. The table 
hereunder provides detail of these assets. 
Descriptive Statistics Mean Std. Deviation Factor Score F/SD 
Refrigerator .3663 .48181 .249 0.52 
Freezer .0323 .17679 -.105 -0.59 
Air conditioner .0460 .20955 -.063 -0.30 
Air cooler .0846 .27826 -.006 -0.02 
Fan (Ceiling, Table, Pedestal, Exhaust) .8398 .36680 .291 0.79 
Geyser (Gas, Electric) .0698 .25474 -.040 -0.16 
Washing machine/dryer .4419 .49662 .248 0.50 
Camera  (Still) .0239 .15280 -.026 -0.17 
Camera (Movie ) .0057 .07553 .002 0.03 
Cooking stove .3575 .47929 .226 0.47 
Cooking Range, Microwave oven .0191 .13682 -.059 -0.43 
Heater .0879 .28311 .011 0.04 
Bicycle .2940 .45559 .059 0.13 
Car / Vehicle .0539 .22582 -.056 -0.25 
Motorcycle/scooter .1795 .38381 .053 0.14 
TV .5314 .49903 .303 0.61 
VCR, VCP, Receiver, De-coder .0188 .13591 .018 0.13 
Radio / cassette player .2345 .42372 -.113 -0.27 
Compact disk player .0447 .20660 .058 0.28 
Vacuum cleaner .0103 .10104 -.068 -0.67 
Sewing/Knitting Machine .5458 .49791 .132 0.27 
Personal Computer .0710 .25690 -.028 -0.11 
 
 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % Variance Cumulative % Total %  Variance Cumulative % 
1 4.950 22.498 22.498 4.950 22.498 22.498 
2 2.139 9.721 32.219 2.139 9.721 32.219 
3 1.242 5.644 37.863 1.242 5.644 37.863 
4 1.107 5.031 42.894 1.107 5.031 42.894 
5 1.028 4.671 47.565 1.028 4.671 47.565 
6 .983 4.468 52.033    
7 .913 4.151 56.183    
8 .883 4.012 60.195    
9 .825 3.752 63.947    
10 .809 3.678 67.624    
11 .749 3.403 71.027    
12 .731 3.323 74.350    
13 .706 3.207 77.558    
14 .673 3.061 80.619    
15 .635 2.886 83.505    
16 .623 2.830 86.335    
17 .613 2.785 89.120    
18 .586 2.662 91.782    
19 .503 2.284 94.066    
20 .483 2.195 96.262    
21 .444 2.019 98.281    
22 .378 1.719 100.000    
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Annex A-5.2: &RQVWUXFWLRQRI0RWKHU·V'HFLVLRQMaking Index 
 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % Variance Cumulative % Total % Variance Cumulative % 
1 3.212 64.241 64.241 3.212 64.241 64.241 
2 .712 14.244 78.484    
3 .608 12.155 90.639    
4 .328 6.551 97.190    
5 .140 2.810 100.000    
 
 
Annex A- 5.3: T-Tests (Assuming unequal variance)  
 
All Pakistan  
Group Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Confidence Interval] 
Not in LF 10360 1.22 0.01 0.98 1.20 1.24 
In LF 849 1.14 0.03 0.95 1.08 1.21 
Combined 11209 1.22 0.01 0.98 1.20 1.23 
Difference  0.08 0.03  0.01 0.14 
 Difference = mean(not in L) - mean(in LF) t = 2.2679 
Ho.: diff = 0 Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 1001.72 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
Pr. (T < t) = 0.9882 Pr. (|T| > |t|) = 0.0235 Pr. (T > t) = 0.0118 
Group Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Confidence Interval] 
Not in School 3420 1.06 0.02 0.90 1.03 1.09 
In School 7789 1.28 0.01 1.01 1.26 1.31 
Combined 11209 1.22 0.01 0.98 1.20 1.23 
Difference  -0.23 0.02  -0.26 -0.19 
 Difference = mean(not in L) - mean(in LF) t = -11.7813 
Ho.: diff = 0 Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 7291.83 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
Pr. (T < t) = 0.0000 Pr. (|T| > |t|) = 0.0000 Pr. (T > t) = 1.0000 
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 Urban  
Group Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Confidence Interval] 
Not in LF 4181 1.37 0.02 0.99 1.34 1.40 
In LF 171 1.41 0.08 1.05 1.25 1.57 
Combined 4352 1.37 0.02 1.00 1.34 1.40 
Difference  -0.04 0.08  -0.21 0.12 
 Difference = mean(not in L) - mean(in LF) t = -0.5460 
Ho.: diff = 0 Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 182.639 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
Pr. (T < t) = 0.2929 Pr. (|T| > |t|) = 0.5857 Pr. (T > t) = 0.7071 
Group Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Confidence Interval] 
Not in School 806 1.18 0.03 0.93 1.11 1.24 
In School 3546 1.41 0.02 1.01 1.38 1.44 
Combined 4352 1.37 0.02 1.00 1.34 1.40 
Difference  -0.23 0.04  -0.31 -0.16 
 Difference = mean(not in L) - mean(in LF) t = -6.2864 
Ho.: diff = 0 Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 1264.88 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
Pr. (T < t) = 0.0000 Pr. (|T| > |t|) = 0.0000 Pr. (T > t) = 1.0000 
 
Rural  
Group Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Confidence Interval] 
Not in LF 6179 1.12 0.01 0.97 1.10 1.15 
In LF 678 1.08 0.04 0.92 1.01 1.15 
Combined 6857 1.12 0.01 0.96 1.10 1.14 
Difference  0.05 0.04  -0.03 0.12 
 Difference = mean(not in L) - mean(in LF) t = 1.2472 
Ho.: diff = 0 Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 850.428 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
Pr. (T < t) = 0.8937 Pr. (|T| > |t|) = 0.2127 Pr. (T > t) = 0.1063 
Group Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Confidence Interval] 
Not in School 2614 1.02 0.02 0.88 0.99 1.06 
In School 4243 1.18 0.02 1.00 1.15 1.21 
Combined 6857 1.12 0.01 0.96 1.10 1.14 
Difference  -0.16 0.02  -0.20 -0.11 
 Difference = mean(not in L) - mean(in LF) t = -6.7548 
Ho.: diff = 0 Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 6056.61 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
Pr. (T < t) = 0.0000 Pr. (|T| > |t|) = 0.0000 Pr. (T > t) = 1.0000 
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Boys  
Group Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Confidence Interval] 
Not in LF 5135 1.22 0.01 0.98 1.19 1.25 
In LF 548 1.12 0.04 0.96 1.04 1.21 
Combined 5683 1.21 0.01 0.98 1.18 1.24 
Difference  0.09 0.04  0.01 0.18 
 Difference = mean(not in L) - mean(in LF) t = 2.1722 
Ho.: diff = 0 Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 675.246 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
Pr. (T < t) = 0.9849 Pr. (|T| > |t|) = 0.0302 Pr. (T > t) = 0.0151 
Group Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Confidence Interval] 
Not in School 1210 1.15 0.03 0.94 1.09 1.20 
In School 4473 1.23 0.01 0.99 1.20 1.26 
Combined 5683 1.21 0.01 0.98 1.18 1.24 
Difference  -0.08 0.03  -0.14 -0.02 
 Difference = mean(not in L) - mean(in LF) t = -2.6614 
Ho.: diff = 0 Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 2001.38 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
Pr. (T < t) = 0.0039 Pr. (|T| > |t|) = 0.0078 Pr. (T > t) = 0.9961 
 
Girls  
Group Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Confidence Interval] 
Not in LF 5225 1.22 0.01 0.99 1.20 1.25 
In LF 301 1.18 0.05 0.94 1.07 1.28 
Combined 5526 1.22 0.01 0.98 1.19 1.25 
Difference  0.05 0.06  -0.06 0.16 
 Difference = mean(not in L) - mean(in LF) t = 0.8130 
Ho.: diff = 0 Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 338.886 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
Pr. (T < t) = 0.7916 Pr. (|T| > |t|) = 0.4168 Pr. (T > t) = 0.2084 
Group Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Confidence Interval] 
Not in School 2210 1.01 0.02 0.87 0.97 1.05 
In School 3316 1.36 0.02 1.03 1.33 1.40 
Combined 5526 1.22 0.01 0.98 1.19 1.25 
Difference  -0.35 0.03  -0.40 -0.30 
 Difference = mean(not in L) - mean(in LF) t = -13.5875 
Ho.: diff = 0 Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 5220.84 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0 
Pr. (T < t) = 0.0000 Pr. (|T| > |t|) = 0.0000 Pr. (T > t) = 1.0000 
 
244 
 
Annex A-5.4: First stage regressions for Household size  
 
Dependent Variables All Pakistan Urban Rural 
Age Difference -0.005(0.00)* -0.005(0.02) ** -0.004(0.01) * 
Education Difference 0.002(0.03)** 0.001(0.33) 0.003(0.03) ** 
Square of the  age difference 6.E-05(0.29) 3.E-05(0.78) 0.0001(0.43) 
Square of the Education difference 7.E-05(0.38) 3.E-05(0.79) 0.0001(0.53) 
First two born are of different gender 0.08(0.00)* 0.07(0.00) * 0.09(0.00) * ǯ -0.005(0.00)* -0.004(0.00) * -0.01(0.00) * 
Child Age -0.03(0.36) -0.05(0.45) -0.02(0.69) 
Square of Child Age -1.E-04(0.94) 0.0001(0.95) -0.001(0.74) 
Birth Order of the child 0.25(0.00)* 0.28(0.00) * 0.23(0.00) * 
Square of Birth Order -0.01(0.00)* -0.01(0.00) * -0.01(0.00) * 
Child if male 0.01(0.38) 0.003(0.80) 0.01(0.37) 
Household headed by Male 0.18(0.00)* 0.16(0.00) * 0.19(0.00) * 
Proportion of Female age 0-5 -0.73(0.00) * -0.90(0.00) * -0.63(0.00) * 
Proportion of Female age 6-9 -1.29(0.00) * -1.50(0.00) * -1.18(0.00) * 
Proportion of Female age 10-14 -1.21(0.00) * -1.30(0.00) * -1.16(0.00) * 
Proportion of Female age 15-65 0.11(0.00) * 0.21(0.00) * 0.03(0.56) 
Proportion of Female age 65 or more 0.28(0.00) * 0.27(0.06) ** 0.26(0.01) * 
Proportion of Male age 0-5 -0.70(0.00) * -0.86(0.00) * -0.61(0.00) * 
Proportion of Male age 6-9 -1.34(0.00) * -1.37(0.00) * -1.33(0.00) * 
Proportion of Male age 10-14 -1.33(0.00) * -1.43(0.00) * -1.26(0.00) * 
Proportion of Male age 65 or more 0.86(0.00) * 0.96(0.00) * 0.79(0.00) * 
Living standard Index -0.03(0.00) * -0.02(0.01) * -0.06(0.00) * 
Durable Asset Index 0.07(0.00) * 0.04(0.00) * 0.09(0.00) * 
Agricultural Land Ownership 0.04(0.00) * 0.09(0.00) * 0.01(0.35) 
Provincial Dummies: Punjab -0.12(0.00) * -0.07(0.00) * -0.15(0.00) * 
Sindh -0.08(0.00) * -0.07(0.00) * -0.08(0.00) * 
Balochistan -0.03(0.00) * 0.04(0.00) * -0.08(0.00) * 
constant 2.28(0.00) * 2.33(0.00) * 2.21(0.00) * 
Number of Observation 11209 4352 6857 
Adjusted R-square 0.41 0.42 0.41 
F-statistics 286.37 119.1 174.63 
Prob. F-test 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: *, ** & *** represents significant at 1%, 5% & 10% significance level. Numbers in parenthesis are 
P-values.
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Annex A- 5.5: Exploring the Non-linearity and Non Monotonicity in MDM by 
Gender 
Variables: 
Child Labour Child Schooling 
Boys Girls Boys Girls ǯ 0.35(0.06) ** 0.28(0.21) 0.92(0.21) -0.18(0.22) 
Square of ǯ -0.37(0.02) ** -0.34(0.07) *** 0.22(0.70) 0.13(0.27) ǯ 0.08(0.01) * 0.07(0.07) *** -0.10(0.49) -0.01(0.56) ǯ -0.07(0.00) * -0.04(0.00) * 0.06(0.00) * 0.07(0.00) * 
Child Age -0.54(0.13) -0.004(0.99) 0.83(0.00) * 0.42(0.12) 
Square of Child Age 0.03(0.03) ** 0.005(0.78) -0.04(0.00) * -0.03(0.03) ** 
Birth Order of the child -0.23(0.00) * 0.12(0.21) 0.003(0.98) 0.19(0.00) * 
Square of Birth Order 0.03(0.00) * -0.01(0.56) -0.001(0.96) -0.02(0.00) * 
Household headed by Male 0.49(0.00) * 0.0002(1.00) -0.08(0.79) -0.2(0.06) *** 
Log of Household Size -0.11(0.26) -0.08(0.55) 0.27(0.69) -0.28(0.00) * 
Proportion of Female age 0-5 0.72(0.10) *** 0.18(0.74) 0.95(0.09)*** -0.36(0.30) 
Proportion of Female age 6-9 1.02(0.02) ** -0.26(0.65) 0.05(0.95) -0.11(0.77) 
Proportion of Female age 10-14 0.36(0.40) -0.68(0.20) 0.44(0.44) 0.65(0.04) ** 
Proportion of Female age 15-65 0.83(0.02) ** 0.21(0.63) 1.24(0.00) * 1.14(0.00) * 
Proportion of Female age 65 or more -1.02(0.26) 0.33(0.73) 1.94(0.01) * 0.88(0.17) 
Proportion of Male age 0-5 1.03(0.02) ** 0.05(0.93) 0.67(0.21) -0.33(0.33) 
Proportion of Male age 6-9 0.55(0.22) -0.38(0.50) 0.33(0.71) 0.03(0.94) 
Proportion of Male age 10-14 0.36(0.39) -0.60(0.25) 0.16(0.90) 0.40(0.20) 
Proportion of Male age 65 or more -0.77(0.40) -0.59(0.57) 0.96(0.29) 1.14(0.09)*** 
Living standard Index 0.02(0.55) -0.10(0.04) ** -0.1(0.07)*** 0.18(0.00) * 
Durable Asset Index -0.23(0.00) * -0.26(0.00) * 0.22(0.00) * 0.37(0.00) * 
Agricultural Land Ownership 0.05(0.61) -0.02(0.84) 0.25(0.01) * 0.10(0.18) 
Provincial Dummies: Punjab 0.39(0.00) * 0.49(0.00) * -1.35(0.00) * 0.18(0.00) * 
Sindh 0.40(0.00) * 0.45(0.00) * -1.03(0.00) * -0.33(0.00) * 
Balochistan 0.07(0.41) -0.48(0.00) * -0.1 (0.10)*** -0.37(0.00) * 
Constant 0.07(0.98) -2.44(0.34) -4.9(0.05) ** -1.45(0.37) 
Number of Observation 5683 5526 5683 5526 
Log Likelihood Ratio -1472.88 -984.069 -2460.56 -2669.9 
LR-statistics 659.11 369.05 964.12 2097.97 
Prob. LR-statistics 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 
Pseudo R-square 0.183 0.158 0.164 0.28 
Note: *, ** & *** represents significant at 1%, 5% & 10% significance level. Numbers in parenthesis are P-values. 
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Annex A-5.6: Effect of ownership of Household enterprises and 
Agriculture land 
 
The table below explores the effect of ownership of household enterprise and land on 
children schooling and labour decisions. The issue is worth exploring as 72% of the 
economically active children work as unpaid family helper. Although not all of these 
children work on family owned farms and household enterprise, they usually help 
parents who work as tenants or labourer.  
 
Table A-5.6 
Effect of Household ownership of enterprise and land on Child status 
Variables Child Labour Child Schooling ǯIndex -0.05(0.02) ** 0.02(0.27) ǯ -0.06(0.00) * 0.06(0.00) * 
Child Age -0.25(0.35) 0.67(0.00) * 
Square of Child Age 0.02(0.10) *** -0.03(0.00) * 
Birth Order of the child -0.09(0.12) 0.10(0.02) ** 
Square of Birth Order 0.02(0.01) * -0.01(0.02) ** 
Household headed by Male 0.23(0.02) ** -0.31(0.00) * 
Log of Household Size -0.10(0.19) -0.16(0.00) * 
Proportion of Female age 0-5 0.55(0.10) *** 0.07(0.78) 
Proportion of Female age 6-9 0.53(0.13) 0.01(0.96) 
Proportion of Female age 10-14 -0.68(0.03) ** -0.67(0.00) * 
Proportion of Female age 15-65 0.60(0.03) ** 1.04(0.00) * 
Proportion of Female age 65 or more -0.30(0.64) 1.46(0.00) * 
Proportion of Male age 0-5 0.66(0.05) ** 0.04(0.88) 
Proportion of Male age 6-9 0.23(0.50) 0.26(0.28) 
Proportion of Male age 10-14 0.68(0.02) ** 1.54(0.00) * 
Proportion of Male age 65 or more -0.64(0.34) 0.83(0.08) *** 
Living standard Index -0.03(0.30) 0.06(0.00) * 
Durable Asset Index -0.24(0.00) * 0.31(0.00) * 
Agricultural Land Ownership  0.02(0.83) 0.13(0.01) * 
Household Enterprise ownership 0.07(0.20) 0.03(0.35) 
Provincial Dummies: Punjab 0.42(0.00) * -0.05(0.22) 
Sindh 0.44(0.00) * -0.39(0.00) * 
Balochistan -0.05(0.45) -0.24(0.00) * 
constant -1.30(0.43) -2.66(0.02) ** 
Number of Observation 11209 11209 
Log Likelihood Ratio -2515.81 -5462.76 
LR-statistics 981.93 2864.54 
Prob. LR-statistics 0.00 0.00 
Pseudo R-square 0.16 0.208 
Wald test of exogeneity: chi2 3.08 2.90 
Prob. > chi2 0.2143 0.2344 
Amemiya-Lee-Newey chi2 (OID-Test) - - 
P-value (OID-Test) - - 
Note: *, ** & *** represents significant at 1%, 5% & 10% significance level. Numbers in parenthesis are P-
values. The endogeneity in the Decision making power and household size is control in all sub-samples where 
Wald tests of Exogeneity is significant i.e. predicting the endogeneity. 
 
It is evident from table A-5.6 that the effect of household enterprise is insignificant on 
FKLOG¶V VFKRROLQJ DQG ODERXU GHFLVLRQ EXW WKH HIIHFW RI RZQHUVKLS RI DJULculture land 
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does show significant and positive effect. The effect is significant only for the schooling 
decision. Although we assumed that the ownership of the land will increase the child 
labour incidence thereby reduce schooling, as children work mostly as family helpers. 
But the result shows contradiction to the above assumption. This could be because 
household with agri-land might have stable income therefore invest in their children 
schooling rather than engaging them to work.   
 
Annex A-5.7: Some Diagnostic Tests 
 
a) Testing Multi-collinearity among the Variables 
 
Variable VIF SQRT VIF Tolerance R-Squared 
Child in LF 1.17 0.15 1.17 0.15 
Child in School 1.43 0.30 1.43 0.30 
MDM Index 1.14 0.12 1.14 0.12 
Sum of parents years of Schooling 1.63 0.39 1.63 0.39 
Child Age 1.34 0.26 1.34 0.26 
Birth order 4.01 0.75 4.01 0.75 
Child if male 2.05 0.51 2.05 0.51 
Household headed by Male 1.25 0.20 1.25 0.20 
Log of Household Size 1.66 0.40 1.66 0.40 
Proportion of Female age 0-5 2.05 0.51 2.05 0.51 
Proportion of Female age 6-9 2.12 0.53 2.12 0.53 
Proportion of Female age 10-14 2.78 0.64 2.78 0.64 
Proportion of Female age 15-65 1.94 0.48 1.94 0.48 
Proportion of Female age 65 or more 1.12 0.11 1.12 0.11 
Proportion of Male age 0-5 2.05 0.51 2.05 0.51 
Proportion of Male age 6-9 2.15 0.54 2.15 0.54 
Proportion of Male age 10-14 2.75 0.64 2.75 0.64 
Proportion of Male age 65 or more 1.10 0.09 1.10 0.09 
Living standard Index 1.61 0.38 1.61 0.38 
Durable Assets Index 1.76 0.43 1.76 0.43 
Agricultural Land Ownership 1.03 0.03 1.03 0.03 
Punjab Province 1.02 0.02 1.02 0.02 
Sindh Province 1.26 0.21 1.26 0.21 
Balochistan Province 1.07 0.06 1.07 0.06 
Age Difference 1.17 0.15 1.17 0.15 
Education Difference 1.43 0.30 1.43 0.30 
First two are of Different Gender 1.14 0.12 1.14 0.12 
Mean VIF 1.73 
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b) F-test to check the Weak Instrument  
 
Test Parameter: Age Difference, Education Difference, Square of the Age Difference, 
Square of the education difference and First two born are of different Gender 
 
 (1)  Age Difference = 0 
 (2)  Education Difference = 0 
 (3)  Square of the Age Difference = 0 
 (4)  Square of the education difference = 0 
 (5)  First two born are of different Gender = 0 
 
In Decision Making model (All) 
F. (5, 11182) = 12.44 
Prob. > F = 0.0000 
In Household Size model (all) 
F. (5, 11182) =53.62 
Prob. > F. = 0.0000 
 
In Decision Making model (Rural) 
F. (5,  6830) = 6.84 
Prob. > F = 0.0000 
In Household Size model (Rural) 
F. (5,  6830) = 38.48 
Prob. > F = 0.0000 
In Decision Making model (Boys) 
F(  5,  5656) =    4.16 
Prob> F =    0.0009 
In Household Size model (Boys) 
F(  5,  5656) =   13.99 
Prob> F =    0.0000 
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c) Marginal Effects: 
 
(i) Probit model for Child Labour (with fertility and demographic  controls) 
Dependent Variables: Child Labour All Pakistan Urban Rural ǯ -0.005 0.001 -0.18 ǯ -0.01 -0.002 -0.01 
Child Age -0.03 0.003 -0.05 
Square of Child Age 0.002 0.0002 0.003 
Birth Order of the child -0.01 -0.01 0.002 
Square of Birth Order 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Child if male 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Household headed by Male 0.02 0.01 -0.04 
Log of Household Size -0.01 0.01 -0.09 
Proportion of Female age 0-5 0.05 0.04 -0.004 
Proportion of Female age 6-9 0.04 0.05 0.003 
Proportion of Female age 10-14 -0.004 0.05 -0.05 
Proportion of Female age 15-65 0.05 0.02 0.07 
Proportion of Female age 65 or more -0.03 0.02 0.004 
Proportion of Male age 0-5 0.05 0.03 0.02 
Proportion of Male age 6-9 0.02 0.03 0.0001 
Proportion of Male age 10-14 0.01 0.06 -0.05 
Proportion of Male age 65 or more -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 
Living standard Index -0.003 -0.001 0.01 
Durable Asset Index -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
Agricultural Land Ownership 0.001 -0.004 -0.001 
Provincial Dummies: Punjab 0.04 0.02 0.31 
Sindh 0.05 0.02 0.20 
Balochistan -0.01 0.01 -0.02 
 
(ii) Probit model for Child Labour (without fertility and demographic controls) 
Dependent Variables: Child Labour All Pakistan Urban Rural ǯ -0.005 0.001 -0.14 ǯ -0.01 -0.002 -0.01 
Child Age -0.03 0.0003 -0.04 
Square of Child Age 0.002 0.0004 0.003 
Child if male 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Household headed by Male 0.01 0.01 -0.05 
Living standard Index -0.002 -0.001 0.02 
Durable Asset Index -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 
Agricultural Land Ownership 0.001 -0.004 -0.003 
Provincial Dummies: Punjab 0.04 0.02 0.26 
Sindh 0.05 0.02 0.17 
Balochistan -0.01 0.01 -0.02 
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(iii) Non-linearity and Non Monotonicity in MDM 
Dependent Variables: Child Labour All Pakistan Urban Rural ǯ 0.03 -0.002 0.06 ǯ -0.03 -0.001 -0.06 ǯ 0.01 0.001 0.01 ǯ -0.01 -0.002 -0.01 
Child Age -0.03 0.004 -0.05 
Square of Child Age 0.002 0.0002 0.003 
Birth Order of the child -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Square of Birth Order 0.001 0.001 0.002 
Child if male 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Household headed by Male 0.02 0.01 0.03 
Log of Household Size 0.01 0.01 -0.03 
Proportion of Female age 0-5 0.04 0.04 0.03 
Proportion of Female age 6-9 0.04 0.05 0.03 
Proportion of Female age 10-14 -0.01 0.05 -0.08 
Proportion of Female age 15-65 0.05 0.02 0.06 
Proportion of Female age 65 or more -0.03 0.02 -0.09 
Proportion of Male age 0-5 0.05 0.03 0.06 
Proportion of Male age 6-9 0.01 0.03 -0.01 
Proportion of Male age 10-14 0.01 0.06 -0.07 
Proportion of Male age 65 or more -0.05 -0.03 -0.08 
Living standard Index -0.002 -0.001 0.002 
Durable Asset Index -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 
Agricultural Land Ownership 0.001 -0.004 0.003 
Provincial Dummies: Punjab 0.04 0.02 0.06 
Sindh 0.04 0.02 0.06 
Balochistan -0.01 0.01 -0.02 
 
(iv) Probit model for Child Labour by Gender 
Dependent Variables: Child Labour Boys Girls ǯ -0.003 -0.01 ǯ -0.01 -0.003 
Child Age -0.06 -0.0003 
Square of Child Age 0.003 0.0003 
Birth Order of the child -0.03 0.01 
Square of Birth Order 0.003 -0.0004 
Household headed by Male 0.04 -0.001 
Log of Household Size -0.01 -0.01 
Proportion of Female age 0-5 0.08 0.01 
Proportion of Female age 6-9 0.11 -0.02 
Proportion of Female age 10-14 0.04 -0.04 
Proportion of Female age 15-65 0.09 0.01 
Proportion of Female age 65 or more -0.11 0.03 
Proportion of Male age 0-5 0.11 0.004 
Proportion of Male age 6-9 0.06 -0.02 
Proportion of Male age 10-14 0.04 -0.04 
Proportion of Male age 65 or more -0.09 -0.04 
Living standard Index 0.002 -0.01 
Durable Asset Index -0.02 -0.02 
Agricultural Land Ownership 0.01 -0.001 
Provincial Dummies: Punjab 0.04 0.03 
Sindh 0.05 0.04 
Balochistan 0.01 -0.02 
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(v) Non-linearity and Non Monotonicity in MDM by Gender 
Dependent Variables: Child Labour Boys Girls ǯ 0.04 0.02 ǯ -0.04 -0.02 ǯ 0.01 0.005 ǯ -0.01 -0.003 
Child Age -0.06 -0.0003 
Square of Child Age 0.003 0.0003 
Birth Order of the child -0.02 0.01 
Square of Birth Order 0.003 -0.0004 
Household headed by Male 0.04 0.00001 
Log of Household Size -0.01 -0.005 
Proportion of Female age 0-5 0.08 0.01 
Proportion of Female age 6-9 0.11 -0.02 
Proportion of Female age 10-14 0.04 -0.04 
Proportion of Female age 15-65 0.09 0.01 
Proportion of Female age 65 or more -0.11 0.02 
Proportion of Male age 0-5 0.11 0.003 
Proportion of Male age 6-9 0.06 -0.02 
Proportion of Male age 10-14 0.04 -0.04 
Proportion of Male age 65 or more -0.08 -0.04 
Living standard Index 0.002 -0.01 
Durable Asset Index -0.02 -0.02 
Agricultural Land Ownership 0.01 -0.001 
Provincial Dummies: Punjab 0.05 0.04 
Sindh 0.05 0.04 
Balochistan 0.01 -0.02 
 
(vi) Probit model for Child Schooling (with fertility and demographic controls) 
Dependent Variables: Child Schooling All Pakistan Urban Rural ǯ 0.01 0.01 0.24 ǯ 0.02 0.01 0.03 
Child Age 0.17 0.07 0.22 
Square of Child Age -0.01 -0.005 -0.01 
Birth Order of the child 0.04 0.05 0.05 
Square of Birth Order -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 
Child if male 0.23 0.08 0.34 
Household headed by Male -0.09 -0.04 -0.01 
Log of Household Size -0.05 -0.05 -0.13 
Proportion of Female age 0-5 0.02 -0.14 0.07 
Proportion of Female age 6-9 -0.01 -0.13 -0.11 
Proportion of Female age 10-14 0.23 0.12 0.08 
Proportion of Female age 15-65 0.34 0.16 0.43 
Proportion of Female age 65 or more 0.45 0.37 0.44 
Proportion of Male age 0-5 -0.002 -0.14 0.04 
Proportion of Male age 6-9 0.06 -0.01 -0.13 
Proportion of Male age 10-14 0.05 -0.06 -0.12 
Proportion of Male age 65 or more 0.29 -0.12 0.69 
Living standard Index 0.02 0.01 -0.02 
Durable Asset Index 0.10 0.06 0.13 
Agricultural Land Ownership 0.04 0.06 0.05 
Provincial Dummies: Punjab -0.02 -0.01 -0.28 
Sindh -0.14 -0.07 -0.31 
Balochistan -0.09 -0.02 -0.14 
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(vii) Probit model for Child Schooling (without fertility and demographic 
controls) 
 
Dependent Variables: Child Schooling All Pakistan Urban Rural ǯ 0.01 0.01 0.23 ǯ 0.02 0.01 0.03 
Child Age 0.17 0.08 0.22 
Square of Child Age -0.01 -0.005 -0.01 
Child if male 0.21 0.06 0.32 
Household headed by Male -0.11 -0.06 -0.06 
Living standard Index 0.02 0.01 -0.01 
Durable Asset Index 0.10 0.06 0.12 
Agricultural Land Ownership 0.04 0.05 0.05 
Provincial Dummies: Punjab -0.01 -0.01 -0.25 
Sindh -0.14 -0.07 -0.31 
Balochistan -0.09 -0.02 -0.14 
 
(viii) Non-linearity and Non Monotonicity in MDM 
Dependent Variables: Child Schooling All Pakistan Urban Rural ǯ -0.05 -0.06 -0.01 ǯ 0.03 0.05 -0.01 ǯ -0.004 -0.01 0.005 ǯof Education 0.02 0.01 0.03 
Child Age 0.17 0.07 0.23 
Square of Child Age -0.01 -0.005 -0.01 
Birth Order of the child 0.04 0.05 0.02 
Square of Birth Order -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 
Child if male 0.23 0.08 0.33 
Household headed by Male -0.08 -0.04 -0.12 
Log of Household Size -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 
Proportion of Female age 0-5 0.02 -0.14 0.12 
Proportion of Female age 6-9 -0.02 -0.12 0.07 
Proportion of Female age 10-14 0.23 0.12 0.31 
Proportion of Female age 15-65 0.34 0.16 0.43 
Proportion of Female age 65 or more 0.45 0.38 0.53 
Proportion of Male age 0-5 -0.01 -0.13 0.09 
Proportion of Male age 6-9 0.06 -0.01 0.11 
Proportion of Male age 10-14 0.05 -0.06 0.13 
Proportion of Male age 65 or more 0.28 -0.13 0.60 
Living standard Index 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Durable Asset Index 0.10 0.06 0.12 
Agricultural Land Ownership 0.04 0.06 0.04 
Provincial Dummies: Punjab -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 
Sindh -0.14 -0.07 -0.18 
Balochistan -0.09 -0.02 -0.14 
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(ix) Probit model for Child Schooling by Gender 
Dependent Variables: Child Schooling Boys Girls ǯ 0.23 0.03 ǯ 0.01 0.03 
Child Age 0.20 0.16 
Square of Child Age -0.01 -0.01 
Birth Order of the child -0.01 0.07 
Square of Birth Order 0.00002 -0.01 
Household headed by Male -0.01 -0.08 
Log of Household Size 0.10 -0.10 
Proportion of Female age 0-5 0.25 -0.13 
Proportion of Female age 6-9 0.05 -0.04 
Proportion of Female age 10-14 0.13 0.24 
Proportion of Female age 15-65 0.30 0.42 
Proportion of Female age 65 or more 0.46 0.33 
Proportion of Male age 0-5 0.18 -0.12 
Proportion of Male age 6-9 0.12 0.02 
Proportion of Male age 10-14 0.10 0.15 
Proportion of Male age 65 or more 0.21 0.43 
Living standard Index -0.02 0.07 
Durable Asset Index 0.05 0.14 
Agricultural Land Ownership 0.05 0.04 
Provincial Dummies: Punjab -0.35 0.07 
Sindh -0.29 -0.13 
Balochistan -0.04 -0.14 
 
(x) Non-linearity and Non Monotonicity in MDM by Gender 
Dependent Variables: Child Schooling Boys Girls ǯ 0.23 -0.07 ǯ 0.05 0.05 ǯ -0.02 -0.01 ǯ 0.01 0.03 
Child Age 0.20 0.16 
Square of Child Age -0.01 -0.01 
Birth Order of the child 0.001 0.07 
Square of Birth Order -0.0001 -0.01 
Household headed by Male -0.02 -0.06 
Log of Household Size 0.07 -0.10 
Proportion of Female age 0-5 0.23 -0.13 
Proportion of Female age 6-9 0.01 -0.04 
Proportion of Female age 10-14 0.11 0.24 
Proportion of Female age 15-65 0.31 0.42 
Proportion of Female age 65 or more 0.48 0.32 
Proportion of Male age 0-5 0.17 -0.12 
Proportion of Male age 6-9 0.08 0.01 
Proportion of Male age 10-14 0.04 0.15 
Proportion of Male age 65 or more 0.24 0.42 
Living standard Index -0.02 0.07 
Durable Asset Index 0.05 0.14 
Agricultural Land Ownership 0.06 0.03 
Provincial Dummies: Punjab -0.37 0.06 
Sindh -0.31 -0.12 
Balochistan -0.03 -0.14 
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(xi) Economically Inactive Children 
Variables Economically Inactive Children 
Mother's DM Index -0.01 0.05 
Square of the Mother's DM Index - -0.03 
Cube of the Mother's DM Index - 0.005 ǯ -0.02 -0.02 
Child Age -0.23 -0.23 
Square of Child Age 0.01 0.01 
Birth Order of the child -0.04 -0.04 
Square of Birth Order 0.004 0.004 
Household headed by Male 0.09 0.08 
Log of Household Size 0.05 0.05 
Proportion of Female age 0-5 -0.01 -0.01 
Proportion of Female age 6-9 0.01 0.01 
Proportion of Female age 10-14 0.22 0.22 
Proportion of Female age 15-65 -0.28 -0.27 
Proportion of Female age 65 or more -0.41 -0.41 
Proportion of Male age 0-5 0.02 0.03 
Proportion of Male age 6-9 -0.06 -0.06 
Proportion of Male age 10-14 -0.46 -0.46 
Proportion of Male age 65 or more -0.27 -0.26 
Living standard Index -0.02 -0.02 
Durable Asset Index -0.10 -0.10 
Agricultural Land Ownership -0.04 -0.04 
Provincial Dummies: Punjab 0.01 0.02 
Sindh 0.14 0.13 
Balochistan 0.07 0.07 
 
(xii) Paid and Unpaid Labour 
Variables Unpaid Child Labour Paid Child Labour ǯ -0.01 -0.07 ǯ -0.003 -0.001 
Child Age -0.01 0.0002 
Square of Child Age 0.001 0.0002 
Birth Order of the child -0.003 -0.01 
Square of Birth Order 0.001 0.0005 
Child if male 0.01 0.01 
Household headed by Male 0.01 -0.12 
Log of Household Size -0.01 0.001 
Proportion of Female age 0-5 0.01 0.03 
Proportion of Female age 6-9 0.004 0.05 
Proportion of Female age 10-14 -0.02 0.05 
Proportion of Female age 15-65 0.02 0.01 
Proportion of Female age 65 or more -0.03 0.03 
Proportion of Male age 0-5 0.01 0.03 
Proportion of Male age 6-9 -0.01 0.05 
Proportion of Male age 10-14 -0.02 0.06 
Proportion of Male age 65 or more -0.02 -0.05 
Living standard Index -0.01 0.01 
Durable Asset Index -0.01 0.0001 
Agricultural Land Ownership 0.01 -0.01 
Provincial Dummies: Punjab 0.02 0.49 
Sindh 0.03 0.17 
Balochistan -0.01 -0.002 
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Annex A-5.8: Sub-sample consist of Household headed by Male 
$OWKRXJK UHVXOWVSUHGLFW WKHVLJQLILFDQWHIIHFWRIPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQ- making power on 
KHUFKLOG¶VVFKRROLQJDQGODERXUGHFLVLRQEXWLQRUGHUWRFKHFNVSHFLILFDOO\Whe influence 
of decision making power gained by females in the male- headed household, we re-
estimated the model for only those households that have male heads. Out of the 11209 
household 94% is headed by males. Female- headed household mostly includes those 
household where mothers of the husbands, head the house. Table A-5.10.1 and table A-
5.10.2 provides the results. Result does not show any significant difference for the child 
ODERXUEXWIRU WKHVFKRROLQJWKHUHVXOWGLIIHU7KHHIIHFWRIPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRn- making 
SRZHU RQ KHU FKLOG¶V VFKRROLQJ LQ XUEDQ DUHDV LV LQVLJQLILFDQW ZKLFK ZDV SUHYLRXVO\
significant.   
 
Table A-5.8.1: Effect on Child Labour 
Variables 
All 
Pakistan 
Urban Rural Boys Girls ǯ -0.06(0.02)* 0.003(0.94) -1.6(0.01) * -0.05(0.17) -0.1(0.02)** ǯ
Education 
-0.06(0.00) * -0.05(0.00)* -0.07(0.0) * -0.07(0.0) * -0.04(0.0) * 
Child Age -0.22(0.43) 0.51(0.40) -0.35(0.28) -0.45(0.22) -0.003(0.99) 
Square of Child Age 0.02(0.15) -0.01(0.68) 0.02(0.11) .03(0.06)*** 0.005(0.80) 
Birth Order of the child -0.09(0.13) -0.23(0.04) ** -.004(0.98) -0.2(0.00) * 0.14(0.16) 
Square of Birth Order 0.02(0.01) * 0.03(0.03) ** 0.01(0.18) 0.03(0.00) * -0.01(0.44) 
Log of Household Size -0.06(0.45) 0.32(0.03) ** -0.60(0.29) -0.11(0.26) -0.02(0.89) 
Proportion of Female age 0-5 0.50(0.16) 1.2(0.10) *** -0.09(0.87) 0.9(0.05) ** -0.09(0.88) 
Proportion of Female age 6-9 0.56(0.12) 1.44(0.05) ** 0.21(0.78) 1.0(0.03) ** -0.23(0.70) 
Proportion of Female age 10-14 -0.7(0.03) ** 0.44(0.49) -0.73(0.30) 0.52(0.23) -0.76(0.18) 
Proportion of Female age 15-65 0.5(0.09) *** 0.69(0.21) 0.39(0.26) 0.8(0.03) ** 0.00(1.00) 
Proportion of Female age 65 or 
more 
-0.06(0.93) 1.21(0.39) 0.34(0.69) -0.78(0.4) 0.67(0.50) 
Proportion of Male age 0-5 0.6(0.07) *** 1.10(0.15) 0.19(0.72) 1.1(0.02) ** -0.03(0.96) 
Proportion of Male age 6-9 0.17(0.63) 0.77(0.28) 0.18(0.83) 0.51(0.27) -0.43(0.46) 
Proportion of Male age 10-14 0.75(0.01) * 2.66(0.00) * 0.34(0.65) 0.36(0.40) -0.59(0.27) 
Proportion of Male age 65 or 
more 
-0.98(0.17) -1.76(0.30) -0.70(0.43) -1.24(0.19) -0.78(0.48) 
Living standard Index -0.04(0.19) -0.03(0.48) 0.11(0.12) 0.01(0.71) -0.1(0.02)** 
Durable Asset Index -0.21(0.00) * -0.21(0.00) * -0.14(0.04) -0.2(0.00) * -0.23(0.0) * 
Agricultural Land Ownership -0.002(0.98) -0.14(0.53) -0.03(0.71) 0.03(0.79) -0.02(0.86) 
Provincial Dummies: Punjab 0.47(0.00) * 0.51(0.00) * 1.98(0.0) * 0.40(0.00) * 0.59(0.00) * 
Sindh 0.47(0.00) * 0.55(0.00) * 1.2(0.0) * 0.42(0.00) * 0.55(0.00) * 
Balochistan -0.03(0.70) 0.22(0.16) -.2(0.09)*** 0.09(0.29) -0.4(0.01) * 
Constant -1.32(0.43) -7.53(0.04) ** 1.83(0.46) 0.07(0.98) -2.52(0.35) 
Number of Observation 10540 4129 6411 5373 5167 
Log Likelihood Ratio -2385.01 -548.75 -1818.55 -1417.45 -912.48 
LR-statistics 937.86 282.01 548.23 621.82 352.13 
Prob. LR-statistics 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pseudo R-square 0.164 0.204 0.131 0.18 0.16 
Note: *, ** & *** represents significant at 1%, 5% & 10% significance level. Numbers in parenthesis are 
P-values. The endogeneity in the Decision making power and household size is checked using Wald tests of 
Exogeneity. As the test value is insignificant the variables are considered as exogenous. 
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Table A-5.8.2: Effect on Child Schooling 
Variables All Pakistan Urban Rural Boys Girls ǯ 0.01(0.74) 0.03(0.28) 0.54(0.17) 1.13(0.01) * 0.05(0.05) ** ǯ
Education 
0.06(0.00) * 0.06(0.0) * 0.07(0.00) * 0.05(0.00) * 0.07(0.00) * 
Child Age 0.62(0.00) * 0.34(0.33) 0.71(0.00) * 0.81(0.01) * 0.35(0.21) 
Square of Child Age -0.03(0.00) * -0.02(0.13) -0.04(0.0) * -0.04(0.0) * -0.02(0.06) *** 
Birth Order of the child 0.09(0.03) ** 0.2(0.01) * 0.10(0.33) 0.03(0.86) 0.17(0.01) * 
Square of Birth Order -0.01(0.04) ** -0.02(0.01) * -0.01(0.26) -0.002(0.86) -0.02(0.01) * 
Log of Household Size -0.17(0.00) * -0.30(0.00) * -0.31(0.47) 0.17(0.82) -0.27(0.00) * 
Proportion of Female age 0-5 0.09(0.71) -0.50(0.27) 0.13(0.74) 0.9(0.10) *** -0.34(0.35) 
Proportion of Female age 6-9 0.03(0.92) -0.39(0.40) -0.27(0.63) -0.05(0.96) -0.09(0.81) 
Proportion of Female age 10-14 -0.69(0.00) * -0.12(0.75) -1.59(0.0) * 0.39(0.52) 0.59(0.08) *** 
Proportion of Female age 15-65 1.07(0.00) * 0.95(0.00) * 0.99(0.0) * 1.34(0.00) * 1.20(0.00) * 
Proportion of Female age 65 or 
more 
1.55(0.00) * 2.1(0.02) ** 1.1(0.07)*** 2.09(0.01) * 0.99(0.14) 
Proportion of Male age 0-5 0.04(0.88) -0.49(0.27) 0.08(0.84) 0.67(0.23) -0.33(0.35) 
Proportion of Male age 6-9 0.28(0.27) 0.12(0.79) -0.25(0.67) 0.22(0.82) 0.07(0.85) 
Proportion of Male age 10-14 1.61(0.00) * 0.53(0.14) 1.54(0.01) * -0.01(1.0) 0.49(0.13) 
Proportion of Male age 65 or 
more 
0.94(0.05) ** -0.54(0.53) 1.72(0.01) * 1.32(0.18) 1.26(0.06) *** 
Living standard Index 0.07(0.00) * 0.04(0.17) -0.03(0.53) -.1(0.06)*** 0.19(0.00) * 
Durable Asset Index 0.30(0.00) * 0.28(0.00) * 0.31(0.00) * 0.22(0.0) * 0.35(0.00) * 
Agricultural Land Ownership 0.12(0.02) ** 0.35(0.01) * 0.1(0.08)*** 0.3(0.02) ** 0.1(0.17) 
Provincial Dummies: Punjab -0.06(0.19) -0.05(0.55) -0.6(0.1) *** -1.53(0.0) * 0.20(0.00) * 
Sindh -0.41(0.00) * -0.30(0.00) * -0.73(0.0) * -1.09(0.0) * -0.34(0.00) * 
Balochistan -0.26(0.00) * -0.08(0.34) -0.34(0.0) * -.2(0.07)*** -0.37(0.00) * 
Constant -2.64(0.02) ** -0.53(0.80) -3.2(0.08)*** -5(0.07)*** -1.25(0.46) 
Number of Observation 10540 4129 6411 5373 5167 
Log Likelihood Ratio -5175.93 -1611.03 -3517.79 -2367.36 -2510.98 
LR-statistics 2725.23 762.51 1547.73 917.13 1963.50 
Prob. LR-statistics 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pseudo R-square 0.208 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.28 
Note: *, ** & *** represents significant at 1%, 5% & 10% significance level. Numbers in parenthesis are P-values. 
The endogeneity in the Decision making power and household size is control in all Pakistan and rural samples, 
where Wald tests of Exogeneity is significant i.e. predicting the endogeneity 
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6. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
6.1 Summary of Findings and Policy implications 
 
The issue of child labour has been in debate for many centuries. It is a pervasive 
problem in developing countries but developed countries have also remained concerned 
over the alarming situation of child labour. The issue is not only relevant for 
investigation on humanitarian grounds but also for the sustainable growth of a country. 
Sustainable development requires human capital formation for which child labour is an 
obstacle. History suggests that every nation has passed through a stage of development 
during which child labour persisted but with compulsory education laws brought in 
place, technological advancement and resulting growth, child labour has eliminated. 
The issue is therefore not new, but the recent growth in the literature may be attributed 
to the Child Deterrence Act of US which restricted the export of products that uses 
children as inputs. The motivation of the dissertation is thus based on the on-going 
debates on child labour.  
 
Specifically the dissertation has explored the determinants of child labour in the light of 
recent debates on trade sanctions, labour market conditions and intra household 
bargaining power. The dissertation provides two kind of evidence. The first kind of 
evidence (chapter 3) is macro and cross country, while the second kind (4 and 5) is 
meso/micro and speak to Pakistan. The two parts can be grouped into demand and 
supply side economics of child labour. The first two empirical chapters (chapter 3 and 
4) focus on the demand for child labour whereas the third empirical chapter (chapter 5) 
looks into the question why households supply child labour. This chapter provides a 
brief summary of the aims of each empirical chapter, how they contribute to the 
literature and their principal findings.  
 
As was said earlier, a large part of recent literature has explicitly explored the effect of 
trade liberalization on the incidence of child labour. But the effect was mainly explored 
without controlling the endogeneity of the trade variable, while Edmond and Pavcnik 
(2006) rejected the exogeneity of the trade variable. Further to this Davis and Voy 
(2009) not only rejected the exogeneity of the trade variable but they also argued that 
the effect of FDI inflow is also endogenous to the child labour. Both of these studies 
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provided the empirical support for their argument using a cross country regression 
framework. On the theoretical side Jafarey and Lahiri (2002) have explored the effect of 
trade sanctions by considering the credit market imperfection on child labour incidence. 
Their model demonstrates that trade can increase child labour among poor households; 
a possibility that decreases as their access to credit improves. Maskus (1997) on the 
other hand argues that overall incidence of child labour may decline due to the income 
effect of trade but child labour incidence in export related industries could increase due 
to the result of an increase in demand for cheap labour. 
 
Mostly studies exploring the effect of globalisation (defined by trade openness and FDI 
inflow) on child labour did not explore the presence of imperfect credit market on child 
labour. Although there are studies that have explored the effect of credit market 
imperfections but they are not concerned with the effect of globalization. The first 
contribution of this chapter is that it has explored the effect of credit market 
imperfections and globalization, after controlling for the endogeneity in trade openness, 
FDI inflow and credit market indicator. Chapter 3 further contribute in the existing 
literature by comparing the effect of export and trade and by including an alternative 
measure of the income, estimated by using Gini coefficient and income share of bottom 
quintile population.     
 
The findings indicate that countries that are more open to trade and have higher FDI 
inflow have lower incidence of child labour. This effect is channelled through income 
(after correcting for endogeneity in trade openness and FDI inflow). This is because 
both trade openness and FDI inflow is statistically significant only after dropping 
income from the model. It is evident from the macro data that trade openness and FDI 
inflow will affect child labour through affecting the living standard. Hence, trade 
sanctions may not have a significant effect on the incidence of child labour. This may 
be because child labour in export related industries is hard to find. Further to this, credit 
market imperfection does not show significant effect. We included credit variable to 
analyse the proposition given by Jafarey and Lahiri (2002) that when trade reduces the 
income, poor household will need credit to overcome the income shock. In our 
estimation both trade and FDI found to be enhancing the income rather than reducing it. 
The insignificant effect of credit may be because of this reason (both trade and FDI 
inflow reducing child labour through increasing income).  Furthermore, comparing the 
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results of trade openness and exports study conclude that, at macro level, both trade 
openness and exports effects child labour through raising income of the poor. This 
might be because at macro level it very difficult to find children working for the large 
scale exporting sectors as explains earlier.   
 
Chapter 3 has also explored the effect of income on child labour, first by testing the 
effect of real GDP per capita and then by including alternative measure of income 
estimated from Gini coefficient and income share of the bottom quintile population as 
explained earlier. Both measures of income shows that increases in income reduce the 
incidence of child labour significantly. Based on statistical tests (AIC and BIC) the 
study conclude that income of the bottom quartile of the population is the best 
representation of the income of the poor when studying child labour.  
 
In addition to the above, results also show highly negative and significant effect of 
average years of adult schooling on incidence of child labour, an important variable 
representing presence of skilled labour in an economy. The higher the average year of 
schooling the higher will be skilled labour force and the lower will be the child labour 
incidence. Furthermore, result also provides empirical evidence of the negative 
relationship between foreign aid and incidence of child labour. Hence study concludes 
that increasing the aid flow from developed countries to developing countries may help 
countries in increasing the development and social expenditure which may help in 
reducing child labour incidence.  
 
After exploring the effect of globalization and some macro-economic factors on the 
incidence of child labour, the study then turns to the question of where children find 
employment. What role does the labour market conditions have in creating demand for 
child labour? Cain and Mozumder (1980) argued that the economic value of children 
cannot properly be assessed without reference to the structure of the labour market. 
Chapter 4 addresses various specific research questions namely: Are households more 
likely to send their children to work if they live in regions where wages are low? Is 
there any demand side effect of higher adult wages? Does there exist substitution 
between adult and child labour leading to high adult unemployment rate? And is the 
effect sensitive to the degree of segmentation between the formal and informal sector? 
The issue is probed by using the Labour Force Survey data of Pakistan. Chapter 4 is 
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based on Pakistan, firstly because there is an extensive literature addressing the 
economics of child labour in Pakistan but the literature ignores the effect of labour 
market conditions. Secondly because the in-depth analysis of the effect of labour 
market indicators on the incidence of child labour requires micro level surveys that are 
rarely available. Although SIMPOC 48  provides some micro level surveys but the 
indicators of SIMPOC do not measure the labour market situation of the countries.   
 
Chapter 4 is also the first comprehensive study of Pakistan that looks into the effect of 
labour market indicators by pooling the cross sectional surveys of Labour Force from 
1990 onwards. The chapter has not only controlled the regional variations but has also 
explored the effect with respect to time as well. The findings indicate that labour market 
indicators can produce both supply side and demand driven effects. The demand for 
child labour arises mainly due to adult wages and presence of the informal, agriculture 
and exporting sectors while the supply of child labour usually arise because of high adult 
unemployment in the household. 
 
Conversely the higher adult unemployment at a division/district/city lowers the 
probability for a child to find employment. This is in contrast to the effect of adult 
unemployed proportion at the household level which lowers the income of the 
household and thus raises supply of child labour. The Informal sector is the sector 
which absorbs a high proportion of child labour due its nature of being not recognized 
or protected under the legal and regulatory frameworks. We find, the higher the size of 
informal sector in an area, the higher will be child labour. 
 
Recall that in chapter 3, results at macro level (cross country analysis) predicted that the 
effect of export and trade only affected child labour by increasing the income of the 
poor. This macro finding could be explained on the ground that presence of child labour 
in the export related industries is very small. However, based on the micro data, the 
study reveals that the presence of export related industry in a division/district/city 
increases child labour significantly. This is due to the subcontracting system that exists 
in Pakistan. In Pakistan, like in other developing countries, to remain cost competitive 
in the world market, producers are using a subcontracting system for the production 
process. Children are sometimes engaged in the informal sector or in the subsidiary 
                                                 
48Statistical Information and Monitoring Programme on Child Labour (SIMPOC) by ILO/IPEC 
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sectors which provides raw material to the exporting sectors. The macro level data fails 
to capture the effect of these hidden industries. But based on the meso level evidence, 
the study concludes that the higher the export related work in a division/district/city the 
higher will be the probability for a child to find employment. 
 
Chapter 3 and 4 are mainly concerned with the demand side determinant of child 
labour49. On the supply side there exists a vast literature on the topic. A large part of the 
literature explores the effect of poverty, parental education and occupation, household 
income and child characteristics on the incidence of child labour. However recently, 
there is a growing debate on the intra household distribution of power and its effect on 
household expenditure including expenditure on education. The on-going debate on 
intra household balance of power has raised an argument i.e. is the identification of the 
person who holds the money important for welfare of the household, especially for child 
related outcomes (health and education)? 
 
Recently Basu (2006) theoretically while Lancaster et.al (2006) and Felkey (2005) 
HPSLULFDOO\ IRXQG WKDW WKH HIIHFW RI PRWKHU¶V EDUJDLQLQJ SRZHU RQ FKLOG HGXFDWLRQ LV
significant. Addressing the arguments that have arisen in recent literature, chapter 5 of 
the dissertation KDVH[SORUHG WKHHIIHFWRIDPRWKHU¶VEDUJDLQLQJSRZHURQKHUFKLOG¶V
schooling and labour decisions. The issue is probed by using the Pakistan Standard of 
Living Measurement Survey data. Although for Pakistan Hou (2011) has explored the 
HIIHFWRIZRPHQ¶VEDUJDLQLQJSRZHURQWKHEXGJHWVKDUHFDORULFLQWDNHDQGFKLOGUHQ¶V
school enrollment, but the effect on child labour has not yet been addressed in any 
study. His finding indicate that when women have more decision making power at 
home, households WHQG WR VSHQG PRUH RQ ZRPHQ¶V SUHIHUUHG JRRGs such as clothing, 
education, non-grain items and children¶V education particularly girls are more likely to 
be enrolled in the school. Furthermore, Hou (2011) does not explore the possible 
nonlinearity and non-monotonic nature of bargaining power effect. The aim of chapter 5 
LV WKHUHIRUHQRWRQO\ WR H[SORUH WKHHIIHFWRIPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQPDNLQJSRZHURQKHU
FKLOG¶V labour and schooling decision but also to explore the nonlinear and non-
PRQRWRQLFQDWXUHRIWKHPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQPDNLQJSRZHUDVZHOO 
 
                                                 
49
 Although some of the indicators analysed also have supply side effect but the overall objectives (the 
effect of trade and labour market) usually concerned demand side effects.   
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The chapter clearly shows that WKHPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ power significantly affects 
child schooling and labour decision. Generally the effect is positive on child schooling 
decisions while negative on the child labour. However, tKHHIIHFWRIPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQ
making power is non-monotonic for child labour only. There is a turning point, beyond 
which additional power gained by mothers may have a different effect on labour 
decision. Further to this chapter 5 also point out that the effect of mother decision 
PDNLQJ GLIIHUV E\ JHQGHU 7KH HIIHFW LV VLJQLILFDQW IRU JLUO¶V ODERXU GHFLVLRQ EXW
iQVLJQLILFDQW IRU ER\¶V ODERXU GHFLVLRQ 7KH HIIHFW GLIIHUV DFURVV UHJLRQV DV ZHOO 7KH
HIIHFWRIPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQPDNLQJSRZHURQKHUFKLOG¶VODERXUGHFLVLRQ LVVLJQLILFDQW
only in rural areas.  
 
Overall the dissertation predicts that globalization, labour market conditions and intra-
household distribution of power significantly influence child labour supply and demand. 
In sum the dissertation points out that:  
 
x Trade openness and FDI inflow after correcting for endogeneity raise the standard of 
living in an economy thereby reducing the supply of child labour.  
x Income either measure by GDP per-capita or by income of the poorest quintile after 
correcting for endogeneity shows significant negative effect 
x As trade and FDI both affect through income, credit market indicator does not show 
significant effect.  
x Average years of adult schooling and foreign aid reduce child labour incidence 
significantly.  
x For exports dissertation provides some mixed evidence. At macro level it reduces the 
supply of child labour by affecting the income of the poor. While at meso level the 
subcontracting of production process to small informal sector, producing raw 
material for the large exporting sector, increases the demand for child labour.  
x the informal sector being unprotected by law employ a high proportion of child 
labour 
x high adult wages in an area increase the demand for child labour 
x presence of adult unemployed proportion in an area reduces the demand for child 
labour, in contrast to household adult unemployment which increases the supply of 
child labour 
x agriculture sector increase the demand for child labour  
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x 0RWKHU¶V GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ SRZHU GHFUHDVHV WKH FKLOG ODERXU VXSSO\ DQG LQFUHDVHV
child schooling.  
x The effect of PRWKHU¶V GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ SRZHU IRU KHU FKLOG¶V ODERXU GHFLVLRQ LV
significant only for girls while its effect on child schooling decision is significant for 
both girls and boys. 
x Furthermore, the effect is non-PRQRWRQLFIRUKHUFKLOG¶VODERXUGHFLVLRQRQO\  
 
Any policy combating child labour incidence must take into account the role of above 
variables. For example, for globalization as discuss above, at the macro level 
dissertation points out that the channel through which trade and FDI could affect child 
labour is by increasing the income therefore, study recommend that trade sanctions may 
not have significant effect. Moreover, at macro level exports decreases child labour 
incidence while at meso level exports found to be increasing child labour incidence in 
the informal sector. There may be circumstances in which export may generate the 
demand for child labour in the informal sectors producing raw material for large scale 
sector. Therefore, study recommends that promoting trade liberalization policies may be 
meaningful in reducing child labour incidence by increasing income and raising living 
standard of the people. However as it may also generate child labour demand in 
informal sector therefore we recommend that trade policies such as relaxation of taxes 
and provision of subsidies and encouraging inflow of investment in the modern sectors, 
may help in the development of modern sectors through technological advancement. 
Technological advancement may decrease the reliance on human capital and may also 
increase income. Overall this will increase the standard of living (as evidence show) 
thereby effectively reducing the demand for child labour. 
 
Next as analysis shows significant negative effect of income of the poorest quintile 
study recommend that effective policy to reduce child labour incidence within an 
economy should accompany with the efforts in reducing income inequality as well. The 
result also shows a highly negative and significant effect of increase in average year of 
adult schooling on incidence of child labour. In developing countries, mainly because of 
the low level of educational attainment, unskilled labourers are in abundance. This 
includes child labour as well. Therefore any increase in average years of schooling will 
result in skill formation leading to high wages and a reduction in the supply of child 
labour. Presence of high skilled labour increased labour productivity and economic 
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growth over the long run. It may also result in more equal distribution of income 
because of an increase in the relative wage for unskilled labour resulting from a reduced 
supply of unskilled labour. This may also help in attracting FDI, leading to further 
economic development.  
 
The result also provides empirical evidence of the negative relationship between aid and 
incidence of child labour. Increasing aid flow from developed countries to developing 
countries was found to reduce child labour. Hence, the study concludes that if the 
developed nations fund programs that target working children for rehabilitation and 
HGXFDWLRQOLNH81,&()SURJUDP³IRRGIRUHGXFDWLRQ´WKLVPD\KHOSLQUHGXFLQJFKLOG
labour in the developing countries. With the help of foreign aid, World Bank poverty 
reduction programs and UNICEF programs, a change could be made. Working children 
may end up going to school rather than working. With a ban on child labour and 
support for the education assistance programmes, children may benefit. 
 
In case of Pakistan result shows that the demand for child labour usually arises because 
of the presence of informal, agriculture and export related sectors. Exporting sector 
employing children is usually informal in nature as one cannot find children in large 
scale manufacturing sector while agriculture sector is by nature informal. Overall these 
three sectors employing children can be considered as basically informal.  Now the 
question arises, how to reduce the effect of informal sector on child labour? It is a very 
critical question. In Pakistan 74% of the economy is informal. Its role in generating 
employment, income and growth cannot be ignored. There is a paper by Burki and 
Afaqi (1996) on the role of informal sector in Pakistan economy. By considering its 
importance he concluded that it is necessary to develop these sector through inter or 
intra industry technology transfer. If this is the case then technology transfer could 
reduce child labour demand as there is ample evidence from the 19th century technology 
revolution that technology reduces child labour demand considerably. 
 
Generally, in Pakistan the most common reason given by parents for sending children to 
work is to equip the children with skills. This situation can be moderated by providing 
vocational training based education with some small compensation. Realizing this fact, 
government of Pakistan has already started establishing the Vocational training 
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institutes. But the work is more concentrated in the urban areas (mainly in large cities) 
and targeting unskilled adult. This may be fruitful in long run as it will help in 
enhancing the skill and income of the adult labour which will definitely affect child 
ODERXU VXSSO\ 6RPH 1*2¶V DUH DOVR ZRUNLQJ DW JUDVV URRW OHYHO WR SURYLGH VNLOOHG
based education at school level with some compensation such as; a tin of oil, meal for 
one time a day or some small amount as compensation. But the work is still in progress 
and the fruit is yet to be analysed.  
 
Finally, based on the finding of chapter 5, the study proposed that in-order to target 
poor mothers in the cash transfer programme it is necessary to understand the effect of 
distribution of power on the welfare of the household or on child related outcome in 
depth. Transferring cash to the mother may result in the human development of her 
child and it may lower child labour supply but the effect may not be same for all 
children and region. 7KHHIIHFWRIPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQPDNLQJSRZHUYDULHVEDVHGRQWKH
gender of the child and region residing. Moreover, the non-monotonic relationship 
EHWZHHQPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQPDNLQJSRZHURQKHUFKLOG¶VODERXUstresses that the effect 
should be constantly reassessed. As the effect of cash transfer for reducing the child 
labour today may differ from the effect of tomorrow. The changes in the effect depend 
on the changing behaviour of the distribution of power with in the household.  
 
Lastly, we also recommend that Governmental organizations, Non-governmental 
organizations:RPHQ¶V organizations and other stakeholders (private initiatives, civil 
society etc.) should address women directly with awareness, literacy and skill related 
development programmes. For example agencies could implement skill based education 
programmes for the mothers. These skill base education strategies will also encourage 
husbands to support their wives in taking part in the employment opportunities. This 
will enhance PRWKHU¶V economic contribution which in turn improve their status and 
role within the house and outside in the community as well. 
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Table 6.1: Summary Findings 
Chapters Main Objective  List of Variables 
Estimation Technique & 
Data set Used 
Major Findings 
Effect of 
Globalization and 
credit market 
imperfections on 
child labour 
Investigate the link 
between globalization, 
defined as increase in 
trade openness and 
penetration of FDI, 
and incidence of child 
labour by taking in to 
account the role of 
credit market 
imperfections 
Dependent Variable: Percentage of 
Economically Active Children Age 10-14.  
Independent Variables: Trade openness, 
FDI, Private Credit (% GDP), GDP per-
capita, Income based on Poorest Quintile 
(Q1), Export & Import.  
Control Variables: Share of Agriculture 
and Manufacturing Sectors in GDP, 
Average Years of Schooling, Pupil Teacher 
Ratio, Female Labour Force Participation 
Rate, Aid (% GNI).   
IV-2SLS and Tobit. 
Endogenous Variables: 
Income of Bottom Quintile, 
GDP per-capita, Trade 
Openness, Export, FDI and 
Private Credit as % GDP. 
Data set is based on 129 
Developing Countries for 5 
decades, 1970, 80, 90, 2000 
& 2010 
x Predicts the negative effect of income using two different measures 
of income, after correcting endogeneity bias, (i) GDP per-capita (ii) 
Income of the poorest Quintile (Q1)-helpful in testing the inequality 
argument as well. 
x Impacts of international trade and FDI on child labour, after 
correcting for endogeneity shows that, countries that are more open 
to trade and having higher FDI inflow have lower incidence of child 
labour. But this effect is principally channel through income. 
x As trade, export and FDI all affect child labour through income, the 
proposition that household will borrow when trade sanction 
reduces the income, in-order to avoid child work does not hold.  
Labour Market 
Conditions and 
Child Labour 
Explores the effect of 
Labour conditions on 
Child Labour incidence 
by arguing that Labour 
market indicators can 
produce both supply 
side and demand 
driven affects. 
Dependent Variable: Economically Active 
Children Age 10-14.  
Independent Variables: Adult Wages at 
District and Household level, Adult 
Unemployment at Household and district 
level, Size of Informal, Agriculture and 
Exporting Sector at District level 
Control Variables: Child age & Gender, 
Gender of the household head, Education 
of the male & Female heads, Education of 
the spouse of male heads & household size.   
Fixed Effect after making 
Pseudo Panel. Based on 
Cross sectional data of 
Labour Force Survey of 
Pakistan for the period 
1990-91, 1991-92, 1992-93, 
1994-95, 1997-98, 1999-
2000, 2001-02, 2003-4, 
2005-06 and 2007-08  
x The demand for child labour arises mainly due to the adult wages, 
Size of informal, agriculture and exporting Sectors at District level.  
x The supply of child labour usually arises because of the high adult 
unemployed proportion in the household and low household wages. 
x Adult unemployment rate at district level shows that the higher the 
adult unemployed proportion in a division/district/city the lower 
will be the probability for a child to find an employment. 
x Presence of the export related industries in an area increases the 
probability of child work mainly due to the existence of 
subcontracting system. 
x Informal sector absorbs high proportion of child labour due its 
nature being not recognized or protected under the legal & 
regulatory frameworks.   ǯ
Decision Making 
Power and ǯ
and Schooling 
Decisions 
Intra-household 
distribution of power 
affects the child 
related outcomes 
Dependent Variable: Children in labour 
force and in Schools, age 10-14.  
Independent Variables: ǯ
Decision Making Index 
Control Variables: Child age & Birth 
order, Gender of the household head, 
Parents years of Schooling, household size, 
Living standard & durable Asset Index.   
IV-Probit.  
Endogenous Variables: ǯ
Index and Household Size. 
Based on Pakistan Standard 
of Living Measurement 
Survey- 2007-08   
x ǯ
and la Ǥ      ǯ ǯǤ 
x The effect is of mothers decision making power is nonlinear but 
non-monotonic for child labour. 
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6.2 Some Limitations and Future scope of the study 
 
There are some fundamental limitations imposed on desk-based research studies that 
rely exclusively on existing literature and available datasets. This study also faces 
certain limitations. The first limitation that this study faced is the limited availability of 
data on economically active children aged 10-14. In chapter 4 the data on economically 
active population age 10-14 is taken from the ILO database of EAPEP [Economically 
Active Population, Estimates and Projections ± 4th Editions (1996)]. The ILO has 
computed the activity rates by using the household survey data of individual countries. 
In order to make the data comparable across countries and time, several adjustments 
had been made by ILO. The adjustments were made because the individual country 
survey data vary in terms of definition of economically active population followed, 
geographical areas covered, type of survey available, age groups considered etc.  
Furthermore survey years also differ for each country. Although EAPEP provides 
comparable information on individual countries across time but the problem with this 
data is that very few countries have multiple observations available over time. 
Therefore much of the variation in child labor data is because of the imputations and 
adjustments made by ILO. This puts a question mark on the reliability of the estimates 
as well.  
 
However, in the absence of the cross country comparable estimates with respect to time, 
many empirical studies have used this dataset for the assessment purpose (e.g. Cigno et 
al., 2002; Deheija and Gatti, 2002; Rogers, and Swinnerton, 2001 and many others). 
Although this study acknowledges the limitation of this dataset but in the absence of 
any comparable estimates, the empirical assessment of chapter 4 is also based on this 
dataset as well.   
 
6HFRQGPHDVXULQJWKHPRWKHU¶VGHFLVLRQPDNLQJSRZHULVDGLIILFXOWWDVNERWKLQ-terms 
of finding the suitable measure and finding good quantitative surveys. The concept of 
decision making is multi-dimensional, difficult to define, identify or measure. It refers 
to a variety of attitudes and attributes, which are likely to vary across class, time, and 
space [Mayoux, (1998)]. The social, political and cultural dimensions of decision 
making process are interconnected, qualitative and subjective. This makes the 
assessment difficult [Goetz and Sen Gupta, (1996)]. Recently authors have used control 
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over resources and share of women earning as a decision making indicator. But as in 
Pakistan the women are less likely to be involved in outside paid work and the data on 
the ownership of assets is hard to find, the study cannot be based on these two 
indicators. Further to this, survey data of PSLM-2007-08, used to measure the decision 
making power, is the last available dataset that incorporates questions on the women 
decision making power of mother. After 2007-08, due to the changes in the strategies, 
the PSLM now only covers the living standard measurement questions (such as health, 
education, living conditions etc.). The PSLM 2007-08 provides information on the 
decisions related to purchase of food and clothing, decision about travelling and getting 
into employment etc. In the absence of data on control over resources and female 
earning share, the measure of decision making power is based on these indicators and 
the findings are for 2007-08 only.  
 
Third limitation that this study faced is related to the identification of export related 
industries at division/district/city level. The pseudo panel constructed in chapter four 
provides in-depth assessment of the labour market conditions of Pakistan but the effect 
of export related industry may be over or under estimated. This is because of the 
absence of direct information on individual involvement in exporting firms. Labour 
Force Survey of Pakistan does not provide information about whether the person is 
directly engaged in an exporting firm or not. In the absence of the information, export 
related activity in a division/district/city was computed (as explain in Annex A- 4.21). 
Although the estimated size of the export related industry provides significant positive 
effect on child labour demand but here it is acknowledge that the estimates may be over 
or under estimated. 
 
Finally in order to reach any final conclusion how child labour could be effected by the 
exports study recommend that future studies should explore the role of informal sectors 
providing input to the large scale exporting sector in depth. As in Pakistan national 
level surveys do not have information whether or not informal sectors are producing 
input for the large scale manufacturing directly, a study based on small sample may be 
helpful in order to get the in-depth knowledge. These small scale studies may address 
the labour market conditions in an area. For example, in Pakistan Sialkot city is famous 
for producing surgical instrument that cover a large part of exports as well. The industry 
is once famous for children employment. Due to the world pressure now, at the large 
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scale manufacturing sector, one cannot find working children. There might be a case of 
shifting of children from large scale manufacturing to informal sector. A small scale 
study addressing labour market conditions of Sialkot City may help in generalizing the 
impact in greater detail.  
 
Furthermore, analysis of chapter 4 indicates that there exists substantial difference 
between the two periods, before and after 1995-96. This could be because of the 
changes in the trade polices due to the implementation of Child Deterrence Act of 1997. 
But because of the unavailability of the time series data on child labour, at cross country 
level and also in Pakistan, the effect of exogenous shocks, due to the changes in 
economic events after the implementation of act, cannot be assessed. It is widely 
accepted fact that a structural break is a common problem in macroeconomic series that 
are usually affected by policy changes. Therefore, the relationship between trade 
liberalization and incidence of child labour is likely to be subject to variation as a result 
of changes in the trade structure due to Child Deterrence Act of 1997. In this regard the 
study recommends that instead of using the cross country regression framework future 
studies can perform single country analysis where time series data is available. This 
may help in predicting the parameters, used for making inference or forecasting, more 
accurately. 
Finally, study also acknowledges that chapter on labour market conditions should also 
have explored the work related injuries associated with child labour and the 
determinants of domestic child work. But due to time limitation these two points have 
not been explored in the dissertation. Study recommends that in future study can use the 
data from labour Force survey of Pakistan to evaluate the work related injuries. For 
child domestic work small sample survey can be used to analyse the factors promoting 
domestic child worker. Analysing the factors promoting child domestic work will be 
helpful in designing the policy to protect domestic child worker from violence 
especially in the case of Pakistan.    
 
             
270 
 
7. References 
 
 
Agarwal, B. (1997). Bargaining and Gender Relations: Within and Beyond the 
Household. Feminist Economics, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 1-51. 
Ali, K. and Khan, R. E. A. (2004). Simultaneous Decision Making of Child Schooling 
and Child Labour in Pakistani Urban Households. Lahore Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 9 (1), pp. 127-148. 
Amin, S. (1995). The Poverty-Purdah Trap in Rural Bangladesh: Implications for 
Women Roles in the Family. Working Paper, New York, Research Division, The 
Population Council. 
Anker, R. and Melkas H. (1996). Economic Incentives for Children and Families to 
Eliminate or Reduce Child Labour. ILO, Geneva. 
Anker, R., S. Barge, S. R. and. Joseph M.P. (Eds.), (1998). Economics of Child Labour 
in Hazardous Industries of India, Centre for Operations Research and Training, 
(Baroda, India). 
Ashagrie, K. (1993). Statistics on child labour: A brief report; Bulletin of Labour 
Statistics, Vol. 3, pp-11±28. 
Baland J. M. and Robinson J.A. (2000). Is Child labour Inefficient? Journal of Political 
Economy, Chicago Press, Vol. 108, No. 4, pp-663-679, August.   
Basu K. (2000). The Intriguing relation between adult minimum wage and child labour. 
The Economic journal, Vol. 110, pp. c50-c61. 
Basu K. and Van P. H. (1998). The Economics of Child Labour. The American 
Economic Review, Vol. 88, No.3, pp-412-427.  
Basu, A. K. and Chau, N. H. (2003). Targeting Child Labour in Debt Bondage: 
Evidence, Theory and Policy Implications. The World Bank Economic Review. 
Vol.17, No.2, pp. 255-281. World Bank, Washington DC. 
Basu, K. (1999). Child Labour: Cause, Consequence, and Cure, with Remarks on 
International Labour Standards. Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 37, No. 1, 
September, pp. 1083-1119. 
Basu, K. (2000). The Intriguing Relation between Adult Minimum Wage and Child 
Labour. Economic Journal, Vol. 110, No. 462, March, pp. C50-61. 
271 
 
Basu, K. (2006). Gender and Say: A Model of Household Behaviour with 
Endogenously Determined Balance of Power. Economic Journal, Vol. 116, pp-
558-580. 
Becker, G. S. (1965). A Theory of the Allocation of Time. Economic Journal, Vol. 75, 
pp- 493-517. 
Becker, G. S. (1981). A Treatise on the Family. Harvard University Press. 
Beegle K., Dehejia R. H. and Gatti R. (2005). Why Should We Care About Child 
Labour? The Education, Labour Market, and Health Consequences of Child 
Labour. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, Working Paper No. 3479, 
World Bank, Washington; D.C.   
Beegle K., Dehejia R. H. and Gatti R. (2006). Child labour and agricultural shocks. 
Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 81, pp-80± 96 
Behrman, J. (1988). Intra-Household Allocation of Nutrients in Rural India: Are Boys 
Favoured? Do Parents Exhibit Inequality Aversion? Oxford Economic Papers, 
Vol. 40, No. 1, pp-32±54. 
Behrman, J. R., Duryea, S. and Szekely, M. (1999). Schooling Investments and 
Aggregate Conditions: A Household Survey-Based Approach for Latin America 
and the Caribbean. Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department, 
Working Paper No. 407, Washington, D.C. 
Bell, C., and Gersbach H. (2000). Child Labour and the Education of a Society. IZA 
Discussion Paper No. 338, Institute for the Study of Labour, Bonn. 
Bhalotra S. (2007). Is Child Work Necessary? Oxford Bulletin of Economics and 
Statistics, Vol. 69, No. 1, pp. 29-55. 
Bhalotra, S. (2001). Child Labour: Globalisation, Social Protection and Poverty. 
Background Research Paper commissioned by the Declaration Department, ILO. 
$QLQSXWLQWRWKH'LUHFWRU*HQHUDO¶V5HSRUWRQ&KLOG/DERXU3XEOLVKHGLQ 
Bhalotra, S. (2004). Parent Altruism, Cash Transfers and Child Poverty. Paper 
Presented at the AEA/ASSA Meetings, Atlanta, January (2002), Working Paper 
04/562, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, Bristol. 
Bhalotra, S. and Heady C. (2003). Child Farm Labour: The Wealth Paradox. World 
Bank Economic Review, Vol. 17(2), pp. 197-227. 
Blunch, N., Canagarajah S. and Goyal S. (2002). Short and Long-Term Impacts of 
Economic Policies on Child Labour and Schooling in Ghana, Social Protection 
Discussion Paper No. 0212. World Bank, Washington DC. 
272 
 
Bolt V. J. and Bird, K. (2003). The Intrahousehold Disadvantages Framework: A 
Framework for the Analysis of Intra-household Difference and Inequality. 
Chronic Poverty Research Centre (CPRC) Working Paper No 32. 
Bonnet, M. (1993). Child Labour in Africa. International Labour Review, Vol. 132, No. 
3. pp. 371-389. 
Brown, D.K., Deardorff A. V. and Stern R. M. (2002). The Determinants of Child 
Labour. School of Public Policy. Presented at Research Seminar In International 
Economics, University of Michigan. Discussion Paper No. 486.  
Burki A. A. and Fasih T. (1998). +RXVHKROGV¶ 1RQ-leisure Time Allocation for 
Children and Determinants of Child Labour in Punjab, Pakistan. The Pakistan 
Development Review, Vol. 37, No. 4, Part II (Winter), pp. 899±914 
Burki, A. A. and Afaqi U. (1996). Pakistan's Informal Sector - Review of Evidence and 
Policy Issue. Pakistan's Journal of Applied Economics (Summer), Vol. XII. No. 1, 
pp. 1-30 
Burki, A. A. and Shahnaz L. (2001). The Implications of Household Level Factors for 
Children¶V7LPH8VHLQ3DNLVWDQ3DSHUSUHVHQWHGDW,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RQIHUHQFHRQ
Child Labour in South Asia, New Delhi, October 15-17, 2001. 
Cain, M. and Mozumder, A. (1980). Labour market structure, child employment and 
reproductive behaviour in rural South Asia. Population and Labour Policies 
Programme, Working Paper No. 89. Geneva, ILO. 
Chakraborty S. & Das M., (2003). Mortality, Fertility and Child Labour. University of 
Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2003-35, University of Oregon, 
USA.  
Chaudhuri M. A. and Farzana N. K. (2002). Economic and Social Determinants of 
Child Labour: A Case Study of Dera Ismail Khan, Pakistan. The Lahore Journal 
of Economics, Vol.7, No. 2, pp-15-40 
Chaudhuri S. and Gupta M. R. (2004). Child Labour and Trade Liberalization. Japanese 
Economic Review. Vol. 55, No. 2, pp. 119±220 
Chaudhuri, S., (2009). Labour Market Reform and Incidence of Child Labour in a 
Developing Economy. MPRA Paper No. 19667, Munich, Germany. 
Chen, M.A. and Dunn, E. (1996). Household Economic Portfolios, Assessing the 
Impact of Microenterprise Services (AIMS). Office of Microenterprise, USAID. 
Chenery, H., M. S. Ahluwalia, C. L. G. Bell, J. H. Duloy and R. Jolly (1974). 
Redistribution with Growth. Oxford University Press; Oxford 
273 
 
Chiappori, P. (1988). Rational Household Labour Supply, Econometrica, Vol. 56, No. 1, 
pp. 63-90. 
Chiappori, P. (1992). Collective Labour Supply and Welfare. Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 100, No. 3, Pp-437±467. 
Child Labour Survey (1996). Federal Bureau of Statistics (FBS). Islamabad, Pakistan. 
Chowdhury, O. H., Khandker S., Millimet D., and Pitt M. (2003). Credit Programs for 
the Poor and the Health Status of Children in Rural Bangladesh. International 
Economic Review, Vol. 44, No. 1, pp- 87-118. 
Cigno A., Rosati F. C and Guarcello L. (2002). Does Globalization Increase Child 
Labour? World Development, Vol. 30, No. 9, pp. 1579±1589. 
Cigno, A. And Rosati F. C. (2000). Why Do Indian Children Work, and Is It Bad For 
Them? Discussion Paper No. 115. Bonn: IZA, February. 
CPII dataset generated by Head, K., T. Mayer and J. Ries, (2010) IRU WKHSDSHU³7KH
HURVLRQ RI FRORQLDO WUDGH OLQNDJHV DIWHU LQGHSHQGHQFH´ -RXUQDO RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO
Economics, 81(1):1-14. (Formerly CEPII discussion paper # 2008-27). 
Dagdemir, O. and Acaroglu, H. (2010). The effects of globalization on child labour in 
developing countries. Business and Economic Horizons, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 37-47   
Davidson R. and Mackinnon J. G. (1985). Testing Linear and Log-Linear Regressions 
against BOX-COX Alternatives. Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 18, pp. 
499-517. 
Davies R. B. and Voy A., (2009). The effect of FDI on child labour. Journal of 
Development Economics, Vol. 88, Page No. 59±66 
Deaton, A. (1985). Panel data from time series of cross-sections. Journal of 
Econometrics, Vol. 30, No. 1-2, pp. 109-126. 
Deaton, A. (1997). The Analysis of Household Surveys: A microeconomic approach to 
Development Policy, The World Bank Publication, The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, USA 
Dehejia R. H. and Gatti R. (2002). Child Labour: The Role of Income Variability and 
Credit Constraints across Countries. National Bureau of Economic Research, 
NBER Working Paper No. 9018 
Dehejia, R. H. and Gatti, R. (2005). Child Labour: The Role of Income Variability and 
Access to Credit in a Cross Section of Countries. Economic Development and 
Cultural Change, Vol. 53, No. 4, pp. 913±932. 
274 
 
Deininger, K. and Squire L. (1996).A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality. The 
World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 565-591. 
Dessy, S., (2000). A Defence of Compulsory Measures against Child Labour. Journal of 
Development Economics, Vol. 62, No. 1, pp-261±275. 
Diamond, C. and Fayed, T. (1998). Evidence on Substitutability of Adult and Child 
Labour. The Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3, (February), pp. 62-
70. 
Dollar D. and Kraay A. (2000). Growth is good for the poor. Policy Research Working 
Paper, Paper No. 2587, The World Bank. 
Doss, C.R. (1996). Testing among Models of Intra-Household Resource Allocation. 
World Development, Vol. 24, No. 10, pp. 1597-1609. 
'XU\HD 6  &KLOGUHQ¶V $GYDQFHPHQW WKURXJK 6FKRRO LQ %UD]LO 7KH 5ROH RI
Transitory Shock to Household Income. Inter-American Development Bank, 
Office of the Chief Economist, Working Paper No. 376 (July), Washington, D.C.  
Dwibedi J. K. and Chaudhuri S., (2010). Foreign capital, return to education and child 
labour. International Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 19, pp. 278±286 
Edmonds E. V. (2009). Trade, Child Labour, and Schooling in Poor Countries. 
Dartmouth College, IZA.  Downloaded from:  
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~eedmonds/wbtrade.pdf. 
Edmonds E. V. and Pavcnik N. (2002). Does Globalization Increase Child Labour? 
Evidence from Vietnam. National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working 
Paper No. 8760 
Edmonds E. V. and Pavcnik N., (2006). International trade and child labour: Cross-
country evidence. Journal of International Economics; Vol. 68, pp. 115± 140 
Edmonds, E.V. (2003). Child Labour in South Asia. OECD Social, Employment and 
Migration Working Papers No. 5, OECD, Paris. 
EHII (Estimated Household Income Inequality Data Set) by the University of Texas 
Inequality Project (UTIP), University of Texas. 
Eichengreen B. and  Leblang  D. A. (2008); Democracy and Globalization; Economics 
& Politics, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 289-334. 
Ellis, F. (1988). Peasant Economics: Farm Households and Agrarian Development. 
Cambridge University Press. 
275 
 
Emerson, P. and Souza A. P. (2003). Is There a Child Labour Trap? Inter-Generational 
Persistence of Child Labour in Brazil. Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, Vol. 51, No. 2, pp-375±398 
Emerson, P. and Souza A. P. (2007). Child Labour, School Attendance, and 
Intrahousehold Gender Bias in Brazil. The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 
21, No. 2, pp. 301±316 
Ensing A. (2010). A Triple Burden: Young, Poor and Female Working Girls in the 
Homes and Streets of Dhaka, Bangladesh. Foundation for International Research 
on Working Children (IREWOC), Research Report, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 
Felkey, A. J. (2005). Husbands, Wives and the Peculiar Economics of Household 
Public Goods and Bads. Seminar Presentation, Brown Bag Seminar, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago, IL, US. 
Freeman R. B. and Oostendorp R. H. (2005). Occupational Wages around the World 
(OWW) Database. National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER-Data, 
Downloaded from: http://data.nber.org/oww/. 
Galasso, E. (1999). Intrahousehold Allocation and Child Labour in Indonesia. 
Manuscript, Boston College. 
Galli, R. (2001). The Economic Impact of Child Labour. International Institute for 
Labour Studies Discussion papers series No. 128. 
Ghayur S. (1996). Labour Market Issues in Pakistan: Unemployment, Working 
Conditions, and Child Labour. The Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 35 (4), 
Part II (Winter 1996), pp. 789²803. 
Gitter, S. R. and Barham B. L. (2008).Women's Power, Conditional Cash Transfers, 
and Schooling in Nicaragua. The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 22, No. 2, 
pp- 271-290. 
Godfrey, M. (1993). Labour Market Monitoring and Employment Policy in a 
Developing Economy - A Study of Indonesia. International Labour Organization 
(ILO), Geneva. 
Goetz. M. and Gupta R.S. (1996). Who Takes Credit? Gender, Power and Control over 
Loan Use in Rural Credit Programs in Bangladesh. World Development, Vol. 24, 
No. 1, pp.45Ȃ63. 
Goldin, C. (1979). Household and Market Production of Families in a Late Nineteenth 
Century American Town. Explorations in Economic History, Vol. 16, pp. 111-31. 
276 
 
Grootaert, C. and Patrinos H.A. (1999). (eds.), The Policy Analysis of Child Labour: A 
Comparative Study6W0DUWLQ¶V3UHVV1HZ<RUN 
Grootaert, C. and Kanbur R. (1995).  Child Labour: A Review. Policy Research 
Working Paper-1454, World Bank. 
Gupta, M. R (2002). Child Labour, Skill Formation and Capital Accumulation: A 
Theoretical Analysis. Keio Economic Studies, Volume 38, No. 2, pp. 23-40 (Keio 
University, Tokyo). 
Haddad, L. (1994). Strengthening Food Policy through Intra-Household Analysis. Food 
Policy, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp-347-356. 
Haddad, L., & Hoddinott, J. (1994). Women's Income and Boy-Girl Anthropometric 
Status in the Cote D'ivoire. World Development, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 543-53. 
Hai, A. A., Fatima, A. and Sadaqat, M. (2010). A case study for the fishing sector on 
Balochistan coast. International Journal of Social Economics. Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 
316-338 
Hakim, A. and Aziz A. (1998). Socio-cultural, Religious, and Political Aspects of the 
Status of Women in Pakistan. The Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 37, No. 4, 
Pp-727-746. 
Hamid, S., (1994). A Micro Analysis of Urban Child Labour: Some Determinants of 
Labour and Its Conditions. The Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 33, No. 4.  
Hart, K., (1971). Informal income opportunities and urban employment in Ghana. Paper 
presented at the conference on 'Urban unemployment in Africa', Institute of 
Development Studies, University of Sussex, Subsequently published in revised 
form in Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 1 l, March (1973). 
Hausman J. A. (1978). Specification Tests in Econometrics. Econometrica, Vol. 46, pp. 
1251-1271. 
Hazarika G. and Bedi A. S. (2003). Schooling cost and Child Work in Rural Pakistan. 
The Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 39, No. 5, pp. 29-64 
Hoddinott, J., and Haddad L. (1995). Does Female Income Share Influence Household 
([SHQGLWXUHV"(YLGHQFH IURP&RWH'¶,YRLUHOxford Bulletin of Economics and 
Statistics, Vo. 57, No. 1, pp- 77-95. 
Horan, P. M. and Hargis, P. G. (1991). Children's work and schooling in the late 
nineteenth-century family. American Sociological Review, Vol. 56, pp. 583-96.  
Hou Xi. :RPHQ¶V'HFLVLRQ0DNLQJ3RZHr and Human Development: Evidence 
from Pakistan. Policy Research Working Paper No. 5830, The World Bank. 
277 
 
Hou, Xi. (2009). Wealth: Crucial but not Sufficient Evidence from Pakistan on 
Economic Growth, Child Labour and Schooling. Policy Research Working Paper 
No. 4831. The World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
Humphries, J. (2003). Child Labour: Lessons From the Historical Experience of 
7RGD\¶V,QGXVWULDO(FRQRPLHVThe World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 17, No. 
2, pp. 175-96. World Bank, Washington DC. 
Hussain A., (1998). Child Workers in Hazardous Industries in Pakistan. The Lahore 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 2, No. 2.  
Hussain M. and Muskan K. E. (2003). Child Labour Use and Economic Growth: An 
Econometric Analysis. The World Economy; Vol. 26, No. 7, pp. 993±1017. 
Hussain, A., (1985). Child Labour in Lahore. A Survey Sponsored by Syed Engineers, 
Lahore, Pakistan. 
International Labour Organization, ILO (1996). Economically Active Population 
Estimates and projections, 1950Ǧ2010. (4th edition), Geneva.  
ILO/IPEC-SIMPOC (2007). Explaining the Demand and Supply of Child Labour: A 
Review of The Underlying Theories. Geneva. 
International Labour Organization, ILO (1998). Child Labour: Targeting the 
Intolerable. Geneva. 
International Labour Organization, ILO (2010). Global Child Labour Developments: 
Measuring Trends from 2004 to 2008. Geneva, ILO.  
Iram, U. and Fatima A. (2008). International trade, foreign direct investment and the 
phenomenon of child labour: the case of Pakistan. International Journal of Social 
Economics, Vol. 35, No. 11, pp. 809-822. 
Jacoby, H. G. and Skoufias, E. (1997). Risk, Financial Markets, and Human Capital in a 
Developing Country. Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 64, No. 3, pp. 311-335. 
Jafarey, S. and Lahiri S. (2002). Will Trade Sanctions Reduce Child Labour? The Role 
of Credit Markets. Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 68, No. 1, pp.137-
56. 
Jafri S. M. Y. and Rashid (1997). Some Dimensions of Child Labour in Pakistan. The 
Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 36, No. 1 - pp. 69²86 
Jensen P. & Nielsen H. S. (1997). Child labour or school attendance? Evidence from 
Zambia. Journal of Population Economics, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 407-424. 
Kabeer, N. (1994). Reversed Realities: Gender Hierarchies in Development Thought. 
Verso, London. 
278 
 
Kak, S., (2004). Magnitude and profile of child lDERXULQWKH¶V(YLGHQFHIURPWKH
NSS data. Social Scientist, Vol.32, No1-2, pp.45-73. 
Kanbur, R. And Haddad, L. (1994). Are Better off Households More Equal or Less 
Equal? Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 64, No. 3, pp. 595-609. 
Kar S. and Guha-Khasnobis B. (2003). Wage Determination of Child Labour and Effect 
of Trade Reform. Presented at sharing Global prosperity Conference, Presentation 
at WIDER; Helsinki, September 5-7, 2003 
Khalid U. and Shahnaz L. (2004). Socio Economic Conditions of Child Labourers in 
Pakistan: Evidence from the Labour Force Survey. The Lahore Journal of 
Economics, Vol.9, No.1, pp-85-105 
Khan R. E. A, Kahn T., and Malik A. H. (2011). Home care Children in Pakistan. 
European Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 71-83. 
Khan, O. A. and Ali K., (1991). Child Work and Family Life in Karachi. A Research 
Report for SEBCON, Karachi, Pakistan. 
Khan, R. E. A. (2001). Socioeconomic Aspects of Child Labour - A Case Study of 
Children in Auto Workshops. The Lahore Journal of Economics, Vol. 6, No.1, pp. 
93-112. 
Khan, R. E. A. (2003). Children in Different Activities: Child Schooling and Child 
Labour. Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 137-160. 
Krueger, A., (1996). Observations on International Labour Standards and Trade. 
Working Paper, Vol. 5632, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge. 
Lancaster, G., Maitra, P., and Ray, R. (2006). Endogenous Intra-household Balance of 
Power and its Impact on Expenditure Patterns: Evidence from India. Economica, 
Vol. 73, pp-435±460. 
Levy, V. (1985). Cropping Pattern, Mechanization, Child Labour and Fertility 
Behaviour in a Farming Economy: Rural Egypt. Economic Development and 
Cultural Change, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp-777-791. 
LFS (Labour Force Surveys), Federal Bureau of Statistics, Pakistan 
Li, Q. and Reuveny R. (2002). Economic Globalization and Democracy: An Empirical 
Analysis. British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 29±54. 
Lim, J. and Decker J. (2007). Democracy and Trade: An Empirical Study. MPRA 
Paper. 
279 
 
Lim. J. A. (2002). Regional Review: Child Labour. Strengthening the Role of Labour 
Standards in Selected Developing Member Countries. ADB/ILO RETA Project 
No. 5887 
Lopez-Calva, Felipe L, and Miyamoto K. (1999). Filial Obligations and Child Labour.  
Manuscript, Centro De Estudios Economicos, El Colegio De México. 
López-Córdova, J. E. and Meissner C. M. (2008). The Impact of International Trade on 
Democracy - A Long-Run Perspective. World Politics 60, 539±575. 
Lundberg, M. and Squire L. (2000). The Simultaneous Evolution of Growth and 
Inequality. Manuscript, The World Bank 
Lundberg, S., Pollak R., and Wales T. (1997). Do Husbands and Wives Pool Their 
Resources? Evidence from the United Kingdom Child Benefit. Journal of Human 
Resources, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp-463-480. 
Madala, G. S. (1992). Introduction to Econometrics, 2nd ed. New York: Macmillan. 
Maitra, P. and Ranjan R. (2006). Household expenditure patterns and resource pooling: 
evidence of changes in post-apartheid South Africa. Review of Economics of the 
Household, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp- 325-347. 
0DLWUD 3 3DQGD % 	 6DUDQJL 6  ,GOH &KLOG 7KH +RXVHKROG¶V %XIIHU
Working  Paper.  The World Bank. Downloaded from: 
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/econ/conference/gped-conference-06/papers/panda.pdf. 
Manser, M. and Brown, M. (1980). Marriage and Household Decision Making: A 
Bargaining Analysis, International Economic Review. Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 31-44. 
Maskus K (1997). Should core labour standards be imposed through international trade 
policy? World Bank Development Research Group; Policy Research Working 
Paper 1817; Washington DC: The World Bank. 
0D\HU6:KDW0RQH\&DQ¶W%X\)DPLO\,QFRPHDQG&KLOGUHQ¶V/LIH&KDQFHV"
Cambridge Mass, Harvard University Press.  
0D\RX[ /  3DUWLFLSDWRU\ /HDUQLQJ IRU :RPHQ¶V (PSRZHUPHQW LQ 0LFUR
Finance Programs: Negotiating Complexity. Conflict and Change. IDS Bulletin, 
29, pp. 39-40. 
Menon N. (2010). Investment Credit and Child Labour. Applied Economics, Vol. 42, 
No. 12, pp.1461-1479 
Moazam M., Tariq J. and Baig A. (1994). Why Children do not go to school in 
Pakistan: Some estimate and a theoretical framework. The Pakistan Development 
Review 33, Vol. 4, pp-1231-1248. 
280 
 
Moffitt, R. (1993). Identification and Estimation of Dynamic Models with a Time 
Series of Repeated Cross-Sections. Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 59, pp. 99-123. 
Moore, H.L. (1994). A Passion for Difference: Essays in Anthropology and Gender. 
Indiana University Press. 
Mosel L. and Sarkar U. (2009). Impacts of the Global Financial and Economic Crisis 
On Child Labour and Youth Employment. ILO Regional Office for Asia and 
Pacific. 
Nasir, Z. M. (2000). Earnings differential between public and private sectors in 
Pakistan. The Pakistan Development Review, 39(2), pp. 111-130. 
Neumayer E. and Soysa, I. D. (2005); Trade Openness, Foreign Direct Investment and 
Child Labour. World Development, Vol. 33, No.1, pp-43-63 
Patel A. M., Leonard W. R., Reyes-García V., Mcdade T., Huanca T., Tanner S., Vadez 
V. (2007). Parental Preference, Bargaining Power, and Child Nutritional Status: 
Evidence from the Bolivian Amazon. Tsimane' Amazonian Panel Study Working 
Paper # 31. Downloaded From: 
www.cas.northwestern.edu/anthropology/LHBR/Bolivia.html. 
PSLM (Pakistan Standard of Living Measurement Survey), Federal Bureau of Statistics, 
Pakistan. 
Quisumbing, A.R. & Maluccio, J.A. (2000). Intra-Household Allocation and Gender 
Relations: New Empirical Evidence from Four Developing Countries. Food 
Consumption and Nutrition Division (FCND), Discussion Paper No. 84, IFPRI. 
Quisumbing, A.R. (1994). Intergenerational transfers in Philippine rice villages: Gender 
differences in traditional inheritance customs. Journal of Development 
Economics, Vol. 43, No. 2, pp-167-195. 
Rafia K. (2009). Child Labour at District Level: A Case Study of Rawalpindi. Munich 
Personal RePEc Archive, MPRA Paper No. 19161, Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/19161 
Rangel, M. (2006). Alimony Rights and Intrahousehold Allocation of Resources 
Evidence from Brazil. The Economic Journal, July, pp-627-658. 
Ranjan P. (2001). Credit constraints and the phenomenon of child labour. Journal of 
Development Economics, Vol. 64, pp. 81±102 
Ranjan R.  (2000). Analysis of Child Labour in Peru and Pakistan: A Comparative 
Study. Journal of Population Economics, Vol. 13, pp. 3-19. 
281 
 
Ranjan R. (1999). Poverty, Household Size and Child Welfare in India. School of 
Economics, University of Tasmania, Hobart, Australia 
Ranjan R. (2001). Simultaneous analysis of Child Labour and Child Schooling: 
Comparative Evidence from Nepal and Pakistan. Schools of Economics, 
University of Tasmania, Australia. 
Reggio I. (2010). The influence of the mother's power on her child's labour in Mexico. 
Working Paper, 10-13, Economic Series, 05, Departamento de Economía, 
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. 
Rogers B .L. (1983). The internal dynamics of households a critical factor in 
development policy. Cited in Bolt V. J. and K. Bird, (2003). The Intrahousehold 
Disadvantages Framework: A Framework for the Analysis of Intra-household 
Difference and Inequality. Chronic Poverty Research Centre (CPRC) Working 
Paper No 32. 
Rogers, C. and Swinnerton K. (2001). Inequality, Productivity, and Child Labour: 
Theory and Evidence. Manuscript: Georgetown University. 
Rose A.K. (2004). Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade?  American 
Economic Review, Vol. 94, No. 1, pp. 98-114. 
Roushdy and Namoro (2007). Intrahousehold Resource Allocation in Egypt: Effect of 
Distribution of Power within the Household on Child Work and Schooling. 
University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, Working Papers No. 331. 
Rubalcava, L., and Thomas D. (1997). Family Bargaining and Welfare. RAND mimeo. 
Rubalcava, L., Teruel, G., & Thomas, D. (2004). Spending, Saving and Public 
Transfers Paid to Women. California Center for Population Research. On-Line 
Working Paper Series. Downloaded from: http://repositories.cdlib.org/. 
Schultz, T. P. (1990). Testing the neoclassical model of family labour supply and 
fertility. Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp-599-634. 
Schultz, T. W. (1961). Investment in Human Capital. American Economic Review. Vol. 
51, pp. 1-17. 
Sen, A. (1984). Family and Food: Sex Bias in Poverty. In A. Sen (ed.), Resources, 
Value and Development. London: Blackwell. 
Sen, A. (1990). More than 100 Million Women Are Missing. New York Review of 
Books, Vol. 37, No. 20, pp-61±66. 
Shelbourne, R., (2001). An explanation of the international variation in the prevalence 
of child labour. World Economy, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 359-78 
282 
 
Strauss, J., Thomas, D., (1995). Human Resources: Empirical Modelling of Household 
and Family Decisions, In: Behrman, J., Srinivasan, T. N., (Eds), Handbook of 
Development Economics, Vol. 3A, Elsevier Science. 
Swaminathan, M. (1998). Economic Growth and the Persistence of Child Labour: 
Evidence from an Indian City. World Development, Vol. 26, No. 8, pp. 1513-
1528. 
Swinnerton, K. and Rogers C. A. (1999). Inequality, Productivity, and Child Labour: 
Theory and Evidence. Department of Economics, Georgetown University, 
Working Papers No. gueconwpa~01-01-18, Washington, DC. 
Tanaka R. (2003). Inequality as Determinant of Child labour. Economics Letters, Vol. 
80, pp- 93-97.  
Thomas D., (1994). Like Father, like Son; Like Mother, like Daughter: Parental 
Resources and Child Height. Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp-
950-988. 
Thomas, D. (1990). Intra-Household Resource Allocation: An Inferential Approach. 
Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp-635-664. 
Thomas, D., Contreras D., and Frankenberg E. (1997). Child Health and the 
Distribution of Household Resources at Marriage. RAND mimeo. 
7RRU , $  &KLOG /DERXU¶V /LQN ZLWK /LWHUDF\ DQG 3RYHUW\ LQ 3DNLVWDQ The 
Lahore Journal of Economics, Vol.10, No. 1, pp-15-32 
UN Comtrade (United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database), United Nations 
Statistical Division. United Nations. 
Verbeek, M. (2007). Pseudo panels and repeated cross-sections; chapter in L. Mátyás 
and P. Sevestre, (eds.), The Econometrics of Panel Data: Fundamentals and 
Recent Developments in Theory and Practice, published by Springer in 2008 
(ISBN 978-3-540-75889-1). 
Verbeek, M. and F. Vella (2005). Estimating Dynamic Models from Repeated Cross-
Sections. Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 127, pp. 83-102. 
Verbeek, M., and Nijman, T. (1993). Minimum MSE estimation of a regression model 
with fixed effects from a series of cross-sections. Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 
59, No. 1-2, pp. 125-136. 
WDI (World Development Indicator), the World Bank. 
283 
 
Weiner, N. and Noman, 0. (1995). The Child and the State in India and Pakistan: Child 
Labour and Education Policies in Comparative Perspective. Karachi: Oxford 
University Press. 
Wolf, D.L. (1997). Daughters, Decisions and Domination: An Empirical and 
Conceptual Critique of Household Strategies. In Visvanathan, N. Duggan, L. 
Nisonoff, L. & Wiegersma, N. (eds.) The Women, Gender and Development 
Reader, Zed Books. 
 
 
